-/* crypto/rand/md_rand.c */
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
+ *
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
+ *
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
+ *
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
+ *
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
+ *
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifdef MD_RAND_DEBUG
+# ifndef NDEBUG
+# define NDEBUG
+# endif
+#endif
+#include <assert.h>
#include <stdio.h>
-#include <time.h>
#include <string.h>
-#include "openssl/e_os.h"
+#include "e_os.h"
+#if !(defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_DSPBIOS))
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS)
+# include <time.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/async.h>
+#include "rand_lcl.h"
-#if !defined(USE_MD5_RAND) && !defined(USE_SHA1_RAND) && !defined(USE_MDC2_RAND) && !defined(USE_MD2_RAND)
-#if !defined(NO_SHA) && !defined(NO_SHA1)
-#define USE_SHA1_RAND
-#elif !defined(NO_MD5)
-#define USE_MD5_RAND
-#elif !defined(NO_MDC2) && !defined(NO_DES)
-#define USE_MDC2_RAND
-#elif !defined(NO_MD2)
-#define USE_MD2_RAND
-#else
-#error No message digest algorithm available
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+# include <openssl/fips.h>
#endif
+
+#ifdef BN_DEBUG
+# define PREDICT
#endif
-/* Changed how the state buffer used. I now attempt to 'wrap' such
- * that I don't run over the same locations the next time go through
- * the 1023 bytes - many thanks to
- * Robert J. LeBlanc <rjl@renaissoft.com> for his comments
- */
+/* #define PREDICT 1 */
+
+#define STATE_SIZE 1023
+static int state_num = 0, state_index = 0;
+static unsigned char state[STATE_SIZE + MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+static unsigned char md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+static long md_count[2] = { 0, 0 };
+
+static double entropy = 0;
+static int initialized = 0;
+
+static unsigned int crypto_lock_rand = 0; /* may be set only when a thread
+ * holds CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND (to
+ * prevent double locking) */
+/* access to lockin_thread is synchronized by CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2 */
+/* valid iff crypto_lock_rand is set */
+static CRYPTO_THREADID locking_threadid;
-#if defined(USE_MD5_RAND)
-#include <openssl/md5.h>
-#define MD_DIGEST_LENGTH MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
-#define MD_CTX MD5_CTX
-#define MD_Init(a) MD5_Init(a)
-#define MD_Update(a,b,c) MD5_Update(a,b,c)
-#define MD_Final(a,b) MD5_Final(a,b)
-#define MD(a,b,c) MD5(a,b,c)
-#elif defined(USE_SHA1_RAND)
-#include <openssl/sha.h>
-#define MD_DIGEST_LENGTH SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
-#define MD_CTX SHA_CTX
-#define MD_Init(a) SHA1_Init(a)
-#define MD_Update(a,b,c) SHA1_Update(a,b,c)
-#define MD_Final(a,b) SHA1_Final(a,b)
-#define MD(a,b,c) SHA1(a,b,c)
-#elif defined(USE_MDC2_RAND)
-#include <openssl/mdc2.h>
-#define MD_DIGEST_LENGTH MDC2_DIGEST_LENGTH
-#define MD_CTX MDC2_CTX
-#define MD_Init(a) MDC2_Init(a)
-#define MD_Update(a,b,c) MDC2_Update(a,b,c)
-#define MD_Final(a,b) MDC2_Final(a,b)
-#define MD(a,b,c) MDC2(a,b,c)
-#elif defined(USE_MD2_RAND)
-#include <openssl/md2.h>
-#define MD_DIGEST_LENGTH MD2_DIGEST_LENGTH
-#define MD_CTX MD2_CTX
-#define MD_Init(a) MD2_Init(a)
-#define MD_Update(a,b,c) MD2_Update(a,b,c)
-#define MD_Final(a,b) MD2_Final(a,b)
-#define MD(a,b,c) MD2(a,b,c)
+#ifdef PREDICT
+int rand_predictable = 0;
#endif
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
+static void rand_hw_seed(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
-/* #define NORAND 1 */
-/* #define PREDICT 1 */
+static void rand_cleanup(void);
+static int rand_seed(const void *buf, int num);
+static int rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy);
+static int rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo);
+static int rand_nopseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
+#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+static int rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
+#endif
+static int rand_status(void);
+
+static RAND_METHOD rand_meth = {
+ rand_seed,
+ rand_nopseudo_bytes,
+ rand_cleanup,
+ rand_add,
+#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+ rand_pseudo_bytes,
+#else
+ NULL,
+#endif
+ rand_status
+};
-#define STATE_SIZE 1023
-static int state_num=0,state_index=0;
-static unsigned char state[STATE_SIZE+MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
-static unsigned char md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
-static long md_count[2]={0,0};
-
-const char *RAND_version="RAND" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
-
-static void ssleay_rand_cleanup(void);
-static void ssleay_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num);
-static void ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
-
-RAND_METHOD rand_ssleay_meth={
- ssleay_rand_seed,
- ssleay_rand_bytes,
- ssleay_rand_cleanup,
- };
-
-RAND_METHOD *RAND_SSLeay(void)
- {
- return(&rand_ssleay_meth);
- }
-
-static void ssleay_rand_cleanup(void)
- {
- memset(state,0,sizeof(state));
- state_num=0;
- state_index=0;
- memset(md,0,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
- md_count[0]=0;
- md_count[1]=0;
- }
-
-static void ssleay_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num)
- {
- int i,j,k,st_idx,st_num;
- MD_CTX m;
-
-#ifdef NORAND
- return;
+RAND_METHOD *RAND_OpenSSL(void)
+{
+ return (&rand_meth);
+}
+
+static void rand_cleanup(void)
+{
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(state, sizeof(state));
+ state_num = 0;
+ state_index = 0;
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ md_count[0] = 0;
+ md_count[1] = 0;
+ entropy = 0;
+ initialized = 0;
+}
+
+static int rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
+{
+ int i, j, k, st_idx;
+ long md_c[2];
+ unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ EVP_MD_CTX *m;
+ int do_not_lock;
+ int rv = 0;
+
+ if (!num)
+ return 1;
+
+ /*
+ * (Based on the rand(3) manpage)
+ *
+ * The input is chopped up into units of 20 bytes (or less for
+ * the last block). Each of these blocks is run through the hash
+ * function as follows: The data passed to the hash function
+ * is the current 'md', the same number of bytes from the 'state'
+ * (the location determined by in incremented looping index) as
+ * the current 'block', the new key data 'block', and 'count'
+ * (which is incremented after each use).
+ * The result of this is kept in 'md' and also xored into the
+ * 'state' at the same locations that were used as input into the
+ * hash function.
+ */
+
+ m = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+ if (m == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* check if we already have the lock */
+ if (crypto_lock_rand) {
+ CRYPTO_THREADID cur;
+ CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur);
+ CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+ do_not_lock = !CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&locking_threadid, &cur);
+ CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+ } else
+ do_not_lock = 0;
+
+ if (!do_not_lock)
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ st_idx = state_index;
+
+ /*
+ * use our own copies of the counters so that even if a concurrent thread
+ * seeds with exactly the same data and uses the same subarray there's
+ * _some_ difference
+ */
+ md_c[0] = md_count[0];
+ md_c[1] = md_count[1];
+
+ memcpy(local_md, md, sizeof md);
+
+ /* state_index <= state_num <= STATE_SIZE */
+ state_index += num;
+ if (state_index >= STATE_SIZE) {
+ state_index %= STATE_SIZE;
+ state_num = STATE_SIZE;
+ } else if (state_num < STATE_SIZE) {
+ if (state_index > state_num)
+ state_num = state_index;
+ }
+ /* state_index <= state_num <= STATE_SIZE */
+
+ /*
+ * state[st_idx], ..., state[(st_idx + num - 1) % STATE_SIZE] are what we
+ * will use now, but other threads may use them as well
+ */
+
+ md_count[1] += (num / MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) + (num % MD_DIGEST_LENGTH > 0);
+
+ if (!do_not_lock)
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num; i += MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) {
+ j = (num - i);
+ j = (j > MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) ? MD_DIGEST_LENGTH : j;
+
+ if (!MD_Init(m))
+ goto err;
+ if (!MD_Update(m, local_md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH))
+ goto err;
+ k = (st_idx + j) - STATE_SIZE;
+ if (k > 0) {
+ if (!MD_Update(m, &(state[st_idx]), j - k))
+ goto err;
+ if (!MD_Update(m, &(state[0]), k))
+ goto err;
+ } else if (!MD_Update(m, &(state[st_idx]), j))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* DO NOT REMOVE THE FOLLOWING CALL TO MD_Update()! */
+ if (!MD_Update(m, buf, j))
+ goto err;
+ /*
+ * We know that line may cause programs such as purify and valgrind
+ * to complain about use of uninitialized data. The problem is not,
+ * it's with the caller. Removing that line will make sure you get
+ * really bad randomness and thereby other problems such as very
+ * insecure keys.
+ */
+
+ if (!MD_Update(m, (unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]), sizeof(md_c)))
+ goto err;
+ if (!MD_Final(m, local_md))
+ goto err;
+ md_c[1]++;
+
+ buf = (const char *)buf + j;
+
+ for (k = 0; k < j; k++) {
+ /*
+ * Parallel threads may interfere with this, but always each byte
+ * of the new state is the XOR of some previous value of its and
+ * local_md (intermediate values may be lost). Alway using locking
+ * could hurt performance more than necessary given that
+ * conflicts occur only when the total seeding is longer than the
+ * random state.
+ */
+ state[st_idx++] ^= local_md[k];
+ if (st_idx >= STATE_SIZE)
+ st_idx = 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!do_not_lock)
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ /*
+ * Don't just copy back local_md into md -- this could mean that other
+ * thread's seeding remains without effect (except for the incremented
+ * counter). By XORing it we keep at least as much entropy as fits into
+ * md.
+ */
+ for (k = 0; k < (int)sizeof(md); k++) {
+ md[k] ^= local_md[k];
+ }
+ if (entropy < ENTROPY_NEEDED) /* stop counting when we have enough */
+ entropy += add;
+ if (!do_not_lock)
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_THREADS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32)
+ assert(md_c[1] == md_count[1]);
#endif
+ rv = 1;
+ err:
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(m);
+ return rv;
+}
+
+static int rand_seed(const void *buf, int num)
+{
+ return rand_add(buf, num, (double)num);
+}
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
- st_idx=state_index;
- st_num=state_num;
-
- state_index=(state_index+num);
- if (state_index >= STATE_SIZE)
- {
- state_index%=STATE_SIZE;
- state_num=STATE_SIZE;
- }
- else if (state_num < STATE_SIZE)
- {
- if (state_index > state_num)
- state_num=state_index;
- }
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
-
- for (i=0; i<num; i+=MD_DIGEST_LENGTH)
- {
- j=(num-i);
- j=(j > MD_DIGEST_LENGTH)?MD_DIGEST_LENGTH:j;
-
- MD_Init(&m);
- MD_Update(&m,md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
- k=(st_idx+j)-STATE_SIZE;
- if (k > 0)
- {
- MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),j-k);
- MD_Update(&m,&(state[0]),k);
- }
- else
- MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),j);
-
- MD_Update(&m,buf,j);
- MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_count[0]),sizeof(md_count));
- MD_Final(md,&m);
- md_count[1]++;
-
- buf=(const char *)buf + j;
-
- for (k=0; k<j; k++)
- {
- state[st_idx++]^=md[k];
- if (st_idx >= STATE_SIZE)
- {
- st_idx=0;
- st_num=STATE_SIZE;
- }
- }
- }
- memset((char *)&m,0,sizeof(m));
- }
-
-static void ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
- {
- int i,j,k,st_num,st_idx;
- MD_CTX m;
- static int init=1;
- unsigned long l;
-#ifdef DEVRANDOM
- FILE *fh;
+static int rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo)
+{
+ static volatile int stirred_pool = 0;
+ int i, j, k, st_num, st_idx;
+ int num_ceil;
+ int ok;
+ long md_c[2];
+ unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ EVP_MD_CTX *m;
+#ifndef GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS
+ pid_t curr_pid = getpid();
+#endif
+ time_t curr_time = time(NULL);
+ int do_stir_pool = 0;
+/* time value for various platforms */
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
+ FILETIME tv;
+# ifdef _WIN32_WCE
+ SYSTEMTIME t;
+ GetSystemTime(&t);
+ SystemTimeToFileTime(&t, &tv);
+# else
+ GetSystemTimeAsFileTime(&tv);
+# endif
+#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS)
+ struct timespec tv;
+ clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &ts);
+#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_DSPBIOS)
+ unsigned long long tv, OPENSSL_rdtsc();
+ tv = OPENSSL_rdtsc();
+#else
+ struct timeval tv;
+ gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
#endif
#ifdef PREDICT
- {
- static unsigned char val=0;
+ if (rand_predictable) {
+ static unsigned char val = 0;
- for (i=0; i<num; i++)
- buf[i]=val++;
- return;
- }
+ for (i = 0; i < num; i++)
+ buf[i] = val++;
+ return (1);
+ }
#endif
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
-
- if (init)
- {
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
- /* put in some default random data, we need more than
- * just this */
- RAND_seed(&m,sizeof(m));
-#ifndef MSDOS
- l=getpid();
- RAND_seed(&l,sizeof(l));
- l=getuid();
- RAND_seed(&l,sizeof(l));
+ if (num <= 0)
+ return 1;
+
+ m = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+ if (m == NULL)
+ goto err_mem;
+
+ /* round upwards to multiple of MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2 */
+ num_ceil =
+ (1 + (num - 1) / (MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2)) * (MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2);
+
+ /*
+ * (Based on the rand(3) manpage:)
+ *
+ * For each group of 10 bytes (or less), we do the following:
+ *
+ * Input into the hash function the local 'md' (which is initialized from
+ * the global 'md' before any bytes are generated), the bytes that are to
+ * be overwritten by the random bytes, and bytes from the 'state'
+ * (incrementing looping index). From this digest output (which is kept
+ * in 'md'), the top (up to) 10 bytes are returned to the caller and the
+ * bottom 10 bytes are xored into the 'state'.
+ *
+ * Finally, after we have finished 'num' random bytes for the
+ * caller, 'count' (which is incremented) and the local and global 'md'
+ * are fed into the hash function and the results are kept in the
+ * global 'md'.
+ */
+
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ /*
+ * We could end up in an async engine while holding this lock so ensure
+ * we don't pause and cause a deadlock
+ */
+ ASYNC_block_pause();
+
+ /* prevent rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again */
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+ CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&locking_threadid);
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+ crypto_lock_rand = 1;
+
+ if (!initialized) {
+ RAND_poll();
+ initialized = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (!stirred_pool)
+ do_stir_pool = 1;
+
+ ok = (entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED);
+ if (!ok) {
+ /*
+ * If the PRNG state is not yet unpredictable, then seeing the PRNG
+ * output may help attackers to determine the new state; thus we have
+ * to decrease the entropy estimate. Once we've had enough initial
+ * seeding we don't bother to adjust the entropy count, though,
+ * because we're not ambitious to provide *information-theoretic*
+ * randomness. NOTE: This approach fails if the program forks before
+ * we have enough entropy. Entropy should be collected in a separate
+ * input pool and be transferred to the output pool only when the
+ * entropy limit has been reached.
+ */
+ entropy -= num;
+ if (entropy < 0)
+ entropy = 0;
+ }
+
+ if (do_stir_pool) {
+ /*
+ * In the output function only half of 'md' remains secret, so we
+ * better make sure that the required entropy gets 'evenly
+ * distributed' through 'state', our randomness pool. The input
+ * function (rand_add) chains all of 'md', which makes it more
+ * suitable for this purpose.
+ */
+
+ int n = STATE_SIZE; /* so that the complete pool gets accessed */
+ while (n > 0) {
+#if MD_DIGEST_LENGTH > 20
+# error "Please adjust DUMMY_SEED."
#endif
- l=time(NULL);
- RAND_seed(&l,sizeof(l));
-
-/* #ifdef DEVRANDOM */
- /*
- * Use a random entropy pool device.
- * Linux 1.3.x and FreeBSD-Current has
- * this. Use /dev/urandom if you can
- * as /dev/random will block if it runs out
- * of random entries.
- */
- if ((fh = fopen(DEVRANDOM, "r")) != NULL)
- {
- unsigned char tmpbuf[32];
-
- fread((unsigned char *)tmpbuf,1,32,fh);
- /* we don't care how many bytes we read,
- * we will just copy the 'stack' if there is
- * nothing else :-) */
- fclose(fh);
- RAND_seed(tmpbuf,32);
- memset(tmpbuf,0,32);
- }
-/* #endif */
-#ifdef PURIFY
- memset(state,0,STATE_SIZE);
- memset(md,0,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+#define DUMMY_SEED "...................." /* at least MD_DIGEST_LENGTH */
+ /*
+ * Note that the seed does not matter, it's just that
+ * rand_add expects to have something to hash.
+ */
+ rand_add(DUMMY_SEED, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH, 0.0);
+ n -= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+ }
+ if (ok)
+ stirred_pool = 1;
+ }
+
+ st_idx = state_index;
+ st_num = state_num;
+ md_c[0] = md_count[0];
+ md_c[1] = md_count[1];
+ memcpy(local_md, md, sizeof md);
+
+ state_index += num_ceil;
+ if (state_index > state_num)
+ state_index %= state_num;
+
+ /*
+ * state[st_idx], ..., state[(st_idx + num_ceil - 1) % st_num] are now
+ * ours (but other threads may use them too)
+ */
+
+ md_count[0] += 1;
+
+ /* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */
+ crypto_lock_rand = 0;
+ ASYNC_unblock_pause();
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+
+ while (num > 0) {
+ /* num_ceil -= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2 */
+ j = (num >= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2) ? MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2 : num;
+ num -= j;
+ if (!MD_Init(m))
+ goto err;
+#ifndef GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS
+ if (curr_pid) { /* just in the first iteration to save time */
+ if (!MD_Update(m, (unsigned char *)&curr_pid, sizeof curr_pid))
+ goto err;
+ curr_pid = 0;
+ }
#endif
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
- init=0;
- }
-
- st_idx=state_index;
- st_num=state_num;
- state_index+=num;
- if (state_index > state_num)
- state_index=(state_index%state_num);
-
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
-
- while (num > 0)
- {
- j=(num >= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2)?MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2:num;
- num-=j;
- MD_Init(&m);
- MD_Update(&m,&(md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2]),MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2);
- MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_count[0]),sizeof(md_count));
-#ifndef PURIFY
- MD_Update(&m,buf,j); /* purify complains */
-#endif
- k=(st_idx+j)-st_num;
- if (k > 0)
- {
- MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),j-k);
- MD_Update(&m,&(state[0]),k);
- }
- else
- MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),j);
- MD_Final(md,&m);
-
- for (i=0; i<j; i++)
- {
- if (st_idx >= st_num)
- st_idx=0;
- state[st_idx++]^=md[i];
- *(buf++)=md[i+MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2];
- }
- }
-
- MD_Init(&m);
- MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_count[0]),sizeof(md_count));
- md_count[0]++;
- MD_Update(&m,md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
- MD_Final(md,&m);
- memset(&m,0,sizeof(m));
- }
-
-#ifdef WINDOWS
-#include <windows.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
+ if (curr_time) { /* just in the first iteration to save time */
+ if (!MD_Update(m, (unsigned char *)&curr_time, sizeof curr_time))
+ goto err;
+ if (!MD_Update(m, (unsigned char *)&tv, sizeof tv))
+ goto err;
+ curr_time = 0;
+ rand_hw_seed(m);
+ }
+ if (!MD_Update(m, local_md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH))
+ goto err;
+ if (!MD_Update(m, (unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]), sizeof(md_c)))
+ goto err;
+
+ k = (st_idx + MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2) - st_num;
+ if (k > 0) {
+ if (!MD_Update(m, &(state[st_idx]), MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2 - k))
+ goto err;
+ if (!MD_Update(m, &(state[0]), k))
+ goto err;
+ } else if (!MD_Update(m, &(state[st_idx]), MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2))
+ goto err;
+ if (!MD_Final(m, local_md))
+ goto err;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2; i++) {
+ /* may compete with other threads */
+ state[st_idx++] ^= local_md[i];
+ if (st_idx >= st_num)
+ st_idx = 0;
+ if (i < j)
+ *(buf++) = local_md[i + MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2];
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!MD_Init(m)
+ || !MD_Update(m, (unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]), sizeof(md_c))
+ || !MD_Update(m, local_md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH))
+ goto err;
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ /*
+ * Prevent deadlocks if we end up in an async engine
+ */
+ ASYNC_block_pause();
+ if (!MD_Update(m, md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) || !MD_Final(m, md)) {
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ASYNC_unblock_pause();
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(m);
+ if (ok)
+ return (1);
+ else if (pseudo)
+ return 0;
+ else {
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_BYTES, RAND_R_PRNG_NOT_SEEDED);
+ ERR_add_error_data(1, "You need to read the OpenSSL FAQ, "
+ "https://www.openssl.org/docs/faq.html");
+ return (0);
+ }
+ err:
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_BYTES, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(m);
+ return 0;
+ err_mem:
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_BYTES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(m);
+ return 0;
-/*****************************************************************************
- * Initialisation function for the SSL random generator. Takes the contents
- * of the screen as random seed.
- *
- * Created 960901 by Gertjan van Oosten, gertjan@West.NL, West Consulting B.V.
- *
- * Code adapted from
- * <URL:http://www.microsoft.com/kb/developr/win_dk/q97193.htm>;
- * the original copyright message is:
- *
- * (C) Copyright Microsoft Corp. 1993. All rights reserved.
- *
- * You have a royalty-free right to use, modify, reproduce and
- * distribute the Sample Files (and/or any modified version) in
- * any way you find useful, provided that you agree that
- * Microsoft has no warranty obligations or liability for any
- * Sample Application Files which are modified.
+}
+
+static int rand_nopseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
+{
+ return rand_bytes(buf, num, 0);
+}
+
+#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+/*
+ * pseudo-random bytes that are guaranteed to be unique but not unpredictable
*/
+static int rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
+{
+ return rand_bytes(buf, num, 1);
+}
+#endif
+
+static int rand_status(void)
+{
+ CRYPTO_THREADID cur;
+ int ret;
+ int do_not_lock;
+
+ CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur);
+ /*
+ * check if we already have the lock (could happen if a RAND_poll()
+ * implementation calls RAND_status())
+ */
+ if (crypto_lock_rand) {
+ CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+ do_not_lock = !CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&locking_threadid, &cur);
+ CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+ } else
+ do_not_lock = 0;
+
+ if (!do_not_lock) {
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ /*
+ * Prevent deadlocks in case we end up in an async engine
+ */
+ ASYNC_block_pause();
+
+ /*
+ * prevent rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again
+ */
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+ CRYPTO_THREADID_cpy(&locking_threadid, &cur);
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+ crypto_lock_rand = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (!initialized) {
+ RAND_poll();
+ initialized = 1;
+ }
+
+ ret = entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED;
+
+ if (!do_not_lock) {
+ /* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */
+ crypto_lock_rand = 0;
+
+ ASYNC_unblock_pause();
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
/*
- * I have modified the loading of bytes via RAND_seed() mechanism since
- * the origional would have been very very CPU intensive since RAND_seed()
- * does an MD5 per 16 bytes of input. The cost to digest 16 bytes is the same
- * as that to digest 56 bytes. So under the old system, a screen of
- * 1024*768*256 would have been CPU cost of approximatly 49,000 56 byte MD5
- * digests or digesting 2.7 mbytes. What I have put in place would
- * be 48 16k MD5 digests, or efectivly 48*16+48 MD5 bytes or 816 kbytes
- * or about 3.5 times as much.
- * - eric
+ * rand_hw_seed: get seed data from any available hardware RNG. only
+ * currently supports rdrand.
*/
-void RAND_screen(void)
+
+/* Adapted from eng_rdrand.c */
+
+#if (defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__) || defined(_M_IX86) || \
+ defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
+ defined(_M_AMD64) || defined (_M_X64)) && defined(OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ) \
+ && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RDRAND)
+
+# define RDRAND_CALLS 4
+
+size_t OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand(void);
+extern unsigned int OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[];
+
+static void rand_hw_seed(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
{
- HDC hScrDC; /* screen DC */
- HDC hMemDC; /* memory DC */
- HBITMAP hBitmap; /* handle for our bitmap */
- HBITMAP hOldBitmap; /* handle for previous bitmap */
- BITMAP bm; /* bitmap properties */
- unsigned int size; /* size of bitmap */
- char *bmbits; /* contents of bitmap */
- int w; /* screen width */
- int h; /* screen height */
- int y; /* y-coordinate of screen lines to grab */
- int n = 16; /* number of screen lines to grab at a time */
-
- /* Create a screen DC and a memory DC compatible to screen DC */
- hScrDC = CreateDC("DISPLAY", NULL, NULL, NULL);
- hMemDC = CreateCompatibleDC(hScrDC);
-
- /* Get screen resolution */
- w = GetDeviceCaps(hScrDC, HORZRES);
- h = GetDeviceCaps(hScrDC, VERTRES);
-
- /* Create a bitmap compatible with the screen DC */
- hBitmap = CreateCompatibleBitmap(hScrDC, w, n);
-
- /* Select new bitmap into memory DC */
- hOldBitmap = SelectObject(hMemDC, hBitmap);
-
- /* Get bitmap properties */
- GetObject(hBitmap, sizeof(BITMAP), (LPSTR)&bm);
- size = (unsigned int)bm.bmWidthBytes * bm.bmHeight * bm.bmPlanes;
-
- bmbits = Malloc(size);
- if (bmbits) {
- /* Now go through the whole screen, repeatedly grabbing n lines */
- for (y = 0; y < h-n; y += n)
- {
- unsigned char md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
-
- /* Bitblt screen DC to memory DC */
- BitBlt(hMemDC, 0, 0, w, n, hScrDC, 0, y, SRCCOPY);
-
- /* Copy bitmap bits from memory DC to bmbits */
- GetBitmapBits(hBitmap, size, bmbits);
-
- /* Get the MD5 of the bitmap */
- MD(bmbits,size,md);
-
- /* Seed the random generator with the MD5 digest */
- RAND_seed(md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
- }
-
- Free(bmbits);
- }
-
- /* Select old bitmap back into memory DC */
- hBitmap = SelectObject(hMemDC, hOldBitmap);
-
- /* Clean up */
- DeleteObject(hBitmap);
- DeleteDC(hMemDC);
- DeleteDC(hScrDC);
+ int i;
+ if (!(OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1 << (62 - 32))))
+ return;
+ for (i = 0; i < RDRAND_CALLS; i++) {
+ size_t rnd;
+ rnd = OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand();
+ if (rnd == 0)
+ return;
+ MD_Update(ctx, (unsigned char *)&rnd, sizeof(size_t));
+ }
}
+
+/* XOR an existing buffer with random data */
+
+void rand_hw_xor(unsigned char *buf, size_t num)
+{
+ size_t rnd;
+ if (!(OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1 << (62 - 32))))
+ return;
+ while (num >= sizeof(size_t)) {
+ rnd = OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand();
+ if (rnd == 0)
+ return;
+ *((size_t *)buf) ^= rnd;
+ buf += sizeof(size_t);
+ num -= sizeof(size_t);
+ }
+ if (num) {
+ rnd = OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand();
+ if (rnd == 0)
+ return;
+ while (num) {
+ *buf ^= rnd & 0xff;
+ rnd >>= 8;
+ buf++;
+ num--;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+#else
+
+static void rand_hw_seed(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return;
+}
+
+void rand_hw_xor(unsigned char *buf, size_t num)
+{
+ return;
+}
+
#endif
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff