static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
const char *X509_version="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
-static STACK_OF(CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS) *x509_store_ctx_method=NULL;
-static int x509_store_ctx_num=0;
-
static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
{
}
cb=ctx->verify_cb;
- if (cb == NULL) cb=null_callback;
/* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is
* present and that the first entry is in place */
ctx->error = ret;
ctx->current_cert = x;
ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
- if (ctx->verify_cb)
- return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
return 0;
}
X509 *x;
int (*cb)();
cb=ctx->verify_cb;
- if (cb == NULL) cb=null_callback;
/* Check all untrusted certificates */
for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++)
{
x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
+ if (!(ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
+ && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
+ {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
+ ctx->error_depth = i;
+ ctx->current_cert = x;
+ ok=cb(0,ctx);
+ if (!ok) goto end;
+ }
if (!X509_check_purpose(x, ctx->purpose, i))
{
if (i)
X509 *x;
int (*cb)();
cb=ctx->verify_cb;
- if (cb == NULL) cb=null_callback;
/* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */
i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
if (!(ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
return 1;
if (ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
- last = 0;
- else
last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
+ else
+ last = 0;
for(i = 0; i <= last; i++)
{
ctx->error_depth = i;
if(!ok)
{
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
- if (ctx->verify_cb)
- ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
goto err;
}
ctx->current_crl = crl;
if(!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer))
{
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
- if(ctx->verify_cb)
- ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
if(!ok) goto err;
}
}
if(!ikey)
{
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
- if(ctx->verify_cb)
- ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
if (!ok) goto err;
}
else
if(X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0)
{
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
- if(ctx->verify_cb)
- ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
if (!ok) goto err;
}
}
if (i == 0)
{
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
- ok= 0;
- if(ctx->verify_cb)
- ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
if (!ok) goto err;
}
if (i > 0)
{
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
- ok= 0;
- if(ctx->verify_cb)
- ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
if (!ok) goto err;
}
if (i == 0)
{
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
- ok= 0;
- if(ctx->verify_cb)
- ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
if (!ok) goto err;
}
if (i < 0)
{
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
- ok= 0;
- if(ctx->verify_cb)
- ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
if (!ok) goto err;
}
}
* this to handle entry extensions in V2 CRLs.
*/
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
- if (ctx->verify_cb)
- ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
return ok;
}
int (*cb)();
cb=ctx->verify_cb;
- if (cb == NULL) cb=null_callback;
n=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
ctx->error_depth=n-1;
ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
if (!ok) goto end;
}
- if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0)
+ else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0)
/* XXX For the final trusted self-signed cert,
* this is a waste of time. That check should
* optional so that e.g. 'openssl x509' can be
if (!ok) goto end;
}
- /* CRL CHECK */
-
/* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
ctx->current_cert=xs;
ok=(*cb)(1,ctx);
{
char *str;
ASN1_TIME atm;
- time_t offset;
+ long offset;
char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p;
int i,j;
CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
{
/* This function is (usually) called only once, by
- * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c).
- * That function uses locking, so we don't (usually)
- * have to worry about locking here. For the whole cruel
- * truth, see crypto/ex_data.c */
- x509_store_ctx_num++;
- return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(x509_store_ctx_num-1,
- &x509_store_ctx_method,
- argl,argp,new_func,dup_func,free_func);
+ * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */
+ return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp,
+ new_func, dup_func, free_func);
}
int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
}
}
- if (purpose) ctx->purpose = purpose;
- if (trust) ctx->trust = trust;
+ if (purpose && !ctx->purpose) ctx->purpose = purpose;
+ if (trust && !ctx->trust) ctx->trust = trust;
return 1;
}
{
X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
- if (ctx) memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
+ if (!ctx)
+ {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
return ctx;
}
OPENSSL_free(ctx);
}
-void X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
+int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
{
ctx->ctx=store;
ctx->cert=x509;
ctx->untrusted=chain;
ctx->last_untrusted=0;
- ctx->purpose=0;
- ctx->trust=0;
ctx->check_time=0;
- ctx->flags=0;
ctx->other_ctx=NULL;
ctx->valid=0;
ctx->chain=NULL;
ctx->error_depth=0;
ctx->current_cert=NULL;
ctx->current_issuer=NULL;
- ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
- ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
- ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
- ctx->verify = store->verify;
- ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
- ctx->get_crl = get_crl;
- ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
- ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
- ctx->cleanup = 0;
- memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
+
+ /* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set
+ * use defaults.
+ */
+
+
+ if (store)
+ {
+ ctx->purpose=store->purpose;
+ ctx->trust=store->trust;
+ ctx->flags = store->flags;
+ ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ ctx->purpose = 0;
+ ctx->trust = 0;
+ ctx->flags = 0;
+ ctx->cleanup = 0;
+ }
+
+ if (store && store->check_issued)
+ ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
+ else
+ ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
+
+ if (store && store->get_issuer)
+ ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
+ else
+ ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
+
+ if (store && store->verify_cb)
+ ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
+ else
+ ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
+
+ if (store && store->verify)
+ ctx->verify = store->verify;
+ else
+ ctx->verify = internal_verify;
+
+ if (store && store->check_revocation)
+ ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
+ else
+ ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
+
+ if (store && store->get_crl)
+ ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
+ else
+ ctx->get_crl = get_crl;
+
+ if (store && store->check_crl)
+ ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
+ else
+ ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
+
+ if (store && store->cert_crl)
+ ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
+ else
+ ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
+
+
+ /* This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As
+ * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a
+ * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation. */
+ /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */
+ if(!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
+ &(ctx->ex_data)))
+ {
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
}
/* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates.
sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain,X509_free);
ctx->chain=NULL;
}
- CRYPTO_free_ex_data(x509_store_ctx_method,ctx,&(ctx->ex_data));
+ CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
memset(&ctx->ex_data,0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
}
ctx->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME;
}
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
+ int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
+ {
+ ctx->verify_cb=verify_cb;
+ }
+
IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509)
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff