/*
- * Copyright 2011-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2011-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
- * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include "rand_lcl.h"
+#include "internal/thread_once.h"
+#include "internal/rand_int.h"
+#include "internal/cryptlib_int.h"
/*
- * Support framework for NIST SP 800-90A DRBG, AES-CTR mode.
+ * Support framework for NIST SP 800-90A DRBG
+ *
+ * See manual page RAND_DRBG(7) for a general overview.
+ *
+ * The OpenSSL model is to have new and free functions, and that new
+ * does all initialization. That is not the NIST model, which has
+ * instantiation and un-instantiate, and re-use within a new/free
+ * lifecycle. (No doubt this comes from the desire to support hardware
+ * DRBG, where allocation of resources on something like an HSM is
+ * a much bigger deal than just re-setting an allocated resource.)
*/
+
+typedef struct drbg_global_st {
+ /*
+ * The three shared DRBG instances
+ *
+ * There are three shared DRBG instances: <master>, <public>, and <private>.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * The <master> DRBG
+ *
+ * Not used directly by the application, only for reseeding the two other
+ * DRBGs. It reseeds itself by pulling either randomness from os entropy
+ * sources or by consuming randomness which was added by RAND_add().
+ *
+ * The <master> DRBG is a global instance which is accessed concurrently by
+ * all threads. The necessary locking is managed automatically by its child
+ * DRBG instances during reseeding.
+ */
+ RAND_DRBG *master_drbg;
+ /*
+ * The <public> DRBG
+ *
+ * Used by default for generating random bytes using RAND_bytes().
+ *
+ * The <public> DRBG is thread-local, i.e., there is one instance per
+ * thread.
+ */
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL public_drbg;
+ /*
+ * The <private> DRBG
+ *
+ * Used by default for generating private keys using RAND_priv_bytes()
+ *
+ * The <private> DRBG is thread-local, i.e., there is one instance per
+ * thread.
+ */
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL private_drbg;
+} DRBG_GLOBAL;
+
+typedef struct drbg_nonce_global_st {
+ CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_nonce_lock;
+ int rand_nonce_count;
+} DRBG_NONCE_GLOBAL;
+
+/* NIST SP 800-90A DRBG recommends the use of a personalization string. */
+static const char ossl_pers_string[] = DRBG_DEFAULT_PERS_STRING;
+
+#define RAND_DRBG_TYPE_FLAGS ( \
+ RAND_DRBG_FLAG_MASTER | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PUBLIC | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PRIVATE )
+
+#define RAND_DRBG_TYPE_MASTER 0
+#define RAND_DRBG_TYPE_PUBLIC 1
+#define RAND_DRBG_TYPE_PRIVATE 2
+
+/* Defaults */
+static int rand_drbg_type[3] = {
+ RAND_DRBG_TYPE, /* Master */
+ RAND_DRBG_TYPE, /* Public */
+ RAND_DRBG_TYPE /* Private */
+};
+static unsigned int rand_drbg_flags[3] = {
+ RAND_DRBG_FLAGS | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_MASTER, /* Master */
+ RAND_DRBG_FLAGS | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PUBLIC, /* Public */
+ RAND_DRBG_FLAGS | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PRIVATE /* Private */
+};
+
+static unsigned int master_reseed_interval = MASTER_RESEED_INTERVAL;
+static unsigned int slave_reseed_interval = SLAVE_RESEED_INTERVAL;
+
+static time_t master_reseed_time_interval = MASTER_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL;
+static time_t slave_reseed_time_interval = SLAVE_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL;
+
+/* A logical OR of all used DRBG flag bits (currently there is only one) */
+static const unsigned int rand_drbg_used_flags =
+ RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_NO_DF | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_HMAC | RAND_DRBG_TYPE_FLAGS;
+
+
+static RAND_DRBG *drbg_setup(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, RAND_DRBG *parent, int drbg_type);
+
+static RAND_DRBG *rand_drbg_new(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx,
+ int secure,
+ int type,
+ unsigned int flags,
+ RAND_DRBG *parent);
+
+static int is_ctr(int type)
+{
+ switch (type) {
+ case NID_aes_128_ctr:
+ case NID_aes_192_ctr:
+ case NID_aes_256_ctr:
+ return 1;
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+
+static int is_digest(int type)
+{
+ switch (type) {
+ case NID_sha1:
+ case NID_sha224:
+ case NID_sha256:
+ case NID_sha384:
+ case NID_sha512:
+ case NID_sha512_224:
+ case NID_sha512_256:
+ case NID_sha3_224:
+ case NID_sha3_256:
+ case NID_sha3_384:
+ case NID_sha3_512:
+ return 1;
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+
/*
- * Get entropy from the existing callback. This is mainly used for KATs.
+ * Initialize the OPENSSL_CTX global DRBGs on first use.
+ * Returns the allocated global data on success or NULL on failure.
*/
-static size_t get_entropy(DRBG_CTX *dctx, unsigned char **pout,
- int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len)
+static void *drbg_ossl_ctx_new(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx)
{
- if (dctx->get_entropy != NULL)
- return dctx->get_entropy(dctx, pout, entropy, min_len, max_len);
- /* TODO: Get from parent if it exists. */
- return 0;
+ DRBG_GLOBAL *dgbl = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*dgbl));
+
+ if (dgbl == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(&dgbl->private_drbg, NULL))
+ goto err1;
+
+ if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(&dgbl->public_drbg, NULL))
+ goto err2;
+
+ dgbl->master_drbg = drbg_setup(libctx, NULL, RAND_DRBG_TYPE_MASTER);
+ if (dgbl->master_drbg == NULL)
+ goto err3;
+
+ return dgbl;
+
+ err3:
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&dgbl->public_drbg);
+ err2:
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&dgbl->private_drbg);
+ err1:
+ OPENSSL_free(dgbl);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static void drbg_ossl_ctx_free(void *vdgbl)
+{
+ DRBG_GLOBAL *dgbl = vdgbl;
+
+ RAND_DRBG_free(dgbl->master_drbg);
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&dgbl->private_drbg);
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&dgbl->public_drbg);
+
+ OPENSSL_free(dgbl);
}
+static const OPENSSL_CTX_METHOD drbg_ossl_ctx_method = {
+ drbg_ossl_ctx_new,
+ drbg_ossl_ctx_free,
+};
+
/*
- * Cleanup entropy.
+ * drbg_ossl_ctx_new() calls drgb_setup() which calls rand_drbg_get_nonce()
+ * which needs to get the rand_nonce_lock out of the OPENSSL_CTX...but since
+ * drbg_ossl_ctx_new() hasn't finished running yet we need the rand_nonce_lock
+ * to be in a different global data object. Otherwise we will go into an
+ * infinite recursion loop.
*/
-static void cleanup_entropy(DRBG_CTX *dctx, unsigned char *out, size_t olen)
+static void *drbg_nonce_ossl_ctx_new(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx)
+{
+ DRBG_NONCE_GLOBAL *dngbl = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*dngbl));
+
+ if (dngbl == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ dngbl->rand_nonce_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+ if (dngbl->rand_nonce_lock == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_free(dngbl);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return dngbl;
+}
+
+static void drbg_nonce_ossl_ctx_free(void *vdngbl)
+{
+ DRBG_NONCE_GLOBAL *dngbl = vdngbl;
+
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(dngbl->rand_nonce_lock);
+
+ OPENSSL_free(dngbl);
+}
+
+static const OPENSSL_CTX_METHOD drbg_nonce_ossl_ctx_method = {
+ drbg_nonce_ossl_ctx_new,
+ drbg_nonce_ossl_ctx_free,
+};
+
+static DRBG_GLOBAL *drbg_get_global(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx)
{
- if (dctx->cleanup_entropy != NULL)
- dctx->cleanup_entropy(dctx, out, olen);
+ return openssl_ctx_get_data(libctx, OPENSSL_CTX_DRBG_INDEX,
+ &drbg_ossl_ctx_method);
+}
+
+/* Implements the get_nonce() callback (see RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks()) */
+size_t rand_drbg_get_nonce(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
+ unsigned char **pout,
+ int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len)
+{
+ size_t ret = 0;
+ RAND_POOL *pool;
+ DRBG_NONCE_GLOBAL *dngbl
+ = openssl_ctx_get_data(drbg->libctx, OPENSSL_CTX_DRBG_NONCE_INDEX,
+ &drbg_nonce_ossl_ctx_method);
+ struct {
+ void *instance;
+ int count;
+ } data;
+
+ if (dngbl == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
+ pool = rand_pool_new(0, min_len, max_len);
+ if (pool == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (rand_pool_add_nonce_data(pool) == 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ data.instance = drbg;
+ CRYPTO_atomic_add(&dngbl->rand_nonce_count, 1, &data.count,
+ dngbl->rand_nonce_lock);
+
+ if (rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0) == 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ ret = rand_pool_length(pool);
+ *pout = rand_pool_detach(pool);
+
+ err:
+ rand_pool_free(pool);
+
+ return ret;
}
/*
- * The OpenSSL model is to have new and free functions, and that new
- * does all initialization. That is not the NIST model, which has
- * instantiation and un-instantiate, and re-use within a new/free
- * lifecycle. (No doubt this comes from the desire to support hardware
- * DRBG, where allocation of resources on something like an HSM is
- * a much bigger deal than just re-setting an allocated resource.)
+ * Implements the cleanup_nonce() callback (see RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks())
*
- * The DRBG_CTX is OpenSSL's opaque pointer to an instance of the
- * DRBG.
*/
+void rand_drbg_cleanup_nonce(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
+ unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
+{
+ OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(out, outlen);
+}
/*
- * Set/initialize |dctx| to be of type |nid|, with optional |flags|.
- * Return -2 if the type is not supported, 1 on success and -1 on
- * failure.
+ * Set/initialize |drbg| to be of type |type|, with optional |flags|.
+ *
+ * If |type| and |flags| are zero, use the defaults
+ *
+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
*/
-int RAND_DRBG_set(DRBG_CTX *dctx, int nid, unsigned int flags)
+int RAND_DRBG_set(RAND_DRBG *drbg, int type, unsigned int flags)
{
int ret = 1;
- dctx->status = DRBG_STATUS_UNINITIALISED;
- dctx->flags = flags;
- dctx->nid = nid;
+ if (type == 0 && flags == 0) {
+ type = rand_drbg_type[RAND_DRBG_TYPE_MASTER];
+ flags = rand_drbg_flags[RAND_DRBG_TYPE_MASTER];
+ }
- switch (nid) {
- default:
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_SET, RAND_R_UNSUPPORTED_DRBG_TYPE);
- return -2;
- case 0:
+ /* If set is called multiple times - clear the old one */
+ if (drbg->type != 0 && (type != drbg->type || flags != drbg->flags)) {
+ drbg->meth->uninstantiate(drbg);
+ rand_pool_free(drbg->adin_pool);
+ drbg->adin_pool = NULL;
+ }
+
+ drbg->state = DRBG_UNINITIALISED;
+ drbg->flags = flags;
+ drbg->type = type;
+
+ if (type == 0) {
/* Uninitialized; that's okay. */
+ drbg->meth = NULL;
return 1;
- case NID_aes_128_ctr:
- case NID_aes_192_ctr:
- case NID_aes_256_ctr:
- ret = ctr_init(dctx);
- break;
+ } else if (is_ctr(type)) {
+ ret = drbg_ctr_init(drbg);
+ } else if (is_digest(type)) {
+ if (flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_HMAC)
+ ret = drbg_hmac_init(drbg);
+ else
+ ret = drbg_hash_init(drbg);
+ } else {
+ drbg->type = 0;
+ drbg->flags = 0;
+ drbg->meth = NULL;
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_SET, RAND_R_UNSUPPORTED_DRBG_TYPE);
+ return 0;
}
- if (ret < 0)
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_SET, RAND_R_ERROR_INITIALISING_DRBG);
+ }
return ret;
}
/*
- * Allocate memory and initialize a new DRBG. The |parent|, if not
- * NULL, will be used to auto-seed this DRBG_CTX as needed.
+ * Set/initialize default |type| and |flag| for new drbg instances.
+ *
+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
+ */
+int RAND_DRBG_set_defaults(int type, unsigned int flags)
+{
+ int all;
+ if (!(is_digest(type) || is_ctr(type))) {
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_SET_DEFAULTS, RAND_R_UNSUPPORTED_DRBG_TYPE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if ((flags & ~rand_drbg_used_flags) != 0) {
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_SET_DEFAULTS, RAND_R_UNSUPPORTED_DRBG_FLAGS);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ all = ((flags & RAND_DRBG_TYPE_FLAGS) == 0);
+ if (all || (flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_MASTER) != 0) {
+ rand_drbg_type[RAND_DRBG_TYPE_MASTER] = type;
+ rand_drbg_flags[RAND_DRBG_TYPE_MASTER] = flags | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_MASTER;
+ }
+ if (all || (flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PUBLIC) != 0) {
+ rand_drbg_type[RAND_DRBG_TYPE_PUBLIC] = type;
+ rand_drbg_flags[RAND_DRBG_TYPE_PUBLIC] = flags | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PUBLIC;
+ }
+ if (all || (flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PRIVATE) != 0) {
+ rand_drbg_type[RAND_DRBG_TYPE_PRIVATE] = type;
+ rand_drbg_flags[RAND_DRBG_TYPE_PRIVATE] = flags | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PRIVATE;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Allocate memory and initialize a new DRBG. The DRBG is allocated on
+ * the secure heap if |secure| is nonzero and the secure heap is enabled.
+ * The |parent|, if not NULL, will be used as random source for reseeding.
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to the new DRBG instance on success, NULL on failure.
*/
-DRBG_CTX *RAND_DRBG_new(int type, unsigned int flags, DRBG_CTX *parent)
+static RAND_DRBG *rand_drbg_new(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx,
+ int secure,
+ int type,
+ unsigned int flags,
+ RAND_DRBG *parent)
{
- DRBG_CTX *dctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*dctx));
+ RAND_DRBG *drbg = secure ? OPENSSL_secure_zalloc(sizeof(*drbg))
+ : OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*drbg));
- if (dctx == NULL) {
+ if (drbg == NULL) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
- dctx->parent = parent;
- if (RAND_DRBG_set(dctx, type, flags) < 0) {
- OPENSSL_free(dctx);
- return NULL;
+ drbg->libctx = ctx;
+ drbg->secure = secure && CRYPTO_secure_allocated(drbg);
+ drbg->fork_count = rand_fork_count;
+ drbg->parent = parent;
+
+ if (parent == NULL) {
+#ifdef FIPS_MODE
+ drbg->get_entropy = rand_crngt_get_entropy;
+ drbg->cleanup_entropy = rand_crngt_cleanup_entropy;
+#else
+ drbg->get_entropy = rand_drbg_get_entropy;
+ drbg->cleanup_entropy = rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy;
+#endif
+#ifndef RAND_DRBG_GET_RANDOM_NONCE
+ drbg->get_nonce = rand_drbg_get_nonce;
+ drbg->cleanup_nonce = rand_drbg_cleanup_nonce;
+#endif
+
+ drbg->reseed_interval = master_reseed_interval;
+ drbg->reseed_time_interval = master_reseed_time_interval;
+ } else {
+ drbg->get_entropy = rand_drbg_get_entropy;
+ drbg->cleanup_entropy = rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy;
+ /*
+ * Do not provide nonce callbacks, the child DRBGs will
+ * obtain their nonce using random bits from the parent.
+ */
+
+ drbg->reseed_interval = slave_reseed_interval;
+ drbg->reseed_time_interval = slave_reseed_time_interval;
+ }
+
+ if (RAND_DRBG_set(drbg, type, flags) == 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (parent != NULL) {
+ rand_drbg_lock(parent);
+ if (drbg->strength > parent->strength) {
+ /*
+ * We currently don't support the algorithm from NIST SP 800-90C
+ * 10.1.2 to use a weaker DRBG as source
+ */
+ rand_drbg_unlock(parent);
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_NEW, RAND_R_PARENT_STRENGTH_TOO_WEAK);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ rand_drbg_unlock(parent);
}
- return dctx;
+
+ return drbg;
+
+ err:
+ RAND_DRBG_free(drbg);
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_new_ex(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, int type, unsigned int flags,
+ RAND_DRBG *parent)
+{
+ return rand_drbg_new(ctx, 0, type, flags, parent);
+}
+
+RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_new(int type, unsigned int flags, RAND_DRBG *parent)
+{
+ return RAND_DRBG_new_ex(NULL, type, flags, parent);
+}
+
+RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_secure_new_ex(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, int type,
+ unsigned int flags, RAND_DRBG *parent)
+{
+ return rand_drbg_new(ctx, 1, type, flags, parent);
}
+RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_secure_new(int type, unsigned int flags, RAND_DRBG *parent)
+{
+ return RAND_DRBG_secure_new_ex(NULL, type, flags, parent);
+}
/*
- * Uninstantiate |dctx| and free all memory.
+ * Uninstantiate |drbg| and free all memory.
*/
-void RAND_DRBG_free(DRBG_CTX *dctx)
+void RAND_DRBG_free(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
{
- if (dctx == NULL)
+ if (drbg == NULL)
return;
- ctr_uninstantiate(dctx);
- CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_DRBG, dctx, &dctx->ex_data);
+ if (drbg->meth != NULL)
+ drbg->meth->uninstantiate(drbg);
+ rand_pool_free(drbg->adin_pool);
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(drbg->lock);
+ CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_DRBG, drbg, &drbg->ex_data);
- /* Don't free up default DRBG */
- if (dctx == RAND_DRBG_get_default()) {
- memset(dctx, 0, sizeof(DRBG_CTX));
- dctx->nid = 0;
- dctx->status = DRBG_STATUS_UNINITIALISED;
- } else {
- OPENSSL_cleanse(&dctx->ctr, sizeof(dctx->ctr));
- OPENSSL_free(dctx);
- }
+ if (drbg->secure)
+ OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(drbg, sizeof(*drbg));
+ else
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(drbg, sizeof(*drbg));
}
/*
- * Instantiate |dctx|, after it has been initialized. Use |pers| and
+ * Instantiate |drbg|, after it has been initialized. Use |pers| and
* |perslen| as prediction-resistance input.
+ *
+ * Requires that drbg->lock is already locked for write, if non-null.
+ *
+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
*/
-int RAND_DRBG_instantiate(DRBG_CTX *dctx,
+int RAND_DRBG_instantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
const unsigned char *pers, size_t perslen)
{
- size_t entlen = 0, noncelen = 0;
unsigned char *nonce = NULL, *entropy = NULL;
- int r = 0;
+ size_t noncelen = 0, entropylen = 0;
+ size_t min_entropy = drbg->strength;
+ size_t min_entropylen = drbg->min_entropylen;
+ size_t max_entropylen = drbg->max_entropylen;
- if (perslen > dctx->max_pers) {
- r = RAND_R_PERSONALISATION_STRING_TOO_LONG;
+ if (perslen > drbg->max_perslen) {
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE,
+ RAND_R_PERSONALISATION_STRING_TOO_LONG);
goto end;
}
- if (dctx->status != DRBG_STATUS_UNINITIALISED) {
- r = dctx->status == DRBG_STATUS_ERROR ? RAND_R_IN_ERROR_STATE
- : RAND_R_ALREADY_INSTANTIATED;
+
+ if (drbg->meth == NULL) {
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE,
+ RAND_R_NO_DRBG_IMPLEMENTATION_SELECTED);
goto end;
}
- dctx->status = DRBG_STATUS_ERROR;
- entlen = get_entropy(dctx, &entropy, dctx->strength,
- dctx->min_entropy, dctx->max_entropy);
- if (entlen < dctx->min_entropy || entlen > dctx->max_entropy) {
- r = RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_ENTROPY;
+ if (drbg->state != DRBG_UNINITIALISED) {
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE,
+ drbg->state == DRBG_ERROR ? RAND_R_IN_ERROR_STATE
+ : RAND_R_ALREADY_INSTANTIATED);
goto end;
}
- if (dctx->max_nonce > 0 && dctx->get_nonce != NULL) {
- noncelen = dctx->get_nonce(dctx, &nonce,
- dctx->strength / 2,
- dctx->min_nonce, dctx->max_nonce);
+ drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
+
+ /*
+ * NIST SP800-90Ar1 section 9.1 says you can combine getting the entropy
+ * and nonce in 1 call by increasing the entropy with 50% and increasing
+ * the minimum length to accomadate the length of the nonce.
+ * We do this in case a nonce is require and get_nonce is NULL.
+ */
+ if (drbg->min_noncelen > 0 && drbg->get_nonce == NULL) {
+ min_entropy += drbg->strength / 2;
+ min_entropylen += drbg->min_noncelen;
+ max_entropylen += drbg->max_noncelen;
+ }
+
+ drbg->reseed_next_counter = tsan_load(&drbg->reseed_prop_counter);
+ if (drbg->reseed_next_counter) {
+ drbg->reseed_next_counter++;
+ if(!drbg->reseed_next_counter)
+ drbg->reseed_next_counter = 1;
+ }
- if (noncelen < dctx->min_nonce || noncelen > dctx->max_nonce) {
- r = RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_NONCE;
+ if (drbg->get_entropy != NULL)
+ entropylen = drbg->get_entropy(drbg, &entropy, min_entropy,
+ min_entropylen, max_entropylen, 0);
+ if (entropylen < min_entropylen
+ || entropylen > max_entropylen) {
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_ENTROPY);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (drbg->min_noncelen > 0 && drbg->get_nonce != NULL) {
+ noncelen = drbg->get_nonce(drbg, &nonce, drbg->strength / 2,
+ drbg->min_noncelen, drbg->max_noncelen);
+ if (noncelen < drbg->min_noncelen || noncelen > drbg->max_noncelen) {
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_NONCE);
goto end;
}
}
- if (!ctr_instantiate(dctx, entropy, entlen,
+ if (!drbg->meth->instantiate(drbg, entropy, entropylen,
nonce, noncelen, pers, perslen)) {
- r = RAND_R_ERROR_INSTANTIATING_DRBG;
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, RAND_R_ERROR_INSTANTIATING_DRBG);
goto end;
}
- dctx->status = DRBG_STATUS_READY;
- dctx->reseed_counter = 1;
+ drbg->state = DRBG_READY;
+ drbg->reseed_gen_counter = 1;
+ drbg->reseed_time = time(NULL);
+ tsan_store(&drbg->reseed_prop_counter, drbg->reseed_next_counter);
-end:
- if (entropy != NULL && dctx->cleanup_entropy != NULL)
- dctx->cleanup_entropy(dctx, entropy, entlen);
- if (nonce != NULL && dctx->cleanup_nonce!= NULL )
- dctx->cleanup_nonce(dctx, nonce, noncelen);
- if (dctx->status == DRBG_STATUS_READY)
+ end:
+ if (entropy != NULL && drbg->cleanup_entropy != NULL)
+ drbg->cleanup_entropy(drbg, entropy, entropylen);
+ if (nonce != NULL && drbg->cleanup_nonce != NULL)
+ drbg->cleanup_nonce(drbg, nonce, noncelen);
+ if (drbg->state == DRBG_READY)
return 1;
-
- if (r)
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, r);
return 0;
}
/*
- * Uninstantiate |dctx|. Must be instantiated before it can be used.
+ * Uninstantiate |drbg|. Must be instantiated before it can be used.
+ *
+ * Requires that drbg->lock is already locked for write, if non-null.
+ *
+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
*/
-int RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(DRBG_CTX *dctx)
+int RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
{
- int ret = ctr_uninstantiate(dctx);
+ int index = -1, type, flags;
+ if (drbg->meth == NULL) {
+ drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_UNINSTANTIATE,
+ RAND_R_NO_DRBG_IMPLEMENTATION_SELECTED);
+ return 0;
+ }
- OPENSSL_cleanse(&dctx->ctr, sizeof(dctx->ctr));
- dctx->status = DRBG_STATUS_UNINITIALISED;
- return ret;
+ /* Clear the entire drbg->ctr struct, then reset some important
+ * members of the drbg->ctr struct (e.g. keysize, df_ks) to their
+ * initial values.
+ */
+ drbg->meth->uninstantiate(drbg);
+
+ /* The reset uses the default values for type and flags */
+ if (drbg->flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_MASTER)
+ index = RAND_DRBG_TYPE_MASTER;
+ else if (drbg->flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PRIVATE)
+ index = RAND_DRBG_TYPE_PRIVATE;
+ else if (drbg->flags & RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PUBLIC)
+ index = RAND_DRBG_TYPE_PUBLIC;
+
+ if (index != -1) {
+ flags = rand_drbg_flags[index];
+ type = rand_drbg_type[index];
+ } else {
+ flags = drbg->flags;
+ type = drbg->type;
+ }
+ return RAND_DRBG_set(drbg, type, flags);
}
/*
- * Mix in the specified data to reseed |dctx|.
+ * Reseed |drbg|, mixing in the specified data
+ *
+ * Requires that drbg->lock is already locked for write, if non-null.
+ *
+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
*/
-int RAND_DRBG_reseed(DRBG_CTX *dctx,
- const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen)
+int RAND_DRBG_reseed(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
+ const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen,
+ int prediction_resistance)
{
unsigned char *entropy = NULL;
- size_t entlen = 0;
- int r = 0;
-
- if (dctx->status != DRBG_STATUS_READY
- && dctx->status != DRBG_STATUS_RESEED) {
- if (dctx->status == DRBG_STATUS_ERROR)
- r = RAND_R_IN_ERROR_STATE;
- else if (dctx->status == DRBG_STATUS_UNINITIALISED)
- r = RAND_R_NOT_INSTANTIATED;
- goto end;
+ size_t entropylen = 0;
+
+ if (drbg->state == DRBG_ERROR) {
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESEED, RAND_R_IN_ERROR_STATE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (drbg->state == DRBG_UNINITIALISED) {
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESEED, RAND_R_NOT_INSTANTIATED);
+ return 0;
}
- if (adin == NULL)
+ if (adin == NULL) {
adinlen = 0;
- else if (adinlen > dctx->max_adin) {
- r = RAND_R_ADDITIONAL_INPUT_TOO_LONG;
- goto end;
+ } else if (adinlen > drbg->max_adinlen) {
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESEED, RAND_R_ADDITIONAL_INPUT_TOO_LONG);
+ return 0;
}
- dctx->status = DRBG_STATUS_ERROR;
- entlen = get_entropy(dctx, &entropy, dctx->strength,
- dctx->min_entropy, dctx->max_entropy);
+ drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
+
+ drbg->reseed_next_counter = tsan_load(&drbg->reseed_prop_counter);
+ if (drbg->reseed_next_counter) {
+ drbg->reseed_next_counter++;
+ if(!drbg->reseed_next_counter)
+ drbg->reseed_next_counter = 1;
+ }
- if (entlen < dctx->min_entropy || entlen > dctx->max_entropy) {
- r = RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_ENTROPY;
+ if (drbg->get_entropy != NULL)
+ entropylen = drbg->get_entropy(drbg, &entropy, drbg->strength,
+ drbg->min_entropylen,
+ drbg->max_entropylen,
+ prediction_resistance);
+ if (entropylen < drbg->min_entropylen
+ || entropylen > drbg->max_entropylen) {
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESEED, RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_ENTROPY);
goto end;
}
- if (!ctr_reseed(dctx, entropy, entlen, adin, adinlen))
+ if (!drbg->meth->reseed(drbg, entropy, entropylen, adin, adinlen))
goto end;
- dctx->status = DRBG_STATUS_READY;
- dctx->reseed_counter = 1;
-end:
- if (entropy != NULL && dctx->cleanup_entropy != NULL)
- cleanup_entropy(dctx, entropy, entlen);
- if (dctx->status == DRBG_STATUS_READY)
- return 1;
- if (r)
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESEED, r);
+ drbg->state = DRBG_READY;
+ drbg->reseed_gen_counter = 1;
+ drbg->reseed_time = time(NULL);
+ tsan_store(&drbg->reseed_prop_counter, drbg->reseed_next_counter);
+ end:
+ if (entropy != NULL && drbg->cleanup_entropy != NULL)
+ drbg->cleanup_entropy(drbg, entropy, entropylen);
+ if (drbg->state == DRBG_READY)
+ return 1;
return 0;
}
+/*
+ * Restart |drbg|, using the specified entropy or additional input
+ *
+ * Tries its best to get the drbg instantiated by all means,
+ * regardless of its current state.
+ *
+ * Optionally, a |buffer| of |len| random bytes can be passed,
+ * which is assumed to contain at least |entropy| bits of entropy.
+ *
+ * If |entropy| > 0, the buffer content is used as entropy input.
+ *
+ * If |entropy| == 0, the buffer content is used as additional input
+ *
+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
+ *
+ * This function is used internally only.
+ */
+int rand_drbg_restart(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
+ const unsigned char *buffer, size_t len, size_t entropy)
+{
+ int reseeded = 0;
+ const unsigned char *adin = NULL;
+ size_t adinlen = 0;
+
+ if (drbg->seed_pool != NULL) {
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESTART, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
+ rand_pool_free(drbg->seed_pool);
+ drbg->seed_pool = NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (buffer != NULL) {
+ if (entropy > 0) {
+ if (drbg->max_entropylen < len) {
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESTART,
+ RAND_R_ENTROPY_INPUT_TOO_LONG);
+ drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (entropy > 8 * len) {
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESTART, RAND_R_ENTROPY_OUT_OF_RANGE);
+ drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* will be picked up by the rand_drbg_get_entropy() callback */
+ drbg->seed_pool = rand_pool_attach(buffer, len, entropy);
+ if (drbg->seed_pool == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ if (drbg->max_adinlen < len) {
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESTART,
+ RAND_R_ADDITIONAL_INPUT_TOO_LONG);
+ drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ adin = buffer;
+ adinlen = len;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* repair error state */
+ if (drbg->state == DRBG_ERROR)
+ RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(drbg);
+
+ /* repair uninitialized state */
+ if (drbg->state == DRBG_UNINITIALISED) {
+ /* reinstantiate drbg */
+ RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg,
+ (const unsigned char *) ossl_pers_string,
+ sizeof(ossl_pers_string) - 1);
+ /* already reseeded. prevent second reseeding below */
+ reseeded = (drbg->state == DRBG_READY);
+ }
+
+ /* refresh current state if entropy or additional input has been provided */
+ if (drbg->state == DRBG_READY) {
+ if (adin != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * mix in additional input without reseeding
+ *
+ * Similar to RAND_DRBG_reseed(), but the provided additional
+ * data |adin| is mixed into the current state without pulling
+ * entropy from the trusted entropy source using get_entropy().
+ * This is not a reseeding in the strict sense of NIST SP 800-90A.
+ */
+ drbg->meth->reseed(drbg, adin, adinlen, NULL, 0);
+ } else if (reseeded == 0) {
+ /* do a full reseeding if it has not been done yet above */
+ RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, NULL, 0, 0);
+ }
+ }
+
+ rand_pool_free(drbg->seed_pool);
+ drbg->seed_pool = NULL;
+
+ return drbg->state == DRBG_READY;
+}
+
/*
* Generate |outlen| bytes into the buffer at |out|. Reseed if we need
* to or if |prediction_resistance| is set. Additional input can be
* sent in |adin| and |adinlen|.
+ *
+ * Requires that drbg->lock is already locked for write, if non-null.
+ *
+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
+ *
*/
-int RAND_DRBG_generate(DRBG_CTX *dctx, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
+int RAND_DRBG_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
int prediction_resistance,
const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen)
{
- int r = 0;
+ int reseed_required = 0;
- if (dctx->status != DRBG_STATUS_READY
- && dctx->status != DRBG_STATUS_RESEED) {
- if (dctx->status == DRBG_STATUS_ERROR)
- r = RAND_R_IN_ERROR_STATE;
- else if(dctx->status == DRBG_STATUS_UNINITIALISED)
- r = RAND_R_NOT_INSTANTIATED;
- goto end;
+ if (drbg->state != DRBG_READY) {
+ /* try to recover from previous errors */
+ rand_drbg_restart(drbg, NULL, 0, 0);
+
+ if (drbg->state == DRBG_ERROR) {
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_IN_ERROR_STATE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (drbg->state == DRBG_UNINITIALISED) {
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_NOT_INSTANTIATED);
+ return 0;
+ }
}
- if (outlen > dctx->max_request) {
- r = RAND_R_REQUEST_TOO_LARGE_FOR_DRBG;
+ if (outlen > drbg->max_request) {
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_REQUEST_TOO_LARGE_FOR_DRBG);
return 0;
}
- if (adinlen > dctx->max_adin) {
- r = RAND_R_ADDITIONAL_INPUT_TOO_LONG;
- goto end;
+ if (adinlen > drbg->max_adinlen) {
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_ADDITIONAL_INPUT_TOO_LONG);
+ return 0;
}
- if (dctx->reseed_counter >= dctx->reseed_interval)
- dctx->status = DRBG_STATUS_RESEED;
+ if (drbg->fork_count != rand_fork_count) {
+ drbg->fork_count = rand_fork_count;
+ reseed_required = 1;
+ }
- if (dctx->status == DRBG_STATUS_RESEED || prediction_resistance) {
- if (!RAND_DRBG_reseed(dctx, adin, adinlen)) {
- r = RAND_R_RESEED_ERROR;
- goto end;
+ if (drbg->reseed_interval > 0) {
+ if (drbg->reseed_gen_counter > drbg->reseed_interval)
+ reseed_required = 1;
+ }
+ if (drbg->reseed_time_interval > 0) {
+ time_t now = time(NULL);
+ if (now < drbg->reseed_time
+ || now - drbg->reseed_time >= drbg->reseed_time_interval)
+ reseed_required = 1;
+ }
+ if (drbg->parent != NULL) {
+ unsigned int reseed_counter = tsan_load(&drbg->reseed_prop_counter);
+ if (reseed_counter > 0
+ && tsan_load(&drbg->parent->reseed_prop_counter)
+ != reseed_counter)
+ reseed_required = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (reseed_required || prediction_resistance) {
+ if (!RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, adin, adinlen, prediction_resistance)) {
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_RESEED_ERROR);
+ return 0;
}
adin = NULL;
adinlen = 0;
}
- if (!ctr_generate(dctx, out, outlen, adin, adinlen)) {
- r = RAND_R_GENERATE_ERROR;
- dctx->status = DRBG_STATUS_ERROR;
- goto end;
+ if (!drbg->meth->generate(drbg, out, outlen, adin, adinlen)) {
+ drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_GENERATE_ERROR);
+ return 0;
}
- if (dctx->reseed_counter >= dctx->reseed_interval)
- dctx->status = DRBG_STATUS_RESEED;
- else
- dctx->reseed_counter++;
+
+ drbg->reseed_gen_counter++;
+
return 1;
+}
-end:
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, r);
- return 0;
+/*
+ * Generates |outlen| random bytes and stores them in |out|. It will
+ * using the given |drbg| to generate the bytes.
+ *
+ * Requires that drbg->lock is already locked for write, if non-null.
+ *
+ * Returns 1 on success 0 on failure.
+ */
+int RAND_DRBG_bytes(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
+{
+ unsigned char *additional = NULL;
+ size_t additional_len;
+ size_t chunk;
+ size_t ret = 0;
+
+ if (drbg->adin_pool == NULL) {
+ if (drbg->type == 0)
+ goto err;
+ drbg->adin_pool = rand_pool_new(0, 0, drbg->max_adinlen);
+ if (drbg->adin_pool == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ additional_len = rand_drbg_get_additional_data(drbg->adin_pool,
+ &additional);
+
+ for ( ; outlen > 0; outlen -= chunk, out += chunk) {
+ chunk = outlen;
+ if (chunk > drbg->max_request)
+ chunk = drbg->max_request;
+ ret = RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, out, chunk, 0, additional, additional_len);
+ if (!ret)
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+ if (additional != NULL)
+ rand_drbg_cleanup_additional_data(drbg->adin_pool, additional);
+
+ return ret;
}
/*
- * Set the callbacks for entropy and nonce. Used mainly for the KATs
+ * Set the RAND_DRBG callbacks for obtaining entropy and nonce.
+ *
+ * Setting the callbacks is allowed only if the drbg has not been
+ * initialized yet. Otherwise, the operation will fail.
+ *
+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
*/
-int RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(DRBG_CTX *dctx,
- size_t (*cb_get_entropy)(DRBG_CTX *ctx, unsigned char **pout,
- int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len),
- void (*cb_cleanup_entropy)(DRBG_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t olen),
- size_t (*cb_get_nonce)(DRBG_CTX *ctx, unsigned char **pout,
- int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len),
- void (*cb_cleanup_nonce)(DRBG_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t olen))
-{
- if (dctx->status != DRBG_STATUS_UNINITIALISED)
+int RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
+ RAND_DRBG_get_entropy_fn get_entropy,
+ RAND_DRBG_cleanup_entropy_fn cleanup_entropy,
+ RAND_DRBG_get_nonce_fn get_nonce,
+ RAND_DRBG_cleanup_nonce_fn cleanup_nonce)
+{
+ if (drbg->state != DRBG_UNINITIALISED
+ || drbg->parent != NULL)
return 0;
- dctx->get_entropy = cb_get_entropy;
- dctx->cleanup_entropy = cb_cleanup_entropy;
- dctx->get_nonce = cb_get_nonce;
- dctx->cleanup_nonce = cb_cleanup_nonce;
+ drbg->get_entropy = get_entropy;
+ drbg->cleanup_entropy = cleanup_entropy;
+ drbg->get_nonce = get_nonce;
+ drbg->cleanup_nonce = cleanup_nonce;
return 1;
}
/*
- * Set the reseed internal. Used mainly for the KATs.
+ * Set the reseed interval.
+ *
+ * The drbg will reseed automatically whenever the number of generate
+ * requests exceeds the given reseed interval. If the reseed interval
+ * is 0, then this feature is disabled.
+ *
+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
*/
-void RAND_DRBG_set_reseed_interval(DRBG_CTX *dctx, int interval)
+int RAND_DRBG_set_reseed_interval(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned int interval)
{
- dctx->reseed_interval = interval;
+ if (interval > MAX_RESEED_INTERVAL)
+ return 0;
+ drbg->reseed_interval = interval;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set the reseed time interval.
+ *
+ * The drbg will reseed automatically whenever the time elapsed since
+ * the last reseeding exceeds the given reseed time interval. For safety,
+ * a reseeding will also occur if the clock has been reset to a smaller
+ * value.
+ *
+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
+ */
+int RAND_DRBG_set_reseed_time_interval(RAND_DRBG *drbg, time_t interval)
+{
+ if (interval > MAX_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL)
+ return 0;
+ drbg->reseed_time_interval = interval;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set the default values for reseed (time) intervals of new DRBG instances
+ *
+ * The default values can be set independently for master DRBG instances
+ * (without a parent) and slave DRBG instances (with parent).
+ *
+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
+ */
+
+int RAND_DRBG_set_reseed_defaults(
+ unsigned int _master_reseed_interval,
+ unsigned int _slave_reseed_interval,
+ time_t _master_reseed_time_interval,
+ time_t _slave_reseed_time_interval
+ )
+{
+ if (_master_reseed_interval > MAX_RESEED_INTERVAL
+ || _slave_reseed_interval > MAX_RESEED_INTERVAL)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (_master_reseed_time_interval > MAX_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL
+ || _slave_reseed_time_interval > MAX_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL)
+ return 0;
+
+ master_reseed_interval = _master_reseed_interval;
+ slave_reseed_interval = _slave_reseed_interval;
+
+ master_reseed_time_interval = _master_reseed_time_interval;
+ slave_reseed_time_interval = _slave_reseed_time_interval;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Locks the given drbg. Locking a drbg which does not have locking
+ * enabled is considered a successful no-op.
+ *
+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
+ */
+int rand_drbg_lock(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
+{
+ if (drbg->lock != NULL)
+ return CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(drbg->lock);
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Unlocks the given drbg. Unlocking a drbg which does not have locking
+ * enabled is considered a successful no-op.
+ *
+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
+ */
+int rand_drbg_unlock(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
+{
+ if (drbg->lock != NULL)
+ return CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(drbg->lock);
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Enables locking for the given drbg
+ *
+ * Locking can only be enabled if the random generator
+ * is in the uninitialized state.
+ *
+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
+ */
+int rand_drbg_enable_locking(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
+{
+ if (drbg->state != DRBG_UNINITIALISED) {
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_ENABLE_LOCKING,
+ RAND_R_DRBG_ALREADY_INITIALIZED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (drbg->lock == NULL) {
+ if (drbg->parent != NULL && drbg->parent->lock == NULL) {
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_ENABLE_LOCKING,
+ RAND_R_PARENT_LOCKING_NOT_ENABLED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ drbg->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+ if (drbg->lock == NULL) {
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_ENABLE_LOCKING,
+ RAND_R_FAILED_TO_CREATE_LOCK);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 1;
}
/*
* Get and set the EXDATA
*/
-int RAND_DRBG_set_ex_data(DRBG_CTX *dctx, int idx, void *arg)
+int RAND_DRBG_set_ex_data(RAND_DRBG *drbg, int idx, void *arg)
+{
+ return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&drbg->ex_data, idx, arg);
+}
+
+void *RAND_DRBG_get_ex_data(const RAND_DRBG *drbg, int idx)
+{
+ return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&drbg->ex_data, idx);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * The following functions provide a RAND_METHOD that works on the
+ * global DRBG. They lock.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Allocates a new global DRBG on the secure heap (if enabled) and
+ * initializes it with default settings.
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to the new DRBG instance on success, NULL on failure.
+ */
+static RAND_DRBG *drbg_setup(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, RAND_DRBG *parent, int drbg_type)
+{
+ RAND_DRBG *drbg;
+
+ drbg = RAND_DRBG_secure_new_ex(ctx, rand_drbg_type[drbg_type],
+ rand_drbg_flags[drbg_type], parent);
+ if (drbg == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /* Only the master DRBG needs to have a lock */
+ if (parent == NULL && rand_drbg_enable_locking(drbg) == 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* enable seed propagation */
+ tsan_store(&drbg->reseed_prop_counter, 1);
+
+ /*
+ * Ignore instantiation error to support just-in-time instantiation.
+ *
+ * The state of the drbg will be checked in RAND_DRBG_generate() and
+ * an automatic recovery is attempted.
+ */
+ (void)RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg,
+ (const unsigned char *) ossl_pers_string,
+ sizeof(ossl_pers_string) - 1);
+ return drbg;
+
+err:
+ RAND_DRBG_free(drbg);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void drbg_delete_thread_state(void)
+{
+ /* TODO(3.0): Other PRs will pass the ctx as a param to this function */
+ OPENSSL_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ DRBG_GLOBAL *dgbl = drbg_get_global(ctx);
+ RAND_DRBG *drbg;
+
+ if (dgbl == NULL)
+ return;
+ drbg = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&dgbl->public_drbg);
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&dgbl->public_drbg, NULL);
+ RAND_DRBG_free(drbg);
+
+ drbg = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&dgbl->private_drbg);
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&dgbl->private_drbg, NULL);
+ RAND_DRBG_free(drbg);
+}
+
+/* Implements the default OpenSSL RAND_bytes() method */
+static int drbg_bytes(unsigned char *out, int count)
+{
+ int ret;
+ RAND_DRBG *drbg = RAND_DRBG_get0_public();
+
+ if (drbg == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ ret = RAND_DRBG_bytes(drbg, out, count);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Calculates the minimum length of a full entropy buffer
+ * which is necessary to seed (i.e. instantiate) the DRBG
+ * successfully.
+ */
+size_t rand_drbg_seedlen(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
{
- return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&dctx->ex_data, idx, arg);
+ /*
+ * If no os entropy source is available then RAND_seed(buffer, bufsize)
+ * is expected to succeed if and only if the buffer length satisfies
+ * the following requirements, which follow from the calculations
+ * in RAND_DRBG_instantiate().
+ */
+ size_t min_entropy = drbg->strength;
+ size_t min_entropylen = drbg->min_entropylen;
+
+ /*
+ * Extra entropy for the random nonce in the absence of a
+ * get_nonce callback, see comment in RAND_DRBG_instantiate().
+ */
+ if (drbg->min_noncelen > 0 && drbg->get_nonce == NULL) {
+ min_entropy += drbg->strength / 2;
+ min_entropylen += drbg->min_noncelen;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Convert entropy requirement from bits to bytes
+ * (dividing by 8 without rounding upwards, because
+ * all entropy requirements are divisible by 8).
+ */
+ min_entropy >>= 3;
+
+ /* Return a value that satisfies both requirements */
+ return min_entropy > min_entropylen ? min_entropy : min_entropylen;
}
-void *RAND_DRBG_get_ex_data(const DRBG_CTX *dctx, int idx)
+/* Implements the default OpenSSL RAND_add() method */
+static int drbg_add(const void *buf, int num, double randomness)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ RAND_DRBG *drbg = RAND_DRBG_get0_master();
+ size_t buflen;
+ size_t seedlen;
+
+ if (drbg == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (num < 0 || randomness < 0.0)
+ return 0;
+
+ rand_drbg_lock(drbg);
+ seedlen = rand_drbg_seedlen(drbg);
+
+ buflen = (size_t)num;
+
+#ifdef FIPS_MODE
+ /*
+ * NIST SP-800-90A mandates that entropy *shall not* be provided
+ * by the consuming application. By setting the randomness to zero,
+ * we ensure that the buffer contents will be added to the internal
+ * state of the DRBG only as additional data.
+ *
+ * (NIST SP-800-90Ar1, Sections 9.1 and 9.2)
+ */
+ randomness = 0.0;
+#endif
+ if (buflen < seedlen || randomness < (double) seedlen) {
+#if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_NONE)
+ /*
+ * If no os entropy source is available, a reseeding will fail
+ * inevitably. So we use a trick to mix the buffer contents into
+ * the DRBG state without forcing a reseeding: we generate a
+ * dummy random byte, using the buffer content as additional data.
+ * Note: This won't work with RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_NO_DF.
+ */
+ unsigned char dummy[1];
+
+ ret = RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, dummy, sizeof(dummy), 0, buf, buflen);
+ rand_drbg_unlock(drbg);
+ return ret;
+#else
+ /*
+ * If an os entropy source is available then we declare the buffer content
+ * as additional data by setting randomness to zero and trigger a regular
+ * reseeding.
+ */
+ randomness = 0.0;
+#endif
+ }
+
+ if (randomness > (double)seedlen) {
+ /*
+ * The purpose of this check is to bound |randomness| by a
+ * relatively small value in order to prevent an integer
+ * overflow when multiplying by 8 in the rand_drbg_restart()
+ * call below. Note that randomness is measured in bytes,
+ * not bits, so this value corresponds to eight times the
+ * security strength.
+ */
+ randomness = (double)seedlen;
+ }
+
+ ret = rand_drbg_restart(drbg, buf, buflen, (size_t)(8 * randomness));
+ rand_drbg_unlock(drbg);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* Implements the default OpenSSL RAND_seed() method */
+static int drbg_seed(const void *buf, int num)
+{
+ return drbg_add(buf, num, num);
+}
+
+/* Implements the default OpenSSL RAND_status() method */
+static int drbg_status(void)
+{
+ int ret;
+ RAND_DRBG *drbg = RAND_DRBG_get0_master();
+
+ if (drbg == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ rand_drbg_lock(drbg);
+ ret = drbg->state == DRBG_READY ? 1 : 0;
+ rand_drbg_unlock(drbg);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get the master DRBG.
+ * Returns pointer to the DRBG on success, NULL on failure.
+ *
+ */
+RAND_DRBG *OPENSSL_CTX_get0_master_drbg(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ DRBG_GLOBAL *dgbl = drbg_get_global(ctx);
+
+ if (dgbl == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ return dgbl->master_drbg;
+}
+
+RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_get0_master(void)
+{
+ return OPENSSL_CTX_get0_master_drbg(NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get the public DRBG.
+ * Returns pointer to the DRBG on success, NULL on failure.
+ */
+RAND_DRBG *OPENSSL_CTX_get0_public_drbg(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ DRBG_GLOBAL *dgbl = drbg_get_global(ctx);
+ RAND_DRBG *drbg;
+
+ if (dgbl == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ drbg = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&dgbl->public_drbg);
+ if (drbg == NULL) {
+ if (!ossl_init_thread_start(OPENSSL_INIT_THREAD_RAND))
+ return NULL;
+ drbg = drbg_setup(ctx, dgbl->master_drbg, RAND_DRBG_TYPE_PUBLIC);
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&dgbl->public_drbg, drbg);
+ }
+ return drbg;
+}
+
+RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_get0_public(void)
+{
+ return OPENSSL_CTX_get0_public_drbg(NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get the private DRBG.
+ * Returns pointer to the DRBG on success, NULL on failure.
+ */
+RAND_DRBG *OPENSSL_CTX_get0_private_drbg(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ DRBG_GLOBAL *dgbl = drbg_get_global(ctx);
+ RAND_DRBG *drbg;
+
+ if (dgbl == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ drbg = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&dgbl->private_drbg);
+ if (drbg == NULL) {
+ if (!ossl_init_thread_start(OPENSSL_INIT_THREAD_RAND))
+ return NULL;
+ drbg = drbg_setup(ctx, dgbl->master_drbg, RAND_DRBG_TYPE_PRIVATE);
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&dgbl->private_drbg, drbg);
+ }
+ return drbg;
+}
+
+RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_get0_private(void)
+{
+ return OPENSSL_CTX_get0_private_drbg(NULL);
+}
+
+RAND_METHOD rand_meth = {
+ drbg_seed,
+ drbg_bytes,
+ NULL,
+ drbg_add,
+ drbg_bytes,
+ drbg_status
+};
+
+RAND_METHOD *RAND_OpenSSL(void)
{
- return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&dctx->ex_data, idx);
+#ifndef FIPS_MODE
+ return &rand_meth;
+#else
+ return NULL;
+#endif
}
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff