-/* crypto/rand/rand_lib.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <time.h>
-#include "cryptlib.h"
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+#include "internal/rand_int.h"
#include <openssl/engine.h>
-#endif
+#include "internal/thread_once.h"
+#include "rand_lcl.h"
+#include "e_os.h"
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
/* non-NULL if default_RAND_meth is ENGINE-provided */
-static ENGINE *funct_ref =NULL;
+static ENGINE *funct_ref;
+static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_engine_lock;
+#endif
+static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_meth_lock;
+static const RAND_METHOD *default_RAND_meth;
+static CRYPTO_ONCE rand_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
+
+int rand_fork_count;
+
+static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_nonce_lock;
+static int rand_nonce_count;
+
+static int rand_inited = 0;
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDTSC
+/*
+ * IMPORTANT NOTE: It is not currently possible to use this code
+ * because we are not sure about the amount of randomness it provides.
+ * Some SP900 tests have been run, but there is internal skepticism.
+ * So for now this code is not used.
+ */
+# error "RDTSC enabled? Should not be possible!"
+
+/*
+ * Acquire entropy from high-speed clock
+ *
+ * Since we get some randomness from the low-order bits of the
+ * high-speed clock, it can help.
+ *
+ * Returns the total entropy count, if it exceeds the requested
+ * entropy count. Otherwise, returns an entropy count of 0.
+ */
+size_t rand_acquire_entropy_from_tsc(RAND_POOL *pool)
+{
+ unsigned char c;
+ int i;
+
+ if ((OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[0] & (1 << 4)) != 0) {
+ for (i = 0; i < TSC_READ_COUNT; i++) {
+ c = (unsigned char)(OPENSSL_rdtsc() & 0xFF);
+ rand_pool_add(pool, &c, 1, 4);
+ }
+ }
+ return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDCPU
+size_t OPENSSL_ia32_rdseed_bytes(unsigned char *buf, size_t len);
+size_t OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, size_t len);
+
+extern unsigned int OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[];
+
+/*
+ * Acquire entropy using Intel-specific cpu instructions
+ *
+ * Uses the RDSEED instruction if available, otherwise uses
+ * RDRAND if available.
+ *
+ * For the differences between RDSEED and RDRAND, and why RDSEED
+ * is the preferred choice, see https://goo.gl/oK3KcN
+ *
+ * Returns the total entropy count, if it exceeds the requested
+ * entropy count. Otherwise, returns an entropy count of 0.
+ */
+size_t rand_acquire_entropy_from_cpu(RAND_POOL *pool)
+{
+ size_t bytes_needed;
+ unsigned char *buffer;
+
+ bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
+ if (bytes_needed > 0) {
+ buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
+
+ if (buffer != NULL) {
+ /* Whichever comes first, use RDSEED, RDRAND or nothing */
+ if ((OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[2] & (1 << 18)) != 0) {
+ if (OPENSSL_ia32_rdseed_bytes(buffer, bytes_needed)
+ == bytes_needed) {
+ rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes_needed, 8 * bytes_needed);
+ }
+ } else if ((OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1 << (62 - 32))) != 0) {
+ if (OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand_bytes(buffer, bytes_needed)
+ == bytes_needed) {
+ rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes_needed, 8 * bytes_needed);
+ }
+ } else {
+ rand_pool_add_end(pool, 0, 0);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
+}
+#endif
+
+
+/*
+ * Implements the get_entropy() callback (see RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks())
+ *
+ * If the DRBG has a parent, then the required amount of entropy input
+ * is fetched using the parent's RAND_DRBG_generate().
+ *
+ * Otherwise, the entropy is polled from the system entropy sources
+ * using rand_pool_acquire_entropy().
+ *
+ * If a random pool has been added to the DRBG using RAND_add(), then
+ * its entropy will be used up first.
+ */
+size_t rand_drbg_get_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
+ unsigned char **pout,
+ int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len,
+ int prediction_resistance)
+{
+ size_t ret = 0;
+ size_t entropy_available = 0;
+ RAND_POOL *pool;
+
+ if (drbg->parent != NULL && drbg->strength > drbg->parent->strength) {
+ /*
+ * We currently don't support the algorithm from NIST SP 800-90C
+ * 10.1.2 to use a weaker DRBG as source
+ */
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GET_ENTROPY, RAND_R_PARENT_STRENGTH_TOO_WEAK);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (drbg->seed_pool != NULL) {
+ pool = drbg->seed_pool;
+ pool->entropy_requested = entropy;
+ } else {
+ pool = rand_pool_new(entropy, min_len, max_len);
+ if (pool == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (drbg->parent != NULL) {
+ size_t bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
+ unsigned char *buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
+
+ if (buffer != NULL) {
+ size_t bytes = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Get random from parent, include our state as additional input.
+ * Our lock is already held, but we need to lock our parent before
+ * generating bits from it. (Note: taking the lock will be a no-op
+ * if locking if drbg->parent->lock == NULL.)
+ */
+ rand_drbg_lock(drbg->parent);
+ if (RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg->parent,
+ buffer, bytes_needed,
+ prediction_resistance,
+ NULL, 0) != 0)
+ bytes = bytes_needed;
+ drbg->reseed_next_counter
+ = tsan_load(&drbg->parent->reseed_prop_counter);
+ rand_drbg_unlock(drbg->parent);
+
+ rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
+ entropy_available = rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
+ }
+
+ } else {
+ /* Get entropy by polling system entropy sources. */
+ entropy_available = rand_pool_acquire_entropy(pool);
+ }
+
+ if (entropy_available > 0) {
+ ret = rand_pool_length(pool);
+ *pout = rand_pool_detach(pool);
+ }
+
+ if (drbg->seed_pool == NULL)
+ rand_pool_free(pool);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Implements the cleanup_entropy() callback (see RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks())
+ *
+ */
+void rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
+ unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
+{
+ if (drbg->seed_pool == NULL)
+ OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(out, outlen);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Implements the get_nonce() callback (see RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks())
+ *
+ */
+size_t rand_drbg_get_nonce(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
+ unsigned char **pout,
+ int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len)
+{
+ size_t ret = 0;
+ RAND_POOL *pool;
+
+ struct {
+ void * instance;
+ int count;
+ } data;
+
+ memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
+ pool = rand_pool_new(0, min_len, max_len);
+ if (pool == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (rand_pool_add_nonce_data(pool) == 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ data.instance = drbg;
+ CRYPTO_atomic_add(&rand_nonce_count, 1, &data.count, rand_nonce_lock);
+
+ if (rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0) == 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ ret = rand_pool_length(pool);
+ *pout = rand_pool_detach(pool);
+
+ err:
+ rand_pool_free(pool);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Implements the cleanup_nonce() callback (see RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks())
+ *
+ */
+void rand_drbg_cleanup_nonce(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
+ unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
+{
+ OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(out, outlen);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generate additional data that can be used for the drbg. The data does
+ * not need to contain entropy, but it's useful if it contains at least
+ * some bits that are unpredictable.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on failure.
+ *
+ * On success it allocates a buffer at |*pout| and returns the length of
+ * the data. The buffer should get freed using OPENSSL_secure_clear_free().
+ */
+size_t rand_drbg_get_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned char **pout)
+{
+ size_t ret = 0;
+
+ if (rand_pool_add_additional_data(pool) == 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ ret = rand_pool_length(pool);
+ *pout = rand_pool_detach(pool);
+
+ err:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+void rand_drbg_cleanup_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned char *out)
+{
+ rand_pool_reattach(pool, out);
+}
+
+void rand_fork(void)
+{
+ rand_fork_count++;
+}
+
+DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_rand_init)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+ rand_engine_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+ if (rand_engine_lock == NULL)
+ return 0;
#endif
-static const RAND_METHOD *default_RAND_meth = NULL;
+
+ rand_meth_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+ if (rand_meth_lock == NULL)
+ goto err1;
+
+ rand_nonce_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+ if (rand_nonce_lock == NULL)
+ goto err2;
+
+ if (!rand_pool_init())
+ goto err3;
+
+ rand_inited = 1;
+ return 1;
+
+err3:
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_nonce_lock);
+ rand_nonce_lock = NULL;
+err2:
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_meth_lock);
+ rand_meth_lock = NULL;
+err1:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_engine_lock);
+ rand_engine_lock = NULL;
+#endif
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void rand_cleanup_int(void)
+{
+ const RAND_METHOD *meth = default_RAND_meth;
+
+ if (!rand_inited)
+ return;
+
+ if (meth != NULL && meth->cleanup != NULL)
+ meth->cleanup();
+ RAND_set_rand_method(NULL);
+ rand_pool_cleanup();
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_engine_lock);
+ rand_engine_lock = NULL;
+#endif
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_meth_lock);
+ rand_meth_lock = NULL;
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_nonce_lock);
+ rand_nonce_lock = NULL;
+ rand_inited = 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * RAND_close_seed_files() ensures that any seed file decriptors are
+ * closed after use.
+ */
+void RAND_keep_random_devices_open(int keep)
+{
+ if (RUN_ONCE(&rand_init, do_rand_init))
+ rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(keep);
+}
+
+/*
+ * RAND_poll() reseeds the default RNG using random input
+ *
+ * The random input is obtained from polling various entropy
+ * sources which depend on the operating system and are
+ * configurable via the --with-rand-seed configure option.
+ */
+int RAND_poll(void)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ RAND_POOL *pool = NULL;
+
+ const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
+
+ if (meth == RAND_OpenSSL()) {
+ /* fill random pool and seed the master DRBG */
+ RAND_DRBG *drbg = RAND_DRBG_get0_master();
+
+ if (drbg == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ rand_drbg_lock(drbg);
+ ret = rand_drbg_restart(drbg, NULL, 0, 0);
+ rand_drbg_unlock(drbg);
+
+ return ret;
+
+ } else {
+ /* fill random pool and seed the current legacy RNG */
+ pool = rand_pool_new(RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH,
+ (RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH + 7) / 8,
+ RAND_POOL_MAX_LENGTH);
+ if (pool == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (rand_pool_acquire_entropy(pool) == 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (meth->add == NULL
+ || meth->add(rand_pool_buffer(pool),
+ rand_pool_length(pool),
+ (rand_pool_entropy(pool) / 8.0)) == 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ ret = 1;
+ }
+
+err:
+ rand_pool_free(pool);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Allocate memory and initialize a new random pool
+ */
+
+RAND_POOL *rand_pool_new(int entropy_requested, size_t min_len, size_t max_len)
+{
+ RAND_POOL *pool = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*pool));
+
+ if (pool == NULL) {
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ pool->min_len = min_len;
+ pool->max_len = (max_len > RAND_POOL_MAX_LENGTH) ?
+ RAND_POOL_MAX_LENGTH : max_len;
+
+ pool->buffer = OPENSSL_secure_zalloc(pool->max_len);
+ if (pool->buffer == NULL) {
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ pool->entropy_requested = entropy_requested;
+
+ return pool;
+
+err:
+ OPENSSL_free(pool);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Attach new random pool to the given buffer
+ *
+ * This function is intended to be used only for feeding random data
+ * provided by RAND_add() and RAND_seed() into the <master> DRBG.
+ */
+RAND_POOL *rand_pool_attach(const unsigned char *buffer, size_t len,
+ size_t entropy)
+{
+ RAND_POOL *pool = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*pool));
+
+ if (pool == NULL) {
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_ATTACH, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The const needs to be cast away, but attached buffers will not be
+ * modified (in contrary to allocated buffers which are zeroed and
+ * freed in the end).
+ */
+ pool->buffer = (unsigned char *) buffer;
+ pool->len = len;
+
+ pool->attached = 1;
+
+ pool->min_len = pool->max_len = pool->len;
+ pool->entropy = entropy;
+
+ return pool;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Free |pool|, securely erasing its buffer.
+ */
+void rand_pool_free(RAND_POOL *pool)
+{
+ if (pool == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * Although it would be advisable from a cryptographical viewpoint,
+ * we are not allowed to clear attached buffers, since they are passed
+ * to rand_pool_attach() as `const unsigned char*`.
+ * (see corresponding comment in rand_pool_attach()).
+ */
+ if (!pool->attached)
+ OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(pool->buffer, pool->max_len);
+ OPENSSL_free(pool);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return the |pool|'s buffer to the caller (readonly).
+ */
+const unsigned char *rand_pool_buffer(RAND_POOL *pool)
+{
+ return pool->buffer;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return the |pool|'s entropy to the caller.
+ */
+size_t rand_pool_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
+{
+ return pool->entropy;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return the |pool|'s buffer length to the caller.
+ */
+size_t rand_pool_length(RAND_POOL *pool)
+{
+ return pool->len;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Detach the |pool| buffer and return it to the caller.
+ * It's the responsibility of the caller to free the buffer
+ * using OPENSSL_secure_clear_free() or to re-attach it
+ * again to the pool using rand_pool_reattach().
+ */
+unsigned char *rand_pool_detach(RAND_POOL *pool)
+{
+ unsigned char *ret = pool->buffer;
+ pool->buffer = NULL;
+ pool->entropy = 0;
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Re-attach the |pool| buffer. It is only allowed to pass
+ * the |buffer| which was previously detached from the same pool.
+ */
+void rand_pool_reattach(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned char *buffer)
+{
+ pool->buffer = buffer;
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(pool->buffer, pool->len);
+ pool->len = 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * If |entropy_factor| bits contain 1 bit of entropy, how many bytes does one
+ * need to obtain at least |bits| bits of entropy?
+ */
+#define ENTROPY_TO_BYTES(bits, entropy_factor) \
+ (((bits) * (entropy_factor) + 7) / 8)
+
+
+/*
+ * Checks whether the |pool|'s entropy is available to the caller.
+ * This is the case when entropy count and buffer length are high enough.
+ * Returns
+ *
+ * |entropy| if the entropy count and buffer size is large enough
+ * 0 otherwise
+ */
+size_t rand_pool_entropy_available(RAND_POOL *pool)
+{
+ if (pool->entropy < pool->entropy_requested)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (pool->len < pool->min_len)
+ return 0;
+
+ return pool->entropy;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the (remaining) amount of entropy needed to fill
+ * the random pool.
+ */
+
+size_t rand_pool_entropy_needed(RAND_POOL *pool)
+{
+ if (pool->entropy < pool->entropy_requested)
+ return pool->entropy_requested - pool->entropy;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the number of bytes needed to fill the pool, assuming
+ * the input has 1 / |entropy_factor| entropy bits per data bit.
+ * In case of an error, 0 is returned.
+ */
+
+size_t rand_pool_bytes_needed(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned int entropy_factor)
+{
+ size_t bytes_needed;
+ size_t entropy_needed = rand_pool_entropy_needed(pool);
+
+ if (entropy_factor < 1) {
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_BYTES_NEEDED, RAND_R_ARGUMENT_OUT_OF_RANGE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ bytes_needed = ENTROPY_TO_BYTES(entropy_needed, entropy_factor);
+
+ if (bytes_needed > pool->max_len - pool->len) {
+ /* not enough space left */
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_BYTES_NEEDED, RAND_R_RANDOM_POOL_OVERFLOW);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (pool->len < pool->min_len &&
+ bytes_needed < pool->min_len - pool->len)
+ /* to meet the min_len requirement */
+ bytes_needed = pool->min_len - pool->len;
+
+ return bytes_needed;
+}
+
+/* Returns the remaining number of bytes available */
+size_t rand_pool_bytes_remaining(RAND_POOL *pool)
+{
+ return pool->max_len - pool->len;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Add random bytes to the random pool.
+ *
+ * It is expected that the |buffer| contains |len| bytes of
+ * random input which contains at least |entropy| bits of
+ * randomness.
+ *
+ * Returns 1 if the added amount is adequate, otherwise 0
+ */
+int rand_pool_add(RAND_POOL *pool,
+ const unsigned char *buffer, size_t len, size_t entropy)
+{
+ if (len > pool->max_len - pool->len) {
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_ADD, RAND_R_ENTROPY_INPUT_TOO_LONG);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (pool->buffer == NULL) {
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_ADD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (len > 0) {
+ memcpy(pool->buffer + pool->len, buffer, len);
+ pool->len += len;
+ pool->entropy += entropy;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Start to add random bytes to the random pool in-place.
+ *
+ * Reserves the next |len| bytes for adding random bytes in-place
+ * and returns a pointer to the buffer.
+ * The caller is allowed to copy up to |len| bytes into the buffer.
+ * If |len| == 0 this is considered a no-op and a NULL pointer
+ * is returned without producing an error message.
+ *
+ * After updating the buffer, rand_pool_add_end() needs to be called
+ * to finish the udpate operation (see next comment).
+ */
+unsigned char *rand_pool_add_begin(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len)
+{
+ if (len == 0)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (len > pool->max_len - pool->len) {
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_ADD_BEGIN, RAND_R_RANDOM_POOL_OVERFLOW);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (pool->buffer == NULL) {
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_ADD_BEGIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return pool->buffer + pool->len;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Finish to add random bytes to the random pool in-place.
+ *
+ * Finishes an in-place update of the random pool started by
+ * rand_pool_add_begin() (see previous comment).
+ * It is expected that |len| bytes of random input have been added
+ * to the buffer which contain at least |entropy| bits of randomness.
+ * It is allowed to add less bytes than originally reserved.
+ */
+int rand_pool_add_end(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len, size_t entropy)
+{
+ if (len > pool->max_len - pool->len) {
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_ADD_END, RAND_R_RANDOM_POOL_OVERFLOW);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (len > 0) {
+ pool->len += len;
+ pool->entropy += entropy;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
int RAND_set_rand_method(const RAND_METHOD *meth)
- {
+{
+ if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_init, do_rand_init))
+ return 0;
+
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_meth_lock);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
- if(funct_ref)
- {
- ENGINE_finish(funct_ref);
- funct_ref = NULL;
- }
+ ENGINE_finish(funct_ref);
+ funct_ref = NULL;
#endif
- default_RAND_meth = meth;
- return 1;
- }
+ default_RAND_meth = meth;
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_meth_lock);
+ return 1;
+}
const RAND_METHOD *RAND_get_rand_method(void)
- {
- if (!default_RAND_meth)
- {
+{
+ const RAND_METHOD *tmp_meth = NULL;
+
+ if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_init, do_rand_init))
+ return NULL;
+
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_meth_lock);
+ if (default_RAND_meth == NULL) {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
- ENGINE *e = ENGINE_get_default_RAND();
- if(e)
- {
- default_RAND_meth = ENGINE_get_RAND(e);
- if(!default_RAND_meth)
- {
- ENGINE_finish(e);
- e = NULL;
- }
- }
- if(e)
- funct_ref = e;
- else
+ ENGINE *e;
+
+ /* If we have an engine that can do RAND, use it. */
+ if ((e = ENGINE_get_default_RAND()) != NULL
+ && (tmp_meth = ENGINE_get_RAND(e)) != NULL) {
+ funct_ref = e;
+ default_RAND_meth = tmp_meth;
+ } else {
+ ENGINE_finish(e);
+ default_RAND_meth = &rand_meth;
+ }
+#else
+ default_RAND_meth = &rand_meth;
#endif
- default_RAND_meth = RAND_SSLeay();
- }
- return default_RAND_meth;
- }
+ }
+ tmp_meth = default_RAND_meth;
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_meth_lock);
+ return tmp_meth;
+}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
int RAND_set_rand_engine(ENGINE *engine)
- {
- const RAND_METHOD *tmp_meth = NULL;
- if(engine)
- {
- if(!ENGINE_init(engine))
- return 0;
- tmp_meth = ENGINE_get_RAND(engine);
- if(!tmp_meth)
- {
- ENGINE_finish(engine);
- return 0;
- }
- }
- /* This function releases any prior ENGINE so call it first */
- RAND_set_rand_method(tmp_meth);
- funct_ref = engine;
- return 1;
- }
-#endif
+{
+ const RAND_METHOD *tmp_meth = NULL;
-void RAND_cleanup(void)
- {
- const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
- if (meth && meth->cleanup)
- meth->cleanup();
- RAND_set_rand_method(NULL);
- }
+ if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_init, do_rand_init))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (engine != NULL) {
+ if (!ENGINE_init(engine))
+ return 0;
+ tmp_meth = ENGINE_get_RAND(engine);
+ if (tmp_meth == NULL) {
+ ENGINE_finish(engine);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_engine_lock);
+ /* This function releases any prior ENGINE so call it first */
+ RAND_set_rand_method(tmp_meth);
+ funct_ref = engine;
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_engine_lock);
+ return 1;
+}
+#endif
void RAND_seed(const void *buf, int num)
- {
- const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
- if (meth && meth->seed)
- meth->seed(buf,num);
- }
-
-void RAND_add(const void *buf, int num, double entropy)
- {
- const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
- if (meth && meth->add)
- meth->add(buf,num,entropy);
- }
+{
+ const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
+
+ if (meth->seed != NULL)
+ meth->seed(buf, num);
+}
+
+void RAND_add(const void *buf, int num, double randomness)
+{
+ const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
+
+ if (meth->add != NULL)
+ meth->add(buf, num, randomness);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function is not part of RAND_METHOD, so if we're not using
+ * the default method, then just call RAND_bytes(). Otherwise make
+ * sure we're instantiated and use the private DRBG.
+ */
+int RAND_priv_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
+{
+ const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
+ RAND_DRBG *drbg;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (meth != RAND_OpenSSL())
+ return RAND_bytes(buf, num);
+
+ drbg = RAND_DRBG_get0_private();
+ if (drbg == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ ret = RAND_DRBG_bytes(drbg, buf, num);
+ return ret;
+}
int RAND_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
- {
- const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
- if (meth && meth->bytes)
- return meth->bytes(buf,num);
- return(-1);
- }
+{
+ const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
+
+ if (meth->bytes != NULL)
+ return meth->bytes(buf, num);
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_BYTES, RAND_R_FUNC_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
+ return -1;
+}
+#if !OPENSSL_API_1_1_0
int RAND_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
- {
- const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
- if (meth && meth->pseudorand)
- return meth->pseudorand(buf,num);
- return(-1);
- }
+{
+ const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
+
+ if (meth->pseudorand != NULL)
+ return meth->pseudorand(buf, num);
+ return -1;
+}
+#endif
int RAND_status(void)
- {
- const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
- if (meth && meth->status)
- return meth->status();
- return 0;
- }
+{
+ const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
+
+ if (meth->status != NULL)
+ return meth->status();
+ return 0;
+}
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff