*
*/
+#define OPENSSL_FIPSAPI
+
#ifdef MD_RAND_DEBUG
# ifndef NDEBUG
# define NDEBUG
#include "e_os.h"
+#if !(defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYSNAME_DSPBIOS))
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS)
+# include <time.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include "rand_lcl.h"
-#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+#include <openssl/fips.h>
+#endif
+
#ifdef BN_DEBUG
# define PREDICT
#endif
const char RAND_version[]="RAND" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
+static void rand_hw_seed(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
+
static void ssleay_rand_cleanup(void);
static int ssleay_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num);
static int ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy);
-static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
+static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo);
+static int ssleay_rand_nopseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
static int ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
static int ssleay_rand_status(void);
-RAND_METHOD rand_ssleay_meth={
+static RAND_METHOD rand_ssleay_meth={
ssleay_rand_seed,
- ssleay_rand_bytes,
+ ssleay_rand_nopseudo_bytes,
ssleay_rand_cleanup,
ssleay_rand_add,
ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes,
int do_not_lock;
int rv = 0;
+ if (!num)
+ return 1;
+
/*
* (Based on the rand(3) manpage)
*
return ssleay_rand_add(buf, num, (double)num);
}
-static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
+static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo)
{
static volatile int stirred_pool = 0;
int i,j,k,st_num,st_idx;
#ifndef GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS
pid_t curr_pid = getpid();
#endif
+ time_t curr_time = time(NULL);
int do_stir_pool = 0;
+/* time value for various platforms */
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
+ FILETIME tv;
+# ifdef _WIN32_WCE
+ SYSTEMTIME t;
+ GetSystemTime(&t);
+ SystemTimeToFileTime(&t, &tv);
+# else
+ GetSystemTimeAsFileTime(&tv);
+# endif
+#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS)
+ struct timespec tv;
+ clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &ts);
+#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYSNAME_DSPBIOS)
+ unsigned long long tv, OPENSSL_rdtsc();
+ tv = OPENSSL_rdtsc();
+#else
+ struct timeval tv;
+ gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
+#endif
#ifdef PREDICT
if (rand_predictable)
#ifndef GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS
if (curr_pid) /* just in the first iteration to save time */
{
- if (!MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char*)&curr_pid,sizeof curr_pid))
+ if (!MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char*)&curr_pid,
+ sizeof curr_pid))
goto err;
curr_pid = 0;
}
#endif
+ if (curr_time) /* just in the first iteration to save time */
+ {
+ if (!MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char*)&curr_time,
+ sizeof curr_time))
+ goto err;
+ if (!MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char*)&tv,
+ sizeof tv))
+ goto err;
+ curr_time = 0;
+ rand_hw_seed(&m);
+ }
if (!MD_Update(&m,local_md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH))
goto err;
if (!MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c)))
goto err;
#ifndef PURIFY /* purify complains */
- /* DO NOT REMOVE THE FOLLOWING CALL TO MD_Update()! */
+ /* The following line uses the supplied buffer as a small
+ * source of entropy: since this buffer is often uninitialised
+ * it may cause programs such as purify or valgrind to
+ * complain. So for those builds it is not used: the removal
+ * of such a small source of entropy has negligible impact on
+ * security.
+ */
if (!MD_Update(&m,buf,j))
goto err;
- /* We know that line may cause programs such as
- purify and valgrind to complain about use of
- uninitialized data. */
#endif
k=(st_idx+MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2)-st_num;
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m);
if (ok)
return(1);
- else
+ else if (pseudo)
+ return 0;
+ else
{
RANDerr(RAND_F_SSLEAY_RAND_BYTES,RAND_R_PRNG_NOT_SEEDED);
ERR_add_error_data(1, "You need to read the OpenSSL FAQ, "
}
+static int ssleay_rand_nopseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
+ {
+ return ssleay_rand_bytes(buf, num, 0);
+ }
+
/* pseudo-random bytes that are guaranteed to be unique but not
unpredictable */
static int ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
{
- int ret;
- unsigned long err;
-
- ret = RAND_bytes(buf, num);
- if (ret == 0)
- {
- err = ERR_peek_error();
- if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_RAND &&
- ERR_GET_REASON(err) == RAND_R_PRNG_NOT_SEEDED)
- ERR_clear_error();
- }
- return (ret);
+ return ssleay_rand_bytes(buf, num, 1);
}
static int ssleay_rand_status(void)
return ret;
}
+
+/* rand_hw_seed: get seed data from any available hardware RNG.
+ * only currently supports rdrand.
+ */
+
+/* Adapted from eng_rdrand.c */
+
+#if (defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__) || defined(_M_IX86) || \
+ defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
+ defined(_M_AMD64) || defined (_M_X64)) && defined(OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ)
+
+#define RDRAND_CALLS 4
+
+size_t OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand(void);
+extern unsigned int OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[];
+
+static void rand_hw_seed(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+ {
+ int i;
+ if (!(OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1<<(62-32))))
+ return;
+ for (i = 0; i < RDRAND_CALLS; i++)
+ {
+ size_t rnd;
+ rnd = OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand();
+ if (rnd == 0)
+ return;
+ MD_Update(ctx, (unsigned char *)&rnd, sizeof(size_t));
+ }
+ }
+
+/* XOR an existing buffer with random data */
+
+void rand_hw_xor(unsigned char *buf, size_t num)
+ {
+ size_t rnd;
+ if (!(OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1<<(62-32))))
+ return;
+ while (num >= sizeof(size_t))
+ {
+ rnd = OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand();
+ if (rnd == 0)
+ return;
+ *((size_t *)buf) ^= rnd;
+ buf += sizeof(size_t);
+ num -= sizeof(size_t);
+ }
+ if (num)
+ {
+ rnd = OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand();
+ if (rnd == 0)
+ return;
+ while(num)
+ {
+ *buf ^= rnd & 0xff;
+ rnd >>= 8;
+ buf++;
+ num--;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+
+#else
+
+static void rand_hw_seed(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+ {
+ return;
+ }
+
+void rand_hw_xor(unsigned char *buf, size_t num)
+ {
+ return;
+ }
+
+#endif
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff