/* crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1997 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* This package is an SSL implementation written
*/
#include <stdio.h>
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
#include "cryptlib.h"
-#include "asn1.h"
-#include "objects.h"
-#include "x509.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
-int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(a,b)
-X509 *a;
-X509 *b;
+int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
{
int i;
X509_CINF *ai,*bi;
ai=a->cert_info;
bi=b->cert_info;
- i=ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(ai->serialNumber,bi->serialNumber);
+ i=M_ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(ai->serialNumber,bi->serialNumber);
if (i) return(i);
return(X509_NAME_cmp(ai->issuer,bi->issuer));
}
-#ifndef NO_MD5
-unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(a)
-X509 *a;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a)
{
unsigned long ret=0;
- MD5_CTX ctx;
+ EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
unsigned char md[16];
- char str[256];
-
- X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info->issuer,str,256);
- ret=strlen(str);
- MD5_Init(&ctx);
- MD5_Update(&ctx,(unsigned char *)str,ret);
- MD5_Update(&ctx,(unsigned char *)a->cert_info->serialNumber->data,
- (unsigned long)a->cert_info->serialNumber->length);
- MD5_Final(&(md[0]),&ctx);
+ char *f;
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
+ f=X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info->issuer,NULL,0);
+ if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL))
+ goto err;
+ if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,(unsigned char *)f,strlen(f)))
+ goto err;
+ OPENSSL_free(f);
+ if(!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,(unsigned char *)a->cert_info->serialNumber->data,
+ (unsigned long)a->cert_info->serialNumber->length))
+ goto err;
+ if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,&(md[0]),NULL))
+ goto err;
ret=( ((unsigned long)md[0] )|((unsigned long)md[1]<<8L)|
((unsigned long)md[2]<<16L)|((unsigned long)md[3]<<24L)
)&0xffffffffL;
+ err:
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
return(ret);
}
#endif
-int X509_issuer_name_cmp(a, b)
-X509 *a;
-X509 *b;
+int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
{
return(X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->issuer,b->cert_info->issuer));
}
-int X509_subject_name_cmp(a, b)
-X509 *a;
-X509 *b;
+int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
{
return(X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->subject,b->cert_info->subject));
}
-int X509_CRL_cmp(a, b)
-X509_CRL *a;
-X509_CRL *b;
+int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
{
return(X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl->issuer,b->crl->issuer));
}
-X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(a)
-X509 *a;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
+int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
+ {
+ return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, 20);
+ }
+#endif
+
+X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(X509 *a)
{
return(a->cert_info->issuer);
}
-unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash(x)
-X509 *x;
+unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x)
{
return(X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->issuer));
}
-X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(a)
-X509 *a;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
+ {
+ return(X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->issuer));
+ }
+#endif
+
+X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(X509 *a)
{
return(a->cert_info->subject);
}
-ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get_serialNumber(a)
-X509 *a;
+ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a)
{
return(a->cert_info->serialNumber);
}
-unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash(x)
-X509 *x;
+unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x)
{
return(X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->subject));
}
-int X509_NAME_cmp(a, b)
-X509_NAME *a;
-X509_NAME *b;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
{
- int i,j;
- X509_NAME_ENTRY *na,*nb;
+ return(X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->subject));
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
+/* Compare two certificates: they must be identical for
+ * this to work. NB: Although "cmp" operations are generally
+ * prototyped to take "const" arguments (eg. for use in
+ * STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these operations may
+ * involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring
+ * certain cert information is cached. So this is the point
+ * where the "depth-first" constification tree has to halt
+ * with an evil cast.
+ */
+int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
+{
+ int rv;
+ /* ensure hash is valid */
+ X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0);
+ X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0);
- if (sk_num(a->entries) != sk_num(b->entries))
- return(sk_num(a->entries)-sk_num(b->entries));
- for (i=sk_num(a->entries)-1; i>=0; i--)
+ rv = memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ if (rv)
+ return rv;
+ /* Check for match against stored encoding too */
+ if (!a->cert_info->enc.modified && !b->cert_info->enc.modified)
{
- na=(X509_NAME_ENTRY *)sk_value(a->entries,i);
- nb=(X509_NAME_ENTRY *)sk_value(b->entries,i);
- j=na->value->length-nb->value->length;
- if (j) return(j);
- j=memcmp(na->value->data,nb->value->data,
- na->value->length);
- if (j) return(j);
- j=na->set-nb->set;
- if (j) return(j);
+ rv = (int)(a->cert_info->enc.len - b->cert_info->enc.len);
+ if (rv)
+ return rv;
+ return memcmp(a->cert_info->enc.enc, b->cert_info->enc.enc,
+ a->cert_info->enc.len);
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+#endif
+
+
+int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b)
+ {
+ int ret;
+
+ /* Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date */
+
+ if (!a->canon_enc || a->modified)
+ {
+ ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, NULL);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return -2;
}
- /* We will check the object types after checking the values
- * since the values will more often be different than the object
- * types. */
- for (i=sk_num(a->entries)-1; i>=0; i--)
+ if (!b->canon_enc || b->modified)
{
- na=(X509_NAME_ENTRY *)sk_value(a->entries,i);
- nb=(X509_NAME_ENTRY *)sk_value(b->entries,i);
- j=OBJ_cmp(na->object,nb->object);
- if (j) return(j);
+ ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, NULL);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return -2;
}
- return(0);
+
+ ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen;
+
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ return memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen);
+
}
-#ifndef NO_MD5
-/* I should do a DER encoding of the name and then hash it. */
-unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(x)
-X509_NAME *x;
+unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x)
{
unsigned long ret=0;
- unsigned char md[16];
- char str[256];
+ unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+
+ /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
+ i2d_X509_NAME(x,NULL);
+ if (!EVP_Digest(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md, NULL, EVP_sha1(),
+ NULL))
+ return 0;
- X509_NAME_oneline(x,str,256);
- ret=strlen(str);
- MD5((unsigned char *)str,ret,&(md[0]));
ret=( ((unsigned long)md[0] )|((unsigned long)md[1]<<8L)|
((unsigned long)md[2]<<16L)|((unsigned long)md[3]<<24L)
)&0xffffffffL;
return(ret);
}
+
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+/* I now DER encode the name and hash it. Since I cache the DER encoding,
+ * this is reasonably efficient. */
+
+unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME *x)
+ {
+ EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
+ unsigned long ret=0;
+ unsigned char md[16];
+
+ /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
+ i2d_X509_NAME(x,NULL);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
+ if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL)
+ && EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length)
+ && EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,md,NULL))
+ ret=(((unsigned long)md[0] )|((unsigned long)md[1]<<8L)|
+ ((unsigned long)md[2]<<16L)|((unsigned long)md[3]<<24L)
+ )&0xffffffffL;
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+
+ return(ret);
+ }
#endif
/* Search a stack of X509 for a match */
-X509 *X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(sk,name,serial)
-STACK *sk;
-X509_NAME *name;
-ASN1_INTEGER *serial;
+X509 *X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name,
+ ASN1_INTEGER *serial)
{
int i;
X509_CINF cinf;
X509 x,*x509=NULL;
+ if(!sk) return NULL;
+
x.cert_info= &cinf;
cinf.serialNumber=serial;
cinf.issuer=name;
- for (i=0; i<sk_num(sk); i++)
+ for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
{
- x509=(X509 *)sk_value(sk,i);
+ x509=sk_X509_value(sk,i);
if (X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(x509,&x) == 0)
return(x509);
}
- return(x509);
+ return(NULL);
}
-X509 *X509_find_by_subject(sk,name)
-STACK *sk;
-X509_NAME *name;
+X509 *X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name)
{
X509 *x509;
int i;
- for (i=0; i<sk_num(sk); i++)
+ for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
{
- x509=(X509 *)sk_value(sk,i);
+ x509=sk_X509_value(sk,i);
if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509),name) == 0)
return(x509);
}
return(NULL);
}
+EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x)
+ {
+ if ((x == NULL) || (x->cert_info == NULL))
+ return(NULL);
+ return(X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info->key));
+ }
+
+ASN1_BIT_STRING *X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(const X509 *x)
+ {
+ if(!x) return NULL;
+ return x->cert_info->key->public_key;
+ }
+
+
+int X509_check_private_key(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *k)
+ {
+ EVP_PKEY *xk;
+ int ret;
+
+ xk=X509_get_pubkey(x);
+
+ if (xk)
+ ret = EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k);
+ else
+ ret = -2;
+
+ switch (ret)
+ {
+ case 1:
+ break;
+ case 0:
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH);
+ break;
+ case -1:
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH);
+ break;
+ case -2:
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE);
+ }
+ if (xk)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(xk);
+ if (ret > 0)
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+/* Check a suite B algorithm is permitted: pass in a public key and
+ * the NID of its signature (or 0 if no signature). The pflags is
+ * a pointer to a flags field which must contain the suite B verification
+ * flags.
+ */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+
+static int check_suite_b(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int sign_nid, unsigned long *pflags)
+ {
+ const EC_GROUP *grp = NULL;
+ int curve_nid;
+ if (pkey && pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
+ grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(pkey->pkey.ec);
+ if (!grp)
+ return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM;
+ curve_nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
+ /* Check curve is consistent with LOS */
+ if (curve_nid == NID_secp384r1) /* P-384 */
+ {
+ /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with
+ * curve.
+ */
+ if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384)
+ return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
+ if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS))
+ return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED;
+ /* If we encounter P-384 we cannot use P-256 later */
+ *pflags &= ~X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY;
+ }
+ else if (curve_nid == NID_X9_62_prime256v1) /* P-256 */
+ {
+ if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
+ return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
+ if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY))
+ return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED;
+ }
+ else
+ return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE;
+
+ return X509_V_OK;
+ }
+
+int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
+ unsigned long flags)
+ {
+ int rv, i, sign_nid;
+ EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL;
+ unsigned long tflags;
+ if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
+ return X509_V_OK;
+ tflags = flags;
+ /* If no EE certificate passed in must be first in chain */
+ if (x == NULL)
+ {
+ x = sk_X509_value(chain, 0);
+ i = 1;
+ }
+ else
+ i = 0;
+
+ if (X509_get_version(x) != 2)
+ {
+ rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
+ /* Correct error depth */
+ i = 0;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ pk = X509_get_pubkey(x);
+ /* Check EE key only */
+ rv = check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags);
+ if (rv != X509_V_OK)
+ {
+ /* Correct error depth */
+ i = 0;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ for(; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
+ {
+ sign_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
+ x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
+ if (X509_get_version(x) != 2)
+ {
+ rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
+ pk = X509_get_pubkey(x);
+ rv = check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &tflags);
+ if (rv != X509_V_OK)
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ /* Final check: root CA signature */
+ rv = check_suite_b(pk, X509_get_signature_nid(x), &tflags);
+ end:
+ if (pk)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
+ if (rv != X509_V_OK)
+ {
+ /* Invalid signature or LOS errors are for previous cert */
+ if ((rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
+ || rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED) && i)
+ i--;
+ /* If we have LOS error and flags changed then we are signing
+ * P-384 with P-256. Use more meaninggul error.
+ */
+ if (rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED && flags != tflags)
+ rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256;
+ if (perror_depth)
+ *perror_depth = i;
+ }
+ return rv;
+ }
+
+int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags)
+ {
+ int sign_nid;
+ if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
+ return X509_V_OK;
+ sign_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(crl->crl->sig_alg->algorithm);
+ return check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &flags);
+ }
+
+#else
+int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
+ unsigned long flags)
+ {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags)
+ {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+#endif
+/* Not strictly speaking an "up_ref" as a STACK doesn't have a reference
+ * count but it has the same effect by duping the STACK and upping the ref
+ * of each X509 structure.
+ */
+STACK_OF(X509) *X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
+ {
+ STACK_OF(X509) *ret;
+ int i;
+ ret = sk_X509_dup(chain);
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ret); i++)
+ {
+ X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ret, i);
+ CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+ }
+ return ret;
+ }
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff