/*
- * Copyright 1999-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1999-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
#include <openssl/x509_vfy.h>
#include "crypto/x509.h"
#include "internal/tsan_assist.h"
-
-static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x);
+#include "x509_local.h"
static int check_ssl_ca(const X509 *x);
static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
int idx;
const X509_PURPOSE *pt;
- x509v3_cache_extensions(x);
+ if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(x))
+ return -1;
/* Return if side-effect only call */
if (id == -1)
return 0;
}
-static void setup_dp(X509 *x, DIST_POINT *dp)
+/* return 1 on success, 0 if x is invalid, -1 on (internal) error */
+static int setup_dp(const X509 *x, DIST_POINT *dp)
{
- X509_NAME *iname = NULL;
+ const X509_NAME *iname = NULL;
int i;
- if (dp->reasons) {
+
+ if (dp->distpoint == NULL && sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer) <= 0) {
+ X509err(0, X509_R_INVALID_DISTPOINT);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (dp->reasons != NULL) {
if (dp->reasons->length > 0)
dp->dp_reasons = dp->reasons->data[0];
if (dp->reasons->length > 1)
dp->dp_reasons |= (dp->reasons->data[1] << 8);
dp->dp_reasons &= CRLDP_ALL_REASONS;
- } else
+ } else {
dp->dp_reasons = CRLDP_ALL_REASONS;
- if (!dp->distpoint || (dp->distpoint->type != 1))
- return;
+ }
+ if (dp->distpoint == NULL || dp->distpoint->type != 1)
+ return 1;
+
+ /* handle name fragment given by nameRelativeToCRLIssuer */
+ /*
+ * Note that the below way of determining iname is not really compliant
+ * with https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.13
+ * According to it, sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer) MUST be <= 1
+ * and any CRLissuer could be of type different to GEN_DIRNAME.
+ */
for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) {
GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
+
if (gen->type == GEN_DIRNAME) {
iname = gen->d.directoryName;
break;
}
}
- if (!iname)
+ if (iname == NULL)
iname = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
+ return DIST_POINT_set_dpname(dp->distpoint, iname) ? 1 : -1;
+}
- DIST_POINT_set_dpname(dp->distpoint, iname);
+/* return 1 on success, 0 if x is invalid, -1 on (internal) error */
+static int setup_crldp(X509 *x)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ x->crldp = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_crl_distribution_points, &i, NULL);
+ if (x->crldp == NULL && i != -1)
+ return 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) {
+ int res = setup_dp(x, sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i));
+
+ if (res < 1)
+ return res;
+ }
+ return 1;
}
-static void setup_crldp(X509 *x)
+/* Check that issuer public key algorithm matches subject signature algorithm */
+static int check_sig_alg_match(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, const X509 *subject)
{
- int i;
- x->crldp = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_crl_distribution_points, NULL, NULL);
- for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++)
- setup_dp(x, sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i));
+ int pkey_nid;
+
+ if (pkey == NULL)
+ return X509_V_ERR_NO_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
+ if (OBJ_find_sigid_algs(OBJ_obj2nid(subject->cert_info.signature.algorithm),
+ NULL, &pkey_nid) == 0)
+ return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
+ if (EVP_PKEY_type(pkey_nid) != EVP_PKEY_base_id(pkey))
+ return X509_V_ERR_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH;
+ return X509_V_OK;
}
#define V1_ROOT (EXFLAG_V1|EXFLAG_SS)
#define ns_reject(x, usage) \
(((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) && !((x)->ex_nscert & (usage)))
-static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x)
+/*
+ * Cache info on various X.509v3 extensions and further derived information,
+ * e.g., if cert 'x' is self-issued, in x->ex_flags and other internal fields.
+ * X509_SIG_INFO_VALID is set in x->flags if x->siginf was filled successfully.
+ * Set EXFLAG_INVALID and return 0 in case the certificate is invalid.
+ */
+int x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x)
{
BASIC_CONSTRAINTS *bs;
PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION *pci;
ASN1_BIT_STRING *usage;
ASN1_BIT_STRING *ns;
EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE *extusage;
- X509_EXTENSION *ex;
int i;
+ int res;
#ifdef tsan_ld_acq
/* fast lock-free check, see end of the function for details. */
if (tsan_ld_acq((TSAN_QUALIFIER int *)&x->ex_cached))
- return;
+ return (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID) == 0;
#endif
CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(x->lock);
- if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET) {
+ if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET) { /* cert has already been processed */
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(x->lock);
- return;
+ return (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID) == 0;
}
+ ERR_set_mark();
+
+ /* Cache the SHA1 digest of the cert */
+ if (!X509_digest(x, EVP_sha1(), x->sha1_hash, NULL))
+ /*
+ * Note that the cert is marked invalid also on internal malloc failure
+ * or on failure of EVP_MD_fetch(), potentially called by X509_digest().
+ */
+ x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
- X509_digest(x, EVP_sha1(), x->sha1_hash, NULL);
/* V1 should mean no extensions ... */
- if (!X509_get_version(x))
+ if (X509_get_version(x) == 0)
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_V1;
+
/* Handle basic constraints */
- if ((bs = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_basic_constraints, NULL, NULL))) {
+ x->ex_pathlen = -1;
+ if ((bs = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_basic_constraints, &i, NULL)) != NULL) {
if (bs->ca)
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CA;
- if (bs->pathlen) {
- if ((bs->pathlen->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER)
- || !bs->ca) {
+ if (bs->pathlen != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * the error case !bs->ca is checked by check_chain_extensions()
+ * in case ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT
+ */
+ if (bs->pathlen->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER) {
+ X509err(0, X509V3_R_NEGATIVE_PATHLEN);
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
- x->ex_pathlen = 0;
- } else
+ } else {
x->ex_pathlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(bs->pathlen);
- } else
- x->ex_pathlen = -1;
+ }
+ }
BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_free(bs);
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_BCONS;
+ } else if (i != -1) {
+ x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
}
+
/* Handle proxy certificates */
- if ((pci = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_proxyCertInfo, NULL, NULL))) {
+ if ((pci = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_proxyCertInfo, &i, NULL)) != NULL) {
if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA
|| X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_subject_alt_name, -1) >= 0
|| X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_issuer_alt_name, -1) >= 0) {
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
}
- if (pci->pcPathLengthConstraint) {
+ if (pci->pcPathLengthConstraint != NULL)
x->ex_pcpathlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(pci->pcPathLengthConstraint);
- } else
+ else
x->ex_pcpathlen = -1;
PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION_free(pci);
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_PROXY;
+ } else if (i != -1) {
+ x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
}
- /* Handle key usage */
- if ((usage = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_key_usage, NULL, NULL))) {
+
+ /* Handle (basic) key usage */
+ if ((usage = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_key_usage, &i, NULL)) != NULL) {
+ x->ex_kusage = 0;
if (usage->length > 0) {
x->ex_kusage = usage->data[0];
if (usage->length > 1)
x->ex_kusage |= usage->data[1] << 8;
- } else
- x->ex_kusage = 0;
+ }
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_KUSAGE;
ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(usage);
+ /* Check for empty key usage according to RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.3 */
+ if (x->ex_kusage == 0) {
+ X509err(0, X509V3_R_EMPTY_KEY_USAGE);
+ x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
+ }
+ } else if (i != -1) {
+ x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
}
+
+ /* Handle extended key usage */
x->ex_xkusage = 0;
- if ((extusage = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_ext_key_usage, NULL, NULL))) {
+ if ((extusage = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_ext_key_usage, &i, NULL)) != NULL) {
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_XKUSAGE;
for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(extusage); i++) {
switch (OBJ_obj2nid(sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(extusage, i))) {
case NID_server_auth:
x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SSL_SERVER;
break;
-
case NID_client_auth:
x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SSL_CLIENT;
break;
-
case NID_email_protect:
x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SMIME;
break;
-
case NID_code_sign:
x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_CODE_SIGN;
break;
-
case NID_ms_sgc:
case NID_ns_sgc:
x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SGC;
break;
-
case NID_OCSP_sign:
x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_OCSP_SIGN;
break;
-
case NID_time_stamp:
x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_TIMESTAMP;
break;
-
case NID_dvcs:
x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_DVCS;
break;
-
case NID_anyExtendedKeyUsage:
x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_ANYEKU;
break;
+ default:
+ /* ignore unknown extended key usage */
+ break;
}
}
sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(extusage, ASN1_OBJECT_free);
+ } else if (i != -1) {
+ x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
}
- if ((ns = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_netscape_cert_type, NULL, NULL))) {
+ /* Handle legacy Netscape extension */
+ if ((ns = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_netscape_cert_type, &i, NULL)) != NULL) {
if (ns->length > 0)
x->ex_nscert = ns->data[0];
else
x->ex_nscert = 0;
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_NSCERT;
ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(ns);
+ } else if (i != -1) {
+ x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
}
- x->skid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_key_identifier, NULL, NULL);
- x->akid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_authority_key_identifier, NULL, NULL);
- /* Does subject name match issuer ? */
- if (!X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x), X509_get_issuer_name(x))) {
- x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SI;
- /* If SKID matches AKID also indicate self signed */
- if (X509_check_akid(x, x->akid) == X509_V_OK &&
- !ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN))
- x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SS;
+
+ /* Handle subject key identifier and issuer/authority key identifier */
+ x->skid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_key_identifier, &i, NULL);
+ if (x->skid == NULL && i != -1)
+ x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
+
+ x->akid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_authority_key_identifier, &i, NULL);
+ if (x->akid == NULL && i != -1)
+ x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
+
+ /* Check if subject name matches issuer */
+ if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x), X509_get_issuer_name(x)) == 0) {
+ x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SI; /* cert is self-issued */
+ if (X509_check_akid(x, x->akid) == X509_V_OK /* SKID matches AKID */
+ /* .. and the signature alg matches the PUBKEY alg: */
+ && check_sig_alg_match(X509_get0_pubkey(x), x) == X509_V_OK)
+ x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SS; /* indicate self-signed */
+ /* This is very related to x509_likely_issued(x, x) == X509_V_OK */
}
- x->altname = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL);
+
+ /* Handle subject alternative names and various other extensions */
+ x->altname = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_alt_name, &i, NULL);
+ if (x->altname == NULL && i != -1)
+ x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
x->nc = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_name_constraints, &i, NULL);
- if (!x->nc && (i != -1))
+ if (x->nc == NULL && i != -1)
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
- setup_crldp(x);
+
+ /* Handle CRL distribution point entries */
+ res = setup_crldp(x);
+ if (res == 0)
+ x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
+ else if (res < 0)
+ goto err;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
- x->rfc3779_addr = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_sbgp_ipAddrBlock, NULL, NULL);
- x->rfc3779_asid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_sbgp_autonomousSysNum,
- NULL, NULL);
+ x->rfc3779_addr = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_sbgp_ipAddrBlock, &i, NULL);
+ if (x->rfc3779_addr == NULL && i != -1)
+ x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
+ x->rfc3779_asid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_sbgp_autonomousSysNum, &i, NULL);
+ if (x->rfc3779_asid == NULL && i != -1)
+ x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
#endif
for (i = 0; i < X509_get_ext_count(x); i++) {
- ex = X509_get_ext(x, i);
- if (OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex))
- == NID_freshest_crl)
+ X509_EXTENSION *ex = X509_get_ext(x, i);
+ int nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex));
+
+ if (nid == NID_freshest_crl)
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_FRESHEST;
if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ex))
continue;
x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CRITICAL;
break;
}
+ switch (nid) {
+ case NID_basic_constraints:
+ x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_BCONS_CRITICAL;
+ break;
+ case NID_authority_key_identifier:
+ x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_AKID_CRITICAL;
+ break;
+ case NID_subject_key_identifier:
+ x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SKID_CRITICAL;
+ break;
+ case NID_subject_alt_name:
+ x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SAN_CRITICAL;
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
}
- x509_init_sig_info(x);
- x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SET;
+
+ /* Set x->siginf, ignoring errors due to unsupported algos */
+ (void)x509_init_sig_info(x);
+
+ x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SET; /* indicate that cert has been processed */
#ifdef tsan_st_rel
tsan_st_rel((TSAN_QUALIFIER int *)&x->ex_cached, 1);
/*
* all stores are visible on all processors. Hence the release fence.
*/
#endif
+ ERR_pop_to_mark();
+ if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID) == 0) {
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(x->lock);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ X509err(0, X509V3_R_INVALID_CERTIFICATE);
+
+ err:
+ x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SET; /* indicate that cert has been processed */
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(x->lock);
+ return 0;
}
/*-
* return codes:
* 0 not a CA
* 1 is a CA
- * 2 basicConstraints absent so "maybe" a CA
- * 3 basicConstraints absent but self signed V1.
+ * 2 Only possible in older versions of openSSL when basicConstraints are absent
+ * new versions will not return this value. May be a CA
+ * 3 basicConstraints absent but self-signed V1.
* 4 basicConstraints absent but keyUsage present and keyCertSign asserted.
+ * 5 Netscape specific CA Flags present
*/
static int check_ca(const X509 *x)
int X509_check_ca(X509 *x)
{
- x509v3_cache_extensions(x);
+ /* Note 0 normally means "not a CA" - but in this case means error. */
+ if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(x))
+ return 0;
return check_ca(x);
}
}
/*-
- * Various checks to see if one certificate issued the second.
- * This can be used to prune a set of possible issuer certificates
- * which have been looked up using some simple method such as by
- * subject name.
+ * Various checks to see if one certificate potentially issued the second.
+ * This can be used to prune a set of possible issuer certificates which
+ * have been looked up using some simple method such as by subject name.
* These are:
* 1. Check issuer_name(subject) == subject_name(issuer)
* 2. If akid(subject) exists, check that it matches issuer
* 3. Check that issuer public key algorithm matches subject signature algorithm
- * 4. If key_usage(issuer) exists, check that it supports certificate signing
- * returns 0 for OK, positive for reason for mismatch, reasons match
- * codes for X509_verify_cert()
+ * 4. Check that any key_usage(issuer) allows certificate signing
+ * Note that this does not include actually checking the signature.
+ * Returns 0 for OK, or positive for reason for mismatch
+ * where reason codes match those for X509_verify_cert().
*/
-
int X509_check_issued(X509 *issuer, X509 *subject)
{
- if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(issuer),
- X509_get_issuer_name(subject)))
- return X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH;
+ int ret;
- x509v3_cache_extensions(issuer);
- x509v3_cache_extensions(subject);
+ if ((ret = x509_likely_issued(issuer, subject)) != X509_V_OK)
+ return ret;
+ return x509_signing_allowed(issuer, subject);
+}
- if (subject->akid) {
- int ret = X509_check_akid(issuer, subject->akid);
- if (ret != X509_V_OK)
- return ret;
- }
+/* do the checks 1., 2., and 3. as described above for X509_check_issued() */
+int x509_likely_issued(X509 *issuer, X509 *subject)
+{
+ int ret;
- {
- /*
- * Check if the subject signature algorithm matches the issuer's PUBKEY
- * algorithm
- */
- EVP_PKEY *i_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(issuer);
- X509_ALGOR *s_algor = &subject->cert_info.signature;
- int s_pknid = NID_undef, s_mdnid = NID_undef;
+ if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(issuer),
+ X509_get_issuer_name(subject)) != 0)
+ return X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH;
- if (i_pkey == NULL)
- return X509_V_ERR_NO_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
+ /* set issuer->skid and subject->akid */
+ if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(issuer)
+ || !x509v3_cache_extensions(subject))
+ return X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
- if (!OBJ_find_sigid_algs(OBJ_obj2nid(s_algor->algorithm),
- &s_mdnid, &s_pknid)
- || EVP_PKEY_type(s_pknid) != EVP_PKEY_base_id(i_pkey))
- return X509_V_ERR_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH;
- }
+ ret = X509_check_akid(issuer, subject->akid);
+ if (ret != X509_V_OK)
+ return ret;
+ /* check if the subject signature alg matches the issuer's PUBKEY alg */
+ return check_sig_alg_match(X509_get0_pubkey(issuer), subject);
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Check if certificate I<issuer> is allowed to issue certificate I<subject>
+ * according to the B<keyUsage> field of I<issuer> if present
+ * depending on any proxyCertInfo extension of I<subject>.
+ * Returns 0 for OK, or positive for reason for rejection
+ * where reason codes match those for X509_verify_cert().
+ */
+int x509_signing_allowed(const X509 *issuer, const X509 *subject)
+{
if (subject->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
if (ku_reject(issuer, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE))
return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE;
return X509_V_OK;
}
-int X509_check_akid(X509 *issuer, AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid)
+int X509_check_akid(const X509 *issuer, const AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid)
{
-
- if (!akid)
+ if (akid == NULL)
return X509_V_OK;
/* Check key ids (if present) */
return X509_V_ERR_AKID_SKID_MISMATCH;
/* Check serial number */
if (akid->serial &&
- ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(X509_get_serialNumber(issuer), akid->serial))
+ ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(X509_get0_serialNumber(issuer), akid->serial))
return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH;
/* Check issuer name */
if (akid->issuer) {
break;
}
}
- if (nm && X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_get_issuer_name(issuer)))
+ if (nm != NULL && X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_get_issuer_name(issuer)) != 0)
return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH;
}
return X509_V_OK;
uint32_t X509_get_key_usage(X509 *x)
{
/* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */
- X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1);
+ if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1) != 1)
+ return 0;
if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE)
return x->ex_kusage;
return UINT32_MAX;
uint32_t X509_get_extended_key_usage(X509 *x)
{
/* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */
- X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1);
+ if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1) != 1)
+ return 0;
if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE)
return x->ex_xkusage;
return UINT32_MAX;
const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *X509_get0_subject_key_id(X509 *x)
{
/* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */
- X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1);
+ if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1) != 1)
+ return NULL;
return x->skid;
}
const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *X509_get0_authority_key_id(X509 *x)
{
/* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */
- X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1);
+ if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1) != 1)
+ return NULL;
return (x->akid != NULL ? x->akid->keyid : NULL);
}
const GENERAL_NAMES *X509_get0_authority_issuer(X509 *x)
{
/* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */
- X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1);
+ if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1) != 1)
+ return NULL;
return (x->akid != NULL ? x->akid->issuer : NULL);
}
const ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get0_authority_serial(X509 *x)
{
/* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */
- X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1);
+ if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1) != 1)
+ return NULL;
return (x->akid != NULL ? x->akid->serial : NULL);
}
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff