/* crypto/rand/randfile.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1997 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
+/* We need to define this to get macros like S_IFBLK and S_IFCHR */
+#define _XOPEN_SOURCE 500
+
+#include <errno.h>
#include <stdio.h>
-#include "cryptlib.h"
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include "rand.h"
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "e_os.h"
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+#include <unixio.h>
+#endif
+#ifndef NO_SYS_TYPES_H
+# include <sys/types.h>
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef _WIN32
+#define stat _stat
+#define chmod _chmod
+#define open _open
+#define fdopen _fdopen
+#endif
#undef BUFSIZE
#define BUFSIZE 1024
#define RAND_DATA 1024
-/* #define RFILE ".rand" - defined in ../../e_os.h */
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+/* This declaration is a nasty hack to get around vms' extension to fopen
+ * for passing in sharing options being disabled by our /STANDARD=ANSI89 */
+static FILE *(*const vms_fopen)(const char *, const char *, ...) =
+ (FILE *(*)(const char *, const char *, ...))fopen;
+#define VMS_OPEN_ATTRS "shr=get,put,upd,del","ctx=bin,stm","rfm=stm","rat=none","mrs=0"
+#endif
-int RAND_load_file(file,bytes)
-char *file;
-long bytes;
+/* #define RFILE ".rnd" - defined in ../../e_os.h */
+
+/* Note that these functions are intended for seed files only.
+ * Entropy devices and EGD sockets are handled in rand_unix.c */
+
+int RAND_load_file(const char *file, long bytes)
{
+ /* If bytes >= 0, read up to 'bytes' bytes.
+ * if bytes == -1, read complete file. */
+
MS_STATIC unsigned char buf[BUFSIZE];
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO
struct stat sb;
+#endif
int i,ret=0,n;
FILE *in;
if (file == NULL) return(0);
- i=stat(file,&sb);
- /* If the state fails, put some crap in anyway */
- RAND_seed((unsigned char *)&sb,sizeof(sb));
- ret+=sizeof(sb);
- if (i < 0) return(0);
- if (bytes <= 0) return(ret);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO
+#ifdef PURIFY
+ /* struct stat can have padding and unused fields that may not be
+ * initialized in the call to stat(). We need to clear the entire
+ * structure before calling RAND_add() to avoid complaints from
+ * applications such as Valgrind.
+ */
+ memset(&sb, 0, sizeof(sb));
+#endif
+ if (stat(file,&sb) < 0) return(0);
+ RAND_add(&sb,sizeof(sb),0.0);
+#endif
+ if (bytes == 0) return(ret);
- in=fopen(file,"r");
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+ in=vms_fopen(file,"rb",VMS_OPEN_ATTRS);
+#else
+ in=fopen(file,"rb");
+#endif
if (in == NULL) goto err;
+#if defined(S_IFBLK) && defined(S_IFCHR) && !defined(OPNESSL_NO_POSIX_IO)
+ if (sb.st_mode & (S_IFBLK | S_IFCHR)) {
+ /* this file is a device. we don't want read an infinite number
+ * of bytes from a random device, nor do we want to use buffered
+ * I/O because we will waste system entropy.
+ */
+ bytes = (bytes == -1) ? 2048 : bytes; /* ok, is 2048 enough? */
+ setvbuf(in, NULL, _IONBF, 0); /* don't do buffered reads */
+ }
+#endif
for (;;)
{
- n=(bytes < BUFSIZE)?(int)bytes:BUFSIZE;
+ if (bytes > 0)
+ n = (bytes < BUFSIZE)?(int)bytes:BUFSIZE;
+ else
+ n = BUFSIZE;
i=fread(buf,1,n,in);
if (i <= 0) break;
+#ifdef PURIFY
+ RAND_add(buf,i,(double)i);
+#else
/* even if n != i, use the full array */
- RAND_seed(buf,n);
+ RAND_add(buf,n,(double)i);
+#endif
ret+=i;
- bytes-=n;
- if (bytes <= 0) break;
+ if (bytes > 0)
+ {
+ bytes-=n;
+ if (bytes <= 0) break;
+ }
}
fclose(in);
- memset(buf,0,BUFSIZE);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,BUFSIZE);
err:
return(ret);
}
-int RAND_write_file(file)
-char *file;
+int RAND_write_file(const char *file)
{
unsigned char buf[BUFSIZE];
- int i,ret=0;
- FILE *out;
+ int i,ret=0,rand_err=0;
+ FILE *out = NULL;
int n;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO
+ struct stat sb;
+
+ i=stat(file,&sb);
+ if (i != -1) {
+#if defined(S_ISBLK) && defined(S_ISCHR)
+ if (S_ISBLK(sb.st_mode) || S_ISCHR(sb.st_mode)) {
+ /* this file is a device. we don't write back to it.
+ * we "succeed" on the assumption this is some sort
+ * of random device. Otherwise attempting to write to
+ * and chmod the device causes problems.
+ */
+ return(1);
+ }
+#endif
+ }
+#endif
- out=fopen(file,"w");
+#if defined(O_CREAT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
+ {
+#ifndef O_BINARY
+#define O_BINARY 0
+#endif
+ /* chmod(..., 0600) is too late to protect the file,
+ * permissions should be restrictive from the start */
+ int fd = open(file, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_BINARY, 0600);
+ if (fd != -1)
+ out = fdopen(fd, "wb");
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+ /* VMS NOTE: Prior versions of this routine created a _new_
+ * version of the rand file for each call into this routine, then
+ * deleted all existing versions named ;-1, and finally renamed
+ * the current version as ';1'. Under concurrent usage, this
+ * resulted in an RMS race condition in rename() which could
+ * orphan files (see vms message help for RMS$_REENT). With the
+ * fopen() calls below, openssl/VMS now shares the top-level
+ * version of the rand file. Note that there may still be
+ * conditions where the top-level rand file is locked. If so, this
+ * code will then create a new version of the rand file. Without
+ * the delete and rename code, this can result in ascending file
+ * versions that stop at version 32767, and this routine will then
+ * return an error. The remedy for this is to recode the calling
+ * application to avoid concurrent use of the rand file, or
+ * synchronize usage at the application level. Also consider
+ * whether or not you NEED a persistent rand file in a concurrent
+ * use situation.
+ */
+
+ out = vms_fopen(file,"rb+",VMS_OPEN_ATTRS);
+ if (out == NULL)
+ out = vms_fopen(file,"wb",VMS_OPEN_ATTRS);
+#else
+ if (out == NULL)
+ out = fopen(file,"wb");
+#endif
if (out == NULL) goto err;
+
+#ifndef NO_CHMOD
chmod(file,0600);
+#endif
n=RAND_DATA;
for (;;)
{
i=(n > BUFSIZE)?BUFSIZE:n;
n-=BUFSIZE;
- RAND_bytes(buf,i);
+ if (RAND_bytes(buf,i) <= 0)
+ rand_err=1;
i=fwrite(buf,1,i,out);
if (i <= 0)
{
}
ret+=i;
if (n <= 0) break;
- }
+ }
+
fclose(out);
- memset(buf,0,BUFSIZE);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,BUFSIZE);
err:
- return(ret);
+ return (rand_err ? -1 : ret);
}
-char *RAND_file_name(buf,size)
-char *buf;
-int size;
+const char *RAND_file_name(char *buf, size_t size)
{
- char *s;
- char *ret=NULL;
+ char *s=NULL;
+#ifdef __OpenBSD__
+ struct stat sb;
+#endif
- s=getenv("RANDFILE");
- if (s != NULL)
+ if (OPENSSL_issetugid() == 0)
+ s=getenv("RANDFILE");
+ if (s != NULL && *s && strlen(s) + 1 < size)
{
- strncpy(buf,s,size-1);
- buf[size-1]='\0';
- ret=buf;
+ if (BUF_strlcpy(buf,s,size) >= size)
+ return NULL;
}
else
{
- s=getenv("HOME");
- if (s == NULL) return(RFILE);
- if (((int)(strlen(s)+strlen(RFILE)+2)) > size)
- return(RFILE);
- strcpy(buf,s);
- strcat(buf,"/");
- strcat(buf,RFILE);
- ret=buf;
+ if (OPENSSL_issetugid() == 0)
+ s=getenv("HOME");
+#ifdef DEFAULT_HOME
+ if (s == NULL)
+ {
+ s = DEFAULT_HOME;
+ }
+#endif
+ if (s && *s && strlen(s)+strlen(RFILE)+2 < size)
+ {
+ BUF_strlcpy(buf,s,size);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+ BUF_strlcat(buf,"/",size);
+#endif
+ BUF_strlcat(buf,RFILE,size);
+ }
+ else
+ buf[0] = '\0'; /* no file name */
}
- return(ret);
+
+#ifdef __OpenBSD__
+ /* given that all random loads just fail if the file can't be
+ * seen on a stat, we stat the file we're returning, if it
+ * fails, use /dev/arandom instead. this allows the user to
+ * use their own source for good random data, but defaults
+ * to something hopefully decent if that isn't available.
+ */
+
+ if (!buf[0])
+ if (BUF_strlcpy(buf,"/dev/arandom",size) >= size) {
+ return(NULL);
+ }
+ if (stat(buf,&sb) == -1)
+ if (BUF_strlcpy(buf,"/dev/arandom",size) >= size) {
+ return(NULL);
+ }
+
+#endif
+ return(buf);
}
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff