+ OPENSSL_clear_free(tmps, (size_t)encoded_len);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * int_rsa_verify verifies an RSA signature in |sigbuf| using |rsa|. It may be
+ * called in two modes. If |rm| is NULL, it verifies the signature for digest
+ * |m|. Otherwise, it recovers the digest from the signature, writing the digest
+ * to |rm| and the length to |*prm_len|. |type| is the NID of the digest
+ * algorithm to use. It returns one on successful verification and zero
+ * otherwise.
+ */
+int int_rsa_verify(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
+ unsigned char *rm, size_t *prm_len,
+ const unsigned char *sigbuf, size_t siglen, RSA *rsa)
+{
+ int decrypt_len, ret = 0, encoded_len = 0;
+ unsigned char *decrypt_buf = NULL, *encoded = NULL;
+
+ if (siglen != (size_t)RSA_size(rsa)) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Recover the encoded digest. */
+ decrypt_buf = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen);
+ if (decrypt_buf == NULL) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ decrypt_len = RSA_public_decrypt((int)siglen, sigbuf, decrypt_buf, rsa,
+ RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+ if (decrypt_len <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (type == NID_md5_sha1) {
+ /*
+ * NID_md5_sha1 corresponds to the MD5/SHA1 combination in TLS 1.1 and
+ * earlier. It has no DigestInfo wrapper but otherwise is
+ * RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5.
+ */
+ if (decrypt_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (rm != NULL) {
+ memcpy(rm, decrypt_buf, SSL_SIG_LENGTH);
+ *prm_len = SSL_SIG_LENGTH;
+ } else {
+ if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (memcmp(decrypt_buf, m, SSL_SIG_LENGTH) != 0) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ } else if (type == NID_mdc2 && decrypt_len == 2 + 16
+ && decrypt_buf[0] == 0x04 && decrypt_buf[1] == 0x10) {
+ /*
+ * Oddball MDC2 case: signature can be OCTET STRING. check for correct
+ * tag and length octets.
+ */
+ if (rm != NULL) {
+ memcpy(rm, decrypt_buf + 2, 16);
+ *prm_len = 16;
+ } else {
+ if (m_len != 16) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (memcmp(m, decrypt_buf + 2, 16) != 0) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * If recovering the digest, extract a digest-sized output from the end
+ * of |decrypt_buf| for |encode_pkcs1|, then compare the decryption
+ * output as in a standard verification.
+ */
+ if (rm != NULL) {
+ const EVP_MD *md = EVP_get_digestbynid(type);
+ if (md == NULL) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ m_len = EVP_MD_size(md);
+ if (m_len > (size_t)decrypt_len) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ m = decrypt_buf + decrypt_len - m_len;
+ }
+
+ /* Construct the encoded digest and ensure it matches. */
+ if (!encode_pkcs1(&encoded, &encoded_len, type, m, m_len))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (encoded_len != decrypt_len
+ || memcmp(encoded, decrypt_buf, encoded_len) != 0) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Output the recovered digest. */
+ if (rm != NULL) {
+ memcpy(rm, m, m_len);
+ *prm_len = m_len;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ret = 1;
+
+err:
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(encoded, (size_t)encoded_len);
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(decrypt_buf, siglen);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int RSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
+ const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, RSA *rsa)
+{
+
+ if (rsa->meth->rsa_verify) {
+ return rsa->meth->rsa_verify(type, m, m_len, sigbuf, siglen, rsa);
+ }