Allow digests to supply S/MIME micalg values from a ctrl.

[openssl.git] / crypto / rsa / rsa_chk.c

diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_chk.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_chk.c
index 2462c5e7933c602d135851da3c2d9d4d52bd7924..9d848db8c6c783f8718d86a0b86bbae2bb3f967d 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_chk.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_chk.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* crypto/rsa/rsa_chck.c  -*- Mode: C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* crypto/rsa/rsa_chk.c  -*- Mode: C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
 /* ====================================================================
  * Copyright (c) 1999 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -53,10 +53,11 @@
 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
 
 
-int RSA_check_key(RSA *key)
+int RSA_check_key(const RSA *key)
        {
        BIGNUM *i, *j, *k, *l, *m;
        BN_CTX *ctx;
+       int r;
        int ret=1;
        
        i = BN_new();
@@ -68,86 +69,110 @@ int RSA_check_key(RSA *key)
        if (i == NULL || j == NULL || k == NULL || l == NULL ||
                m == NULL || ctx == NULL)
                {
+               ret = -1;
                RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
                goto err;
                }
        
        /* p prime? */
-       if (BN_is_prime(key->p, BN_prime_checks, NULL, NULL, NULL) != 1)
+       r = BN_is_prime_ex(key->p, BN_prime_checks, NULL, NULL);
+       if (r != 1)
                {
-               ret = 0;
-               if (ERR_GET_REASON(ERR_peek_error()) == ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE)
+               ret = r;
+               if (r != 0)
                        goto err;
                RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY, RSA_R_P_NOT_PRIME);
                }
        
        /* q prime? */
-       if (BN_is_prime(key->q, BN_prime_checks, NULL, NULL, NULL) != 1)
+       r = BN_is_prime_ex(key->q, BN_prime_checks, NULL, NULL);
+       if (r != 1)
                {
-               ret = 0;
-               if (ERR_GET_REASON(ERR_peek_error()) == ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE)
+               ret = r;
+               if (r != 0)
                        goto err;
                RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY, RSA_R_Q_NOT_PRIME);
                }
        
        /* n = p*q? */
-       BN_mul(i, key->p, key->q, ctx);
+       r = BN_mul(i, key->p, key->q, ctx);
+       if (!r) { ret = -1; goto err; }
+       
        if (BN_cmp(i, key->n) != 0)
                {
                ret = 0;
-               if (ERR_GET_REASON(ERR_peek_error()) == ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE)
-                       goto err;
-               RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY, RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_PQ);
+               RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY, RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q);
                }
        
-       /* dmp1 = d mod (p-1)? */
-       BN_sub(i, key->p, BN_value_one());
-       BN_mod(j, key->d, i, ctx);
-       if (BN_cmp(j, key->dmp1) != 0)
+       /* d*e = 1  mod lcm(p-1,q-1)? */
+
+       r = BN_sub(i, key->p, BN_value_one());
+       if (!r) { ret = -1; goto err; }
+       r = BN_sub(j, key->q, BN_value_one());
+       if (!r) { ret = -1; goto err; }
+
+       /* now compute k = lcm(i,j) */
+       r = BN_mul(l, i, j, ctx);
+       if (!r) { ret = -1; goto err; }
+       r = BN_gcd(m, i, j, ctx);
+       if (!r) { ret = -1; goto err; }
+       r = BN_div(k, NULL, l, m, ctx); /* remainder is 0 */
+       if (!r) { ret = -1; goto err; }
+
+       r = BN_mod_mul(i, key->d, key->e, k, ctx);
+       if (!r) { ret = -1; goto err; }
+
+       if (!BN_is_one(i))
                {
                ret = 0;
-               if (ERR_GET_REASON(ERR_peek_error()) == ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE)
-                       goto err;
-               RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY, RSA_R_DMP1_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_D);
+               RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY, RSA_R_D_E_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_1);
                }
        
-       /* dmq1 = d mod (q-1)? */    
-       BN_sub(i, key->q, BN_value_one());
-       BN_mod(j, key->d, i, ctx);
-       if (BN_cmp(j, key->dmq1) != 0)
+       if (key->dmp1 != NULL && key->dmq1 != NULL && key->iqmp != NULL)
                {
-               ret = 0;
-               if (ERR_GET_REASON(ERR_peek_error()) == ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE)
-                       goto err;
-               RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY, RSA_R_DMQ1_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_D);
-               }
+               /* dmp1 = d mod (p-1)? */
+               r = BN_sub(i, key->p, BN_value_one());
+               if (!r) { ret = -1; goto err; }
+
+               r = BN_mod(j, key->d, i, ctx);
+               if (!r) { ret = -1; goto err; }
+
+               if (BN_cmp(j, key->dmp1) != 0)
+                       {
+                       ret = 0;
+                       RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY,
+                               RSA_R_DMP1_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_D);
+                       }
        
-       /* iqmp = q^-1 mod p? */
-       BN_mod_inverse(i, key->q, key->p, ctx);
-       if (BN_cmp(i, key->iqmp) != 0)
-               {
-               ret = 0;
-               if (ERR_GET_REASON(ERR_peek_error()) == ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE)
-                       goto err;
-               RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY, RSA_R_IQMP_NOT_INVERSE_OF_Q);
-               }
+               /* dmq1 = d mod (q-1)? */    
+               r = BN_sub(i, key->q, BN_value_one());
+               if (!r) { ret = -1; goto err; }
        
-       /* d*e = 1  mod lcm(p-1,q-1)? */
-       BN_sub(i, key->p, BN_value_one());
-       BN_sub(j, key->q, BN_value_one());
-       /* now compute k = lcm(i,j) */
-       BN_mul(l, i, j, ctx);
-       BN_gcd(m, i, j, ctx);
-       BN_div(k, NULL, l, m, ctx); /* remainder is 0 */
-       BN_mod_mul(i, key->d, key->e, k, ctx);
-       if (!BN_is_one(i))
-               {
-               ret = 0;
-               if (ERR_GET_REASON(ERR_peek_error()) == ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE)
+               r = BN_mod(j, key->d, i, ctx);
+               if (!r) { ret = -1; goto err; }
+
+               if (BN_cmp(j, key->dmq1) != 0)
+                       {
+                       ret = 0;
+                       RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY,
+                               RSA_R_DMQ1_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_D);
+                       }
+       
+               /* iqmp = q^-1 mod p? */
+               if(!BN_mod_inverse(i, key->q, key->p, ctx))
+                       {
+                       ret = -1;
                        goto err;
-               RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY, RSA_R_DE_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_1);
+                       }
+
+               if (BN_cmp(i, key->iqmp) != 0)
+                       {
+                       ret = 0;
+                       RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY,
+                               RSA_R_IQMP_NOT_INVERSE_OF_Q);
+                       }
                }
-       
+
  err:
        if (i != NULL) BN_free(i);
        if (j != NULL) BN_free(j);