/*
- * Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1999-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
-# include <stdio.h>
-# include "internal/cryptlib.h"
-# include <openssl/crypto.h>
-# include <openssl/hmac.h>
-# include <openssl/rand.h>
-# include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
-# include "p12_lcl.h"
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
+#include "p12_lcl.h"
int PKCS12_mac_present(const PKCS12 *p12)
{
}
}
-# define TK26_MAC_KEY_LEN 32
+#define TK26_MAC_KEY_LEN 32
static int pkcs12_gen_gost_mac_key(const char *pass, int passlen,
const unsigned char *salt, int saltlen,
return 1;
}
-#undef PKCS12_key_gen
-/*
- * |PKCS12_key_gen| is used to convey information about old-style broken
- * password being used to PKCS12_PBE_keyivgen in decrypt cases. Workflow
- * is if PKCS12_verify_mac notes that password encoded with compliant
- * PKCS12_key_gen_utf8 conversion subroutine isn't right, while encoded
- * with legacy non-compliant one is, then it sets |PKCS12_key_gen| to
- * legacy PKCS12_key_gen_asc conversion subroutine, which is then picked
- * by PKCS12_PBE_keyivgen. This applies to reading data. Written data
- * on the other hand is protected with standard-compliant encoding, i.e.
- * in backward-incompatible manner. Note that formally the approach is
- * not MT-safe. Rationale is that in order to access PKCS#12 files from
- * MT or even production application, you would be required to convert
- * data to correct interoperable format. In which case this variable
- * won't have to change. Conversion would have to be done with pkcs12
- * utility, which is not MT, and hence can tolerate it. In other words
- * goal is not to make this heuristic approach work in general case,
- * but in one specific one, apps/pkcs12.c.
- */
-int (*PKCS12_key_gen)(const char *pass, int passlen,
- unsigned char *salt, int slen,
- int id, int iter, int n,
- unsigned char *out,
- const EVP_MD *md_type) = NULL;
-
-
/* Generate a MAC */
static int pkcs12_gen_mac(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen,
unsigned char *mac, unsigned int *maclen,
unsigned char *out,
const EVP_MD *md_type))
{
+ int ret = 0;
const EVP_MD *md_type;
HMAC_CTX *hmac = NULL;
unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], *salt;
const X509_ALGOR *macalg;
const ASN1_OBJECT *macoid;
- if (pkcs12_key_gen == NULL)
- pkcs12_key_gen = PKCS12_key_gen;
if (pkcs12_key_gen == NULL)
pkcs12_key_gen = PKCS12_key_gen_utf8;
if ((md_type_nid == NID_id_GostR3411_94
|| md_type_nid == NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
|| md_type_nid == NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512)
- && !getenv("LEGACY_GOST_PKCS12")) {
+ && ossl_safe_getenv("LEGACY_GOST_PKCS12") == NULL) {
md_size = TK26_MAC_KEY_LEN;
if (!pkcs12_gen_gost_mac_key(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, iter,
md_size, key, md_type)) {
PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_GEN_MAC, PKCS12_R_KEY_GEN_ERROR);
- return 0;
+ goto err;
}
} else
if (!(*pkcs12_key_gen)(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, PKCS12_MAC_ID,
iter, md_size, key, md_type)) {
PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_GEN_MAC, PKCS12_R_KEY_GEN_ERROR);
- return 0;
+ goto err;
}
- hmac = HMAC_CTX_new();
- if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hmac, key, md_size, md_type, NULL)
+ if ((hmac = HMAC_CTX_new()) == NULL
+ || !HMAC_Init_ex(hmac, key, md_size, md_type, NULL)
|| !HMAC_Update(hmac, p12->authsafes->d.data->data,
p12->authsafes->d.data->length)
|| !HMAC_Final(hmac, mac, maclen)) {
- HMAC_CTX_free(hmac);
- return 0;
+ goto err;
}
+ ret = 1;
+
+err:
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(key, sizeof(key));
HMAC_CTX_free(hmac);
- return 1;
+ return ret;
}
int PKCS12_gen_mac(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen,
return 0;
}
X509_SIG_get0(p12->mac->dinfo, NULL, &macoct);
- if (maclen != (unsigned int)ASN1_STRING_length(macoct))
+ if ((maclen != (unsigned int)ASN1_STRING_length(macoct))
+ || CRYPTO_memcmp(mac, ASN1_STRING_get0_data(macoct), maclen) != 0)
return 0;
- if (CRYPTO_memcmp(mac, ASN1_STRING_get0_data(macoct), maclen) != 0) {
- if (pass == NULL)
- return 0;
- /*
- * In order to facilitate accessing old data retry with
- * old-style broken password ...
- */
- if (!pkcs12_gen_mac(p12, pass, passlen, mac, &maclen,
- PKCS12_key_gen_asc)) {
- PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_VERIFY_MAC, PKCS12_R_MAC_GENERATION_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- if ((maclen != (unsigned int)ASN1_STRING_length(macoct))
- || CRYPTO_memcmp(mac, ASN1_STRING_get0_data(macoct), maclen) != 0)
- return 0;
- else
- PKCS12_key_gen = PKCS12_key_gen_asc;
- /*
- * ... and if suceeded, pass it on to PKCS12_PBE_keyivgen.
- */
- }
return 1;
}
{
X509_ALGOR *macalg;
+ PKCS12_MAC_DATA_free(p12->mac);
+ p12->mac = NULL;
+
if ((p12->mac = PKCS12_MAC_DATA_new()) == NULL)
return PKCS12_ERROR;
if (iter > 1) {
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