* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
-#define ENTROPY_NEEDED 32 /* require 128 bits of randomness */
+#define OPENSSL_FIPSAPI
-#ifndef MD_RAND_DEBUG
+#ifdef MD_RAND_DEBUG
# ifndef NDEBUG
# define NDEBUG
# endif
#include <assert.h>
#include <stdio.h>
-#include <time.h>
#include <string.h>
-#include "openssl/e_os.h"
-
-#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include "e_os.h"
-#if !defined(USE_MD5_RAND) && !defined(USE_SHA1_RAND) && !defined(USE_MDC2_RAND) && !defined(USE_MD2_RAND)
-#if !defined(NO_SHA) && !defined(NO_SHA1)
-#define USE_SHA1_RAND
-#elif !defined(NO_MD5)
-#define USE_MD5_RAND
-#elif !defined(NO_MDC2) && !defined(NO_DES)
-#define USE_MDC2_RAND
-#elif !defined(NO_MD2)
-#define USE_MD2_RAND
-#else
-#error No message digest algorithm available
+#if !(defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYSNAME_DSPBIOS))
+# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS)
+# include <time.h>
#endif
-/* Changed how the state buffer used. I now attempt to 'wrap' such
- * that I don't run over the same locations the next time go through
- * the 1023 bytes - many thanks to
- * Robert J. LeBlanc <rjl@renaissoft.com> for his comments
- */
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include "rand_lcl.h"
-#if defined(USE_MD5_RAND)
-#include <openssl/md5.h>
-#define MD_DIGEST_LENGTH MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
-#define MD_CTX MD5_CTX
-#define MD_Init(a) MD5_Init(a)
-#define MD_Update(a,b,c) MD5_Update(a,b,c)
-#define MD_Final(a,b) MD5_Final(a,b)
-#define MD(a,b,c) MD5(a,b,c)
-#elif defined(USE_SHA1_RAND)
-#include <openssl/sha.h>
-#define MD_DIGEST_LENGTH SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
-#define MD_CTX SHA_CTX
-#define MD_Init(a) SHA1_Init(a)
-#define MD_Update(a,b,c) SHA1_Update(a,b,c)
-#define MD_Final(a,b) SHA1_Final(a,b)
-#define MD(a,b,c) SHA1(a,b,c)
-#elif defined(USE_MDC2_RAND)
-#include <openssl/mdc2.h>
-#define MD_DIGEST_LENGTH MDC2_DIGEST_LENGTH
-#define MD_CTX MDC2_CTX
-#define MD_Init(a) MDC2_Init(a)
-#define MD_Update(a,b,c) MDC2_Update(a,b,c)
-#define MD_Final(a,b) MDC2_Final(a,b)
-#define MD(a,b,c) MDC2(a,b,c)
-#elif defined(USE_MD2_RAND)
-#include <openssl/md2.h>
-#define MD_DIGEST_LENGTH MD2_DIGEST_LENGTH
-#define MD_CTX MD2_CTX
-#define MD_Init(a) MD2_Init(a)
-#define MD_Update(a,b,c) MD2_Update(a,b,c)
-#define MD_Final(a,b) MD2_Final(a,b)
-#define MD(a,b,c) MD2(a,b,c)
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+#include <openssl/fips.h>
#endif
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#ifdef BN_DEBUG
+# define PREDICT
+#endif
-/* #define NORAND 1 */
/* #define PREDICT 1 */
#define STATE_SIZE 1023
static unsigned char state[STATE_SIZE+MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
static unsigned char md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
static long md_count[2]={0,0};
-static unsigned entropy=0;
+static double entropy=0;
+static int initialized=0;
+
+static unsigned int crypto_lock_rand = 0; /* may be set only when a thread
+ * holds CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND
+ * (to prevent double locking) */
+/* access to lockin_thread is synchronized by CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2 */
+static CRYPTO_THREADID locking_threadid; /* valid iff crypto_lock_rand is set */
-const char *RAND_version="RAND" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
+
+#ifdef PREDICT
+int rand_predictable=0;
+#endif
+
+const char RAND_version[]="RAND" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
+
+static void rand_hw_seed(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
static void ssleay_rand_cleanup(void);
-static void ssleay_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num);
-static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, int add_entropy);
-static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
+static int ssleay_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num);
+static int ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy);
+static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo);
+static int ssleay_rand_nopseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
static int ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
+static int ssleay_rand_status(void);
-RAND_METHOD rand_ssleay_meth={
+static RAND_METHOD rand_ssleay_meth={
ssleay_rand_seed,
- ssleay_rand_bytes,
+ ssleay_rand_nopseudo_bytes,
ssleay_rand_cleanup,
ssleay_rand_add,
ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes,
+ ssleay_rand_status
};
RAND_METHOD *RAND_SSLeay(void)
static void ssleay_rand_cleanup(void)
{
- memset(state,0,sizeof(state));
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(state,sizeof(state));
state_num=0;
state_index=0;
- memset(md,0,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
md_count[0]=0;
md_count[1]=0;
entropy=0;
+ initialized=0;
}
-static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, int add)
+static int ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
{
int i,j,k,st_idx;
long md_c[2];
unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
- MD_CTX m;
+ EVP_MD_CTX m;
+ int do_not_lock;
+ int rv = 0;
-#ifdef NORAND
- return;
-#endif
+ if (!num)
+ return;
/*
* (Based on the rand(3) manpage)
*
- * The input is chopped up into units of 16 bytes (or less for
+ * The input is chopped up into units of 20 bytes (or less for
* the last block). Each of these blocks is run through the hash
- * function as follow: The data passed to the hash function
+ * function as follows: The data passed to the hash function
* is the current 'md', the same number of bytes from the 'state'
* (the location determined by in incremented looping index) as
* the current 'block', the new key data 'block', and 'count'
* hash function.
*/
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&m);
+ /* check if we already have the lock */
+ if (crypto_lock_rand)
+ {
+ CRYPTO_THREADID cur;
+ CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur);
+ CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+ do_not_lock = !CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&locking_threadid, &cur);
+ CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+ }
+ else
+ do_not_lock = 0;
+
+ if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
st_idx=state_index;
/* use our own copies of the counters so that even
md_count[1] += (num / MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) + (num % MD_DIGEST_LENGTH > 0);
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
for (i=0; i<num; i+=MD_DIGEST_LENGTH)
{
j=(num-i);
j=(j > MD_DIGEST_LENGTH)?MD_DIGEST_LENGTH:j;
- MD_Init(&m);
- MD_Update(&m,local_md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ if (!MD_Init(&m))
+ goto err;
+ if (!MD_Update(&m,local_md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH))
+ goto err;
k=(st_idx+j)-STATE_SIZE;
if (k > 0)
{
- MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),j-k);
- MD_Update(&m,&(state[0]),k);
+ if (!MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),j-k))
+ goto err;
+ if (!MD_Update(&m,&(state[0]),k))
+ goto err;
}
else
- MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),j);
-
- MD_Update(&m,buf,j);
- MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c));
- MD_Final(local_md,&m);
+ if (!MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),j))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* DO NOT REMOVE THE FOLLOWING CALL TO MD_Update()! */
+ if (!MD_Update(&m,buf,j))
+ goto err;
+ /* We know that line may cause programs such as
+ purify and valgrind to complain about use of
+ uninitialized data. The problem is not, it's
+ with the caller. Removing that line will make
+ sure you get really bad randomness and thereby
+ other problems such as very insecure keys. */
+
+ if (!MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c)))
+ goto err;
+ if (!MD_Final(&m,local_md))
+ goto err;
md_c[1]++;
buf=(const char *)buf + j;
st_idx=0;
}
}
- memset((char *)&m,0,sizeof(m));
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
/* Don't just copy back local_md into md -- this could mean that
* other thread's seeding remains without effect (except for
* the incremented counter). By XORing it we keep at least as
* much entropy as fits into md. */
- for (k = 0; k < sizeof md; k++)
+ for (k = 0; k < (int)sizeof(md); k++)
{
md[k] ^= local_md[k];
}
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ if (entropy < ENTROPY_NEEDED) /* stop counting when we have enough */
+ entropy += add;
+ if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
-#ifndef THREADS
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_THREADS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32)
assert(md_c[1] == md_count[1]);
#endif
- if (entropy < ENTROPY_NEEDED)
- entropy += add;
+ rv = 1;
+ err:
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m);
+ return rv;
}
-static void ssleay_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num)
+static int ssleay_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num)
{
- ssleay_rand_add(buf, num, num);
+ return ssleay_rand_add(buf, num, (double)num);
}
-static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
+static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo)
{
+ static volatile int stirred_pool = 0;
int i,j,k,st_num,st_idx;
+ int num_ceil;
int ok;
long md_c[2];
unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
- MD_CTX m;
- static int init=1;
- unsigned long l;
+ EVP_MD_CTX m;
#ifndef GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS
pid_t curr_pid = getpid();
#endif
-#ifdef DEVRANDOM
- FILE *fh;
+ time_t curr_time = time(NULL);
+ int do_stir_pool = 0;
+/* time value for various platforms */
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
+ FILETIME tv;
+# ifdef _WIN32_WCE
+ SYSTEMTIME t;
+ GetSystemTime(&t);
+ SystemTimeToFileTime(&t, &tv);
+# else
+ GetSystemTimeAsFileTime(&tv);
+# endif
+#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS)
+ struct timespec tv;
+ clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &ts);
+#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYSNAME_DSPBIOS)
+ unsigned long long tv, OPENSSL_rdtsc();
+ tv = OPENSSL_rdtsc();
+#else
+ struct timeval tv;
+ gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
#endif
#ifdef PREDICT
- {
- static unsigned char val=0;
+ if (rand_predictable)
+ {
+ static unsigned char val=0;
- for (i=0; i<num; i++)
- buf[i]=val++;
- return(1);
- }
+ for (i=0; i<num; i++)
+ buf[i]=val++;
+ return(1);
+ }
#endif
+ if (num <= 0)
+ return 1;
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&m);
+ /* round upwards to multiple of MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2 */
+ num_ceil = (1 + (num-1)/(MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2)) * (MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2);
+
/*
- * (Based on doc/ssleay.txt, section rand.doc:)
+ * (Based on the rand(3) manpage:)
*
- * For each group of 8 bytes (or less), we do the following,
+ * For each group of 10 bytes (or less), we do the following:
*
- * Input into MD5, the top 8 bytes from 'md', the byte that are
- * to be overwritten by the random bytes and bytes from the
- * 'state' (incrementing looping index). From this digest output
- * (which is kept in 'md'), the top (upto) 8 bytes are
- * returned to the caller and the bottom (upto) 8 bytes are xored
- * into the 'state'.
+ * Input into the hash function the local 'md' (which is initialized from
+ * the global 'md' before any bytes are generated), the bytes that are to
+ * be overwritten by the random bytes, and bytes from the 'state'
+ * (incrementing looping index). From this digest output (which is kept
+ * in 'md'), the top (up to) 10 bytes are returned to the caller and the
+ * bottom 10 bytes are xored into the 'state'.
+ *
* Finally, after we have finished 'num' random bytes for the
- * caller, 'count' (which is incremented) and the local and globl 'md'
- * are fed into MD5 and the results are kept in the global 'md'.
+ * caller, 'count' (which is incremented) and the local and global 'md'
+ * are fed into the hash function and the results are kept in the
+ * global 'md'.
*/
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
- if (init)
+ /* prevent ssleay_rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again */
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+ CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&locking_threadid);
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+ crypto_lock_rand = 1;
+
+ if (!initialized)
{
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
- /* put in some default random data, we need more than
- * just this */
- RAND_add(&m,sizeof(m),0);
-#ifndef GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS
- l=curr_pid;
- RAND_add(&l,sizeof(l),0);
- l=getuid();
- RAND_add(&l,sizeof(l),0);
-#endif
- l=time(NULL);
- RAND_add(&l,sizeof(l),0);
-
-#ifdef DEVRANDOM
- /*
- * Use a random entropy pool device.
- * Linux 1.3.x and FreeBSD-Current has
- * this. Use /dev/urandom if you can
- * as /dev/random will block if it runs out
- * of random entries.
+ RAND_poll();
+ initialized = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (!stirred_pool)
+ do_stir_pool = 1;
+
+ ok = (entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED);
+ if (!ok)
+ {
+ /* If the PRNG state is not yet unpredictable, then seeing
+ * the PRNG output may help attackers to determine the new
+ * state; thus we have to decrease the entropy estimate.
+ * Once we've had enough initial seeding we don't bother to
+ * adjust the entropy count, though, because we're not ambitious
+ * to provide *information-theoretic* randomness.
+ *
+ * NOTE: This approach fails if the program forks before
+ * we have enough entropy. Entropy should be collected
+ * in a separate input pool and be transferred to the
+ * output pool only when the entropy limit has been reached.
*/
- if ((fh = fopen(DEVRANDOM, "r")) != NULL)
- {
- unsigned char tmpbuf[ENTROPY_NEEDED];
- int n;
+ entropy -= num;
+ if (entropy < 0)
+ entropy = 0;
+ }
- n=fread((unsigned char *)tmpbuf,1,ENTROPY_NEEDED,fh);
- fclose(fh);
- RAND_add(tmpbuf,sizeof tmpbuf,n);
- memset(tmpbuf,0,n);
- }
-#endif
-#ifdef PURIFY
- memset(state,0,STATE_SIZE);
- memset(md,0,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ if (do_stir_pool)
+ {
+ /* In the output function only half of 'md' remains secret,
+ * so we better make sure that the required entropy gets
+ * 'evenly distributed' through 'state', our randomness pool.
+ * The input function (ssleay_rand_add) chains all of 'md',
+ * which makes it more suitable for this purpose.
+ */
+
+ int n = STATE_SIZE; /* so that the complete pool gets accessed */
+ while (n > 0)
+ {
+#if MD_DIGEST_LENGTH > 20
+# error "Please adjust DUMMY_SEED."
#endif
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
- init=0;
+#define DUMMY_SEED "...................." /* at least MD_DIGEST_LENGTH */
+ /* Note that the seed does not matter, it's just that
+ * ssleay_rand_add expects to have something to hash. */
+ ssleay_rand_add(DUMMY_SEED, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH, 0.0);
+ n -= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+ }
+ if (ok)
+ stirred_pool = 1;
}
- ok = (entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED);
-
st_idx=state_index;
st_num=state_num;
md_c[0] = md_count[0];
md_c[1] = md_count[1];
memcpy(local_md, md, sizeof md);
- state_index+=num;
+ state_index+=num_ceil;
if (state_index > state_num)
state_index %= state_num;
- /* state[st_idx], ..., state[(st_idx + num - 1) % st_num]
+ /* state[st_idx], ..., state[(st_idx + num_ceil - 1) % st_num]
* are now ours (but other threads may use them too) */
md_count[0] += 1;
+
+ /* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */
+ crypto_lock_rand = 0;
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
while (num > 0)
{
+ /* num_ceil -= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2 */
j=(num >= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2)?MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2:num;
num-=j;
- MD_Init(&m);
+ if (!MD_Init(&m))
+ goto err;
#ifndef GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS
if (curr_pid) /* just in the first iteration to save time */
{
- MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char*)&curr_pid,sizeof curr_pid);
+ if (!MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char*)&curr_pid,
+ sizeof curr_pid))
+ goto err;
curr_pid = 0;
}
#endif
- MD_Update(&m,&(local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2]),MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2);
- MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c));
-#ifndef PURIFY
- MD_Update(&m,buf,j); /* purify complains */
+ if (curr_time) /* just in the first iteration to save time */
+ {
+ if (!MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char*)&curr_time,
+ sizeof curr_time))
+ goto err;
+ if (!MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char*)&tv,
+ sizeof tv))
+ goto err;
+ curr_time = 0;
+ rand_hw_seed(&m);
+ }
+ if (!MD_Update(&m,local_md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH))
+ goto err;
+ if (!MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c)))
+ goto err;
+
+#ifndef PURIFY /* purify complains */
+ /* The following line uses the supplied buffer as a small
+ * source of entropy: since this buffer is often uninitialised
+ * it may cause programs such as purify or valgrind to
+ * complain. So for those builds it is not used: the removal
+ * of such a small source of entropy has negligible impact on
+ * security.
+ */
+ if (!MD_Update(&m,buf,j))
+ goto err;
#endif
- k=(st_idx+j)-st_num;
+
+ k=(st_idx+MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2)-st_num;
if (k > 0)
{
- MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),j-k);
- MD_Update(&m,&(state[0]),k);
+ if (!MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2-k))
+ goto err;
+ if (!MD_Update(&m,&(state[0]),k))
+ goto err;
}
else
- MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),j);
- MD_Final(local_md,&m);
+ if (!MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2))
+ goto err;
+ if (!MD_Final(&m,local_md))
+ goto err;
- for (i=0; i<j; i++)
+ for (i=0; i<MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2; i++)
{
state[st_idx++]^=local_md[i]; /* may compete with other threads */
- *(buf++)=local_md[i+MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2];
if (st_idx >= st_num)
st_idx=0;
+ if (i < j)
+ *(buf++)=local_md[i+MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2];
}
}
- MD_Init(&m);
- MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c));
- MD_Update(&m,local_md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ if (!MD_Init(&m)
+ || !MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c))
+ || !MD_Update(&m,local_md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH))
+ goto err;
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
- MD_Update(&m,md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
- MD_Final(md,&m);
+ if (!MD_Update(&m,md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) || !MD_Final(&m,md))
+ {
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ goto err;
+ }
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
- memset(&m,0,sizeof(m));
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m);
if (ok)
return(1);
- else
+ else if (pseudo)
+ return 0;
+ else
{
RANDerr(RAND_F_SSLEAY_RAND_BYTES,RAND_R_PRNG_NOT_SEEDED);
+ ERR_add_error_data(1, "You need to read the OpenSSL FAQ, "
+ "http://www.openssl.org/support/faq.html");
return(0);
}
+ err:
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m);
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_SSLEAY_RAND_BYTES,ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ return 0;
+
+ }
+
+static int ssleay_rand_nopseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
+ {
+ return ssleay_rand_bytes(buf, num, 0);
}
/* pseudo-random bytes that are guaranteed to be unique but not
unpredictable */
static int ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
{
- int ret, err;
+ return ssleay_rand_bytes(buf, num, 1);
+ }
- ret = RAND_bytes(buf, num);
- if (ret == 0)
+static int ssleay_rand_status(void)
+ {
+ CRYPTO_THREADID cur;
+ int ret;
+ int do_not_lock;
+
+ CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur);
+ /* check if we already have the lock
+ * (could happen if a RAND_poll() implementation calls RAND_status()) */
+ if (crypto_lock_rand)
{
- err = ERR_peek_error();
- if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_RAND &&
- ERR_GET_REASON(err) == RAND_R_PRNG_NOT_SEEDED)
- (void)ERR_get_error();
+ CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+ do_not_lock = !CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&locking_threadid, &cur);
+ CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+ }
+ else
+ do_not_lock = 0;
+
+ if (!do_not_lock)
+ {
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+
+ /* prevent ssleay_rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again */
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+ CRYPTO_THREADID_cpy(&locking_threadid, &cur);
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+ crypto_lock_rand = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (!initialized)
+ {
+ RAND_poll();
+ initialized = 1;
}
- return (ret);
- }
-#ifdef WINDOWS
-#include <windows.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
+ ret = entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED;
-/*****************************************************************************
- * Initialisation function for the SSL random generator. Takes the contents
- * of the screen as random seed.
- *
- * Created 960901 by Gertjan van Oosten, gertjan@West.NL, West Consulting B.V.
- *
- * Code adapted from
- * <URL:http://www.microsoft.com/kb/developr/win_dk/q97193.htm>;
- * the original copyright message is:
- *
- * (C) Copyright Microsoft Corp. 1993. All rights reserved.
- *
- * You have a royalty-free right to use, modify, reproduce and
- * distribute the Sample Files (and/or any modified version) in
- * any way you find useful, provided that you agree that
- * Microsoft has no warranty obligations or liability for any
- * Sample Application Files which are modified.
- */
-/*
- * I have modified the loading of bytes via RAND_seed() mechanism since
- * the origional would have been very very CPU intensive since RAND_seed()
- * does an MD5 per 16 bytes of input. The cost to digest 16 bytes is the same
- * as that to digest 56 bytes. So under the old system, a screen of
- * 1024*768*256 would have been CPU cost of approximatly 49,000 56 byte MD5
- * digests or digesting 2.7 mbytes. What I have put in place would
- * be 48 16k MD5 digests, or efectivly 48*16+48 MD5 bytes or 816 kbytes
- * or about 3.5 times as much.
- * - eric
+ if (!do_not_lock)
+ {
+ /* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */
+ crypto_lock_rand = 0;
+
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+/* rand_hw_seed: get seed data from any available hardware RNG.
+ * only currently supports rdrand.
*/
-void RAND_screen(void)
-{
- HDC hScrDC; /* screen DC */
- HDC hMemDC; /* memory DC */
- HBITMAP hBitmap; /* handle for our bitmap */
- HBITMAP hOldBitmap; /* handle for previous bitmap */
- BITMAP bm; /* bitmap properties */
- unsigned int size; /* size of bitmap */
- char *bmbits; /* contents of bitmap */
- int w; /* screen width */
- int h; /* screen height */
- int y; /* y-coordinate of screen lines to grab */
- int n = 16; /* number of screen lines to grab at a time */
-
- /* Create a screen DC and a memory DC compatible to screen DC */
- hScrDC = CreateDC("DISPLAY", NULL, NULL, NULL);
- hMemDC = CreateCompatibleDC(hScrDC);
-
- /* Get screen resolution */
- w = GetDeviceCaps(hScrDC, HORZRES);
- h = GetDeviceCaps(hScrDC, VERTRES);
-
- /* Create a bitmap compatible with the screen DC */
- hBitmap = CreateCompatibleBitmap(hScrDC, w, n);
-
- /* Select new bitmap into memory DC */
- hOldBitmap = SelectObject(hMemDC, hBitmap);
-
- /* Get bitmap properties */
- GetObject(hBitmap, sizeof(BITMAP), (LPSTR)&bm);
- size = (unsigned int)bm.bmWidthBytes * bm.bmHeight * bm.bmPlanes;
-
- bmbits = Malloc(size);
- if (bmbits) {
- /* Now go through the whole screen, repeatedly grabbing n lines */
- for (y = 0; y < h-n; y += n)
- {
- unsigned char md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
-
- /* Bitblt screen DC to memory DC */
- BitBlt(hMemDC, 0, 0, w, n, hScrDC, 0, y, SRCCOPY);
-
- /* Copy bitmap bits from memory DC to bmbits */
- GetBitmapBits(hBitmap, size, bmbits);
-
- /* Get the MD5 of the bitmap */
- MD(bmbits,size,md);
-
- /* Seed the random generator with the MD5 digest */
- RAND_seed(md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+
+/* Adapted from eng_rdrand.c */
+
+#if (defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__) || defined(_M_IX86) || \
+ defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
+ defined(_M_AMD64) || defined (_M_X64)) && defined(OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ)
+
+#define RDRAND_CALLS 4
+
+size_t OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand(void);
+extern unsigned int OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[];
+
+static void rand_hw_seed(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+ {
+ int i;
+ if (!(OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1<<(62-32))))
+ return;
+ for (i = 0; i < RDRAND_CALLS; i++)
+ {
+ size_t rnd;
+ rnd = OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand();
+ if (rnd == 0)
+ return;
+ MD_Update(ctx, (unsigned char *)&rnd, sizeof(size_t));
+ }
+ }
+
+/* XOR an existing buffer with random data */
+
+void rand_hw_xor(unsigned char *buf, size_t num)
+ {
+ size_t rnd;
+ if (!(OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1<<(62-32))))
+ return;
+ while (num >= sizeof(size_t))
+ {
+ rnd = OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand();
+ if (rnd == 0)
+ return;
+ *((size_t *)buf) ^= rnd;
+ buf += sizeof(size_t);
+ num -= sizeof(size_t);
+ }
+ if (num)
+ {
+ rnd = OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand();
+ if (rnd == 0)
+ return;
+ while(num)
+ {
+ *buf ^= rnd & 0xff;
+ rnd >>= 8;
+ buf++;
+ num--;
+ }
+ }
}
- Free(bmbits);
- }
- /* Select old bitmap back into memory DC */
- hBitmap = SelectObject(hMemDC, hOldBitmap);
+#else
+
+static void rand_hw_seed(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+ {
+ return;
+ }
+
+void rand_hw_xor(unsigned char *buf, size_t num)
+ {
+ return;
+ }
- /* Clean up */
- DeleteObject(hBitmap);
- DeleteDC(hMemDC);
- DeleteDC(hScrDC);
-}
#endif
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff