/*
* Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
- * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
# include <openssl/hmac.h>
# include <openssl/ec.h>
# include <openssl/rand_drbg.h>
+# include "internal/tsan_assist.h"
+
+# include "internal/numbers.h"
/* How many times to read the TSC as a randomness source. */
# define TSC_READ_COUNT 4
# define MASTER_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL (60*60) /* 1 hour */
# define SLAVE_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL (7*60) /* 7 minutes */
+/*
+ * The number of bytes that constitutes an atomic lump of entropy with respect
+ * to the FIPS 140-2 section 4.9.2 Conditional Tests. The size is somewhat
+ * arbitrary, the smaller the value, the less entropy is consumed on first
+ * read but the higher the probability of the test failing by accident.
+ *
+ * The value is in bytes.
+ */
+#define CRNGT_BUFSIZ 16
+/*
+ * Maximum input size for the DRBG (entropy, nonce, personalization string)
+ *
+ * NIST SP800 90Ar1 allows a maximum of (1 << 35) bits i.e., (1 << 32) bytes.
+ *
+ * We lower it to 'only' INT32_MAX bytes, which is equivalent to 2 gigabytes.
+ */
+# define DRBG_MAX_LENGTH INT32_MAX
-/* Max size of additional input and personalization string. */
-# define DRBG_MAX_LENGTH 4096
+/* The default nonce */
+# define DRBG_DEFAULT_PERS_STRING "OpenSSL NIST SP 800-90A DRBG"
/*
- * The quotient between max_{entropy,nonce}len and min_{entropy,nonce}len
+ * Maximum allocation size for RANDOM_POOL buffers
*
- * The current factor is large enough that the RAND_POOL can store a
- * random input which has a lousy entropy rate of 0.0625 bits per byte.
- * This input will be sent through the derivation function which 'compresses'
- * the low quality input into a high quality output.
+ * The max_len value for the buffer provided to the rand_drbg_get_entropy()
+ * callback is currently 2^31 bytes (2 gigabytes), if a derivation function
+ * is used. Since this is much too large to be allocated, the rand_pool_new()
+ * function chooses more modest values as default pool length, bounded
+ * by RAND_POOL_MIN_LENGTH and RAND_POOL_MAX_LENGTH
+ *
+ * The choice of the RAND_POOL_FACTOR is large enough such that the
+ * RAND_POOL can store a random input which has a lousy entropy rate of
+ * 8/256 (= 0.03125) bits per byte. This input will be sent through the
+ * derivation function which 'compresses' the low quality input into a
+ * high quality output.
+ *
+ * The factor 1.5 below is the pessimistic estimate for the extra amount
+ * of entropy required when no get_nonce() callback is defined.
+ */
+# define RAND_POOL_FACTOR 256
+# define RAND_POOL_MAX_LENGTH (RAND_POOL_FACTOR * \
+ 3 * (RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH / 16))
+/*
+ * = (RAND_POOL_FACTOR * \
+ * 1.5 * (RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH / 8))
*/
-# define DRBG_MINMAX_FACTOR 128
/* DRBG status values */
} DRBG_STATUS;
-/* intantiate */
+/* instantiate */
typedef int (*RAND_DRBG_instantiate_fn)(RAND_DRBG *ctx,
const unsigned char *ent,
size_t entlen,
size_t entlen,
const unsigned char *adin,
size_t adinlen);
-/* generat output */
+/* generate output */
typedef int (*RAND_DRBG_generate_fn)(RAND_DRBG *ctx,
unsigned char *out,
size_t outlen,
RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate_fn uninstantiate;
} RAND_DRBG_METHOD;
+/* 888 bits from SP800-90Ar1 10.1 table 2 */
+#define HASH_PRNG_MAX_SEEDLEN (888/8)
+
+typedef struct rand_drbg_hash_st {
+ const EVP_MD *md;
+ EVP_MD_CTX *ctx;
+ size_t blocklen;
+ unsigned char V[HASH_PRNG_MAX_SEEDLEN];
+ unsigned char C[HASH_PRNG_MAX_SEEDLEN];
+ /* Temporary value storage: should always exceed max digest length */
+ unsigned char vtmp[HASH_PRNG_MAX_SEEDLEN];
+} RAND_DRBG_HASH;
+
+typedef struct rand_drbg_hmac_st {
+ const EVP_MD *md;
+ HMAC_CTX *ctx;
+ size_t blocklen;
+ unsigned char K[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ unsigned char V[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+} RAND_DRBG_HMAC;
/*
* The state of a DRBG AES-CTR.
} RAND_DRBG_CTR;
+/*
+ * The 'random pool' acts as a dumb container for collecting random
+ * input from various entropy sources. The pool has no knowledge about
+ * whether its randomness is fed into a legacy RAND_METHOD via RAND_add()
+ * or into a new style RAND_DRBG. It is the callers duty to 1) initialize the
+ * random pool, 2) pass it to the polling callbacks, 3) seed the RNG, and
+ * 4) cleanup the random pool again.
+ *
+ * The random pool contains no locking mechanism because its scope and
+ * lifetime is intended to be restricted to a single stack frame.
+ */
+struct rand_pool_st {
+ unsigned char *buffer; /* points to the beginning of the random pool */
+ size_t len; /* current number of random bytes contained in the pool */
+
+ int attached; /* true pool was attached to existing buffer */
+
+ size_t min_len; /* minimum number of random bytes requested */
+ size_t max_len; /* maximum number of random bytes (allocated buffer size) */
+ size_t entropy; /* current entropy count in bits */
+ size_t entropy_requested; /* requested entropy count in bits */
+};
+
/*
* The state of all types of DRBGs, even though we only have CTR mode
* right now.
*/
struct rand_drbg_st {
CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
+ /* The library context this DRBG is associated with, if any */
+ OPENSSL_CTX *libctx;
RAND_DRBG *parent;
int secure; /* 1: allocated on the secure heap, 0: otherwise */
int type; /* the nid of the underlying algorithm */
+ /*
+ * Stores the value of the rand_fork_count global as of when we last
+ * reseeded. The DRBG reseeds automatically whenever drbg->fork_count !=
+ * rand_fork_count. Used to provide fork-safety and reseed this DRBG in
+ * the child process.
+ */
int fork_count;
unsigned short flags; /* various external flags */
/*
- * The random pool is used by RAND_add()/drbg_add() to attach random
+ * The random_data is used by RAND_add()/drbg_add() to attach random
* data to the global drbg, such that the rand_drbg_get_entropy() callback
* can pull it during instantiation and reseeding. This is necessary to
* reconcile the different philosophies of the RAND and the RAND_DRBG
* with respect to how randomness is added to the RNG during reseeding
* (see PR #4328).
*/
- struct rand_pool_st *pool;
+ struct rand_pool_st *seed_pool;
+
+ /*
+ * Auxiliary pool for additional data.
+ */
+ struct rand_pool_st *adin_pool;
/*
* The following parameters are setup by the per-type "init" function.
*
- * Currently the only type is CTR_DRBG, its init function is drbg_ctr_init().
+ * The supported types and their init functions are:
+ * (1) CTR_DRBG: drbg_ctr_init().
+ * (2) HMAC_DRBG: drbg_hmac_init().
+ * (3) HASH_DRBG: drbg_hash_init().
*
* The parameters are closely related to the ones described in
* section '10.2.1 CTR_DRBG' of [NIST SP 800-90Ar1], with one
size_t min_noncelen, max_noncelen;
size_t max_perslen, max_adinlen;
- /* Counts the number of generate requests since the last reseed. */
- unsigned int generate_counter;
+ /*
+ * Counts the number of generate requests since the last reseed
+ * (Starts at 1). This value is the reseed_counter as defined in
+ * NIST SP 800-90Ar1
+ */
+ unsigned int reseed_gen_counter;
/*
* Maximum number of generate requests until a reseed is required.
* This value is ignored if it is zero.
* is added by RAND_add() or RAND_seed() will have an immediate effect on
* the output of RAND_bytes() resp. RAND_priv_bytes().
*/
- unsigned int reseed_counter;
+ TSAN_QUALIFIER unsigned int reseed_prop_counter;
+ unsigned int reseed_next_counter;
size_t seedlen;
DRBG_STATUS state;
/* Application data, mainly used in the KATs. */
CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data;
- /* Implementation specific data (currently only one implementation) */
+ /* Implementation specific data */
union {
RAND_DRBG_CTR ctr;
+ RAND_DRBG_HASH hash;
+ RAND_DRBG_HMAC hmac;
} data;
/* Implementation specific methods */
/* The global RAND method, and the global buffer and DRBG instance. */
extern RAND_METHOD rand_meth;
-/* How often we've forked (only incremented in child). */
+/*
+ * A "generation count" of forks. Incremented in the child process after a
+ * fork. Since rand_fork_count is increment-only, and only ever written to in
+ * the child process of the fork, which is guaranteed to be single-threaded, no
+ * locking is needed for normal (read) accesses; the rest of pthread fork
+ * processing is assumed to introduce the necessary memory barriers. Sibling
+ * children of a given parent will produce duplicate values, but this is not
+ * problematic because the reseeding process pulls input from the system CSPRNG
+ * and/or other global sources, so the siblings will end up generating
+ * different output streams.
+ */
extern int rand_fork_count;
/* DRBG helpers */
int rand_drbg_restart(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
const unsigned char *buffer, size_t len, size_t entropy);
-
+size_t rand_drbg_seedlen(RAND_DRBG *drbg);
/* locking api */
int rand_drbg_lock(RAND_DRBG *drbg);
int rand_drbg_unlock(RAND_DRBG *drbg);
int rand_drbg_enable_locking(RAND_DRBG *drbg);
-/* initializes the AES-CTR DRBG implementation */
+/* initializes the DRBG implementation */
int drbg_ctr_init(RAND_DRBG *drbg);
+int drbg_hash_init(RAND_DRBG *drbg);
+int drbg_hmac_init(RAND_DRBG *drbg);
+
+/*
+ * Entropy call back for the FIPS 140-2 section 4.9.2 Conditional Tests.
+ * These need to be exposed for the unit tests.
+ */
+int rand_crngt_get_entropy_cb(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *buf,
+ unsigned char *md, unsigned int *md_size);
+extern int (*crngt_get_entropy)(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *buf,
+ unsigned char *md,
+ unsigned int *md_size);
#endif
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff