-/* x509_trs.c */
/*
* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project
* 1999.
*/
#include <stdio.h>
-#include "cryptlib.h"
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include "internal/x509_int.h"
static int tr_cmp(const X509_TRUST *const *a, const X509_TRUST *const *b);
static void trtable_free(X509_TRUST *p);
{
X509_TRUST *pt;
int idx;
- if (id == -1)
- return 1;
+
/* We get this as a default value */
- if (id == 0) {
- int rv;
- rv = obj_trust(NID_anyExtendedKeyUsage, x, 0);
- if (rv != X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED)
- return rv;
- return trust_compat(NULL, x, 0);
- }
+ if (id == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT)
+ return obj_trust(NID_anyExtendedKeyUsage, x,
+ flags | X509_TRUST_DO_SS_COMPAT);
idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(id);
if (idx == -1)
return default_trust(id, x, flags);
idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(id);
/* Need a new entry */
if (idx == -1) {
- if (!(trtmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_TRUST)))) {
+ if ((trtmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*trtmp))) == NULL) {
X509err(X509_F_X509_TRUST_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
if (trtmp->flags & X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC_NAME)
OPENSSL_free(trtmp->name);
/* dup supplied name */
- if (!(trtmp->name = BUF_strdup(name))) {
+ if ((trtmp->name = OPENSSL_strdup(name)) == NULL) {
X509err(X509_F_X509_TRUST_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
/* If its a new entry manage the dynamic table */
if (idx == -1) {
- if (!trtable && !(trtable = sk_X509_TRUST_new(tr_cmp))) {
+ if (trtable == NULL
+ && (trtable = sk_X509_TRUST_new(tr_cmp)) == NULL) {
X509err(X509_F_X509_TRUST_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
static int trust_1oidany(X509_TRUST *trust, X509 *x, int flags)
{
- if (x->aux && (x->aux->trust || x->aux->reject))
- return obj_trust(trust->arg1, x, flags);
/*
- * we don't have any trust settings: for compatibility we return trusted
- * if it is self signed
+ * Declare the chain verified if the desired trust OID is not rejected in
+ * any auxiliary trust info for this certificate, and the OID is either
+ * expressly trusted, or else either "anyEKU" is trusted, or the
+ * certificate is self-signed.
*/
- return trust_compat(trust, x, flags);
+ flags |= X509_TRUST_DO_SS_COMPAT | X509_TRUST_OK_ANY_EKU;
+ return obj_trust(trust->arg1, x, flags);
}
static int trust_1oid(X509_TRUST *trust, X509 *x, int flags)
{
- if (x->aux)
- return obj_trust(trust->arg1, x, flags);
- return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
+ /*
+ * Declare the chain verified only if the desired trust OID is not
+ * rejected and is expressly trusted. Neither "anyEKU" nor "compat"
+ * trust in self-signed certificates apply.
+ */
+ flags &= ~(X509_TRUST_DO_SS_COMPAT | X509_TRUST_OK_ANY_EKU);
+ return obj_trust(trust->arg1, x, flags);
}
static int trust_compat(X509_TRUST *trust, X509 *x, int flags)
{
+ /* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */
X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
- if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS)
+ if ((flags & X509_TRUST_NO_SS_COMPAT) == 0 && x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS)
return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
else
return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
static int obj_trust(int id, X509 *x, int flags)
{
- ASN1_OBJECT *obj;
+ X509_CERT_AUX *ax = x->aux;
int i;
- X509_CERT_AUX *ax;
- ax = x->aux;
- if (!ax)
- return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
- if (ax->reject) {
+
+ if (ax && ax->reject) {
for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(ax->reject); i++) {
- obj = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(ax->reject, i);
- if (OBJ_obj2nid(obj) == id)
+ ASN1_OBJECT *obj = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(ax->reject, i);
+ int nid = OBJ_obj2nid(obj);
+
+ if (nid == id || (nid == NID_anyExtendedKeyUsage &&
+ (flags & X509_TRUST_OK_ANY_EKU)))
return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
}
}
- if (ax->trust) {
+
+ if (ax && ax->trust) {
for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(ax->trust); i++) {
- obj = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(ax->trust, i);
- if (OBJ_obj2nid(obj) == id)
+ ASN1_OBJECT *obj = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(ax->trust, i);
+ int nid = OBJ_obj2nid(obj);
+
+ if (nid == id || (nid == NID_anyExtendedKeyUsage &&
+ (flags & X509_TRUST_OK_ANY_EKU)))
return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
}
+ /*
+ * Reject when explicit trust EKU are set and none match.
+ *
+ * Returning untrusted is enough for for full chains that end in
+ * self-signed roots, because when explicit trust is specified it
+ * suppresses the default blanket trust of self-signed objects.
+ *
+ * But for partial chains, this is not enough, because absent a similar
+ * trust-self-signed policy, non matching EKUs are indistinguishable
+ * from lack of EKU constraints.
+ *
+ * Therefore, failure to match any trusted purpose must trigger an
+ * explicit reject.
+ */
+ return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
}
- return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
+
+ if ((flags & X509_TRUST_DO_SS_COMPAT) == 0)
+ return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
+
+ /*
+ * Not rejected, and there is no list of accepted uses, try compat.
+ */
+ return trust_compat(NULL, x, flags);
}