#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#endif
#ifndef RSA_NULL
0, /* flags */
NULL,
0, /* rsa_sign */
- 0 /* rsa_verify */
+ 0, /* rsa_verify */
+ NULL /* rsa_keygen */
};
const RSA_METHOD *RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(void)
return(&rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth);
}
+/* Static helper to reduce oodles of code duplication. As a slight
+ * optimisation, the "MONT_HELPER() macro must be used as front-end to this
+ * function, to prevent unnecessary function calls - there is an initial test
+ * that is performed by the macro-generated code. */
+static int rsa_eay_mont_helper(BN_MONT_CTX **ptr, const BIGNUM *modulus, BN_CTX *ctx)
+ {
+ BN_MONT_CTX *bn_mont_ctx;
+ if((bn_mont_ctx = BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if(!BN_MONT_CTX_set(bn_mont_ctx, modulus, ctx))
+ {
+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (*ptr == NULL) /* other thread may have finished first */
+ {
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+ if (*ptr == NULL) /* check again in the lock to stop races */
+ {
+ *ptr = bn_mont_ctx;
+ bn_mont_ctx = NULL;
+ }
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+ }
+ if (bn_mont_ctx)
+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
+ return 1;
+ }
+/* Usage example;
+ * MONT_HELPER(rsa, bn_ctx, p, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE, goto err);
+ */
+#define MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, m, pre_cond, err_instr) \
+ if((pre_cond) && ((rsa)->_method_mod_##m == NULL) && \
+ !rsa_eay_mont_helper(&((rsa)->_method_mod_##m), \
+ (rsa)->m, (ctx))) \
+ err_instr
+
static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
{
goto err;
}
- if ((rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) && (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC))
- {
- BN_MONT_CTX* bn_mont_ctx;
- if ((bn_mont_ctx=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
- goto err;
- if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(bn_mont_ctx,rsa->n,ctx))
- {
- BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
- goto err;
- }
- if (rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) /* other thread may have finished first */
- {
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
- if (rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL)
- {
- rsa->_method_mod_n = bn_mont_ctx;
- bn_mont_ctx = NULL;
- }
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
- }
- if (bn_mont_ctx)
- BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
- }
-
+ MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC, goto err);
+
if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
BN_clear_free(&ret);
if (buf != NULL)
{
- memset(buf,0,num);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
OPENSSL_free(buf);
}
return(r);
}
+static int rsa_eay_blinding(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
+ {
+ int ret = 1;
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+ /* Check again inside the lock - the macro's check is racey */
+ if(rsa->blinding == NULL)
+ ret = RSA_blinding_on(rsa, ctx);
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+#define BLINDING_HELPER(rsa, ctx, err_instr) \
+ do { \
+ if((!((rsa)->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) && \
+ ((rsa)->blinding == NULL) && \
+ !rsa_eay_blinding(rsa, ctx)) \
+ err_instr \
+ } while(0)
+
+static BN_BLINDING *setup_blinding(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
+ {
+ BIGNUM *A, *Ai;
+ BN_BLINDING *ret = NULL;
+
+ /* added in OpenSSL 0.9.6j and 0.9.7b */
+
+ /* NB: similar code appears in RSA_blinding_on (rsa_lib.c);
+ * this should be placed in a new function of its own, but for reasons
+ * of binary compatibility can't */
+
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ A = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ if ((RAND_status() == 0) && rsa->d != NULL && rsa->d->d != NULL)
+ {
+ /* if PRNG is not properly seeded, resort to secret exponent as unpredictable seed */
+ RAND_add(rsa->d->d, rsa->d->dmax * sizeof rsa->d->d[0], 0);
+ if (!BN_pseudo_rand_range(A,rsa->n)) goto err;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (!BN_rand_range(A,rsa->n)) goto err;
+ }
+ if ((Ai=BN_mod_inverse(NULL,A,rsa->n,ctx)) == NULL) goto err;
+
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(A,A,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,rsa->_method_mod_n))
+ goto err;
+ ret = BN_BLINDING_new(A,Ai,rsa->n);
+ BN_free(Ai);
+err:
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
/* signing */
static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1;
unsigned char *buf=NULL;
BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
+ int local_blinding = 0;
+ BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
BN_init(&f);
BN_init(&ret);
goto err;
}
- if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) && (rsa->blinding == NULL))
- RSA_blinding_on(rsa,ctx);
- if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING)
- if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(&f,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err;
+ BLINDING_HELPER(rsa, ctx, goto err;);
+ blinding = rsa->blinding;
+
+ /* Now unless blinding is disabled, 'blinding' is non-NULL.
+ * But the BN_BLINDING object may be owned by some other thread
+ * (we don't want to keep it constant and we don't want to use
+ * lots of locking to avoid race conditions, so only a single
+ * thread can use it; other threads have to use local blinding
+ * factors) */
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING))
+ {
+ if (blinding == NULL)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (blinding != NULL)
+ {
+ if (blinding->thread_id != CRYPTO_thread_id())
+ {
+ /* we need a local one-time blinding factor */
+
+ blinding = setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
+ if (blinding == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ local_blinding = 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (blinding)
+ if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(&f, blinding, ctx)) goto err;
if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
((rsa->p != NULL) &&
{ if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa)) goto err; }
else
{
- if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL)) goto err;
+ MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC, goto err);
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,
+ rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
}
- if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING)
- if (!BN_BLINDING_invert(&ret,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err;
+ if (blinding)
+ if (!BN_BLINDING_invert(&ret, blinding, ctx)) goto err;
/* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the
* length of the modulus */
if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
BN_clear_free(&ret);
BN_clear_free(&f);
+ if (local_blinding)
+ BN_BLINDING_free(blinding);
if (buf != NULL)
{
- memset(buf,0,num);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
OPENSSL_free(buf);
}
return(r);
unsigned char *p;
unsigned char *buf=NULL;
BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
+ int local_blinding = 0;
+ BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
BN_init(&f);
BN_init(&ret);
goto err;
}
- if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) && (rsa->blinding == NULL))
- RSA_blinding_on(rsa,ctx);
- if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING)
- if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(&f,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err;
+ BLINDING_HELPER(rsa, ctx, goto err;);
+ blinding = rsa->blinding;
+
+ /* Now unless blinding is disabled, 'blinding' is non-NULL.
+ * But the BN_BLINDING object may be owned by some other thread
+ * (we don't want to keep it constant and we don't want to use
+ * lots of locking to avoid race conditions, so only a single
+ * thread can use it; other threads have to use local blinding
+ * factors) */
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING))
+ {
+ if (blinding == NULL)
+ {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (blinding != NULL)
+ {
+ if (blinding->thread_id != CRYPTO_thread_id())
+ {
+ /* we need a local one-time blinding factor */
+
+ blinding = setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
+ if (blinding == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ local_blinding = 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (blinding)
+ if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(&f, blinding, ctx)) goto err;
/* do the decrypt */
if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
{ if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa)) goto err; }
else
{
- if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL))
+ MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC, goto err);
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,
+ rsa->_method_mod_n))
goto err;
}
- if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING)
- if (!BN_BLINDING_invert(&ret,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err;
+ if (blinding)
+ if (!BN_BLINDING_invert(&ret, blinding, ctx)) goto err;
p=buf;
j=BN_bn2bin(&ret,p); /* j is only used with no-padding mode */
BN_clear_free(&ret);
if (buf != NULL)
{
- memset(buf,0,num);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
OPENSSL_free(buf);
}
return(r);
goto err;
}
- /* do the decrypt */
- if ((rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) && (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC))
- {
- BN_MONT_CTX* bn_mont_ctx;
- if ((bn_mont_ctx=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
- goto err;
- if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(bn_mont_ctx,rsa->n,ctx))
- {
- BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
- goto err;
- }
- if (rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) /* other thread may have finished first */
- {
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
- if (rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL)
- {
- rsa->_method_mod_n = bn_mont_ctx;
- bn_mont_ctx = NULL;
- }
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
- }
- if (bn_mont_ctx)
- BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
- }
-
+ MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC, goto err);
+
if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
BN_clear_free(&ret);
if (buf != NULL)
{
- memset(buf,0,num);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
OPENSSL_free(buf);
}
return(r);
BN_init(&vrfy);
if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
- if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE)
- {
- if (rsa->_method_mod_p == NULL)
- {
- BN_MONT_CTX* bn_mont_ctx;
- if ((bn_mont_ctx=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
- goto err;
- if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(bn_mont_ctx,rsa->p,ctx))
- {
- BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
- goto err;
- }
- if (rsa->_method_mod_p == NULL) /* other thread may have finished first */
- {
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
- if (rsa->_method_mod_p == NULL)
- {
- rsa->_method_mod_p = bn_mont_ctx;
- bn_mont_ctx = NULL;
- }
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
- }
- if (bn_mont_ctx)
- BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
- }
+ MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, p, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE, goto err);
+ MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, q, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE, goto err);
+ MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC, goto err);
- if (rsa->_method_mod_q == NULL)
- {
- BN_MONT_CTX* bn_mont_ctx;
- if ((bn_mont_ctx=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
- goto err;
- if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(bn_mont_ctx,rsa->q,ctx))
- {
- BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
- goto err;
- }
- if (rsa->_method_mod_q == NULL) /* other thread may have finished first */
- {
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
- if (rsa->_method_mod_q == NULL)
- {
- rsa->_method_mod_q = bn_mont_ctx;
- bn_mont_ctx = NULL;
- }
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
- }
- if (bn_mont_ctx)
- BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
- }
- }
-
if (!BN_mod(&r1,I,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&m1,&r1,rsa->dmq1,rsa->q,ctx,
rsa->_method_mod_q)) goto err;
if (!BN_sub(r0,r0,&m1)) goto err;
/* This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does
* affect the multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size */
- if (r0->neg)
+ if (BN_get_sign(r0))
if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
if (!BN_mul(&r1,r0,rsa->iqmp,ctx)) goto err;
* This will *never* happen with OpenSSL generated keys because
* they ensure p > q [steve]
*/
- if (r0->neg)
+ if (BN_get_sign(r0))
if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
if (!BN_mul(&r1,r0,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
if (!BN_add(r0,&r1,&m1)) goto err;
if (rsa->e && rsa->n)
{
- if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&vrfy,r0,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,NULL)) goto err;
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&vrfy,r0,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
/* If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation
* will be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of
* the verify will *always* be less than 'n' so we don't check
* for absolute equality, just congruency. */
if (!BN_sub(&vrfy, &vrfy, I)) goto err;
if (!BN_mod(&vrfy, &vrfy, rsa->n, ctx)) goto err;
- if (vrfy.neg)
+ if (BN_get_sign(&vrfy))
if (!BN_add(&vrfy, &vrfy, rsa->n)) goto err;
if (!BN_is_zero(&vrfy))
/* 'I' and 'vrfy' aren't congruent mod n. Don't leak
* miscalculated CRT output, just do a raw (slower)
* mod_exp and return that instead. */
- if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,I,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL)) goto err;
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,I,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,
+ rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
}
ret=1;
err:
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