/* Simplified PKCS#12 routines */
-#ifndef NOPROTO
-static int parse_pk12( PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen, EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert, STACK **ca);
-static int parse_bags( STACK *bags, const char *pass, int passlen, EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert, STACK **ca, ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid, char *keymatch);
-static int parse_bag( PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, const char *pass, int passlen, EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert, STACK **ca, ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid, char *keymatch);
-#else
-static int parse_pk12();
-static int parse_bags();
-static int parse_bag();
-#endif
+static int parse_pk12( PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen,
+ EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert, STACK_OF(X509) **ca);
+
+static int parse_bags( STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags, const char *pass,
+ int passlen, EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert,
+ STACK_OF(X509) **ca, ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid,
+ char *keymatch);
+
+static int parse_bag( PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, const char *pass, int passlen,
+ EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert, STACK_OF(X509) **ca,
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid, char *keymatch);
/* Parse and decrypt a PKCS#12 structure returning user key, user cert
* and other (CA) certs. Note either ca should be NULL, *ca should be NULL,
*/
int PKCS12_parse (PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert,
- STACK **ca)
+ STACK_OF(X509) **ca)
{
-/* Check for NULL PKCS12 structure */
-
-if(!p12) {
- PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE,PKCS12_R_INVALID_NULL_PKCS12_POINTER);
- return 0;
-}
+ /* Check for NULL PKCS12 structure */
-/* Allocate stack for ca certificates if needed */
-if ((ca != NULL) && (*ca == NULL)) {
- if (!(*ca = sk_new(NULL))) {
- PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ if(!p12)
+ {
+ PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE,PKCS12_R_INVALID_NULL_PKCS12_POINTER);
return 0;
- }
-}
+ }
-if(pkey) *pkey = NULL;
-if(cert) *cert = NULL;
+ /* Allocate stack for ca certificates if needed */
+ if ((ca != NULL) && (*ca == NULL))
+ {
+ if (!(*ca = sk_X509_new(NULL)))
+ {
+ PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
-/* Check the mac */
+ if(pkey) *pkey = NULL;
+ if(cert) *cert = NULL;
-if (!PKCS12_verify_mac (p12, pass, -1)) {
- PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE,PKCS12_R_MAC_VERIFY_FAILURE);
- goto err;
-}
+ /* Check the mac */
-if (!parse_pk12 (p12, pass, -1, pkey, cert, ca)) {
- PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE,PKCS12_R_PARSE_ERROR);
- goto err;
-}
+ /* If password is zero length or NULL then try verifying both cases
+ * to determine which password is correct. The reason for this is that
+ * under PKCS#12 password based encryption no password and a zero length
+ * password are two different things...
+ */
+
+ if(!pass || !*pass) {
+ if(PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, NULL, 0)) pass = NULL;
+ else if(PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, "", 0)) pass = "";
+ else {
+ PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE,PKCS12_R_MAC_VERIFY_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else if (!PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, pass, -1)) {
+ PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE,PKCS12_R_MAC_VERIFY_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
-return 1;
+ if (!parse_pk12 (p12, pass, -1, pkey, cert, ca))
+ {
+ PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE,PKCS12_R_PARSE_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
-err:
+ return 1;
-if (pkey && *pkey) EVP_PKEY_free (*pkey);
-if (cert && *cert) X509_free (*cert);
-if (ca) sk_pop_free (*ca, X509_free);
-return 0;
+ err:
+
+ if (pkey && *pkey) EVP_PKEY_free(*pkey);
+ if (cert && *cert) X509_free(*cert);
+ if (ca) sk_X509_pop_free(*ca, X509_free);
+ return 0;
}
/* Parse the outer PKCS#12 structure */
static int parse_pk12 (PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen,
- EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert, STACK **ca)
+ EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert, STACK_OF(X509) **ca)
{
- STACK *asafes, *bags;
+ STACK_OF(PKCS7) *asafes;
+ STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags;
int i, bagnid;
PKCS7 *p7;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *keyid = NULL;
+
char keymatch = 0;
if (!( asafes = M_PKCS12_unpack_authsafes (p12))) return 0;
- for (i = 0; i < sk_num (asafes); i++) {
- p7 = (PKCS7 *) sk_value (asafes, i);
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_PKCS7_num (asafes); i++) {
+ p7 = sk_PKCS7_value (asafes, i);
bagnid = OBJ_obj2nid (p7->type);
if (bagnid == NID_pkcs7_data) {
- bags = M_PKCS12_unpack_p7data (p7);
+ bags = M_PKCS12_unpack_p7data(p7);
} else if (bagnid == NID_pkcs7_encrypted) {
- bags = M_PKCS12_unpack_p7encdata (p7, pass, passlen);
+ bags = M_PKCS12_unpack_p7encdata(p7, pass, passlen);
} else continue;
if (!bags) {
- sk_pop_free (asafes, PKCS7_free);
+ sk_PKCS7_pop_free(asafes, PKCS7_free);
return 0;
}
- if (!parse_bags (bags, pass, passlen, pkey, cert, ca,
+ if (!parse_bags(bags, pass, passlen, pkey, cert, ca,
&keyid, &keymatch)) {
- sk_pop_free (bags, PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free);
- sk_pop_free (asafes, PKCS7_free);
+ sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_pop_free(bags, PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free);
+ sk_PKCS7_pop_free(asafes, PKCS7_free);
return 0;
}
- sk_pop_free (bags, PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free);
+ sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_pop_free(bags, PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free);
}
- sk_pop_free (asafes, PKCS7_free);
- if (keyid) ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free (keyid);
+ sk_PKCS7_pop_free(asafes, PKCS7_free);
+ if (keyid) M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(keyid);
return 1;
}
-static int parse_bags (STACK *bags, const char *pass, int passlen,
- EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert, STACK **ca,
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid, char *keymatch)
+static int parse_bags (STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags, const char *pass,
+ int passlen, EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert,
+ STACK_OF(X509) **ca, ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid,
+ char *keymatch)
{
int i;
- for (i = 0; i < sk_num (bags); i++) {
- if (!parse_bag ((PKCS12_SAFEBAG *)sk_value (bags, i),
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_num(bags); i++) {
+ if (!parse_bag(sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_value (bags, i),
pass, passlen, pkey, cert, ca, keyid,
keymatch)) return 0;
}
#define MATCH_CERT 0x2
#define MATCH_ALL 0x3
-static int parse_bag (PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, const char *pass, int passlen,
- EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert, STACK **ca,
+static int parse_bag(PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, const char *pass, int passlen,
+ EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert, STACK_OF(X509) **ca,
ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid,
char *keymatch)
{
/* Check for any local key id matching (if needed) */
if (lkey && ((*keymatch & MATCH_ALL) != MATCH_ALL)) {
if (*keyid) {
- if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp (*keyid, lkey)) lkey = NULL;
+ if (M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(*keyid, lkey)) lkey = NULL;
} else {
- if (!(*keyid = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_dup (lkey))) {
+ if (!(*keyid = M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_dup(lkey))) {
PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PARSE_BAGS,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
{
case NID_keyBag:
if (!lkey || !pkey) return 1;
- if (!(*pkey = EVP_PKCS82PKEY (bag->value.keybag))) return 0;
+ if (!(*pkey = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(bag->value.keybag))) return 0;
*keymatch |= MATCH_KEY;
break;
case NID_pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag:
if (!lkey || !pkey) return 1;
- if (!(p8 = M_PKCS12_decrypt_skey (bag, pass, passlen)))
+ if (!(p8 = M_PKCS12_decrypt_skey(bag, pass, passlen)))
return 0;
- *pkey = EVP_PKCS82PKEY (p8);
- PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free (p8);
+ *pkey = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(p8);
+ PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8);
if (!(*pkey)) return 0;
*keymatch |= MATCH_KEY;
break;
if (lkey) {
*keymatch |= MATCH_CERT;
if (cert) *cert = x509;
- } else if (ca) sk_push (*ca, (char *)x509);
+ } else {
+ if(ca) sk_X509_push (*ca, x509);
+ else X509_free(x509);
+ }
break;
case NID_safeContentsBag:
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