/* p12_kiss.c */
-/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (shenson@bigfoot.com) for the OpenSSL
+/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
* project 1999.
*/
/* ====================================================================
/* Simplified PKCS#12 routines */
-static int parse_pk12( PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen, EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert, STACK **ca);
-static int parse_bags( STACK *bags, const char *pass, int passlen, EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert, STACK **ca, ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid, char *keymatch);
-static int parse_bag( PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, const char *pass, int passlen, EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert, STACK **ca, ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid, char *keymatch);
+static int parse_pk12( PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen,
+ EVP_PKEY **pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *ocerts);
+
+static int parse_bags( STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags, const char *pass,
+ int passlen, EVP_PKEY **pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *ocerts);
+
+static int parse_bag( PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, const char *pass, int passlen,
+ EVP_PKEY **pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *ocerts);
+
/* Parse and decrypt a PKCS#12 structure returning user key, user cert
* and other (CA) certs. Note either ca should be NULL, *ca should be NULL,
* or it should point to a valid STACK structure. pkey and cert can be
* passed unitialised.
*/
-int PKCS12_parse (PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert,
- STACK **ca)
+int PKCS12_parse(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert,
+ STACK_OF(X509) **ca)
{
-
+ STACK_OF(X509) *ocerts = NULL;
+ X509 *x = NULL;
/* Check for NULL PKCS12 structure */
if(!p12)
return 0;
}
- /* Allocate stack for ca certificates if needed */
- if ((ca != NULL) && (*ca == NULL))
- {
- if (!(*ca = sk_new(NULL)))
- {
- PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- if(pkey) *pkey = NULL;
- if(cert) *cert = NULL;
+ if(pkey)
+ *pkey = NULL;
+ if(cert)
+ *cert = NULL;
/* Check the mac */
- if (!PKCS12_verify_mac (p12, pass, -1))
- {
+ /* If password is zero length or NULL then try verifying both cases
+ * to determine which password is correct. The reason for this is that
+ * under PKCS#12 password based encryption no password and a zero length
+ * password are two different things...
+ */
+
+ if(!pass || !*pass) {
+ if(PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, NULL, 0)) pass = NULL;
+ else if(PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, "", 0)) pass = "";
+ else {
+ PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE,PKCS12_R_MAC_VERIFY_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else if (!PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, pass, -1)) {
PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE,PKCS12_R_MAC_VERIFY_FAILURE);
goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Allocate stack for other certificates */
+ ocerts = sk_X509_new_null();
+
+ if (!ocerts)
+ {
+ PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
}
- if (!parse_pk12 (p12, pass, -1, pkey, cert, ca))
+ if (!parse_pk12 (p12, pass, -1, pkey, ocerts))
{
PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE,PKCS12_R_PARSE_ERROR);
goto err;
}
+ while ((x = sk_X509_pop(ocerts)))
+ {
+ if (pkey && *pkey && cert && !*cert)
+ {
+ if (X509_check_private_key(x, *pkey))
+ {
+ *cert = x;
+ x = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ca && x)
+ {
+ if (!*ca)
+ *ca = sk_X509_new_null();
+ if (!*ca)
+ goto err;
+ if (!sk_X509_push(*ca, x))
+ goto err;
+ x = NULL;
+ }
+ if (x)
+ X509_free(x);
+ }
+
+ if (ocerts)
+ sk_X509_pop_free(ocerts, X509_free);
+
return 1;
err:
- if (pkey && *pkey) EVP_PKEY_free (*pkey);
- if (cert && *cert) X509_free (*cert);
- if (ca) sk_pop_free (*ca, X509_free);
+ if (pkey && *pkey)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(*pkey);
+ if (cert && *cert)
+ X509_free(*cert);
+ if (x)
+ X509_free(*cert);
+ if (ocerts)
+ sk_X509_pop_free(ocerts, X509_free);
return 0;
}
/* Parse the outer PKCS#12 structure */
-static int parse_pk12 (PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen,
- EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert, STACK **ca)
+static int parse_pk12(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen,
+ EVP_PKEY **pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *ocerts)
{
- STACK *asafes, *bags;
+ STACK_OF(PKCS7) *asafes;
+ STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags;
int i, bagnid;
PKCS7 *p7;
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING *keyid = NULL;
- char keymatch = 0;
- if (!( asafes = M_PKCS12_unpack_authsafes (p12))) return 0;
- for (i = 0; i < sk_num (asafes); i++) {
- p7 = (PKCS7 *) sk_value (asafes, i);
+
+ if (!(asafes = PKCS12_unpack_authsafes (p12))) return 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_PKCS7_num (asafes); i++) {
+ p7 = sk_PKCS7_value (asafes, i);
bagnid = OBJ_obj2nid (p7->type);
if (bagnid == NID_pkcs7_data) {
- bags = M_PKCS12_unpack_p7data (p7);
+ bags = PKCS12_unpack_p7data(p7);
} else if (bagnid == NID_pkcs7_encrypted) {
- bags = M_PKCS12_unpack_p7encdata (p7, pass, passlen);
+ bags = PKCS12_unpack_p7encdata(p7, pass, passlen);
} else continue;
if (!bags) {
- sk_pop_free (asafes, PKCS7_free);
+ sk_PKCS7_pop_free(asafes, PKCS7_free);
return 0;
}
- if (!parse_bags(bags, pass, passlen, pkey, cert, ca,
- &keyid, &keymatch)) {
- sk_pop_free(bags, PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free);
- sk_pop_free(asafes, PKCS7_free);
+ if (!parse_bags(bags, pass, passlen, pkey, ocerts)) {
+ sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_pop_free(bags, PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free);
+ sk_PKCS7_pop_free(asafes, PKCS7_free);
return 0;
}
- sk_pop_free(bags, PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free);
+ sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_pop_free(bags, PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free);
}
- sk_pop_free(asafes, PKCS7_free);
- if (keyid) M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(keyid);
+ sk_PKCS7_pop_free(asafes, PKCS7_free);
return 1;
}
-static int parse_bags (STACK *bags, const char *pass, int passlen,
- EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert, STACK **ca,
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid, char *keymatch)
+static int parse_bags(STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *bags, const char *pass,
+ int passlen, EVP_PKEY **pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *ocerts)
{
int i;
- for (i = 0; i < sk_num(bags); i++) {
- if (!parse_bag((PKCS12_SAFEBAG *)sk_value (bags, i),
- pass, passlen, pkey, cert, ca, keyid,
- keymatch)) return 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_num(bags); i++) {
+ if (!parse_bag(sk_PKCS12_SAFEBAG_value (bags, i),
+ pass, passlen, pkey, ocerts))
+ return 0;
}
return 1;
}
-#define MATCH_KEY 0x1
-#define MATCH_CERT 0x2
-#define MATCH_ALL 0x3
-
static int parse_bag(PKCS12_SAFEBAG *bag, const char *pass, int passlen,
- EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert, STACK **ca,
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid,
- char *keymatch)
+ EVP_PKEY **pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *ocerts)
{
PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8;
X509 *x509;
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING *lkey = NULL;
ASN1_TYPE *attrib;
+ ASN1_BMPSTRING *fname = NULL;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING *lkid = NULL;
+ if ((attrib = PKCS12_get_attr (bag, NID_friendlyName)))
+ fname = attrib->value.bmpstring;
if ((attrib = PKCS12_get_attr (bag, NID_localKeyID)))
- lkey = attrib->value.octet_string;
-
- /* Check for any local key id matching (if needed) */
- if (lkey && ((*keymatch & MATCH_ALL) != MATCH_ALL)) {
- if (*keyid) {
- if (M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(*keyid, lkey)) lkey = NULL;
- } else {
- if (!(*keyid = M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_dup(lkey))) {
- PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PARSE_BAGS,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
- }
- }
-
+ lkid = attrib->value.octet_string;
+
switch (M_PKCS12_bag_type(bag))
{
case NID_keyBag:
- if (!lkey || !pkey) return 1;
- if (!(*pkey = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(bag->value.keybag))) return 0;
- *keymatch |= MATCH_KEY;
+ if (!pkey || *pkey)
+ return 1;
+ if (!(*pkey = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(bag->value.keybag)))
+ return 0;
break;
case NID_pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag:
- if (!lkey || !pkey) return 1;
- if (!(p8 = M_PKCS12_decrypt_skey(bag, pass, passlen)))
+ if (!pkey || *pkey)
+ return 1;
+ if (!(p8 = PKCS12_decrypt_skey(bag, pass, passlen)))
return 0;
*pkey = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(p8);
PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8);
if (!(*pkey)) return 0;
- *keymatch |= MATCH_KEY;
break;
case NID_certBag:
if (M_PKCS12_cert_bag_type(bag) != NID_x509Certificate )
- return 1;
- if (!(x509 = M_PKCS12_certbag2x509(bag))) return 0;
- if (lkey) {
- *keymatch |= MATCH_CERT;
- if (cert) *cert = x509;
- } else if (ca) sk_push (*ca, (char *)x509);
+ return 1;
+ if (!(x509 = PKCS12_certbag2x509(bag)))
+ return 0;
+ if(lkid && !X509_keyid_set1(x509, lkid->data, lkid->length))
+ {
+ X509_free(x509);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if(fname) {
+ int len, r;
+ unsigned char *data;
+ len = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&data, fname);
+ if(len > 0) {
+ r = X509_alias_set1(x509, data, len);
+ OPENSSL_free(data);
+ if (!r)
+ {
+ X509_free(x509);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if(!sk_X509_push(ocerts, x509))
+ {
+ X509_free(x509);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
break;
case NID_safeContentsBag:
return parse_bags(bag->value.safes, pass, passlen,
- pkey, cert, ca, keyid, keymatch);
+ pkey, ocerts);
break;
default: