/*
- * Copyright 2006-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2006-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
+/*
+ * RSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
+ * internal use.
+ */
+#include "internal/deprecated.h"
+
#include <stdio.h>
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/cms.h>
+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
+#include <openssl/param_build.h>
#include "crypto/asn1.h"
#include "crypto/evp.h"
-#include "rsa_locl.h"
+#include "crypto/rsa.h"
+#include "rsa_local.h"
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
static int rsa_cms_sign(CMS_SignerInfo *si);
#endif
static RSA_PSS_PARAMS *rsa_pss_decode(const X509_ALGOR *alg);
+static int rsa_sync_to_pss_params_30(RSA *rsa);
/* Set any parameters associated with pkey */
static int rsa_param_encode(const EVP_PKEY *pkey,
*pstr = NULL;
/* If RSA it's just NULL type */
- if (pkey->ameth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
+ if (RSA_test_flags(rsa, RSA_FLAG_TYPE_MASK) != RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSASSAPSS) {
*pstrtype = V_ASN1_NULL;
return 1;
}
rsa->pss = rsa_pss_decode(alg);
if (rsa->pss == NULL)
return 0;
+ if (!rsa_sync_to_pss_params_30(rsa))
+ return 0;
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
-static int rsa_pub_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509_PUBKEY *pubkey)
+static int rsa_pub_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, const X509_PUBKEY *pubkey)
{
const unsigned char *p;
int pklen;
if (!X509_PUBKEY_get0_param(NULL, &p, &pklen, &alg, pubkey))
return 0;
- if ((rsa = d2i_RSAPublicKey(NULL, &p, pklen)) == NULL) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PUB_DECODE, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
+ if ((rsa = d2i_RSAPublicKey(NULL, &p, pklen)) == NULL)
return 0;
- }
if (!rsa_param_decode(rsa, alg)) {
RSA_free(rsa);
return 0;
}
+
+ RSA_clear_flags(rsa, RSA_FLAG_TYPE_MASK);
+ switch (pkey->ameth->pkey_id) {
+ case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
+ RSA_set_flags(rsa, RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSA);
+ break;
+ case EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS:
+ RSA_set_flags(rsa, RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSASSAPSS);
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* Leave the type bits zero */
+ break;
+ }
+
if (!EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, pkey->ameth->pkey_id, rsa)) {
RSA_free(rsa);
return 0;
static int rsa_pub_cmp(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b)
{
+ /*
+ * Don't check the public/private key, this is mostly for smart
+ * cards.
+ */
+ if (((RSA_flags(a->pkey.rsa) & RSA_METHOD_FLAG_NO_CHECK))
+ || (RSA_flags(b->pkey.rsa) & RSA_METHOD_FLAG_NO_CHECK)) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+
if (BN_cmp(b->pkey.rsa->n, a->pkey.rsa->n) != 0
|| BN_cmp(b->pkey.rsa->e, a->pkey.rsa->e) != 0)
return 0;
{
RSA *rsa;
- if ((rsa = d2i_RSAPrivateKey(NULL, pder, derlen)) == NULL) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_OLD_RSA_PRIV_DECODE, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
+ if ((rsa = d2i_RSAPrivateKey(NULL, pder, derlen)) == NULL)
return 0;
- }
EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, pkey->ameth->pkey_id, rsa);
return 1;
}
RSA_free(rsa);
return 0;
}
+
+ RSA_clear_flags(rsa, RSA_FLAG_TYPE_MASK);
+ switch (pkey->ameth->pkey_id) {
+ case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
+ RSA_set_flags(rsa, RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSA);
+ break;
+ case EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS:
+ RSA_set_flags(rsa, RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSASSAPSS);
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* Leave the type bits zero */
+ break;
+ }
+
EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, pkey->ameth->pkey_id, rsa);
return 1;
}
{
const EVP_MD *sigmd, *mgf1md;
EVP_PKEY *pk = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(pkctx);
+ RSA *rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pk);
int saltlen;
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_signature_md(pkctx, &sigmd) <= 0)
if (saltlen == -1) {
saltlen = EVP_MD_size(sigmd);
} else if (saltlen == -2 || saltlen == -3) {
- saltlen = EVP_PKEY_size(pk) - EVP_MD_size(sigmd) - 2;
+ saltlen = RSA_size(rsa) - EVP_MD_size(sigmd) - 2;
if ((EVP_PKEY_bits(pk) & 0x7) == 1)
saltlen--;
if (saltlen < 0)
*/
static int rsa_pss_to_ctx(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx,
- X509_ALGOR *sigalg, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+ const X509_ALGOR *sigalg, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
int rv = -1;
int saltlen;
return rv;
}
-int rsa_pss_get_param(const RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss, const EVP_MD **pmd,
- const EVP_MD **pmgf1md, int *psaltlen)
+static int rsa_pss_verify_param(const EVP_MD **pmd, const EVP_MD **pmgf1md,
+ int *psaltlen, int *ptrailerField)
{
+ if (psaltlen != NULL && *psaltlen < 0) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /*
+ * low-level routines support only trailer field 0xbc (value 1) and
+ * PKCS#1 says we should reject any other value anyway.
+ */
+ if (ptrailerField != NULL && *ptrailerField != 1) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_TRAILER);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int rsa_pss_get_param_unverified(const RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss,
+ const EVP_MD **pmd,
+ const EVP_MD **pmgf1md,
+ int *psaltlen, int *ptrailerField)
+{
+ RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 pss_params;
+
+ /* Get the defaults from the ONE place */
+ (void)ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_defaults(&pss_params);
+
if (pss == NULL)
return 0;
*pmd = rsa_algor_to_md(pss->hashAlgorithm);
*pmgf1md = rsa_algor_to_md(pss->maskHash);
if (*pmgf1md == NULL)
return 0;
- if (pss->saltLength) {
+ if (pss->saltLength)
*psaltlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(pss->saltLength);
- if (*psaltlen < 0) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PSS_GET_PARAM, RSA_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH);
- return 0;
- }
- } else {
- *psaltlen = 20;
- }
+ else
+ *psaltlen = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_saltlen(&pss_params);
+ if (pss->trailerField)
+ *ptrailerField = ASN1_INTEGER_get(pss->trailerField);
+ else
+ *ptrailerField = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_trailerfield(&pss_params);;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int rsa_pss_get_param(const RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss, const EVP_MD **pmd,
+ const EVP_MD **pmgf1md, int *psaltlen)
+{
/*
- * low-level routines support only trailer field 0xbc (value 1) and
- * PKCS#1 says we should reject any other value anyway.
+ * Callers do not care about the trailer field, and yet, we must
+ * pass it from get_param to verify_param, since the latter checks
+ * its value.
+ *
+ * When callers start caring, it's a simple thing to add another
+ * argument to this function.
*/
- if (pss->trailerField && ASN1_INTEGER_get(pss->trailerField) != 1) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PSS_GET_PARAM, RSA_R_INVALID_TRAILER);
- return 0;
- }
+ int trailerField = 0;
+ return rsa_pss_get_param_unverified(pss, pmd, pmgf1md, psaltlen,
+ &trailerField)
+ && rsa_pss_verify_param(pmd, pmgf1md, psaltlen, &trailerField);
+}
+
+static int rsa_sync_to_pss_params_30(RSA *rsa)
+{
+ if (rsa != NULL && rsa->pss != NULL) {
+ const EVP_MD *md = NULL, *mgf1md = NULL;
+ int md_nid, mgf1md_nid, saltlen, trailerField;
+ RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 pss_params;
+
+ /*
+ * We don't care about the validity of the fields here, we just
+ * want to synchronise values. Verifying here makes it impossible
+ * to even read a key with invalid values, making it hard to test
+ * a bad situation.
+ *
+ * Other routines use rsa_pss_get_param(), so the values will be
+ * checked, eventually.
+ */
+ if (!rsa_pss_get_param_unverified(rsa->pss, &md, &mgf1md,
+ &saltlen, &trailerField))
+ return 0;
+ md_nid = EVP_MD_type(md);
+ mgf1md_nid = EVP_MD_type(mgf1md);
+ if (!ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_defaults(&pss_params)
+ || !ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_hashalg(&pss_params, md_nid)
+ || !ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_maskgenhashalg(&pss_params,
+ mgf1md_nid)
+ || !ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_saltlen(&pss_params, saltlen)
+ || !ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_trailerfield(&pss_params,
+ trailerField))
+ return 0;
+ rsa->pss_params = pss_params;
+ }
return 1;
}
* is encountered requiring special handling. We currently only handle PSS.
*/
-static int rsa_item_verify(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *asn,
- X509_ALGOR *sigalg, ASN1_BIT_STRING *sig,
- EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+static int rsa_item_verify(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+ const void *asn, const X509_ALGOR *sigalg,
+ const ASN1_BIT_STRING *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
/* Sanity check: make sure it is PSS */
if (OBJ_obj2nid(sigalg->algorithm) != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
}
#endif
-static int rsa_item_sign(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *asn,
+static int rsa_item_sign(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const ASN1_ITEM *it, const void *asn,
X509_ALGOR *alg1, X509_ALGOR *alg2,
ASN1_BIT_STRING *sig)
{
uint32_t flags;
const EVP_MD *mgf1md = NULL, *md = NULL;
RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss;
+ int secbits;
/* Sanity check: make sure it is PSS */
if (OBJ_obj2nid(sigalg->algorithm) != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS)
else
flags = 0;
/* Note: security bits half number of digest bits */
- X509_SIG_INFO_set(siginf, mdnid, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, EVP_MD_size(md) * 4,
+ secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
+ /*
+ * SHA1 and MD5 are known to be broken. Reduce security bits so that
+ * they're no longer accepted at security level 1. The real values don't
+ * really matter as long as they're lower than 80, which is our security
+ * level 1.
+ * https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/014 puts a chosen-prefix attack for SHA1 at
+ * 2^63.4
+ * https://documents.epfl.ch/users/l/le/lenstra/public/papers/lat.pdf
+ * puts a chosen-prefix attack for MD5 at 2^39.
+ */
+ if (mdnid == NID_sha1)
+ secbits = 64;
+ else if (mdnid == NID_md5_sha1)
+ secbits = 68;
+ else if (mdnid == NID_md5)
+ secbits = 39;
+ X509_SIG_INFO_set(siginf, mdnid, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, secbits,
flags);
rv = 1;
err:
goto err;
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md(pkctx, mgf1md) <= 0)
goto err;
- if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_rsa_oaep_label(pkctx, label, labellen) <= 0)
+ if (label != NULL
+ && EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_rsa_oaep_label(pkctx, label, labellen) <= 0)
goto err;
/* Carry on */
rv = 1;
return RSA_check_key_ex(pkey->pkey.rsa, NULL);
}
+static size_t rsa_pkey_dirty_cnt(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+ return pkey->pkey.rsa->dirty_cnt;
+}
+
+/*
+ * For the moment, we trust the call path, where keys going through
+ * rsa_pkey_export_to() match a KEYMGMT for the "RSA" keytype, while
+ * keys going through rsa_pss_pkey_export_to() match a KEYMGMT for the
+ * "RSA-PSS" keytype.
+ * TODO(3.0) Investigate whether we should simply continue to trust the
+ * call path, or if we should strengthen this function by checking that
+ * |rsa_type| matches the RSA key subtype. The latter requires ensuring
+ * that the type flag for the RSA key is properly set by other functions
+ * in this file.
+ */
+static int rsa_int_export_to(const EVP_PKEY *from, int rsa_type,
+ void *to_keydata, EVP_KEYMGMT *to_keymgmt,
+ OPENSSL_CTX *libctx, const char *propq)
+{
+ RSA *rsa = from->pkey.rsa;
+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD *tmpl = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new();
+ OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
+ int selection = 0;
+ int rv = 0;
+
+ if (tmpl == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ /*
+ * If the RSA method is foreign, then we can't be sure of anything, and
+ * can therefore not export or pretend to export.
+ */
+ if (RSA_get_method(rsa) != RSA_PKCS1_OpenSSL())
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Public parameters must always be present */
+ if (RSA_get0_n(rsa) == NULL || RSA_get0_e(rsa) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!ossl_rsa_todata(rsa, tmpl, NULL))
+ goto err;
+
+ selection |= OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PUBLIC_KEY;
+ if (RSA_get0_d(rsa) != NULL)
+ selection |= OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PRIVATE_KEY;
+
+ if (rsa->pss != NULL) {
+ const EVP_MD *md = NULL, *mgf1md = NULL;
+ int md_nid, mgf1md_nid, saltlen, trailerfield;
+ RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 pss_params;
+
+ if (!rsa_pss_get_param_unverified(rsa->pss, &md, &mgf1md,
+ &saltlen, &trailerfield))
+ goto err;
+ md_nid = EVP_MD_type(md);
+ mgf1md_nid = EVP_MD_type(mgf1md);
+ if (!ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_defaults(&pss_params)
+ || !ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_hashalg(&pss_params, md_nid)
+ || !ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_maskgenhashalg(&pss_params,
+ mgf1md_nid)
+ || !ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_saltlen(&pss_params, saltlen)
+ || !ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_todata(&pss_params, tmpl, NULL))
+ goto err;
+ selection |= OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_OTHER_PARAMETERS;
+ }
+
+ if ((params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(tmpl)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* We export, the provider imports */
+ rv = evp_keymgmt_import(to_keymgmt, to_keydata, selection, params);
+
+ err:
+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free_params(params);
+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(tmpl);
+ return rv;
+}
+
+static int rsa_int_import_from(const OSSL_PARAM params[], void *vpctx,
+ int rsa_type)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = vpctx;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(pctx);
+ RSA *rsa = ossl_rsa_new_with_ctx(pctx->libctx);
+ RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 rsa_pss_params = { 0, };
+ int ok = 0;
+
+ if (rsa == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ RSA_clear_flags(rsa, RSA_FLAG_TYPE_MASK);
+ RSA_set_flags(rsa, rsa_type);
+
+ if (!ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_fromdata(&rsa_pss_params, params, pctx->libctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ switch (rsa_type) {
+ case RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSA:
+ /*
+ * Were PSS parameters filled in?
+ * In that case, something's wrong
+ */
+ if (!ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_is_unrestricted(&rsa_pss_params))
+ goto err;
+ break;
+ case RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSASSAPSS:
+ /*
+ * Were PSS parameters filled in? In that case, create the old
+ * RSA_PSS_PARAMS structure. Otherwise, this is an unrestricted key.
+ */
+ if (!ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_is_unrestricted(&rsa_pss_params)) {
+ /* Create the older RSA_PSS_PARAMS from RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 data */
+ int mdnid = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_hashalg(&rsa_pss_params);
+ int mgf1mdnid = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenhashalg(&rsa_pss_params);
+ int saltlen = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_saltlen(&rsa_pss_params);
+ const EVP_MD *md = EVP_get_digestbynid(mdnid);
+ const EVP_MD *mgf1md = EVP_get_digestbynid(mgf1mdnid);
+
+ if ((rsa->pss = rsa_pss_params_create(md, mgf1md, saltlen)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* RSA key sub-types we don't know how to handle yet */
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!ossl_rsa_fromdata(rsa, params))
+ goto err;
+
+ switch (rsa_type) {
+ case RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSA:
+ ok = EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa);
+ break;
+ case RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSASSAPSS:
+ ok = EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, rsa);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ err:
+ if (!ok)
+ RSA_free(rsa);
+ return ok;
+}
+
+static int rsa_pkey_export_to(const EVP_PKEY *from, void *to_keydata,
+ EVP_KEYMGMT *to_keymgmt, OPENSSL_CTX *libctx,
+ const char *propq)
+{
+ return rsa_int_export_to(from, RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSA, to_keydata,
+ to_keymgmt, libctx, propq);
+}
+
+static int rsa_pss_pkey_export_to(const EVP_PKEY *from, void *to_keydata,
+ EVP_KEYMGMT *to_keymgmt, OPENSSL_CTX *libctx,
+ const char *propq)
+{
+ return rsa_int_export_to(from, RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSASSAPSS, to_keydata,
+ to_keymgmt, libctx, propq);
+}
+
+static int rsa_pkey_import_from(const OSSL_PARAM params[], void *vpctx)
+{
+ return rsa_int_import_from(params, vpctx, RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSA);
+}
+
+static int rsa_pss_pkey_import_from(const OSSL_PARAM params[], void *vpctx)
+{
+ return rsa_int_import_from(params, vpctx, RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSASSAPSS);
+}
+
const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD rsa_asn1_meths[2] = {
{
EVP_PKEY_RSA,
rsa_item_verify,
rsa_item_sign,
rsa_sig_info_set,
- rsa_pkey_check
+ rsa_pkey_check,
+
+ 0, 0,
+ 0, 0, 0, 0,
+
+ rsa_pkey_dirty_cnt,
+ rsa_pkey_export_to,
+ rsa_pkey_import_from
},
{
rsa_item_verify,
rsa_item_sign,
0,
- rsa_pkey_check
+ rsa_pkey_check,
+
+ 0, 0,
+ 0, 0, 0, 0,
+
+ rsa_pkey_dirty_cnt,
+ rsa_pss_pkey_export_to,
+ rsa_pss_pkey_import_from
};
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff