static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+static int crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid);
+static int idp_check_scope(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl);
static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
-const char *X509_version="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
+const char X509_version[]="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
int depth,i,ok=0;
int num;
- int (*cb)(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+ int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL;
if (ctx->cert == NULL)
{
goto end;
}
CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
- sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp);
+ (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp);
ctx->last_untrusted++;
x=xtmp;
num++;
*/
X509_free(x);
x = xtmp;
- sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
+ (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
ctx->last_untrusted=0;
}
}
ok=internal_verify(ctx);
if(!ok) goto end;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
+ /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
+ ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx);
+ if (!ok) goto end;
+ ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx);
+ if (!ok) goto end;
+#endif
+
/* If we get this far evaluate policies */
if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
#else
int i, ok=0, must_be_ca;
X509 *x;
- int (*cb)(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+ int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
int proxy_path_length = 0;
- int allow_proxy_certs = !!(ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
+ int allow_proxy_certs =
+ !!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
cb=ctx->verify_cb;
/* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
#else
int i, ok;
X509 *x;
- int (*cb)(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+ int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
cb=ctx->verify_cb;
/* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */
i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
return 1;
}
-/* Lookup CRLs from the supplied list. Look for matching isser name
- * and validity. If we can't find a valid CRL return the last one
- * with matching name. This gives more meaningful error codes. Otherwise
- * we'd get a CRL not found error if a CRL existed with matching name but
- * was invalid.
+/* Based on a set of possible CRLs decide which one is best suited
+ * to handle the current certificate. This is determined by a number
+ * of criteria. If any of the "must" criteria is not satisfied then
+ * the candidate CRL is rejected. If all "must" and all "should" are
+ * satisfied the CRL is accepted. If no CRL satisfies all criteria then
+ * a "best CRL" is used to provide some meaningful error information.
+ *
+ * CRL issuer name must match "nm" if not NULL.
+ * If IDP is present:
+ * a. it must be consistent.
+ * b. onlyuser, onlyCA, onlyAA should match certificate being checked.
+ * c. indirectCRL must be FALSE.
+ * d. onlysomereason must be absent.
+ * e. if name present a DP in certificate CRLDP must match.
+ * If AKID present it should match certificate AKID.
+ * Check time should fall between lastUpdate and nextUpdate.
*/
+/* IDP name field matches CRLDP or IDP name not present */
+#define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 4
+/* AKID present and matches cert, or AKID not present */
+#define CRL_SCORE_AKID 2
+/* times OK */
+#define CRL_SCORE_TIME 1
+
+#define CRL_SCORE_ALL 7
+
+/* IDP flags which cause a CRL to be rejected */
+
+#define IDP_REJECT (IDP_INVALID|IDP_INDIRECT|IDP_REASONS)
+
static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl,
X509_NAME *nm, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
{
- int i;
+ int i, crl_score, best_score = -1;
X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
{
+ crl_score = 0;
crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
- if (X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl)))
+ if (nm && X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl)))
continue;
if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
+ crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
+
+ if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_PRESENT)
+ {
+ if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REJECT)
+ continue;
+ if (idp_check_scope(ctx->current_cert, crl))
+ crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
+ }
+ else
+ crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
+
+ if (crl->akid)
+ {
+ if (crl_akid_check(ctx, crl->akid))
+ crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
+ }
+ else
+ crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
+
+ if (crl_score == CRL_SCORE_ALL)
{
*pcrl = crl;
- CRYPTO_add(&crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+ CRYPTO_add(&crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
return 1;
}
- best_crl = crl;
+
+ if (crl_score > best_score)
+ {
+ best_crl = crl;
+ best_score = crl_score;
+ }
}
if (best_crl)
{
return 0;
}
-/* Retrieve CRL corresponding to certificate: currently just a
- * subject lookup: maybe use AKID later...
+static int crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid)
+ {
+ int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
+ if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
+ cidx++;
+ if (X509_check_akid(sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx), akid) == X509_V_OK)
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+
+/* Check IDP name matches at least one CRLDP name */
+
+static int idp_check_scope(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl)
+ {
+ int i, j, k;
+ GENERAL_NAMES *inames, *dnames;
+ if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
+ return 0;
+ if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA)
+ {
+ if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!crl->idp->distpoint)
+ return 1;
+ if (crl->idp->distpoint->type != 0)
+ return 1;
+ if (!x->crldp)
+ return 0;
+ inames = crl->idp->distpoint->name.fullname;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(inames); i++)
+ {
+ GENERAL_NAME *igen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(inames, i);
+ for (j = 0; j < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); j++)
+ {
+ DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, j);
+ /* We don't handle these at present */
+ if (dp->reasons || dp->CRLissuer)
+ continue;
+ if (!dp->distpoint || (dp->distpoint->type != 0))
+ continue;
+ dnames = dp->distpoint->name.fullname;
+ for (k = 0; k < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dnames); k++)
+ {
+ GENERAL_NAME *cgen =
+ sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dnames, k);
+ if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(igen, cgen))
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+/* Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. Currently only
+ * one CRL is retrieved. Multiple CRLs may be needed if we handle
+ * CRLs partitioned on reason code later.
*/
+
static int get_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509 *x)
{
int ok;
X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
- X509_OBJECT xobj;
+ STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
X509_NAME *nm;
nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, nm, ctx->crls);
return 1;
}
- ok = X509_STORE_get_by_subject(ctx, X509_LU_CRL, nm, &xobj);
+ /* Lookup CRLs from store */
- if (!ok)
+ skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
+
+ /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
+ if (!skcrl)
{
- /* If we got a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
if (crl)
{
*pcrl = crl;
return 0;
}
- *pcrl = xobj.data.crl;
+ get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, NULL, skcrl);
+
+ sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
+
+ /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
if (crl)
- X509_CRL_free(crl);
- return 1;
+ {
+ *pcrl = crl;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
}
/* Check CRL validity */
if(!ok) goto err;
}
+ if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_PRESENT)
+ {
+ if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
+ {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ if(!ok) goto err;
+ }
+ if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_REASONS|IDP_INDIRECT))
+ {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION_FEATURE;
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ if(!ok) goto err;
+ }
+ if (!idp_check_scope(ctx->current_cert, crl))
+ {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ if(!ok) goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
/* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
}
}
- if (!check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1))
+ ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
+ if (!ok)
goto err;
ok = 1;
/* Check certificate against CRL */
static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
{
- int idx, ok;
- X509_REVOKED rtmp;
- STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts;
- X509_EXTENSION *ext;
- /* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL */
- rtmp.serialNumber = X509_get_serialNumber(x);
- /* Sort revoked into serial number order if not already sorted.
- * Do this under a lock to avoid race condition.
- */
- if (!sk_X509_REVOKED_is_sorted(crl->crl->revoked))
- {
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
- sk_X509_REVOKED_sort(crl->crl->revoked);
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
- }
- idx = sk_X509_REVOKED_find(crl->crl->revoked, &rtmp);
- /* If found assume revoked: want something cleverer than
+ int ok;
+ /* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL
+ * If found assume revoked: want something cleverer than
* this to handle entry extensions in V2 CRLs.
*/
- if(idx >= 0)
+ if (X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(crl, NULL, X509_get_serialNumber(x)) > 0)
{
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
- if (!ok) return 0;
+ if (!ok)
+ return 0;
}
- if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
- return 1;
-
- /* See if we have any critical CRL extensions: since we
- * currently don't handle any CRL extensions the CRL must be
- * rejected.
- * This code accesses the X509_CRL structure directly: applications
- * shouldn't do this.
- */
-
- exts = crl->crl->extensions;
-
- for (idx = 0; idx < sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); idx++)
+ if (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)
{
- ext = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, idx);
- if (ext->critical > 0)
- {
- ctx->error =
- X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
- ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
- if(!ok) return 0;
- break;
- }
+ if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
+ return 1;
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ if(!ok)
+ return 0;
}
+
return 1;
}
ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
if (ret == 0)
{
- X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
/* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
int ok=0,n;
X509 *xs,*xi;
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
- int (*cb)(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+ int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
cb=ctx->verify_cb;
xs->valid = 1;
- if (!check_cert_time(ctx, xs))
+ ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
+ if (!ok)
goto end;
/* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
return ok;
}
-int X509_cmp_current_time(ASN1_TIME *ctm)
+int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
{
return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
}
-int X509_cmp_time(ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
+int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
{
char *str;
ASN1_TIME atm;
offset=0;
else
{
- if ((*str != '+') && (str[5] != '-'))
+ if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
return 0;
offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60;
offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0');
else
ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
+ if (store && store->lookup_certs)
+ ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
+ else
+ ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs;
+
+ if (store && store->lookup_crls)
+ ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
+ else
+ ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls;
+
ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
if (ctx->cleanup) ctx->cleanup(ctx);
- X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
- if (ctx->tree)
+ if (ctx->param != NULL)
+ {
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
+ ctx->param=NULL;
+ }
+ if (ctx->tree != NULL)
+ {
X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
+ ctx->tree=NULL;
+ }
if (ctx->chain != NULL)
{
sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain,X509_free);
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff