unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
-static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa);
+static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx);
static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa);
static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa);
static RSA_METHOD rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth={
static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
{
- BIGNUM f,ret;
+ BIGNUM *f,*ret;
int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1;
unsigned char *buf=NULL;
BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
- BN_init(&f);
- BN_init(&ret);
if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
- if ((buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
+ buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
+ if (!f || !ret || !buf)
{
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (i <= 0) goto err;
- if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,&f) == NULL) goto err;
+ if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,f) == NULL) goto err;
- if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
+ if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0)
{
/* usually the padding functions would catch this */
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC, goto err);
- if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
/* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the
* length of the modulus */
- j=BN_num_bytes(&ret);
- i=BN_bn2bin(&ret,&(to[num-j]));
+ j=BN_num_bytes(ret);
+ i=BN_bn2bin(ret,&(to[num-j]));
for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++)
to[k]=0;
r=num;
err:
- if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- BN_clear_free(&f);
- BN_clear_free(&ret);
+ if (ctx != NULL)
+ {
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ }
if (buf != NULL)
{
OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
return(r);
}
-static int rsa_eay_blinding(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
- {
- int ret = 1;
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
- /* Check again inside the lock - the macro's check is racey */
- if(rsa->blinding == NULL)
- ret = RSA_blinding_on(rsa, ctx);
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
- return ret;
- }
+static BN_BLINDING *rsa_get_blinding(RSA *rsa, BIGNUM **r, int *local, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ BN_BLINDING *ret;
-#define BLINDING_HELPER(rsa, ctx, err_instr) \
- do { \
- if((!((rsa)->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) && \
- ((rsa)->blinding == NULL) && \
- !rsa_eay_blinding(rsa, ctx)) \
- err_instr \
- } while(0)
+ if (rsa->blinding == NULL)
+ {
+ if (rsa->blinding == NULL)
+ {
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+ if (rsa->blinding == NULL)
+ rsa->blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+ }
+ }
-static BN_BLINDING *setup_blinding(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
- {
- BIGNUM *A, *Ai;
- BN_BLINDING *ret = NULL;
+ ret = rsa->blinding;
+ if (ret == NULL)
+ return NULL;
- /* added in OpenSSL 0.9.6j and 0.9.7b */
+ if (BN_BLINDING_get_thread_id(ret) != CRYPTO_thread_id())
+ {
+ *local = 0;
+ if (rsa->mt_blinding == NULL)
+ {
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+ if (rsa->mt_blinding == NULL)
+ rsa->mt_blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+ }
+ ret = rsa->mt_blinding;
+ }
+ else
+ *local = 1;
- /* NB: similar code appears in RSA_blinding_on (rsa_lib.c);
- * this should be placed in a new function of its own, but for reasons
- * of binary compatibility can't */
+ return ret;
+}
- BN_CTX_start(ctx);
- A = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- if ((RAND_status() == 0) && rsa->d != NULL && rsa->d->d != NULL)
+static int rsa_blinding_convert(BN_BLINDING *b, int local, BIGNUM *f,
+ BIGNUM *r, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ if (local)
+ return BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, NULL, b, ctx);
+ else
{
- /* if PRNG is not properly seeded, resort to secret exponent as unpredictable seed */
- RAND_add(rsa->d->d, rsa->d->dmax * sizeof rsa->d->d[0], 0.0);
- if (!BN_pseudo_rand_range(A,rsa->n)) goto err;
+ int ret;
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
+ ret = BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, r, b, ctx);
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
+ return ret;
}
+}
+
+static int rsa_blinding_invert(BN_BLINDING *b, int local, BIGNUM *f,
+ BIGNUM *r, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ if (local)
+ return BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, NULL, b, ctx);
else
{
- if (!BN_rand_range(A,rsa->n)) goto err;
+ int ret;
+ CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
+ ret = BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, r, b, ctx);
+ CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
+ return ret;
}
- if ((Ai=BN_mod_inverse(NULL,A,rsa->n,ctx)) == NULL) goto err;
-
- if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(A,A,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,rsa->_method_mod_n))
- goto err;
- ret = BN_BLINDING_new(A,Ai,rsa->n);
- BN_free(Ai);
-err:
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
- return ret;
- }
+}
/* signing */
static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
{
- BIGNUM f,ret;
+ BIGNUM *f, *ret, *br;
int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1;
unsigned char *buf=NULL;
BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
int local_blinding = 0;
BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
- BN_init(&f);
- BN_init(&ret);
-
if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
- num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
- if ((buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ br = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+ buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
+ if(!f || !ret || !buf)
{
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (i <= 0) goto err;
- if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,&f) == NULL) goto err;
+ if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,f) == NULL) goto err;
- if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
+ if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0)
{
/* usually the padding functions would catch this */
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
goto err;
}
- BLINDING_HELPER(rsa, ctx, goto err;);
- blinding = rsa->blinding;
-
- /* Now unless blinding is disabled, 'blinding' is non-NULL.
- * But the BN_BLINDING object may be owned by some other thread
- * (we don't want to keep it constant and we don't want to use
- * lots of locking to avoid race conditions, so only a single
- * thread can use it; other threads have to use local blinding
- * factors) */
if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING))
{
+ blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &br, &local_blinding, ctx);
if (blinding == NULL)
{
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
}
if (blinding != NULL)
- {
- if (blinding->thread_id != CRYPTO_thread_id())
- {
- /* we need a local one-time blinding factor */
-
- blinding = setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
- if (blinding == NULL)
- goto err;
- local_blinding = 1;
- }
- }
-
- if (blinding)
- if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(&f, blinding, ctx)) goto err;
+ if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, local_blinding, f, br, ctx))
+ goto err;
if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
((rsa->p != NULL) &&
(rsa->dmp1 != NULL) &&
(rsa->dmq1 != NULL) &&
(rsa->iqmp != NULL)) )
- { if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa)) goto err; }
+ { if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret,f,rsa,ctx)) goto err; }
else
{
MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC, goto err);
- if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,
rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
}
if (blinding)
- if (!BN_BLINDING_invert(&ret, blinding, ctx)) goto err;
+ if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, local_blinding, ret, br, ctx))
+ goto err;
/* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the
* length of the modulus */
- j=BN_num_bytes(&ret);
- i=BN_bn2bin(&ret,&(to[num-j]));
+ j=BN_num_bytes(ret);
+ i=BN_bn2bin(ret,&(to[num-j]));
for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++)
to[k]=0;
r=num;
err:
- if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- BN_clear_free(&ret);
- BN_clear_free(&f);
- if (local_blinding)
- BN_BLINDING_free(blinding);
+ if (ctx != NULL)
+ {
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ }
if (buf != NULL)
{
OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
{
- BIGNUM f,ret;
+ BIGNUM *f, *ret, *br;
int j,num=0,r= -1;
unsigned char *p;
unsigned char *buf=NULL;
int local_blinding = 0;
BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
- BN_init(&f);
- BN_init(&ret);
- ctx=BN_CTX_new();
- if (ctx == NULL) goto err;
-
- num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
-
- if ((buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
+ if((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ br = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+ buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
+ if(!f || !ret || !buf)
{
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/* make data into a big number */
- if (BN_bin2bn(from,(int)flen,&f) == NULL) goto err;
+ if (BN_bin2bn(from,(int)flen,f) == NULL) goto err;
- if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
+ if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0)
{
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
goto err;
}
- BLINDING_HELPER(rsa, ctx, goto err;);
- blinding = rsa->blinding;
-
- /* Now unless blinding is disabled, 'blinding' is non-NULL.
- * But the BN_BLINDING object may be owned by some other thread
- * (we don't want to keep it constant and we don't want to use
- * lots of locking to avoid race conditions, so only a single
- * thread can use it; other threads have to use local blinding
- * factors) */
if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING))
{
+ blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &br, &local_blinding, ctx);
if (blinding == NULL)
{
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
if (blinding != NULL)
- {
- if (blinding->thread_id != CRYPTO_thread_id())
- {
- /* we need a local one-time blinding factor */
-
- blinding = setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
- if (blinding == NULL)
- goto err;
- local_blinding = 1;
- }
- }
-
- if (blinding)
- if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(&f, blinding, ctx)) goto err;
+ if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, local_blinding, f, br, ctx))
+ goto err;
/* do the decrypt */
if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
(rsa->dmp1 != NULL) &&
(rsa->dmq1 != NULL) &&
(rsa->iqmp != NULL)) )
- { if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa)) goto err; }
+ { if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret,f,rsa,ctx)) goto err; }
else
{
MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC, goto err);
- if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,
rsa->_method_mod_n))
goto err;
}
if (blinding)
- if (!BN_BLINDING_invert(&ret, blinding, ctx)) goto err;
+ if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, local_blinding, ret, br, ctx))
+ goto err;
p=buf;
- j=BN_bn2bin(&ret,p); /* j is only used with no-padding mode */
+ j=BN_bn2bin(ret,p); /* j is only used with no-padding mode */
switch (padding)
{
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
err:
- if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- BN_clear_free(&f);
- BN_clear_free(&ret);
- if (local_blinding)
- BN_BLINDING_free(blinding);
+ if (ctx != NULL)
+ {
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ }
if (buf != NULL)
{
OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
{
- BIGNUM f,ret;
+ BIGNUM *f,*ret;
int i,num=0,r= -1;
unsigned char *p;
unsigned char *buf=NULL;
BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
- BN_init(&f);
- BN_init(&ret);
- ctx=BN_CTX_new();
- if (ctx == NULL) goto err;
-
+ if((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
- buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num);
- if (buf == NULL)
+ buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
+ if(!f || !ret || !buf)
{
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
goto err;
}
- if (BN_bin2bn(from,flen,&f) == NULL) goto err;
+ if (BN_bin2bn(from,flen,f) == NULL) goto err;
- if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
+ if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0)
{
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
goto err;
MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC, goto err);
- if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
p=buf;
- i=BN_bn2bin(&ret,p);
+ i=BN_bn2bin(ret,p);
switch (padding)
{
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
err:
- if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- BN_clear_free(&f);
- BN_clear_free(&ret);
+ if (ctx != NULL)
+ {
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ }
if (buf != NULL)
{
OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
return(r);
}
-static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa)
+static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
- BIGNUM r1,m1,vrfy;
+ BIGNUM *r1,*m1,*vrfy;
int ret=0;
- BN_CTX *ctx;
- BN_init(&m1);
- BN_init(&r1);
- BN_init(&vrfy);
- if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ m1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ vrfy = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, p, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE, goto err);
MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, q, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE, goto err);
MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC, goto err);
- if (!BN_mod(&r1,I,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
- if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&m1,&r1,rsa->dmq1,rsa->q,ctx,
+ if (!BN_mod(r1,I,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(m1,r1,rsa->dmq1,rsa->q,ctx,
rsa->_method_mod_q)) goto err;
- if (!BN_mod(&r1,I,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
- if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,&r1,rsa->dmp1,rsa->p,ctx,
+ if (!BN_mod(r1,I,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,r1,rsa->dmp1,rsa->p,ctx,
rsa->_method_mod_p)) goto err;
- if (!BN_sub(r0,r0,&m1)) goto err;
+ if (!BN_sub(r0,r0,m1)) goto err;
/* This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does
* affect the multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size */
- if (BN_get_sign(r0))
+ if (BN_is_negative(r0))
if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
- if (!BN_mul(&r1,r0,rsa->iqmp,ctx)) goto err;
- if (!BN_mod(r0,&r1,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
+ if (!BN_mul(r1,r0,rsa->iqmp,ctx)) goto err;
+ if (!BN_mod(r0,r1,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
/* If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of
* adding 'p' if r0 is negative above to leave the result still
* negative. This can break the private key operations: the following
* This will *never* happen with OpenSSL generated keys because
* they ensure p > q [steve]
*/
- if (BN_get_sign(r0))
+ if (BN_is_negative(r0))
if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
- if (!BN_mul(&r1,r0,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
- if (!BN_add(r0,&r1,&m1)) goto err;
+ if (!BN_mul(r1,r0,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
+ if (!BN_add(r0,r1,m1)) goto err;
if (rsa->e && rsa->n)
{
- if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&vrfy,r0,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(vrfy,r0,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
/* If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation
* will be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of
* the verify will *always* be less than 'n' so we don't check
* for absolute equality, just congruency. */
- if (!BN_sub(&vrfy, &vrfy, I)) goto err;
- if (!BN_mod(&vrfy, &vrfy, rsa->n, ctx)) goto err;
- if (BN_get_sign(&vrfy))
- if (!BN_add(&vrfy, &vrfy, rsa->n)) goto err;
- if (!BN_is_zero(&vrfy))
+ if (!BN_sub(vrfy, vrfy, I)) goto err;
+ if (!BN_mod(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n, ctx)) goto err;
+ if (BN_is_negative(vrfy))
+ if (!BN_add(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n)) goto err;
+ if (!BN_is_zero(vrfy))
/* 'I' and 'vrfy' aren't congruent mod n. Don't leak
* miscalculated CRT output, just do a raw (slower)
* mod_exp and return that instead. */
}
ret=1;
err:
- BN_clear_free(&m1);
- BN_clear_free(&r1);
- BN_clear_free(&vrfy);
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
return(ret);
}
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff