-/* crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c */
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
return (NULL);
}
-EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x)
+EVP_PKEY *X509_get0_pubkey(X509 *x)
{
if (x == NULL)
- return (NULL);
- return (X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info.key));
+ return NULL;
+ return X509_PUBKEY_get0(x->cert_info.key);
}
-ASN1_BIT_STRING *X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(const X509 *x)
+EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x)
{
- if (!x)
+ if (x == NULL)
return NULL;
- return x->cert_info.key->public_key;
+ return X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info.key);
}
int X509_check_private_key(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *k)
EVP_PKEY *xk;
int ret;
- xk = X509_get_pubkey(x);
+ xk = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
if (xk)
ret = EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k);
case -2:
X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE);
}
- EVP_PKEY_free(xk);
if (ret > 0)
return 1;
return 0;
{
const EC_GROUP *grp = NULL;
int curve_nid;
- if (pkey && pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
- grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(pkey->pkey.ec);
+ if (pkey && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC)
+ grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
if (!grp)
return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM;
curve_nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
unsigned long flags)
{
int rv, i, sign_nid;
- EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL;
- unsigned long tflags;
+ EVP_PKEY *pk;
+ unsigned long tflags = flags;
+
if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
return X509_V_OK;
- tflags = flags;
+
/* If no EE certificate passed in must be first in chain */
if (x == NULL) {
x = sk_X509_value(chain, 0);
} else
i = 0;
+ pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
+
+ /*
+ * With DANE-EE(3) success, or DANE-EE(3)/PKIX-EE(1) failure we don't build
+ * a chain all, just report trust success or failure, but must also report
+ * Suite-B errors if applicable. This is indicated via a NULL chain
+ * pointer. All we need to do is check the leaf key algorithm.
+ */
+ if (chain == NULL)
+ return check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags);
+
if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) {
rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
/* Correct error depth */
goto end;
}
- pk = X509_get_pubkey(x);
/* Check EE key only */
rv = check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags);
if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
goto end;
}
- EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
- pk = X509_get_pubkey(x);
+ pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
rv = check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &tflags);
if (rv != X509_V_OK)
goto end;
/* Final check: root CA signature */
rv = check_suite_b(pk, X509_get_signature_nid(x), &tflags);
end:
- EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
/* Invalid signature or LOS errors are for previous cert */
if ((rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
i--;
/*
* If we have LOS error and flags changed then we are signing P-384
- * with P-256. Use more meaninggul error.
+ * with P-256. Use more meaningful error.
*/
if (rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED && flags != tflags)
rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256;