/* Macro to convert two thirty two bit values into a sixty four bit one */
#define TWO32TO64(a, b) ((((uint64_t)(a)) << 32) + (b))
+/*
+ * Check for the existence and support of POSIX timers. The standard
+ * says that the _POSIX_TIMERS macro will have a positive value if they
+ * are available.
+ *
+ * However, we want an additional constraint: that the timer support does
+ * not require an extra library dependency. Early versions of glibc
+ * require -lrt to be specified on the link line to access the timers,
+ * so this needs to be checked for.
+ *
+ * It is worse because some libraries define __GLIBC__ but don't
+ * support the version testing macro (e.g. uClibc). This means
+ * an extra check is needed.
+ *
+ * The final condition is:
+ * "have posix timers and either not glibc or glibc without -lrt"
+ *
+ * The nested #if sequences are required to avoid using a parameterised
+ * macro that might be undefined.
+ */
+#undef OSSL_POSIX_TIMER_OKAY
+#if defined(_POSIX_TIMERS) && _POSIX_TIMERS > 0
+# if defined(__GLIBC__)
+# if defined(__GLIBC_PREREQ)
+# if __GLIBC_PREREQ(2, 17)
+# define OSSL_POSIX_TIMER_OKAY
+# endif
+# endif
+# else
+# define OSSL_POSIX_TIMER_OKAY
+# endif
+#endif
+
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
/* non-NULL if default_RAND_meth is ENGINE-provided */
static ENGINE *funct_ref;
if ((OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[0] & (1 << 4)) != 0) {
for (i = 0; i < TSC_READ_COUNT; i++) {
c = (unsigned char)(OPENSSL_rdtsc() & 0xFF);
- RAND_POOL_add(pool, &c, 1, 4);
+ rand_pool_add(pool, &c, 1, 4);
}
}
- return RAND_POOL_entropy_available(pool);
+ return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
}
#endif
size_t bytes_needed;
unsigned char *buffer;
- bytes_needed = RAND_POOL_bytes_needed(pool, 8 /*entropy_per_byte*/);
+ bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 8 /*entropy_per_byte*/);
if (bytes_needed > 0) {
- buffer = RAND_POOL_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
+ buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
if (buffer != NULL) {
-
- /* If RDSEED is available, use that. */
+ /* Whichever comes first, use RDSEED, RDRAND or nothing */
if ((OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[2] & (1 << 18)) != 0) {
if (OPENSSL_ia32_rdseed_bytes(buffer, bytes_needed)
- == bytes_needed)
- return RAND_POOL_add_end(pool,
- bytes_needed,
- 8 * bytes_needed);
- }
-
- /* Second choice is RDRAND. */
- if ((OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1 << (62 - 32))) != 0) {
+ == bytes_needed) {
+ rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes_needed, 8 * bytes_needed);
+ }
+ } else if ((OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1 << (62 - 32))) != 0) {
if (OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand_bytes(buffer, bytes_needed)
- == bytes_needed)
- return RAND_POOL_add_end(pool,
- bytes_needed,
- 8 * bytes_needed);
+ == bytes_needed) {
+ rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes_needed, 8 * bytes_needed);
+ }
+ } else {
+ rand_pool_add_end(pool, 0, 0);
}
-
- return RAND_POOL_add_end(pool, 0, 0);
}
}
- return RAND_POOL_entropy_available(pool);
+ return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
}
#endif
* is fetched using the parent's RAND_DRBG_generate().
*
* Otherwise, the entropy is polled from the system entropy sources
- * using RAND_POOL_acquire_entropy().
+ * using rand_pool_acquire_entropy().
*
* If a random pool has been added to the DRBG using RAND_add(), then
* its entropy will be used up first.
*/
size_t rand_drbg_get_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
- unsigned char **pout,
- int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len)
+ unsigned char **pout,
+ int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len,
+ int prediction_resistance)
{
size_t ret = 0;
size_t entropy_available = 0;
- RAND_POOL *pool = RAND_POOL_new(entropy, min_len, max_len);
+ RAND_POOL *pool;
+
+ if (drbg->parent && drbg->strength > drbg->parent->strength) {
+ /*
+ * We currently don't support the algorithm from NIST SP 800-90C
+ * 10.1.2 to use a weaker DRBG as source
+ */
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GET_ENTROPY, RAND_R_PARENT_STRENGTH_TOO_WEAK);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ pool = rand_pool_new(entropy, min_len, max_len);
if (pool == NULL)
return 0;
if (drbg->pool) {
- RAND_POOL_add(pool,
- RAND_POOL_buffer(drbg->pool),
- RAND_POOL_length(drbg->pool),
- RAND_POOL_entropy(drbg->pool));
- RAND_POOL_free(drbg->pool);
+ rand_pool_add(pool,
+ rand_pool_buffer(drbg->pool),
+ rand_pool_length(drbg->pool),
+ rand_pool_entropy(drbg->pool));
+ rand_pool_free(drbg->pool);
drbg->pool = NULL;
}
if (drbg->parent) {
- size_t bytes_needed = RAND_POOL_bytes_needed(pool, 8);
- unsigned char *buffer = RAND_POOL_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
+ size_t bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 8);
+ unsigned char *buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
if (buffer != NULL) {
size_t bytes = 0;
/*
* Get random from parent, include our state as additional input.
* Our lock is already held, but we need to lock our parent before
- * generating bits from it.
+ * generating bits from it. (Note: taking the lock will be a no-op
+ * if locking if drbg->parent->lock == NULL.)
*/
- if (drbg->parent->lock)
- CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(drbg->parent->lock);
+ rand_drbg_lock(drbg->parent);
if (RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg->parent,
buffer, bytes_needed,
- 0,
+ prediction_resistance,
(unsigned char *)drbg, sizeof(*drbg)) != 0)
bytes = bytes_needed;
- if (drbg->parent->lock)
- CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(drbg->parent->lock);
+ rand_drbg_unlock(drbg->parent);
- entropy_available = RAND_POOL_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
+ rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
+ entropy_available = rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
}
} else {
+ if (prediction_resistance) {
+ /*
+ * We don't have any entropy sources that comply with the NIST
+ * standard to provide prediction resistance (see NIST SP 800-90C,
+ * Section 5.4).
+ */
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GET_ENTROPY,
+ RAND_R_PREDICTION_RESISTANCE_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
/* Get entropy by polling system entropy sources. */
- entropy_available = RAND_POOL_acquire_entropy(pool);
+ entropy_available = rand_pool_acquire_entropy(pool);
}
if (entropy_available > 0) {
- ret = RAND_POOL_length(pool);
- *pout = RAND_POOL_detach(pool);
+ ret = rand_pool_length(pool);
+ *pout = rand_pool_detach(pool);
}
- RAND_POOL_free(pool);
+ err:
+ rand_pool_free(pool);
return ret;
}
/*
- * Find a suitable system time. Start with the highest resolution source
+ * Find a suitable source of time. Start with the highest resolution source
* and work down to the slower ones. This is added as additional data and
* isn't counted as randomness, so any result is acceptable.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 when we weren't able to find any time source
*/
static uint64_t get_timer_bits(void)
{
}
#else
-# if defined(_POSIX_C_SOURCE) \
- && defined(_POSIX_TIMERS) \
- && _POSIX_C_SOURCE >= 199309L \
- && (!defined(__GLIBC__) \
- || (defined(__GLIBC_PREREQ) && __GLIBC_PREREQ(2, 17)))
+# if defined(OSSL_POSIX_TIMER_OKAY)
{
struct timespec ts;
clockid_t cid;
return TWO32TO64(tv.tv_sec, tv.tv_usec);
}
# endif
- return time(NULL);
+ {
+ time_t t = time(NULL);
+ if (t == (time_t)-1)
+ return 0;
+ return t;
+ }
#endif
}
#endif
uint64_t tbits;
- pool = RAND_POOL_new(0, 0, max_len);
+ pool = rand_pool_new(0, 0, max_len);
if (pool == NULL)
return 0;
#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX
pid = getpid();
- RAND_POOL_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&pid, sizeof(pid), 0);
+ rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&pid, sizeof(pid), 0);
#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32)
pid = GetCurrentProcessId();
- RAND_POOL_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&pid, sizeof(pid), 0);
+ rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&pid, sizeof(pid), 0);
#endif
thread_id = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id();
if (thread_id != 0)
- RAND_POOL_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&thread_id, sizeof(thread_id), 0);
+ rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&thread_id, sizeof(thread_id), 0);
tbits = get_timer_bits();
- RAND_POOL_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&tbits, sizeof(tbits), 0);
+ if (tbits != 0)
+ rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&tbits, sizeof(tbits), 0);
/* TODO: Use RDSEED? */
- len = RAND_POOL_length(pool);
+ len = rand_pool_length(pool);
if (len != 0)
- *pout = RAND_POOL_detach(pool);
- RAND_POOL_free(pool);
+ *pout = rand_pool_detach(pool);
+ rand_pool_free(pool);
return len;
}
if (drbg == NULL)
return 0;
- CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(drbg->lock);
+ rand_drbg_lock(drbg);
ret = rand_drbg_restart(drbg, NULL, 0, 0);
- CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(drbg->lock);
+ rand_drbg_unlock(drbg);
return ret;
} else {
/* fill random pool and seed the current legacy RNG */
- pool = RAND_POOL_new(RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH,
+ pool = rand_pool_new(RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH,
RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH / 8,
DRBG_MINMAX_FACTOR * (RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH / 8));
if (pool == NULL)
return 0;
- if (RAND_POOL_acquire_entropy(pool) == 0)
+ if (rand_pool_acquire_entropy(pool) == 0)
goto err;
if (meth->add == NULL
- || meth->add(RAND_POOL_buffer(pool),
- RAND_POOL_length(pool),
- (RAND_POOL_entropy(pool) / 8.0)) == 0)
+ || meth->add(rand_pool_buffer(pool),
+ rand_pool_length(pool),
+ (rand_pool_entropy(pool) / 8.0)) == 0)
goto err;
ret = 1;
}
err:
- RAND_POOL_free(pool);
+ rand_pool_free(pool);
return ret;
}
-/*
- * The 'random pool' acts as a dumb container for collecting random
- * input from various entropy sources. The pool has no knowledge about
- * whether its randomness is fed into a legacy RAND_METHOD via RAND_add()
- * or into a new style RAND_DRBG. It is the callers duty to 1) initialize the
- * random pool, 2) pass it to the polling callbacks, 3) seed the RNG, and
- * 4) cleanup the random pool again.
- *
- * The random pool contains no locking mechanism because its scope and
- * lifetime is intended to be restricted to a single stack frame.
- */
-struct rand_pool_st {
- unsigned char *buffer; /* points to the beginning of the random pool */
- size_t len; /* current number of random bytes contained in the pool */
-
- size_t min_len; /* minimum number of random bytes requested */
- size_t max_len; /* maximum number of random bytes (allocated buffer size) */
- size_t entropy; /* current entropy count in bits */
- size_t requested_entropy; /* requested entropy count in bits */
-};
-
/*
* Allocate memory and initialize a new random pool
*/
-RAND_POOL *RAND_POOL_new(int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len)
+RAND_POOL *rand_pool_new(int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len)
{
RAND_POOL *pool = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*pool));
/*
* Free |pool|, securely erasing its buffer.
*/
-void RAND_POOL_free(RAND_POOL *pool)
+void rand_pool_free(RAND_POOL *pool)
{
if (pool == NULL)
return;
/*
* Return the |pool|'s buffer to the caller (readonly).
*/
-const unsigned char *RAND_POOL_buffer(RAND_POOL *pool)
+const unsigned char *rand_pool_buffer(RAND_POOL *pool)
{
return pool->buffer;
}
/*
* Return the |pool|'s entropy to the caller.
*/
-size_t RAND_POOL_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
+size_t rand_pool_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
{
return pool->entropy;
}
/*
* Return the |pool|'s buffer length to the caller.
*/
-size_t RAND_POOL_length(RAND_POOL *pool)
+size_t rand_pool_length(RAND_POOL *pool)
{
return pool->len;
}
* It's the responsibility of the caller to free the buffer
* using OPENSSL_secure_clear_free().
*/
-unsigned char *RAND_POOL_detach(RAND_POOL *pool)
+unsigned char *rand_pool_detach(RAND_POOL *pool)
{
unsigned char *ret = pool->buffer;
pool->buffer = NULL;
* |entropy| if the entropy count and buffer size is large enough
* 0 otherwise
*/
-size_t RAND_POOL_entropy_available(RAND_POOL *pool)
+size_t rand_pool_entropy_available(RAND_POOL *pool)
{
if (pool->entropy < pool->requested_entropy)
return 0;
* the random pool.
*/
-size_t RAND_POOL_entropy_needed(RAND_POOL *pool)
+size_t rand_pool_entropy_needed(RAND_POOL *pool)
{
if (pool->entropy < pool->requested_entropy)
return pool->requested_entropy - pool->entropy;
* In case of an error, 0 is returned.
*/
-size_t RAND_POOL_bytes_needed(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned int entropy_per_byte)
+size_t rand_pool_bytes_needed(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned int entropy_per_byte)
{
size_t bytes_needed;
- size_t entropy_needed = RAND_POOL_entropy_needed(pool);
+ size_t entropy_needed = rand_pool_entropy_needed(pool);
if (entropy_per_byte < 1 || entropy_per_byte > 8) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_BYTES_NEEDED, RAND_R_ARGUMENT_OUT_OF_RANGE);
}
/* Returns the remaining number of bytes available */
-size_t RAND_POOL_bytes_remaining(RAND_POOL *pool)
+size_t rand_pool_bytes_remaining(RAND_POOL *pool)
{
return pool->max_len - pool->len;
}
* random input which contains at least |entropy| bits of
* randomness.
*
- * Return available amount of entropy after this operation.
- * (see RAND_POOL_entropy_available(pool))
+ * Returns 1 if the added amount is adequate, otherwise 0
*/
-size_t RAND_POOL_add(RAND_POOL *pool,
- const unsigned char *buffer, size_t len, size_t entropy)
+int rand_pool_add(RAND_POOL *pool,
+ const unsigned char *buffer, size_t len, size_t entropy)
{
if (len > pool->max_len - pool->len) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_ADD, RAND_R_ENTROPY_INPUT_TOO_LONG);
pool->entropy += entropy;
}
- return RAND_POOL_entropy_available(pool);
+ return 1;
}
/*
* If |len| == 0 this is considered a no-op and a NULL pointer
* is returned without producing an error message.
*
- * After updating the buffer, RAND_POOL_add_end() needs to be called
+ * After updating the buffer, rand_pool_add_end() needs to be called
* to finish the udpate operation (see next comment).
*/
-unsigned char *RAND_POOL_add_begin(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len)
+unsigned char *rand_pool_add_begin(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len)
{
if (len == 0)
return NULL;
* Finish to add random bytes to the random pool in-place.
*
* Finishes an in-place update of the random pool started by
- * RAND_POOL_add_begin() (see previous comment).
+ * rand_pool_add_begin() (see previous comment).
* It is expected that |len| bytes of random input have been added
* to the buffer which contain at least |entropy| bits of randomness.
* It is allowed to add less bytes than originally reserved.
*/
-size_t RAND_POOL_add_end(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len, size_t entropy)
+int rand_pool_add_end(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len, size_t entropy)
{
if (len > pool->max_len - pool->len) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_ADD_END, RAND_R_RANDOM_POOL_OVERFLOW);
pool->entropy += entropy;
}
- return RAND_POOL_entropy_available(pool);
+ return 1;
}
int RAND_set_rand_method(const RAND_METHOD *meth)
if (drbg == NULL)
return 0;
- /* We have to lock the DRBG before generating bits from it. */
- CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(drbg->lock);
ret = RAND_DRBG_bytes(drbg, buf, num);
- CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(drbg->lock);
return ret;
}
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff