#include <stdio.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <errno.h>
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include "cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include <openssl/lhash.h>
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/asn1.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e);
+static int check_chain_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
const char *X509_version="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
-static STACK *x509_store_ctx_method=NULL;
+static STACK_OF(CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS) *x509_store_ctx_method=NULL;
static int x509_store_ctx_num=0;
#if 0
static int x509_store_num=1;
* present and that the first entry is in place */
if (ctx->chain == NULL)
{
- if ( ((ctx->chain=sk_new_null()) == NULL) ||
- (!sk_push(ctx->chain,(char *)ctx->cert)))
+ if ( ((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
+ (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert)))
{
X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto end;
ctx->last_untrusted=1;
}
- /* We use a temporary so we can chop and hack at it */
+ /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
&& (sktmp=sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL)
{
goto end;
}
- num=sk_num(ctx->chain);
- x=(X509 *)sk_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
+ num=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
+ x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
depth=ctx->depth;
for (;;)
{
/* If we have enough, we break */
- if (depth < num) break;
+ if (depth < num) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
+ * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
+ * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error
+ * code later.
+ */
/* If we are self signed, we break */
xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
xtmp=X509_find_by_subject(sktmp,xn);
if (xtmp != NULL)
{
- if (!sk_push(ctx->chain,(char *)xtmp))
+ if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,xtmp))
{
X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto end;
* certificates. We now need to add at least one trusted one,
* if possible, otherwise we complain. */
- i=sk_num(ctx->chain);
- x=(X509 *)sk_value(ctx->chain,i-1);
- if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x),X509_get_issuer_name(x))
+ i=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
+ x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,i-1);
+ xn = X509_get_subject_name(x);
+ if (X509_NAME_cmp(xn,X509_get_issuer_name(x))
== 0)
{
/* we have a self signed certificate */
- if (sk_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
+ if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
{
- ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
- ctx->current_cert=x;
- ctx->error_depth=i-1;
- ok=cb(0,ctx);
- if (!ok) goto end;
+ /* We have a single self signed certificate: see if
+ * we can find it in the store. We must have an exact
+ * match to avoid possible impersonation.
+ */
+ ok=X509_STORE_get_by_subject(ctx,X509_LU_X509,xn,&obj);
+ if ((ok != X509_LU_X509) || X509_cmp(x, obj.data.x509))
+ {
+ ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
+ ctx->current_cert=x;
+ ctx->error_depth=i-1;
+ if(ok == X509_LU_X509) X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj);
+ ok=cb(0,ctx);
+ if (!ok) goto end;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* We have a match: replace certificate with store version
+ * so we get any trust settings.
+ */
+ X509_free(x);
+ x = obj.data.x509;
+ sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
+ ctx->last_untrusted=0;
+ }
}
else
{
/* worry more about this one elsewhere */
- chain_ss=(X509 *)sk_pop(ctx->chain);
+ chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
ctx->last_untrusted--;
num--;
- x=(X509 *)sk_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
+ x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
}
}
break;
}
x=obj.data.x509;
- if (!sk_push(ctx->chain,(char *)obj.data.x509))
+ if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,obj.data.x509))
{
X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj);
X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
else
{
- sk_push(ctx->chain,(char *)chain_ss);
+ sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,chain_ss);
num++;
ctx->last_untrusted=num;
ctx->current_cert=chain_ss;
if (!ok) goto end;
}
+ /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
+ if(ctx->purpose > 0) ok = check_chain_purpose(ctx);
+
+ if(!ok) goto end;
+
+ /* The chain extensions are OK: check trust */
+
+ if(ctx->trust > 0) ok = check_trust(ctx);
+
+ if(!ok) goto end;
+
/* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
return(ok);
}
+/* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency
+ * with the supplied purpose
+ */
+
+static int check_chain_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+#ifdef NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
+ return 1;
+#else
+ int i, ok=0;
+ X509 *x;
+ int (*cb)();
+ cb=ctx->ctx->verify_cb;
+ if (cb == NULL) cb=null_callback;
+ /* Check all untrusted certificates */
+ for(i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++) {
+ x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
+ if(!X509_check_purpose(x, ctx->purpose, i)) {
+ if(i) ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
+ else ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
+ ctx->error_depth = i;
+ ctx->current_cert = x;
+ ok=cb(0,ctx);
+ if(!ok) goto end;
+ }
+ /* Check pathlen */
+ if((i > 1) && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
+ && (i > (x->ex_pathlen + 1))) {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
+ ctx->error_depth = i;
+ ctx->current_cert = x;
+ ok=cb(0,ctx);
+ if(!ok) goto end;
+ }
+ }
+ ok = 1;
+ end:
+ return(ok);
+#endif
+}
+
+static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+#ifdef NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
+ return 1;
+#else
+ int i, ok;
+ X509 *x;
+ int (*cb)();
+ cb=ctx->ctx->verify_cb;
+ if (cb == NULL) cb=null_callback;
+/* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */
+ i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
+ x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
+ ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->trust, 0);
+ if(ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED) return 1;
+ ctx->error_depth = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
+ ctx->current_cert = x;
+ if(ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
+ else ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED;
+ ok = cb(0, ctx);
+ return(ok);
+#endif
+}
+
static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
int i,ok=0,n;
cb=ctx->ctx->verify_cb;
if (cb == NULL) cb=null_callback;
- n=sk_num(ctx->chain);
+ n=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
ctx->error_depth=n-1;
n--;
- xi=(X509 *)sk_value(ctx->chain,n);
+ xi=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(xi),
X509_get_issuer_name(xi)) == 0)
xs=xi;
{
n--;
ctx->error_depth=n;
- xs=(X509 *)sk_value(ctx->chain,n);
+ xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
}
}
if (n >= 0)
{
xi=xs;
- xs=(X509 *)sk_value(ctx->chain,n);
+ xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
}
}
ok=1;
atm.length=sizeof(buff2);
atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2;
- X509_gmtime_adj(&atm,-offset);
+ X509_gmtime_adj(&atm,-offset*60);
i=(buff1[0]-'0')*10+(buff1[1]-'0');
if (i < 50) i+=100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
return(ASN1_UTCTIME_set(s,t));
}
-int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK *chain)
+int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
{
EVP_PKEY *ktmp=NULL,*ktmp2;
int i,j;
if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return(1);
- for (i=0; i<sk_num(chain); i++)
+ for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
{
- ktmp=X509_get_pubkey((X509 *)sk_value(chain,i));
+ ktmp=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,i));
if (ktmp == NULL)
{
X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
/* first, populate the other certs */
for (j=i-1; j >= 0; j--)
{
- ktmp2=X509_get_pubkey((X509 *)sk_value(chain,j));
+ ktmp2=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,j));
EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2,ktmp);
EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2);
}
X509_OBJECT_up_ref_count(obj);
- r=(X509_OBJECT *)lh_insert(ctx->certs,(char *)obj);
+ r=(X509_OBJECT *)lh_insert(ctx->certs,obj);
if (r != NULL)
{ /* oops, put it back */
- lh_delete(ctx->certs,(char *)obj);
+ lh_delete(ctx->certs,obj);
X509_OBJECT_free_contents(obj);
Free(obj);
- lh_insert(ctx->certs,(char *)r);
+ lh_insert(ctx->certs,r);
X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_ADD_CERT,X509_R_CERT_ALREADY_IN_HASH_TABLE);
ret=0;
}
X509_OBJECT_up_ref_count(obj);
- r=(X509_OBJECT *)lh_insert(ctx->certs,(char *)obj);
+ r=(X509_OBJECT *)lh_insert(ctx->certs,obj);
if (r != NULL)
{ /* oops, put it back */
- lh_delete(ctx->certs,(char *)obj);
+ lh_delete(ctx->certs,obj);
X509_OBJECT_free_contents(obj);
Free(obj);
- lh_insert(ctx->certs,(char *)r);
+ lh_insert(ctx->certs,r);
X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_ADD_CRL,X509_R_CERT_ALREADY_IN_HASH_TABLE);
ret=0;
}
return(ret);
}
-int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, char *argp, int (*new_func)(),
- int (*dup_func)(), void (*free_func)())
+int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
+ CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
{
x509_store_ctx_num++;
return(CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(x509_store_ctx_num-1,
return(ctx->current_cert);
}
-STACK *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
return(ctx->chain);
}
+STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+ {
+ int i;
+ X509 *x;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
+ if(!ctx->chain || !(chain = sk_X509_dup(ctx->chain))) return NULL;
+ for(i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
+ x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
+ CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+ }
+ return(chain);
+ }
+
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
{
ctx->cert=x;
ctx->untrusted=sk;
}
+int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
+ {
+ return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
+ }
+
+int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
+ {
+ return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
+ }
+
+/* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust
+ * values. This is intended to be used when another structure has its
+ * own trust and purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by
+ * the ctx. If they aren't set then we will usually have a default
+ * purpose in mind which should then be used to set the trust value.
+ * An example of this is SSL use: an SSL structure will have its own
+ * purpose and trust settings which the application can set: if they
+ * aren't set then we use the default of SSL client/server.
+ */
+
+int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
+ int purpose, int trust)
+{
+ int idx;
+ /* If purpose not set use default */
+ if(!purpose) purpose = def_purpose;
+ /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
+ if(purpose) {
+ idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
+ if(idx == -1) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
+ X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
+ if(!trust) {
+ X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
+ ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
+ trust = ptmp->trust;
+ }
+ }
+ if(trust) {
+ idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
+ if(idx == -1) {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
+ X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if(purpose) ctx->purpose = purpose;
+ if(trust) ctx->trust = trust;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+
IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509)
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)
+
IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME)
+
IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff