-/* crypto/ts/ts_resp_verify.c */
/*
* Written by Zoltan Glozik (zglozik@stones.com) for the OpenSSL project
* 2002.
#include <openssl/pkcs7.h>
#include "ts_lcl.h"
-/* Private function declarations. */
-
static int ts_verify_cert(X509_STORE *store, STACK_OF(X509) *untrusted,
X509 *signer, STACK_OF(X509) **chain);
static int ts_check_signing_certs(PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si,
static int ts_find_name(STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *gen_names,
GENERAL_NAME *name);
+/*
+ * This must be large enough to hold all values in ts_status_text (with
+ * comma separator) or all text fields in ts_failure_info (also with comma).
+ */
+#define TS_STATUS_BUF_SIZE 256
+
/*
* Local mapping between response codes and descriptions.
- * Don't forget to change TS_STATUS_BUF_SIZE when modifying
- * the elements of this array.
*/
-static const char *ts_status_text[] = { "granted",
+static const char *ts_status_text[] = {
+ "granted",
"grantedWithMods",
"rejection",
"waiting",
#define TS_STATUS_TEXT_SIZE OSSL_NELEM(ts_status_text)
-/*
- * This must be greater or equal to the sum of the strings in TS_status_text
- * plus the number of its elements.
- */
-#define TS_STATUS_BUF_SIZE 256
-
static struct {
int code;
const char *text;
{TS_INFO_SYSTEM_FAILURE, "systemFailure"}
};
-#define TS_FAILURE_INFO_SIZE OSSL_NELEM(ts_failure_info)
-
-/* Functions for verifying a signed TS_TST_INFO structure. */
/*-
* This function carries out the following tasks:
TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_VERIFY_SIGNATURE, TS_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER);
goto err;
}
-
- /* Check for the correct content type */
if (!PKCS7_type_is_signed(token)) {
TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_VERIFY_SIGNATURE, TS_R_WRONG_CONTENT_TYPE);
goto err;
}
-
- /* Check if there is one and only one signer. */
sinfos = PKCS7_get_signer_info(token);
if (!sinfos || sk_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_num(sinfos) != 1) {
TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_VERIFY_SIGNATURE, TS_R_THERE_MUST_BE_ONE_SIGNER);
goto err;
}
si = sk_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_value(sinfos, 0);
-
- /* Check for no content: no data to verify signature. */
if (PKCS7_get_detached(token)) {
TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_VERIFY_SIGNATURE, TS_R_NO_CONTENT);
goto err;
goto err;
signer = sk_X509_value(signers, 0);
- /* Now verify the certificate. */
if (!ts_verify_cert(store, certs, signer, &chain))
goto err;
-
- /*
- * Check if the signer certificate is consistent with the ESS extension.
- */
if (!ts_check_signing_certs(si, chain))
goto err;
-
- /* Creating the message digest. */
p7bio = PKCS7_dataInit(token, NULL);
/* We now have to 'read' from p7bio to calculate digests etc. */
- while ((i = BIO_read(p7bio, buf, sizeof(buf))) > 0) ;
+ while ((i = BIO_read(p7bio, buf, sizeof(buf))) > 0)
+ continue;
- /* Verifying the signature. */
j = PKCS7_signatureVerify(p7bio, token, si, signer);
if (j <= 0) {
TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_VERIFY_SIGNATURE, TS_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
- /* Return the signer certificate if needed. */
if (signer_out) {
*signer_out = signer;
X509_up_ref(signer);
}
-
ret = 1;
err:
int i;
int ret = 1;
- /* chain is an out argument. */
*chain = NULL;
- X509_STORE_CTX_init(&cert_ctx, store, signer, untrusted);
+ if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&cert_ctx, store, signer, untrusted))
+ return 0;
X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(&cert_ctx, X509_PURPOSE_TIMESTAMP_SIGN);
i = X509_verify_cert(&cert_ctx);
if (i <= 0) {
X509_verify_cert_error_string(j));
ret = 0;
} else {
- /* Get a copy of the certificate chain. */
*chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(&cert_ctx);
}
if (!ss)
goto err;
cert_ids = ss->cert_ids;
- /* The signer certificate must be the first in cert_ids. */
cert = sk_X509_value(chain, 0);
if (ts_find_cert(cert_ids, cert) != 0)
goto err;
* certificate ids in cert_ids.
*/
if (sk_ESS_CERT_ID_num(cert_ids) > 1) {
- /* All the certificates of the chain must be in cert_ids. */
for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(chain); ++i) {
cert = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
if (ts_find_cert(cert_ids, cert) < 0)
static int ts_find_cert(STACK_OF(ESS_CERT_ID) *cert_ids, X509 *cert)
{
int i;
+ unsigned char cert_sha1[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
if (!cert_ids || !cert)
return -1;
+ X509_digest(cert, EVP_sha1(), cert_sha1, NULL);
+
/* Recompute SHA1 hash of certificate if necessary (side effect). */
X509_check_purpose(cert, -1, 0);
for (i = 0; i < sk_ESS_CERT_ID_num(cert_ids); ++i) {
ESS_CERT_ID *cid = sk_ESS_CERT_ID_value(cert_ids, i);
- /* Check the SHA-1 hash first. */
- if (cid->hash->length == sizeof(cert->sha1_hash)
- && !memcmp(cid->hash->data, cert->sha1_hash,
- sizeof(cert->sha1_hash))) {
- /* Check the issuer/serial as well if specified. */
+ if (cid->hash->length == SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
+ && memcmp(cid->hash->data, cert_sha1, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) == 0) {
ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL *is = cid->issuer_serial;
if (!is || !ts_issuer_serial_cmp(is, cert))
return i;
if (!is || !cert || sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(is->issuer) != 1)
return -1;
- /* Check the issuer first. It must be a directory name. */
issuer = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(is->issuer, 0);
if (issuer->type != GEN_DIRNAME
|| X509_NAME_cmp(issuer->d.dirn, X509_get_issuer_name(cert)))
return -1;
- /* Check the serial number, too. */
if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(is->serial, X509_get_serialNumber(cert)))
return -1;
TS_TST_INFO *tst_info = response->tst_info;
int ret = 0;
- /* Check if we have a successful TS_TST_INFO object in place. */
if (!ts_check_status_info(response))
goto err;
-
- /* Check the contents of the time stamp token. */
if (!int_ts_RESP_verify_token(ctx, token, tst_info))
goto err;
-
ret = 1;
+
err:
return ret;
}
unsigned imprint_len = 0;
int ret = 0;
- /* Verify the signature. */
if ((ctx->flags & TS_VFY_SIGNATURE)
&& !TS_RESP_verify_signature(token, ctx->certs, ctx->store, &signer))
goto err;
-
- /* Check version number of response. */
if ((ctx->flags & TS_VFY_VERSION)
&& TS_TST_INFO_get_version(tst_info) != 1) {
TSerr(TS_F_INT_TS_RESP_VERIFY_TOKEN, TS_R_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION);
goto err;
}
-
- /* Check policies. */
if ((ctx->flags & TS_VFY_POLICY)
&& !ts_check_policy(ctx->policy, tst_info))
goto err;
-
- /* Check message imprints. */
if ((ctx->flags & TS_VFY_IMPRINT)
&& !ts_check_imprints(ctx->md_alg, ctx->imprint, ctx->imprint_len,
tst_info))
goto err;
-
- /* Compute and check message imprints. */
if ((ctx->flags & TS_VFY_DATA)
&& (!ts_compute_imprint(ctx->data, tst_info,
&md_alg, &imprint, &imprint_len)
|| !ts_check_imprints(md_alg, imprint, imprint_len, tst_info)))
goto err;
-
- /* Check nonces. */
if ((ctx->flags & TS_VFY_NONCE)
&& !ts_check_nonces(ctx->nonce, tst_info))
goto err;
-
- /* Check whether TSA name and signer certificate match. */
if ((ctx->flags & TS_VFY_SIGNER)
&& tsa_name && !ts_check_signer_name(tsa_name, signer)) {
TSerr(TS_F_INT_TS_RESP_VERIFY_TOKEN, TS_R_TSA_NAME_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
-
- /* Check whether the TSA is the expected one. */
if ((ctx->flags & TS_VFY_TSA_NAME)
&& !ts_check_signer_name(ctx->tsa_name, signer)) {
TSerr(TS_F_INT_TS_RESP_VERIFY_TOKEN, TS_R_TSA_UNTRUSTED);
goto err;
}
-
ret = 1;
+
err:
X509_free(signer);
X509_ALGOR_free(md_alg);
char *embedded_status_text = NULL;
char failure_text[TS_STATUS_BUF_SIZE] = "";
- /* Check if everything went fine. */
if (status == 0 || status == 1)
return 1;
/* There was an error, get the description in status_text. */
- if (0 <= status && status < (long)TS_STATUS_TEXT_SIZE)
+ if (0 <= status && status < (long) OSSL_NELEM(ts_status_text))
status_text = ts_status_text[status];
else
status_text = "unknown code";
- /* Set the embedded_status_text to the returned description. */
if (sk_ASN1_UTF8STRING_num(info->text) > 0
&& (embedded_status_text = ts_get_status_text(info->text)) == NULL)
return 0;
- /* Filling in failure_text with the failure information. */
+ /* Fill in failure_text with the failure information. */
if (info->failure_info) {
int i;
int first = 1;
- for (i = 0; i < (int)TS_FAILURE_INFO_SIZE; ++i) {
+ for (i = 0; i < (int)OSSL_NELEM(ts_failure_info); ++i) {
if (ASN1_BIT_STRING_get_bit(info->failure_info,
ts_failure_info[i].code)) {
if (!first)
- strcpy(failure_text, ",");
+ strcat(failure_text, ",");
else
first = 0;
strcat(failure_text, ts_failure_info[i].text);
if (failure_text[0] == '\0')
strcpy(failure_text, "unspecified");
- /* Making up the error string. */
TSerr(TS_F_TS_CHECK_STATUS_INFO, TS_R_NO_TIME_STAMP_TOKEN);
ERR_add_error_data(6,
"status code: ", status_text,
char *result = NULL;
char *p;
- /* Determine length first. */
for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_UTF8STRING_num(text); ++i) {
ASN1_UTF8STRING *current = sk_ASN1_UTF8STRING_value(text, i);
length += ASN1_STRING_length(current);
length += 1; /* separator character */
}
- /* Allocate memory (closing '\0' included). */
if ((result = OPENSSL_malloc(length)) == NULL) {
TSerr(TS_F_TS_GET_STATUS_TEXT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
- /* Concatenate the descriptions. */
+
for (i = 0, p = result; i < sk_ASN1_UTF8STRING_num(text); ++i) {
ASN1_UTF8STRING *current = sk_ASN1_UTF8STRING_value(text, i);
length = ASN1_STRING_length(current);
strncpy(p, (const char *)ASN1_STRING_data(current), length);
p += length;
}
- /* We do have space for this, too. */
*p = '\0';
return result;
TS_MSG_IMPRINT *msg_imprint = tst_info->msg_imprint;
X509_ALGOR *md_alg_resp = msg_imprint->hash_algo;
const EVP_MD *md;
- EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
+ EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;
unsigned char buffer[4096];
int length;
*md_alg = NULL;
*imprint = NULL;
- /* Return the MD algorithm of the response. */
if ((*md_alg = X509_ALGOR_dup(md_alg_resp)) == NULL)
goto err;
-
- /* Getting the MD object. */
if ((md = EVP_get_digestbyobj((*md_alg)->algorithm)) == NULL) {
TSerr(TS_F_TS_COMPUTE_IMPRINT, TS_R_UNSUPPORTED_MD_ALGORITHM);
goto err;
}
-
- /* Compute message digest. */
length = EVP_MD_size(md);
if (length < 0)
goto err;
goto err;
}
- if (!EVP_DigestInit(&md_ctx, md))
+ md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+ if (md_ctx == NULL) {
+ TSerr(TS_F_TS_COMPUTE_IMPRINT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!EVP_DigestInit(md_ctx, md))
goto err;
while ((length = BIO_read(data, buffer, sizeof(buffer))) > 0) {
- if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, buffer, length))
+ if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, buffer, length))
goto err;
}
- if (!EVP_DigestFinal(&md_ctx, *imprint, NULL))
+ if (!EVP_DigestFinal(md_ctx, *imprint, NULL))
goto err;
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
return 1;
err:
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
X509_ALGOR_free(*md_alg);
OPENSSL_free(*imprint);
*imprint_len = 0;
X509_ALGOR *algor_b = b->hash_algo;
int ret = 0;
- /* algor_a is optional. */
if (algor_a) {
- /* Compare algorithm OIDs. */
if (OBJ_cmp(algor_a->algorithm, algor_b->algorithm))
goto err;
goto err;
}
- /* Compare octet strings. */
ret = len_a == (unsigned)ASN1_STRING_length(b->hashed_msg) &&
memcmp(imprint_a, ASN1_STRING_data(b->hashed_msg), len_a) == 0;
err:
{
const ASN1_INTEGER *b = tst_info->nonce;
- /* Error if nonce is missing. */
if (!b) {
TSerr(TS_F_TS_CHECK_NONCES, TS_R_NONCE_NOT_RETURNED);
return 0;
int idx = -1;
int found = 0;
- /* Check the subject name first. */
if (tsa_name->type == GEN_DIRNAME
&& X509_name_cmp(tsa_name->d.dirn, X509_get_subject_name(signer)) == 0)
return 1;
-
- /* Check all the alternative names. */
gen_names = X509_get_ext_d2i(signer, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, &idx);
while (gen_names != NULL) {
found = ts_find_name(gen_names, tsa_name) >= 0;
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