Only one of these needs to be signed.

[openssl.git] / crypto / rand / md_rand.c

diff --git a/crypto/rand/md_rand.c b/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
index e4a24c26db86a77e734f6e0dbb56b21f5ce62baf..48cc2e84a84bde86740600f1cc3504b591dcd92b 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
@@ -190,7 +190,8 @@ static void ssleay_rand_cleanup(void)
 static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, size_t num, double add)
        {
        int i,st_idx;
-       size_t j,k;
+       size_t j;
+       ssize_t k;
        long md_c[2];
        unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
        EVP_MD_CTX m;
@@ -303,7 +304,7 @@ static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, size_t num, double add)
         * other thread's seeding remains without effect (except for
         * the incremented counter).  By XORing it we keep at least as
         * much entropy as fits into md. */
-       for (k = 0; k < (int)sizeof(md); k++)
+       for (k = 0; k < sizeof(md); k++)
                {
                md[k] ^= local_md[k];
                }
@@ -325,7 +326,8 @@ static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, size_t num)
        {
        static volatile int stirred_pool = 0;
        int i,st_num,st_idx;
-       size_t j,k;
+       size_t j;
+       ssize_t k;
        int num_ceil;
        int ok;
        long md_c[2];
@@ -492,7 +494,7 @@ static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, size_t num)
                }
 
        MD_Init(&m);
-       MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c));
+       MD_Update(&m,&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c));
        MD_Update(&m,local_md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
        CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
        MD_Update(&m,md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);