New function X509_get0_pubkey

[openssl.git] / crypto / x509 / x509_cmp.c

diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c b/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c
index 4017545b64167c66e10470cc573047f63cada822..9d9ea4b6050d396f36ae268bd5ae85d256d18207 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c
@@ -82,28 +82,29 @@ int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
 unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a)
 {
     unsigned long ret = 0;
-    EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
+    EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
     unsigned char md[16];
     char *f;
 
-    EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        goto err;
     f = X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info.issuer, NULL, 0);
-    if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL))
+    if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL))
         goto err;
-    if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, (unsigned char *)f, strlen(f)))
+    if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, (unsigned char *)f, strlen(f)))
         goto err;
     OPENSSL_free(f);
     if (!EVP_DigestUpdate
-        (&ctx, (unsigned char *)a->cert_info.serialNumber.data,
+        (ctx, (unsigned char *)a->cert_info.serialNumber.data,
          (unsigned long)a->cert_info.serialNumber.length))
         goto err;
-    if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, &(md[0]), NULL))
+    if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, &(md[0]), NULL))
         goto err;
     ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
            ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
         ) & 0xffffffffL;
  err:
-    EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
     return (ret);
 }
 #endif
@@ -248,21 +249,23 @@ unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x)
 
 unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME *x)
 {
-    EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
+    EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
     unsigned long ret = 0;
     unsigned char md[16];
 
+    if (md_ctx == NULL)
+        return ret;
+
     /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
     i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL);
-    EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
-    EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
-    if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL)
-        && EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length)
-        && EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL))
+    EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
+    if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(md_ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL)
+        && EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length)
+        && EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL))
         ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
                ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
             ) & 0xffffffffL;
-    EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
 
     return (ret);
 }
@@ -302,11 +305,18 @@ X509 *X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name)
     return (NULL);
 }
 
+EVP_PKEY *X509_get0_pubkey(X509 *x)
+{
+    if (x == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    return X509_PUBKEY_get0(x->cert_info.key);
+}
+
 EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x)
 {
     if (x == NULL)
-        return (NULL);
-    return (X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info.key));
+        return NULL;
+    return X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info.key);
 }
 
 ASN1_BIT_STRING *X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(const X509 *x)
@@ -321,7 +331,7 @@ int X509_check_private_key(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *k)
     EVP_PKEY *xk;
     int ret;
 
-    xk = X509_get_pubkey(x);
+    xk = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
 
     if (xk)
         ret = EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k);
@@ -340,7 +350,6 @@ int X509_check_private_key(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *k)
     case -2:
         X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE);
     }
-    EVP_PKEY_free(xk);
     if (ret > 0)
         return 1;
     return 0;
@@ -408,7 +417,7 @@ int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
         goto end;
     }
 
-    pk = X509_get_pubkey(x);
+    pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
     /* Check EE key only */
     rv = check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags);
     if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
@@ -423,7 +432,6 @@ int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
             rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
             goto end;
         }
-        EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
         pk = X509_get_pubkey(x);
         rv = check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &tflags);
         if (rv != X509_V_OK)
@@ -433,7 +441,6 @@ int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
     /* Final check: root CA signature */
     rv = check_suite_b(pk, X509_get_signature_nid(x), &tflags);
  end:
-    EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
     if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
         /* Invalid signature or LOS errors are for previous cert */
         if ((rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM