+++ /dev/null
-/*
- * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
- * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
- * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
- * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
- */
-
-#ifndef HEADER_RAND_LCL_H
-# define HEADER_RAND_LCL_H
-
-# include <openssl/aes.h>
-# include <openssl/evp.h>
-# include <openssl/sha.h>
-# include <openssl/hmac.h>
-# include <openssl/ec.h>
-# include <openssl/rand_drbg.h>
-# include "internal/tsan_assist.h"
-# include "crypto/rand.h"
-
-# include "internal/numbers.h"
-
-/* How many times to read the TSC as a randomness source. */
-# define TSC_READ_COUNT 4
-
-/* Maximum reseed intervals */
-# define MAX_RESEED_INTERVAL (1 << 24)
-# define MAX_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL (1 << 20) /* approx. 12 days */
-
-/* Default reseed intervals */
-# define MASTER_RESEED_INTERVAL (1 << 8)
-# define SLAVE_RESEED_INTERVAL (1 << 16)
-# define MASTER_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL (60*60) /* 1 hour */
-# define SLAVE_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL (7*60) /* 7 minutes */
-
-/*
- * The number of bytes that constitutes an atomic lump of entropy with respect
- * to the FIPS 140-2 section 4.9.2 Conditional Tests. The size is somewhat
- * arbitrary, the smaller the value, the less entropy is consumed on first
- * read but the higher the probability of the test failing by accident.
- *
- * The value is in bytes.
- */
-#define CRNGT_BUFSIZ 16
-
-/*
- * Maximum input size for the DRBG (entropy, nonce, personalization string)
- *
- * NIST SP800 90Ar1 allows a maximum of (1 << 35) bits i.e., (1 << 32) bytes.
- *
- * We lower it to 'only' INT32_MAX bytes, which is equivalent to 2 gigabytes.
- */
-# define DRBG_MAX_LENGTH INT32_MAX
-
-/* The default nonce */
-#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
-# define DRBG_DEFAULT_PERS_STRING { 0x4f, 0x70, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x53, 0x53, \
- 0x4c, 0x20, 0x4e, 0x49, 0x53, 0x54, 0x20, 0x53, 0x50, 0x20, 0x38, 0x30, \
- 0x30, 0x2d, 0x39, 0x30, 0x41, 0x20, 0x44, 0x52, 0x42, 0x47, 0x00};
-#else
-# define DRBG_DEFAULT_PERS_STRING "OpenSSL NIST SP 800-90A DRBG"
-#endif
-
-/*
- * Maximum allocation size for RANDOM_POOL buffers
- *
- * The max_len value for the buffer provided to the rand_drbg_get_entropy()
- * callback is currently 2^31 bytes (2 gigabytes), if a derivation function
- * is used. Since this is much too large to be allocated, the rand_pool_new()
- * function chooses more modest values as default pool length, bounded
- * by RAND_POOL_MIN_LENGTH and RAND_POOL_MAX_LENGTH
- *
- * The choice of the RAND_POOL_FACTOR is large enough such that the
- * RAND_POOL can store a random input which has a lousy entropy rate of
- * 8/256 (= 0.03125) bits per byte. This input will be sent through the
- * derivation function which 'compresses' the low quality input into a
- * high quality output.
- *
- * The factor 1.5 below is the pessimistic estimate for the extra amount
- * of entropy required when no get_nonce() callback is defined.
- */
-# define RAND_POOL_FACTOR 256
-# define RAND_POOL_MAX_LENGTH (RAND_POOL_FACTOR * \
- 3 * (RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH / 16))
-/*
- * = (RAND_POOL_FACTOR * \
- * 1.5 * (RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH / 8))
- */
-
-/*
- * Initial allocation minimum.
- *
- * There is a distinction between the secure and normal allocation minimums.
- * Ideally, the secure allocation size should be a power of two. The normal
- * allocation size doesn't have any such restriction.
- *
- * The secure value is based on 128 bits of secure material, which is 16 bytes.
- * Typically, the DRBGs will set a minimum larger than this so optimal
- * allocation ought to take place (for full quality seed material).
- *
- * The normal value has been chosed by noticing that the rand_drbg_get_nonce
- * function is usually the largest of the built in allocation (twenty four
- * bytes and then appending another sixteen bytes). This means the buffer ends
- * with 40 bytes. The value of forty eight is comfortably above this which
- * allows some slack in the platform specific values used.
- */
-# define RAND_POOL_MIN_ALLOCATION(secure) ((secure) ? 16 : 48)
-
-/* DRBG status values */
-typedef enum drbg_status_e {
- DRBG_UNINITIALISED,
- DRBG_READY,
- DRBG_ERROR
-} DRBG_STATUS;
-
-
-/* instantiate */
-typedef int (*RAND_DRBG_instantiate_fn)(RAND_DRBG *ctx,
- const unsigned char *ent,
- size_t entlen,
- const unsigned char *nonce,
- size_t noncelen,
- const unsigned char *pers,
- size_t perslen);
-/* reseed */
-typedef int (*RAND_DRBG_reseed_fn)(RAND_DRBG *ctx,
- const unsigned char *ent,
- size_t entlen,
- const unsigned char *adin,
- size_t adinlen);
-/* generate output */
-typedef int (*RAND_DRBG_generate_fn)(RAND_DRBG *ctx,
- unsigned char *out,
- size_t outlen,
- const unsigned char *adin,
- size_t adinlen);
-/* uninstantiate */
-typedef int (*RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate_fn)(RAND_DRBG *ctx);
-
-
-/*
- * The DRBG methods
- */
-
-typedef struct rand_drbg_method_st {
- RAND_DRBG_instantiate_fn instantiate;
- RAND_DRBG_reseed_fn reseed;
- RAND_DRBG_generate_fn generate;
- RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate_fn uninstantiate;
-} RAND_DRBG_METHOD;
-
-/* 888 bits from SP800-90Ar1 10.1 table 2 */
-#define HASH_PRNG_MAX_SEEDLEN (888/8)
-
-typedef struct rand_drbg_hash_st {
- EVP_MD *md;
- EVP_MD_CTX *ctx;
- size_t blocklen;
- unsigned char V[HASH_PRNG_MAX_SEEDLEN];
- unsigned char C[HASH_PRNG_MAX_SEEDLEN];
- /* Temporary value storage: should always exceed max digest length */
- unsigned char vtmp[HASH_PRNG_MAX_SEEDLEN];
-} RAND_DRBG_HASH;
-
-typedef struct rand_drbg_hmac_st {
- EVP_MD *md;
- HMAC_CTX *ctx;
- size_t blocklen;
- unsigned char K[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- unsigned char V[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-} RAND_DRBG_HMAC;
-
-/*
- * The state of a DRBG AES-CTR.
- */
-typedef struct rand_drbg_ctr_st {
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx_df;
- EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
- size_t keylen;
- unsigned char K[32];
- unsigned char V[16];
- /* Temporary block storage used by ctr_df */
- unsigned char bltmp[16];
- size_t bltmp_pos;
- unsigned char KX[48];
-} RAND_DRBG_CTR;
-
-
-/*
- * The 'random pool' acts as a dumb container for collecting random
- * input from various entropy sources. The pool has no knowledge about
- * whether its randomness is fed into a legacy RAND_METHOD via RAND_add()
- * or into a new style RAND_DRBG. It is the callers duty to 1) initialize the
- * random pool, 2) pass it to the polling callbacks, 3) seed the RNG, and
- * 4) cleanup the random pool again.
- *
- * The random pool contains no locking mechanism because its scope and
- * lifetime is intended to be restricted to a single stack frame.
- */
-struct rand_pool_st {
- unsigned char *buffer; /* points to the beginning of the random pool */
- size_t len; /* current number of random bytes contained in the pool */
-
- int attached; /* true pool was attached to existing buffer */
- int secure; /* 1: allocated on the secure heap, 0: otherwise */
-
- size_t min_len; /* minimum number of random bytes requested */
- size_t max_len; /* maximum number of random bytes (allocated buffer size) */
- size_t alloc_len; /* current number of bytes allocated */
- size_t entropy; /* current entropy count in bits */
- size_t entropy_requested; /* requested entropy count in bits */
-};
-
-/*
- * The state of all types of DRBGs, even though we only have CTR mode
- * right now.
- */
-struct rand_drbg_st {
- CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
- /* The library context this DRBG is associated with, if any */
- OPENSSL_CTX *libctx;
- RAND_DRBG *parent;
- int secure; /* 1: allocated on the secure heap, 0: otherwise */
- int type; /* the nid of the underlying algorithm */
- /*
- * Stores the return value of openssl_get_fork_id() as of when we last
- * reseeded. The DRBG reseeds automatically whenever drbg->fork_id !=
- * openssl_get_fork_id(). Used to provide fork-safety and reseed this
- * DRBG in the child process.
- */
- int fork_id;
- unsigned short flags; /* various external flags */
-
- /*
- * The random_data is used by RAND_add()/drbg_add() to attach random
- * data to the global drbg, such that the rand_drbg_get_entropy() callback
- * can pull it during instantiation and reseeding. This is necessary to
- * reconcile the different philosophies of the RAND and the RAND_DRBG
- * with respect to how randomness is added to the RNG during reseeding
- * (see PR #4328).
- */
- struct rand_pool_st *seed_pool;
-
- /*
- * Auxiliary pool for additional data.
- */
- struct rand_pool_st *adin_pool;
-
- /*
- * The following parameters are setup by the per-type "init" function.
- *
- * The supported types and their init functions are:
- * (1) CTR_DRBG: drbg_ctr_init().
- * (2) HMAC_DRBG: drbg_hmac_init().
- * (3) HASH_DRBG: drbg_hash_init().
- *
- * The parameters are closely related to the ones described in
- * section '10.2.1 CTR_DRBG' of [NIST SP 800-90Ar1], with one
- * crucial difference: In the NIST standard, all counts are given
- * in bits, whereas in OpenSSL entropy counts are given in bits
- * and buffer lengths are given in bytes.
- *
- * Since this difference has lead to some confusion in the past,
- * (see [GitHub Issue #2443], formerly [rt.openssl.org #4055])
- * the 'len' suffix has been added to all buffer sizes for
- * clarification.
- */
-
- int strength;
- size_t max_request;
- size_t min_entropylen, max_entropylen;
- size_t min_noncelen, max_noncelen;
- size_t max_perslen, max_adinlen;
-
- /*
- * Counts the number of generate requests since the last reseed
- * (Starts at 1). This value is the reseed_counter as defined in
- * NIST SP 800-90Ar1
- */
- unsigned int reseed_gen_counter;
- /*
- * Maximum number of generate requests until a reseed is required.
- * This value is ignored if it is zero.
- */
- unsigned int reseed_interval;
- /* Stores the time when the last reseeding occurred */
- time_t reseed_time;
- /*
- * Specifies the maximum time interval (in seconds) between reseeds.
- * This value is ignored if it is zero.
- */
- time_t reseed_time_interval;
- /*
- * Counts the number of reseeds since instantiation.
- * This value is ignored if it is zero.
- *
- * This counter is used only for seed propagation from the <master> DRBG
- * to its two children, the <public> and <private> DRBG. This feature is
- * very special and its sole purpose is to ensure that any randomness which
- * is added by RAND_add() or RAND_seed() will have an immediate effect on
- * the output of RAND_bytes() resp. RAND_priv_bytes().
- */
- TSAN_QUALIFIER unsigned int reseed_prop_counter;
- unsigned int reseed_next_counter;
-
- size_t seedlen;
- DRBG_STATUS state;
-
- /* Application data, mainly used in the KATs. */
- CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data;
-
- /* Implementation specific data */
- union {
- RAND_DRBG_CTR ctr;
- RAND_DRBG_HASH hash;
- RAND_DRBG_HMAC hmac;
- } data;
-
- /* Implementation specific methods */
- RAND_DRBG_METHOD *meth;
-
- /* Callback functions. See comments in rand_lib.c */
- RAND_DRBG_get_entropy_fn get_entropy;
- RAND_DRBG_cleanup_entropy_fn cleanup_entropy;
- RAND_DRBG_get_nonce_fn get_nonce;
- RAND_DRBG_cleanup_nonce_fn cleanup_nonce;
-};
-
-/* The global RAND method, and the global buffer and DRBG instance. */
-extern RAND_METHOD rand_meth;
-
-/* DRBG helpers */
-int rand_drbg_restart(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
- const unsigned char *buffer, size_t len, size_t entropy);
-size_t rand_drbg_seedlen(RAND_DRBG *drbg);
-/* locking api */
-int rand_drbg_lock(RAND_DRBG *drbg);
-int rand_drbg_unlock(RAND_DRBG *drbg);
-int rand_drbg_enable_locking(RAND_DRBG *drbg);
-
-
-/* initializes the DRBG implementation */
-int drbg_ctr_init(RAND_DRBG *drbg);
-int drbg_hash_init(RAND_DRBG *drbg);
-int drbg_hmac_init(RAND_DRBG *drbg);
-
-/*
- * Entropy call back for the FIPS 140-2 section 4.9.2 Conditional Tests.
- * These need to be exposed for the unit tests.
- */
-int rand_crngt_get_entropy_cb(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, RAND_POOL *pool,
- unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *md,
- unsigned int *md_size);
-extern int (*crngt_get_entropy)(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, RAND_POOL *pool,
- unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *md,
- unsigned int *md_size);
-
-#endif
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