Unless we cast, thorough compilers will complain

[openssl.git] / crypto / x509 / x509_cmp.c

diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c b/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c
index 6213ec2f8d90acc7a66b80285fbb4032d6c02a28..b147d573d2f9613788a66f11ef2e3bd11d1eed0c 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c
@@ -61,15 +61,16 @@
 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
 #include <openssl/objects.h>
 #include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
 
-int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(X509 *a, X509 *b)
+int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
        {
        int i;
        X509_CINF *ai,*bi;
 
        ai=a->cert_info;
        bi=b->cert_info;
-       i=ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(ai->serialNumber,bi->serialNumber);
+       i=M_ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(ai->serialNumber,bi->serialNumber);
        if (i) return(i);
        return(X509_NAME_cmp(ai->issuer,bi->issuer));
        }
@@ -96,17 +97,17 @@ unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a)
        }
 #endif
        
-int X509_issuer_name_cmp(X509 *a, X509 *b)
+int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
        {
        return(X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->issuer,b->cert_info->issuer));
        }
 
-int X509_subject_name_cmp(X509 *a, X509 *b)
+int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
        {
        return(X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->subject,b->cert_info->subject));
        }
 
-int X509_CRL_cmp(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b)
+int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
        {
        return(X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl->issuer,b->crl->issuer));
        }
@@ -136,7 +137,27 @@ unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x)
        return(X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->subject));
        }
 
-int X509_NAME_cmp(X509_NAME *a, X509_NAME *b)
+#ifndef NO_SHA
+/* Compare two certificates: they must be identical for
+ * this to work. NB: Although "cmp" operations are generally
+ * prototyped to take "const" arguments (eg. for use in
+ * STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these operations may
+ * involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring
+ * certain cert information is cached. So this is the point
+ * where the "depth-first" constification tree has to halt
+ * with an evil cast.
+ */
+int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
+{
+       /* ensure hash is valid */
+       X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0);
+       X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0);
+
+       return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+}
+#endif
+
+int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b)
        {
        int i,j;
        X509_NAME_ENTRY *na,*nb;
@@ -173,7 +194,7 @@ int X509_NAME_cmp(X509_NAME *a, X509_NAME *b)
 
 #ifndef NO_MD5
 /* I now DER encode the name and hash it.  Since I cache the DER encoding,
- * this is reasonably effiecent. */
+ * this is reasonably efficient. */
 unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x)
        {
        unsigned long ret=0;
@@ -183,14 +204,14 @@ unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x)
 
        i=i2d_X509_NAME(x,NULL);
        if (i > sizeof(str))
-               p=Malloc(i);
+               p=OPENSSL_malloc(i);
        else
                p=str;
 
        pp=p;
        i2d_X509_NAME(x,&pp);
        MD5((unsigned char *)p,i,&(md[0]));
-       if (p != str) Free(p);
+       if (p != str) OPENSSL_free(p);
 
        ret=(   ((unsigned long)md[0]     )|((unsigned long)md[1]<<8L)|
                ((unsigned long)md[2]<<16L)|((unsigned long)md[3]<<24L)