-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * RSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
+ * internal use.
*/
+#include "internal/deprecated.h"
#include <stdio.h>
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
-#include <openssl/lhash.h>
-#include "internal/bn_int.h"
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
#include <openssl/engine.h>
-#include "rsa_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "internal/refcount.h"
+#include "openssl/param_build.h"
+#include "crypto/bn.h"
+#include "crypto/evp.h"
+#include "crypto/rsa.h"
+#include "crypto/security_bits.h"
+#include "rsa_local.h"
-static const RSA_METHOD *default_RSA_meth = NULL;
+static RSA *rsa_new_intern(ENGINE *engine, OPENSSL_CTX *libctx);
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
RSA *RSA_new(void)
{
- RSA *r = RSA_new_method(NULL);
-
- return r;
-}
-
-void RSA_set_default_method(const RSA_METHOD *meth)
-{
- default_RSA_meth = meth;
-}
-
-const RSA_METHOD *RSA_get_default_method(void)
-{
- if (default_RSA_meth == NULL) {
-#ifdef RSA_NULL
- default_RSA_meth = RSA_null_method();
-#else
- default_RSA_meth = RSA_PKCS1_OpenSSL();
-#endif
- }
-
- return default_RSA_meth;
+ return rsa_new_intern(NULL, NULL);
}
const RSA_METHOD *RSA_get_method(const RSA *rsa)
RSA *RSA_new_method(ENGINE *engine)
{
- RSA *ret;
+ return rsa_new_intern(engine, NULL);
+}
+#endif
+
+RSA *ossl_rsa_new_with_ctx(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx)
+{
+ return rsa_new_intern(NULL, libctx);
+}
+
+static RSA *rsa_new_intern(ENGINE *engine, OPENSSL_CTX *libctx)
+{
+ RSA *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
- ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
if (ret == NULL) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ RSAerr(0, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
+ ret->references = 1;
+ ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+ if (ret->lock == NULL) {
+ RSAerr(0, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ OPENSSL_free(ret);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ ret->libctx = libctx;
ret->meth = RSA_get_default_method();
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE) && !defined(FIPS_MODULE)
+ ret->flags = ret->meth->flags & ~RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW;
if (engine) {
if (!ENGINE_init(engine)) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB);
- OPENSSL_free(ret);
- return NULL;
+ RSAerr(0, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB);
+ goto err;
}
ret->engine = engine;
- } else
+ } else {
ret->engine = ENGINE_get_default_RSA();
+ }
if (ret->engine) {
ret->meth = ENGINE_get_RSA(ret->engine);
if (ret->meth == NULL) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB);
- ENGINE_finish(ret->engine);
- OPENSSL_free(ret);
- return NULL;
+ RSAerr(0, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB);
+ goto err;
}
}
#endif
- ret->references = 1;
ret->flags = ret->meth->flags & ~RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW;
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA, ret, &ret->ex_data)) {
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
- ENGINE_finish(ret->engine);
-#endif
- OPENSSL_free(ret);
- return NULL;
+ goto err;
}
-
- ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
- if (ret->lock == NULL) {
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
- ENGINE_finish(ret->engine);
#endif
- CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA, ret, &ret->ex_data);
- OPENSSL_free(ret);
- return NULL;
- }
if ((ret->meth->init != NULL) && !ret->meth->init(ret)) {
- RSA_free(ret);
- ret = NULL;
+ RSAerr(0, ERR_R_INIT_FAIL);
+ goto err;
}
return ret;
+
+ err:
+ RSA_free(ret);
+ return NULL;
}
void RSA_free(RSA *r)
if (r == NULL)
return;
- CRYPTO_atomic_add(&r->references, -1, &i, r->lock);
+ CRYPTO_DOWN_REF(&r->references, &i, r->lock);
REF_PRINT_COUNT("RSA", r);
if (i > 0)
return;
REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0);
- if (r->meth->finish)
+ if (r->meth != NULL && r->meth->finish != NULL)
r->meth->finish(r);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE) && !defined(FIPS_MODULE)
ENGINE_finish(r->engine);
#endif
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA, r, &r->ex_data);
+#endif
CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(r->lock);
- BN_clear_free(r->n);
- BN_clear_free(r->e);
+ BN_free(r->n);
+ BN_free(r->e);
BN_clear_free(r->d);
BN_clear_free(r->p);
BN_clear_free(r->q);
BN_clear_free(r->dmp1);
BN_clear_free(r->dmq1);
BN_clear_free(r->iqmp);
+
+#if defined(FIPS_MODULE) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ACVP_TESTS)
+ rsa_acvp_test_free(r->acvp_test);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+ RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(r->pss);
+ sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(r->prime_infos, rsa_multip_info_free);
+#endif
BN_BLINDING_free(r->blinding);
BN_BLINDING_free(r->mt_blinding);
OPENSSL_free(r->bignum_data);
{
int i;
- if (CRYPTO_atomic_add(&r->references, 1, &i, r->lock) <= 0)
+ if (CRYPTO_UP_REF(&r->references, &i, r->lock) <= 0)
return 0;
REF_PRINT_COUNT("RSA", r);
REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 2);
- return ((i > 1) ? 1 : 0);
+ return i > 1 ? 1 : 0;
}
+OPENSSL_CTX *ossl_rsa_get0_libctx(RSA *r)
+{
+ return r->libctx;
+}
+
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
int RSA_set_ex_data(RSA *r, int idx, void *arg)
{
- return (CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx, arg));
+ return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx, arg);
}
void *RSA_get_ex_data(const RSA *r, int idx)
{
- return (CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx));
-}
-
-int RSA_memory_lock(RSA *r)
-{
- int i, j, k, off;
- char *p;
- BIGNUM *bn, **t[6], *b;
- BN_ULONG *ul;
-
- if (r->d == NULL)
- return (1);
- t[0] = &r->d;
- t[1] = &r->p;
- t[2] = &r->q;
- t[3] = &r->dmp1;
- t[4] = &r->dmq1;
- t[5] = &r->iqmp;
- k = bn_sizeof_BIGNUM() * 6;
- off = k / sizeof(BN_ULONG) + 1;
- j = 1;
- for (i = 0; i < 6; i++)
- j += bn_get_top(*t[i]);
- if ((p = OPENSSL_malloc((off + j) * sizeof(*p))) == NULL) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_MEMORY_LOCK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return (0);
- }
- memset(p, 0, sizeof(*p) * (off + j));
- bn = (BIGNUM *)p;
- ul = (BN_ULONG *)&(p[off]);
- for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
- b = *(t[i]);
- *(t[i]) = bn_array_el(bn, i);
- memcpy(bn_array_el(bn, i), b, bn_sizeof_BIGNUM());
- memcpy(ul, bn_get_words(b), sizeof(*ul) * bn_get_top(b));
- bn_set_static_words(bn_array_el(bn, i), ul, bn_get_top(b));
- ul += bn_get_top(b);
- BN_clear_free(b);
- }
-
- /* I should fix this so it can still be done */
- r->flags &= ~(RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE | RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC);
-
- r->bignum_data = p;
- return (1);
+ return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx);
}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Define a scaling constant for our fixed point arithmetic.
+ * This value must be a power of two because the base two logarithm code
+ * makes this assumption. The exponent must also be a multiple of three so
+ * that the scale factor has an exact cube root. Finally, the scale factor
+ * should not be so large that a multiplication of two scaled numbers
+ * overflows a 64 bit unsigned integer.
+ */
+static const unsigned int scale = 1 << 18;
+static const unsigned int cbrt_scale = 1 << (2 * 18 / 3);
+
+/* Define some constants, none exceed 32 bits */
+static const unsigned int log_2 = 0x02c5c8; /* scale * log(2) */
+static const unsigned int log_e = 0x05c551; /* scale * log2(M_E) */
+static const unsigned int c1_923 = 0x07b126; /* scale * 1.923 */
+static const unsigned int c4_690 = 0x12c28f; /* scale * 4.690 */
+
+/*
+ * Multiply two scaled integers together and rescale the result.
+ */
+static ossl_inline uint64_t mul2(uint64_t a, uint64_t b)
+{
+ return a * b / scale;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Calculate the cube root of a 64 bit scaled integer.
+ * Although the cube root of a 64 bit number does fit into a 32 bit unsigned
+ * integer, this is not guaranteed after scaling, so this function has a
+ * 64 bit return. This uses the shifting nth root algorithm with some
+ * algebraic simplifications.
+ */
+static uint64_t icbrt64(uint64_t x)
+{
+ uint64_t r = 0;
+ uint64_t b;
+ int s;
+
+ for (s = 63; s >= 0; s -= 3) {
+ r <<= 1;
+ b = 3 * r * (r + 1) + 1;
+ if ((x >> s) >= b) {
+ x -= b << s;
+ r++;
+ }
+ }
+ return r * cbrt_scale;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Calculate the natural logarithm of a 64 bit scaled integer.
+ * This is done by calculating a base two logarithm and scaling.
+ * The maximum logarithm (base 2) is 64 and this reduces base e, so
+ * a 32 bit result should not overflow. The argument passed must be
+ * greater than unity so we don't need to handle negative results.
+ */
+static uint32_t ilog_e(uint64_t v)
+{
+ uint32_t i, r = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Scale down the value into the range 1 .. 2.
+ *
+ * If fractional numbers need to be processed, another loop needs
+ * to go here that checks v < scale and if so multiplies it by 2 and
+ * reduces r by scale. This also means making r signed.
+ */
+ while (v >= 2 * scale) {
+ v >>= 1;
+ r += scale;
+ }
+ for (i = scale / 2; i != 0; i /= 2) {
+ v = mul2(v, v);
+ if (v >= 2 * scale) {
+ v >>= 1;
+ r += i;
+ }
+ }
+ r = (r * (uint64_t)scale) / log_e;
+ return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * NIST SP 800-56B rev 2 Appendix D: Maximum Security Strength Estimates for IFC
+ * Modulus Lengths.
+ *
+ * Note that this formula is also referred to in SP800-56A rev3 Appendix D:
+ * for FFC safe prime groups for modp and ffdhe.
+ * After Table 25 and Table 26 it refers to
+ * "The maximum security strength estimates were calculated using the formula in
+ * Section 7.5 of the FIPS 140 IG and rounded to the nearest multiple of eight
+ * bits".
+ *
+ * The formula is:
+ *
+ * E = \frac{1.923 \sqrt[3]{nBits \cdot log_e(2)}
+ * \cdot(log_e(nBits \cdot log_e(2))^{2/3} - 4.69}{log_e(2)}
+ * The two cube roots are merged together here.
+ */
+uint16_t ifc_ffc_compute_security_bits(int n)
+{
+ uint64_t x;
+ uint32_t lx;
+ uint16_t y;
+
+ /* Look for common values as listed in SP 800-56B rev 2 Appendix D */
+ switch (n) {
+ case 2048:
+ return 112;
+ case 3072:
+ return 128;
+ case 4096:
+ return 152;
+ case 6144:
+ return 176;
+ case 8192:
+ return 200;
+ }
+ /*
+ * The first incorrect result (i.e. not accurate or off by one low) occurs
+ * for n = 699668. The true value here is 1200. Instead of using this n
+ * as the check threshold, the smallest n such that the correct result is
+ * 1200 is used instead.
+ */
+ if (n >= 687737)
+ return 1200;
+ if (n < 8)
+ return 0;
+
+ x = n * (uint64_t)log_2;
+ lx = ilog_e(x);
+ y = (uint16_t)((mul2(c1_923, icbrt64(mul2(mul2(x, lx), lx))) - c4_690)
+ / log_2);
+ return (y + 4) & ~7;
+}
+
+
int RSA_security_bits(const RSA *rsa)
{
- return BN_security_bits(BN_num_bits(rsa->n), -1);
+ int bits = BN_num_bits(rsa->n);
+
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+ if (rsa->version == RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI) {
+ /* This ought to mean that we have private key at hand. */
+ int ex_primes = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_num(rsa->prime_infos);
+
+ if (ex_primes <= 0 || (ex_primes + 2) > rsa_multip_cap(bits))
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif
+ return ifc_ffc_compute_security_bits(bits);
}
int RSA_set0_key(RSA *r, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *d)
{
- /* If the fields in r are NULL, the corresponding input
+ /* If the fields n and e in r are NULL, the corresponding input
* parameters MUST be non-NULL for n and e. d may be
* left NULL (in case only the public key is used).
- *
- * It is an error to give the results from get0 on r
- * as input parameters.
*/
- if (n == r->n || e == r->e
- || (r->d != NULL && d == r->d))
+ if ((r->n == NULL && n == NULL)
+ || (r->e == NULL && e == NULL))
return 0;
if (n != NULL) {
r->e = e;
}
if (d != NULL) {
- BN_free(r->d);
+ BN_clear_free(r->d);
r->d = d;
+ BN_set_flags(r->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
}
+ r->dirty_cnt++;
return 1;
}
int RSA_set0_factors(RSA *r, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q)
{
- /* If the fields in r are NULL, the corresponding input
+ /* If the fields p and q in r are NULL, the corresponding input
* parameters MUST be non-NULL.
- *
- * It is an error to give the results from get0 on r
- * as input parameters.
*/
- if (p == r->p || q == r->q)
+ if ((r->p == NULL && p == NULL)
+ || (r->q == NULL && q == NULL))
return 0;
if (p != NULL) {
- BN_free(r->p);
+ BN_clear_free(r->p);
r->p = p;
+ BN_set_flags(r->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
}
if (q != NULL) {
- BN_free(r->q);
+ BN_clear_free(r->q);
r->q = q;
+ BN_set_flags(r->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
}
+ r->dirty_cnt++;
return 1;
}
int RSA_set0_crt_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *dmp1, BIGNUM *dmq1, BIGNUM *iqmp)
{
- /* If the fields in r are NULL, the corresponding input
+ /* If the fields dmp1, dmq1 and iqmp in r are NULL, the corresponding input
* parameters MUST be non-NULL.
- *
- * It is an error to give the results from get0 on r
- * as input parameters.
*/
- if (dmp1 == r->dmp1 || dmq1 == r->dmq1 || iqmp == r->iqmp)
+ if ((r->dmp1 == NULL && dmp1 == NULL)
+ || (r->dmq1 == NULL && dmq1 == NULL)
+ || (r->iqmp == NULL && iqmp == NULL))
return 0;
if (dmp1 != NULL) {
- BN_free(r->dmp1);
+ BN_clear_free(r->dmp1);
r->dmp1 = dmp1;
+ BN_set_flags(r->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
}
if (dmq1 != NULL) {
- BN_free(r->dmq1);
+ BN_clear_free(r->dmq1);
r->dmq1 = dmq1;
+ BN_set_flags(r->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
}
if (iqmp != NULL) {
- BN_free(r->iqmp);
+ BN_clear_free(r->iqmp);
r->iqmp = iqmp;
+ BN_set_flags(r->iqmp, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ }
+ r->dirty_cnt++;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+/*
+ * Is it better to export RSA_PRIME_INFO structure
+ * and related functions to let user pass a triplet?
+ */
+int RSA_set0_multi_prime_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *primes[], BIGNUM *exps[],
+ BIGNUM *coeffs[], int pnum)
+{
+ STACK_OF(RSA_PRIME_INFO) *prime_infos, *old = NULL;
+ RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo;
+ int i;
+
+ if (primes == NULL || exps == NULL || coeffs == NULL || pnum == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ prime_infos = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_new_reserve(NULL, pnum);
+ if (prime_infos == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (r->prime_infos != NULL)
+ old = r->prime_infos;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < pnum; i++) {
+ pinfo = rsa_multip_info_new();
+ if (pinfo == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (primes[i] != NULL && exps[i] != NULL && coeffs[i] != NULL) {
+ BN_clear_free(pinfo->r);
+ BN_clear_free(pinfo->d);
+ BN_clear_free(pinfo->t);
+ pinfo->r = primes[i];
+ pinfo->d = exps[i];
+ pinfo->t = coeffs[i];
+ BN_set_flags(pinfo->r, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ BN_set_flags(pinfo->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ BN_set_flags(pinfo->t, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ } else {
+ rsa_multip_info_free(pinfo);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ (void)sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_push(prime_infos, pinfo);
+ }
+
+ r->prime_infos = prime_infos;
+
+ if (!rsa_multip_calc_product(r)) {
+ r->prime_infos = old;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (old != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * This is hard to deal with, since the old infos could
+ * also be set by this function and r, d, t should not
+ * be freed in that case. So currently, stay consistent
+ * with other *set0* functions: just free it...
+ */
+ sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(old, rsa_multip_info_free);
}
+ r->version = RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI;
+ r->dirty_cnt++;
+
return 1;
+ err:
+ /* r, d, t should not be freed */
+ sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(prime_infos, rsa_multip_info_free_ex);
+ return 0;
}
+#endif
-void RSA_get0_key(const RSA *r, BIGNUM **n, BIGNUM **e, BIGNUM **d)
+void RSA_get0_key(const RSA *r,
+ const BIGNUM **n, const BIGNUM **e, const BIGNUM **d)
{
if (n != NULL)
*n = r->n;
*d = r->d;
}
-void RSA_get0_factors(const RSA *r, BIGNUM **p, BIGNUM **q)
+void RSA_get0_factors(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q)
{
if (p != NULL)
*p = r->p;
*q = r->q;
}
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+int RSA_get_multi_prime_extra_count(const RSA *r)
+{
+ int pnum;
+
+ pnum = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_num(r->prime_infos);
+ if (pnum <= 0)
+ pnum = 0;
+ return pnum;
+}
+
+int RSA_get0_multi_prime_factors(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM *primes[])
+{
+ int pnum, i;
+ RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo;
+
+ if ((pnum = RSA_get_multi_prime_extra_count(r)) == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * return other primes
+ * it's caller's responsibility to allocate oth_primes[pnum]
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < pnum; i++) {
+ pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(r->prime_infos, i);
+ primes[i] = pinfo->r;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+#endif
+
void RSA_get0_crt_params(const RSA *r,
- BIGNUM **dmp1, BIGNUM **dmq1, BIGNUM **iqmp)
+ const BIGNUM **dmp1, const BIGNUM **dmq1,
+ const BIGNUM **iqmp)
{
if (dmp1 != NULL)
*dmp1 = r->dmp1;
*iqmp = r->iqmp;
}
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+int RSA_get0_multi_prime_crt_params(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM *exps[],
+ const BIGNUM *coeffs[])
+{
+ int pnum;
+
+ if ((pnum = RSA_get_multi_prime_extra_count(r)) == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* return other primes */
+ if (exps != NULL || coeffs != NULL) {
+ RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo;
+ int i;
+
+ /* it's the user's job to guarantee the buffer length */
+ for (i = 0; i < pnum; i++) {
+ pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(r->prime_infos, i);
+ if (exps != NULL)
+ exps[i] = pinfo->d;
+ if (coeffs != NULL)
+ coeffs[i] = pinfo->t;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+#endif
+
+const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_n(const RSA *r)
+{
+ return r->n;
+}
+
+const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_e(const RSA *r)
+{
+ return r->e;
+}
+
+const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_d(const RSA *r)
+{
+ return r->d;
+}
+
+const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_p(const RSA *r)
+{
+ return r->p;
+}
+
+const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_q(const RSA *r)
+{
+ return r->q;
+}
+
+const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_dmp1(const RSA *r)
+{
+ return r->dmp1;
+}
+
+const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_dmq1(const RSA *r)
+{
+ return r->dmq1;
+}
+
+const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_iqmp(const RSA *r)
+{
+ return r->iqmp;
+}
+
+const RSA_PSS_PARAMS *RSA_get0_pss_params(const RSA *r)
+{
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ return NULL;
+#else
+ return r->pss;
+#endif
+}
+
+/* Internal */
+RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *ossl_rsa_get0_pss_params_30(RSA *r)
+{
+ return &r->pss_params;
+}
+
void RSA_clear_flags(RSA *r, int flags)
{
r->flags &= ~flags;
r->flags |= flags;
}
-ENGINE *RSA_get0_engine(RSA *r)
+int RSA_get_version(RSA *r)
+{
+ /* { two-prime(0), multi(1) } */
+ return r->version;
+}
+
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+ENGINE *RSA_get0_engine(const RSA *r)
{
return r->engine;
}
+
+int RSA_pkey_ctx_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int optype, int cmd, int p1, void *p2)
+{
+ /* If key type not RSA or RSA-PSS return error */
+ if (ctx != NULL && ctx->pmeth != NULL
+ && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA
+ && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS)
+ return -1;
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, -1, optype, cmd, p1, p2);
+}
+#endif
+
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(BIGNUM)
+
+int ossl_rsa_set0_all_params(RSA *r, const STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *primes,
+ const STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *exps,
+ const STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *coeffs)
+{
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+ STACK_OF(RSA_PRIME_INFO) *prime_infos, *old_infos = NULL;
+#endif
+ int pnum;
+
+ if (primes == NULL || exps == NULL || coeffs == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ pnum = sk_BIGNUM_num(primes);
+ if (pnum < 2
+ || pnum != sk_BIGNUM_num(exps)
+ || pnum != sk_BIGNUM_num(coeffs) + 1)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!RSA_set0_factors(r, sk_BIGNUM_value(primes, 0),
+ sk_BIGNUM_value(primes, 1))
+ || !RSA_set0_crt_params(r, sk_BIGNUM_value(exps, 0),
+ sk_BIGNUM_value(exps, 1),
+ sk_BIGNUM_value(coeffs, 0)))
+ return 0;
+
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+ old_infos = r->prime_infos;
+#endif
+
+ if (pnum > 2) {
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+ int i;
+
+ prime_infos = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_new_reserve(NULL, pnum);
+ if (prime_infos == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ for (i = 2; i < pnum; i++) {
+ BIGNUM *prime = sk_BIGNUM_value(primes, i);
+ BIGNUM *exp = sk_BIGNUM_value(exps, i);
+ BIGNUM *coeff = sk_BIGNUM_value(coeffs, i - 1);
+ RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo = NULL;
+
+ if (!ossl_assert(prime != NULL && exp != NULL && coeff != NULL))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Using rsa_multip_info_new() is wasteful, so allocate directly */
+ if ((pinfo = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*pinfo))) == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ pinfo->r = prime;
+ pinfo->d = exp;
+ pinfo->t = coeff;
+ BN_set_flags(pinfo->r, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ BN_set_flags(pinfo->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ BN_set_flags(pinfo->t, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ (void)sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_push(prime_infos, pinfo);
+ }
+
+ r->prime_infos = prime_infos;
+
+ if (!rsa_multip_calc_product(r)) {
+ r->prime_infos = old_infos;
+ goto err;
+ }
+#else
+ return 0;
+#endif
+ }
+
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+ if (old_infos != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * This is hard to deal with, since the old infos could
+ * also be set by this function and r, d, t should not
+ * be freed in that case. So currently, stay consistent
+ * with other *set0* functions: just free it...
+ */
+ sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(old_infos, rsa_multip_info_free);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ r->version = pnum > 2 ? RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI : RSA_ASN1_VERSION_DEFAULT;
+ r->dirty_cnt++;
+
+ return 1;
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+ err:
+ /* r, d, t should not be freed */
+ sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(prime_infos, rsa_multip_info_free_ex);
+ return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+DEFINE_SPECIAL_STACK_OF_CONST(BIGNUM_const, BIGNUM)
+
+int ossl_rsa_get0_all_params(RSA *r, STACK_OF(BIGNUM_const) *primes,
+ STACK_OF(BIGNUM_const) *exps,
+ STACK_OF(BIGNUM_const) *coeffs)
+{
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+ RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo;
+ int i, pnum;
+#endif
+
+ if (r == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* If |p| is NULL, there are no CRT parameters */
+ if (RSA_get0_p(r) == NULL)
+ return 1;
+
+ sk_BIGNUM_const_push(primes, RSA_get0_p(r));
+ sk_BIGNUM_const_push(primes, RSA_get0_q(r));
+ sk_BIGNUM_const_push(exps, RSA_get0_dmp1(r));
+ sk_BIGNUM_const_push(exps, RSA_get0_dmq1(r));
+ sk_BIGNUM_const_push(coeffs, RSA_get0_iqmp(r));
+
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+ pnum = RSA_get_multi_prime_extra_count(r);
+ for (i = 0; i < pnum; i++) {
+ pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(r->prime_infos, i);
+ sk_BIGNUM_const_push(primes, pinfo->r);
+ sk_BIGNUM_const_push(exps, pinfo->d);
+ sk_BIGNUM_const_push(coeffs, pinfo->t);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int pad_mode)
+{
+ OSSL_PARAM pad_params[2], *p = pad_params;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+ /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */
+ return -2;
+ }
+
+ /* If key type not RSA or RSA-PSS return error */
+ if (ctx->pmeth != NULL
+ && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA
+ && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS)
+ return -1;
+
+ /* TODO(3.0): Remove this eventually when no more legacy */
+ if ((!EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_ASYM_CIPHER_OP(ctx)
+ || ctx->op.ciph.ciphprovctx == NULL)
+ && (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_SIGNATURE_OP(ctx)
+ || ctx->op.sig.sigprovctx == NULL))
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PADDING,
+ pad_mode, NULL);
+
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PAD_MODE, &pad_mode);
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
+
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(ctx, pad_params);
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_padding(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int *pad_mode)
+{
+ OSSL_PARAM pad_params[2], *p = pad_params;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL || pad_mode == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+ /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */
+ return -2;
+ }
+
+ /* If key type not RSA or RSA-PSS return error */
+ if (ctx->pmeth != NULL
+ && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA
+ && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS)
+ return -1;
+
+ /* TODO(3.0): Remove this eventually when no more legacy */
+ if ((!EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_ASYM_CIPHER_OP(ctx)
+ || ctx->op.ciph.ciphprovctx == NULL)
+ && (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_SIGNATURE_OP(ctx)
+ || ctx->op.sig.sigprovctx == NULL))
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PADDING, 0,
+ pad_mode);
+
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PAD_MODE, pad_mode);
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
+
+ if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_params(ctx, pad_params))
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_oaep_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md)
+{
+ const char *name;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_ASYM_CIPHER_OP(ctx)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+ /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */
+ return -2;
+ }
+
+ /* If key type not RSA return error */
+ if (ctx->pmeth != NULL && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA)
+ return -1;
+
+ /* TODO(3.0): Remove this eventually when no more legacy */
+ if (ctx->op.ciph.ciphprovctx == NULL)
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
+ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_MD, 0, (void *)md);
+
+ name = (md == NULL) ? "" : EVP_MD_name(md);
+
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_oaep_md_name(ctx, name, NULL);
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_oaep_md_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
+ const char *mdprops)
+{
+ OSSL_PARAM rsa_params[3], *p = rsa_params;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_ASYM_CIPHER_OP(ctx)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+ /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */
+ return -2;
+ }
+
+ /* If key type not RSA return error */
+ if (ctx->pmeth != NULL && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA)
+ return -1;
+
+
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_DIGEST,
+ /*
+ * Cast away the const. This is read
+ * only so should be safe
+ */
+ (char *)mdname, 0);
+ if (mdprops != NULL) {
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(
+ OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_DIGEST_PROPS,
+ /*
+ * Cast away the const. This is read
+ * only so should be safe
+ */
+ (char *)mdprops, 0);
+ }
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
+
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(ctx, rsa_params);
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_oaep_md_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, char *name,
+ size_t namelen)
+{
+ OSSL_PARAM rsa_params[2], *p = rsa_params;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_ASYM_CIPHER_OP(ctx)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+ /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */
+ return -2;
+ }
+
+ /* If key type not RSA return error */
+ if (ctx->pmeth != NULL && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA)
+ return -1;
+
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_DIGEST,
+ name, namelen);
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
+
+ if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_params(ctx, rsa_params))
+ return -1;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_oaep_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD **md)
+{
+ /* 80 should be big enough */
+ char name[80] = "";
+
+ if (ctx == NULL || md == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_ASYM_CIPHER_OP(ctx)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+ /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */
+ return -2;
+ }
+
+ /* If key type not RSA return error */
+ if (ctx->pmeth != NULL && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA)
+ return -1;
+
+ /* TODO(3.0): Remove this eventually when no more legacy */
+ if (ctx->op.ciph.ciphprovctx == NULL)
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
+ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_MD, 0, (void *)md);
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_oaep_md_name(ctx, name, sizeof(name)) <= 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ /* May be NULL meaning "unknown" */
+ *md = evp_get_digestbyname_ex(ctx->libctx, name);
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int int_set_rsa_mgf1_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+ /* For EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() */
+ int keytype, int optype, int cmd,
+ const EVP_MD *md,
+ /* For EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params() */
+ const char *mdname, const char *mdprops)
+{
+ OSSL_PARAM rsa_params[3], *p = rsa_params;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL || (ctx->operation & optype) == 0) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+ /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */
+ return -2;
+ }
+
+ /* If key type not RSA return error */
+ if (ctx->pmeth != NULL
+ && (keytype == -1
+ ? (ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA
+ && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS)
+ : ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != keytype))
+ return -1;
+
+ /* TODO(3.0): Remove this eventually when no more legacy */
+ if (cmd != -1) {
+ if ((EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_ASYM_CIPHER_OP(ctx)
+ && ctx->op.ciph.ciphprovctx == NULL)
+ || (EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_SIGNATURE_OP(ctx)
+ && ctx->op.sig.sigprovctx == NULL)
+ || (EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_GEN_OP(ctx)
+ && ctx->op.keymgmt.genctx == NULL))
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, keytype, optype, cmd, 0, (void *)md);
+
+ mdname = (md == NULL) ? "" : EVP_MD_name(md);
+ }
+
+
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST,
+ /*
+ * Cast away the const. This is
+ * read only so should be safe
+ */
+ (char *)mdname, 0);
+ if (mdprops != NULL) {
+ *p++ =
+ OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES,
+ /*
+ * Cast away the const. This is
+ * read only so should be safe
+ */
+ (char *)mdprops, 0);
+ }
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
+
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(ctx, rsa_params);
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md)
+{
+ return int_set_rsa_mgf1_md(ctx, -1,
+ EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG,
+ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD, md, NULL, NULL);
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
+ const char *mdprops)
+{
+ return int_set_rsa_mgf1_md(ctx, -1,
+ EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG,
+ -1, NULL, mdname, mdprops);
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_keygen_mgf1_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md)
+{
+ return int_set_rsa_mgf1_md(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS,
+ EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD,
+ md, NULL, NULL);
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_keygen_mgf1_md_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+ const char *mdname)
+{
+ return int_set_rsa_mgf1_md(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS,
+ EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG,
+ -1, NULL, mdname, NULL);
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_mgf1_md_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, char *name,
+ size_t namelen)
+{
+ OSSL_PARAM rsa_params[2], *p = rsa_params;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL
+ || (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_ASYM_CIPHER_OP(ctx)
+ && !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_SIGNATURE_OP(ctx))) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+ /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */
+ return -2;
+ }
+
+ /* If key type not RSA or RSA-PSS return error */
+ if (ctx->pmeth != NULL
+ && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA
+ && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS)
+ return -1;
+
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST,
+ name, namelen);
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
+
+ if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_params(ctx, rsa_params))
+ return -1;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_mgf1_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD **md)
+{
+ /* 80 should be big enough */
+ char name[80] = "";
+
+ if (ctx == NULL
+ || (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_ASYM_CIPHER_OP(ctx)
+ && !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_SIGNATURE_OP(ctx))) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+ /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */
+ return -2;
+ }
+
+ /* If key type not RSA or RSA-PSS return error */
+ if (ctx->pmeth != NULL
+ && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA
+ && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS)
+ return -1;
+
+ /* TODO(3.0): Remove this eventually when no more legacy */
+ if ((EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_ASYM_CIPHER_OP(ctx)
+ && ctx->op.ciph.ciphprovctx == NULL)
+ || (EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_SIGNATURE_OP(ctx)
+ && ctx->op.sig.sigprovctx == NULL))
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, -1,
+ EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
+ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_MGF1_MD, 0, (void *)md);
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_mgf1_md_name(ctx, name, sizeof(name)) <= 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ /* May be NULL meaning "unknown" */
+ *md = evp_get_digestbyname_ex(ctx->libctx, name);
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_rsa_oaep_label(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, void *label, int llen)
+{
+ OSSL_PARAM rsa_params[2], *p = rsa_params;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_ASYM_CIPHER_OP(ctx)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+ /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */
+ return -2;
+ }
+
+ /* If key type not RSA return error */
+ if (ctx->pmeth != NULL && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA)
+ return -1;
+
+ /* TODO(3.0): Remove this eventually when no more legacy */
+ if (ctx->op.ciph.ciphprovctx == NULL)
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
+ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_LABEL, llen,
+ (void *)label);
+
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_LABEL,
+ /*
+ * Cast away the const. This is
+ * read only so should be safe
+ */
+ (void *)label,
+ (size_t)llen);
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
+
+ if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(ctx, rsa_params))
+ return 0;
+
+ OPENSSL_free(label);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_rsa_oaep_label(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char **label)
+{
+ OSSL_PARAM rsa_params[3], *p = rsa_params;
+ size_t labellen;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_ASYM_CIPHER_OP(ctx)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+ /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */
+ return -2;
+ }
+
+ /* If key type not RSA return error */
+ if (ctx->pmeth != NULL && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA)
+ return -1;
+
+ /* TODO(3.0): Remove this eventually when no more legacy */
+ if (ctx->op.ciph.ciphprovctx == NULL)
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
+ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_LABEL, 0,
+ (void *)label);
+
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_ptr(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_LABEL,
+ (void **)label, 0);
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_LABEL_LEN,
+ &labellen);
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
+
+ if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_params(ctx, rsa_params))
+ return -1;
+
+ if (labellen > INT_MAX)
+ return -1;
+
+ return (int)labellen;
+}
+
+static int int_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int saltlen,
+ int keytype, int optype)
+{
+ OSSL_PARAM pad_params[2], *p = pad_params;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL || (ctx->operation & optype) == 0) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+ /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */
+ return -2;
+ }
+
+ /* If key type not RSA or RSA-PSS return error */
+ if (ctx->pmeth != NULL
+ && (keytype == -1
+ ? (ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA
+ && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS)
+ : ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != keytype))
+ return -1;
+
+ /* TODO(3.0): Remove this eventually when no more legacy */
+ if ((EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_SIGNATURE_OP(ctx)
+ && ctx->op.sig.sigprovctx == NULL)
+ || (EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_GEN_OP(ctx)
+ && ctx->op.keymgmt.genctx == NULL))
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, keytype, optype,
+ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN,
+ saltlen, NULL);
+
+ *p++ =
+ OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN, &saltlen);
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
+
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(ctx, pad_params);
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int saltlen)
+{
+ return int_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(ctx, saltlen, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG);
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_keygen_saltlen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int saltlen)
+{
+ return int_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(ctx, saltlen, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS,
+ EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN);
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_pss_saltlen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int *saltlen)
+{
+ OSSL_PARAM pad_params[2], *p = pad_params;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL || saltlen == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+ /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */
+ return -2;
+ }
+
+ /* If key type not RSA or RSA-PSS return error */
+ if (ctx->pmeth != NULL
+ && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA
+ && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS)
+ return -1;
+
+ /* TODO(3.0): Remove this eventually when no more legacy */
+ if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_SIGNATURE_OP(ctx)
+ || ctx->op.sig.sigprovctx == NULL)
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, -1, -1,
+ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN,
+ 0, saltlen);
+
+ *p++ =
+ OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN, saltlen);
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
+
+ if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_params(ctx, pad_params))
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_bits(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int bits)
+{
+ OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
+ size_t bits2 = bits;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_GEN_OP(ctx)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+ /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */
+ return -2;
+ }
+
+ /* If key type not RSA return error */
+ if (ctx->pmeth != NULL && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA)
+ return -1;
+
+ /* TODO(3.0): Remove this eventually when no more legacy */
+ if (ctx->op.keymgmt.genctx == NULL)
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN,
+ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_BITS, bits, NULL);
+
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_BITS, &bits2);
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
+
+ if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(ctx, params))
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int evp_pkey_ctx_set_rsa_keygen_pubexp_intern(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
+ BIGNUM *pubexp,
+ int copy)
+{
+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD *tmpl;
+ OSSL_PARAM *params;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_GEN_OP(ctx)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+ /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */
+ return -2;
+ }
+
+ /* If key type not RSA return error */
+ if (ctx->pmeth != NULL && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA)
+ return -1;
+
+ /* TODO(3.0): Remove this eventually when no more legacy */
+ if (ctx->op.keymgmt.genctx == NULL) {
+ if (copy == 1)
+ pubexp = BN_dup(pubexp);
+ ret = EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN,
+ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PUBEXP, 0, pubexp);
+ if ((copy == 1) && (ret <= 0))
+ BN_free(pubexp);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if ((tmpl = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_E, pubexp)
+ || (params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(tmpl)) == NULL) {
+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(tmpl);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(tmpl);
+
+ ret = EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(ctx, params);
+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free_params(params);
+
+ /*
+ * Satisfy memory semantics for pre-3.0 callers of
+ * EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_pubexp(): their expectation is that input
+ * pubexp BIGNUM becomes managed by the EVP_PKEY_CTX on success.
+ */
+ if ((copy == 0) && (ret > 0))
+ ctx->rsa_pubexp = pubexp;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_pubexp(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, BIGNUM *pubexp)
+{
+ return evp_pkey_ctx_set_rsa_keygen_pubexp_intern(ctx, pubexp, 0);
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_rsa_keygen_pubexp(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, BIGNUM *pubexp)
+{
+ return evp_pkey_ctx_set_rsa_keygen_pubexp_intern(ctx, pubexp, 1);
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_primes(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int primes)
+{
+ OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
+ size_t primes2 = primes;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_GEN_OP(ctx)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+ /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */
+ return -2;
+ }
+
+ /* If key type not RSA return error */
+ if (ctx->pmeth != NULL && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA)
+ return -1;
+
+ /* TODO(3.0): Remove this eventually when no more legacy */
+ if (ctx->op.keymgmt.genctx == NULL)
+ return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN,
+ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PRIMES, primes,
+ NULL);
+
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_PRIMES, &primes2);
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
+
+ if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(ctx, params))
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+#endif
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff