/*
- * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2001-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
const X509_NAME *nm, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
unsigned long flags);
-/* Verify a basic response message */
+/* Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure, or -1 on fatal error */
+static int ocsp_verify_signer(X509 *signer, int response,
+ X509_STORE *st, unsigned long flags,
+ STACK_OF(X509) *untrusted, STACK_OF(X509) **chain)
+{
+ X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vp;
+ int ret = -1;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_OCSP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, st, signer, untrusted)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_OCSP, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if ((vp = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(ctx)) == NULL)
+ goto end;
+ if ((flags & OCSP_PARTIAL_CHAIN) != 0)
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(vp, X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN);
+ if (response
+ && X509_get_ext_by_NID(signer, NID_id_pkix_OCSP_noCheck, -1) >= 0)
+ /*
+ * Locally disable revocation status checking for OCSP responder cert.
+ * Done here for CRLs; TODO should be done also for OCSP-based checks.
+ */
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_clear_flags(vp, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK);
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(ctx, X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER);
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(ctx, X509_TRUST_OCSP_REQUEST);
+ /* TODO: why is X509_TRUST_OCSP_REQUEST set? Seems to get ignored. */
+
+ ret = X509_verify_cert(ctx);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ ret = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_OCSP, OCSP_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR,
+ "Verify error: %s", X509_verify_cert_error_string(ret));
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (chain != NULL)
+ *chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(ctx);
+
+ end:
+ X509_STORE_CTX_free(ctx);
+ return ret;
+}
+static int ocsp_verify(OCSP_REQUEST *req, OCSP_BASICRESP *bs,
+ X509 *signer, unsigned long flags)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY *skey;
+ int ret = 1;
+
+ if ((flags & OCSP_NOSIGS) == 0) {
+ if ((skey = X509_get0_pubkey(signer)) == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_OCSP, OCSP_R_NO_SIGNER_KEY);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (req != NULL)
+ ret = OCSP_REQUEST_verify(req, skey, signer->libctx, signer->propq);
+ else
+ ret = OCSP_BASICRESP_verify(bs, skey, signer->libctx, signer->propq);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_OCSP, OCSP_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE);
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* Verify a basic response message */
int OCSP_basic_verify(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
X509_STORE *st, unsigned long flags)
{
X509 *signer, *x;
STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
STACK_OF(X509) *untrusted = NULL;
- X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = NULL;
- int i, ret = ocsp_find_signer(&signer, bs, certs, flags);
+ int ret = ocsp_find_signer(&signer, bs, certs, flags);
- if (!ret) {
- OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY,
- OCSP_R_SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND);
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_OCSP, OCSP_R_SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND);
goto end;
}
- ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
- if (ctx == NULL) {
- OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if ((ret == 2) && (flags & OCSP_TRUSTOTHER))
+ if ((ret == 2) && (flags & OCSP_TRUSTOTHER) != 0)
flags |= OCSP_NOVERIFY;
- if (!(flags & OCSP_NOSIGS)) {
- EVP_PKEY *skey;
- skey = X509_get0_pubkey(signer);
- if (skey == NULL) {
- OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, OCSP_R_NO_SIGNER_KEY);
- goto err;
- }
- ret = OCSP_BASICRESP_verify(bs, skey, 0);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, OCSP_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE);
- goto end;
- }
- }
- if (!(flags & OCSP_NOVERIFY)) {
- int init_res;
- if (flags & OCSP_NOCHAIN) {
- untrusted = NULL;
- } else if (bs->certs && certs) {
- untrusted = sk_X509_dup(bs->certs);
- for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
- if (!sk_X509_push(untrusted, sk_X509_value(certs, i))) {
- OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
- } else if (certs != NULL) {
- untrusted = certs;
- } else {
- untrusted = bs->certs;
- }
- init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, st, signer, untrusted);
- if (!init_res) {
- OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
- goto f_err;
- }
- X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(ctx, X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER);
- ret = X509_verify_cert(ctx);
- chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(ctx);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- i = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
- OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY,
- OCSP_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR);
- ERR_add_error_data(2, "Verify error:",
- X509_verify_cert_error_string(i));
- goto end;
+ if ((ret = ocsp_verify(NULL, bs, signer, flags)) <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ if ((flags & OCSP_NOVERIFY) == 0) {
+ ret = -1;
+ if ((flags & OCSP_NOCHAIN) == 0) {
+ if ((untrusted = sk_X509_dup(bs->certs)) == NULL)
+ goto end;
+ if (!X509_add_certs(untrusted, certs, X509_ADD_FLAG_DEFAULT))
+ goto end;
}
- if (flags & OCSP_NOCHECKS) {
+ ret = ocsp_verify_signer(signer, 1, st, flags, untrusted, &chain);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ if ((flags & OCSP_NOCHECKS) != 0) {
ret = 1;
goto end;
}
* Easy case: explicitly trusted. Get root CA and check for explicit
* trust
*/
- if (flags & OCSP_NOEXPLICIT)
+ if ((flags & OCSP_NOEXPLICIT) != 0)
goto end;
x = sk_X509_value(chain, sk_X509_num(chain) - 1);
if (X509_check_trust(x, NID_OCSP_sign, 0) != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED) {
- OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, OCSP_R_ROOT_CA_NOT_TRUSTED);
- goto err;
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_OCSP, OCSP_R_ROOT_CA_NOT_TRUSTED);
+ ret = 0;
+ goto end;
}
ret = 1;
}
+
end:
- X509_STORE_CTX_free(ctx);
sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free);
- if (bs->certs && certs)
- sk_X509_free(untrusted);
+ sk_X509_free(untrusted);
return ret;
-
- err:
- ret = 0;
- goto end;
- f_err:
- ret = -1;
- goto end;
}
int OCSP_resp_get0_signer(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, X509 **signer,
STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs)
{
- int ret;
-
- ret = ocsp_find_signer(signer, bs, extra_certs, 0);
- return (ret > 0) ? 1 : 0;
+ return ocsp_find_signer(signer, bs, extra_certs, 0) > 0;
}
static int ocsp_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_BASICRESP *bs,
{
X509 *signer;
OCSP_RESPID *rid = &bs->tbsResponseData.responderId;
- if ((signer = ocsp_find_signer_sk(certs, rid))) {
+
+ if ((signer = ocsp_find_signer_sk(certs, rid)) != NULL) {
*psigner = signer;
return 2;
}
- if (!(flags & OCSP_NOINTERN) &&
+ if ((flags & OCSP_NOINTERN) == 0 &&
(signer = ocsp_find_signer_sk(bs->certs, rid))) {
*psigner = signer;
return 1;
/* Calculate hash of each key and compare */
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
x = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
- X509_pubkey_digest(x, EVP_sha1(), tmphash, NULL);
- if (!memcmp(keyhash, tmphash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH))
+ if (!X509_pubkey_digest(x, EVP_sha1(), tmphash, NULL))
+ break;
+ if (memcmp(keyhash, tmphash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) == 0)
return x;
}
return NULL;
static int ocsp_check_issuer(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
{
- STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp;
+ STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp = bs->tbsResponseData.responses;
X509 *signer, *sca;
OCSP_CERTID *caid = NULL;
- int i;
- sresp = bs->tbsResponseData.responses;
+ int ret;
if (sk_X509_num(chain) <= 0) {
- OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_ISSUER, OCSP_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_IN_CHAIN);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_OCSP, OCSP_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_IN_CHAIN);
return -1;
}
/* See if the issuer IDs match. */
- i = ocsp_check_ids(sresp, &caid);
+ ret = ocsp_check_ids(sresp, &caid);
/* If ID mismatch or other error then return */
- if (i <= 0)
- return i;
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ return ret;
signer = sk_X509_value(chain, 0);
/* Check to see if OCSP responder CA matches request CA */
if (sk_X509_num(chain) > 1) {
sca = sk_X509_value(chain, 1);
- i = ocsp_match_issuerid(sca, caid, sresp);
- if (i < 0)
- return i;
- if (i) {
+ ret = ocsp_match_issuerid(sca, caid, sresp);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+ if (ret != 0) {
/* We have a match, if extensions OK then success */
if (ocsp_check_delegated(signer))
return 1;
idcount = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_num(sresp);
if (idcount <= 0) {
- OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_IDS,
- OCSP_R_RESPONSE_CONTAINS_NO_REVOCATION_DATA);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_OCSP, OCSP_R_RESPONSE_CONTAINS_NO_REVOCATION_DATA);
return -1;
}
cid = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(sresp, 0)->certId;
*ret = NULL;
-
for (i = 1; i < idcount; i++) {
tmpid = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(sresp, i)->certId;
/* Check to see if IDs match */
return 1;
}
+/*
+ * Match the certificate issuer ID.
+ * Returns -1 on fatal error, 0 if there is no match and 1 if there is a match.
+ */
static int ocsp_match_issuerid(X509 *cert, OCSP_CERTID *cid,
STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp)
{
/* If only one ID to match then do it */
- if (cid) {
- const EVP_MD *dgst;
+ if (cid != NULL) {
+ const EVP_MD *dgst = EVP_get_digestbyobj(cid->hashAlgorithm.algorithm);
const X509_NAME *iname;
int mdlen;
unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- if ((dgst = EVP_get_digestbyobj(cid->hashAlgorithm.algorithm))
- == NULL) {
- OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_MATCH_ISSUERID,
- OCSP_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
+
+ if (dgst == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_OCSP, OCSP_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
return -1;
}
mdlen = EVP_MD_size(dgst);
- if (mdlen < 0)
+ if (mdlen < 0) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_OCSP, OCSP_R_DIGEST_SIZE_ERR);
return -1;
- if ((cid->issuerNameHash.length != mdlen) ||
- (cid->issuerKeyHash.length != mdlen))
+ }
+ if (cid->issuerNameHash.length != mdlen ||
+ cid->issuerKeyHash.length != mdlen)
return 0;
iname = X509_get_subject_name(cert);
- if (!X509_NAME_digest(iname, dgst, md, NULL))
+ if (!X509_NAME_digest(iname, dgst, md, NULL)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_OCSP, OCSP_R_DIGEST_NAME_ERR);
return -1;
- if (memcmp(md, cid->issuerNameHash.data, mdlen))
+ }
+ if (memcmp(md, cid->issuerNameHash.data, mdlen) != 0)
return 0;
- X509_pubkey_digest(cert, dgst, md, NULL);
- if (memcmp(md, cid->issuerKeyHash.data, mdlen))
+ if (!X509_pubkey_digest(cert, dgst, md, NULL)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_OCSP, OCSP_R_DIGEST_ERR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (memcmp(md, cid->issuerKeyHash.data, mdlen) != 0)
return 0;
-
- return 1;
-
} else {
/* We have to match the whole lot */
int i, ret;
OCSP_CERTID *tmpid;
+
for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_num(sresp); i++) {
tmpid = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(sresp, i)->certId;
ret = ocsp_match_issuerid(cert, tmpid, NULL);
if (ret <= 0)
return ret;
}
- return 1;
}
-
+ return 1;
}
static int ocsp_check_delegated(X509 *x)
if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE)
&& (X509_get_extended_key_usage(x) & XKU_OCSP_SIGN))
return 1;
- OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_DELEGATED, OCSP_R_MISSING_OCSPSIGNING_USAGE);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_OCSP, OCSP_R_MISSING_OCSPSIGNING_USAGE);
return 0;
}
/*
- * Verify an OCSP request. This is fortunately much easier than OCSP response
- * verify. Just find the signers certificate and verify it against a given
- * trust value.
+ * Verify an OCSP request. This is much easier than OCSP response verify.
+ * Just find the signer's certificate and verify it against a given trust value.
+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure and on fatal error.
*/
-
int OCSP_request_verify(OCSP_REQUEST *req, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
X509_STORE *store, unsigned long flags)
{
X509 *signer;
const X509_NAME *nm;
GENERAL_NAME *gen;
- int ret = 0;
- X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
-
- if (ctx == NULL) {
- OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
+ int ret;
if (!req->optionalSignature) {
- OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, OCSP_R_REQUEST_NOT_SIGNED);
- goto err;
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_OCSP, OCSP_R_REQUEST_NOT_SIGNED);
+ return 0;
}
gen = req->tbsRequest.requestorName;
if (!gen || gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME) {
- OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY,
- OCSP_R_UNSUPPORTED_REQUESTORNAME_TYPE);
- goto err;
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_OCSP, OCSP_R_UNSUPPORTED_REQUESTORNAME_TYPE);
+ return 0; /* not returning -1 here for backward compatibility*/
}
nm = gen->d.directoryName;
ret = ocsp_req_find_signer(&signer, req, nm, certs, flags);
if (ret <= 0) {
- OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY,
- OCSP_R_SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND);
- goto err;
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_OCSP, OCSP_R_SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND);
+ return 0; /* not returning -1 here for backward compatibility*/
}
- if ((ret == 2) && (flags & OCSP_TRUSTOTHER))
+ if ((ret == 2) && (flags & OCSP_TRUSTOTHER) != 0)
flags |= OCSP_NOVERIFY;
- if (!(flags & OCSP_NOSIGS)) {
- EVP_PKEY *skey;
- skey = X509_get0_pubkey(signer);
- ret = OCSP_REQUEST_verify(req, skey);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, OCSP_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- if (!(flags & OCSP_NOVERIFY)) {
- int init_res;
- if (flags & OCSP_NOCHAIN)
- init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, store, signer, NULL);
- else
- init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, store, signer,
- req->optionalSignature->certs);
- if (!init_res) {
- OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(ctx, X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER);
- X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(ctx, X509_TRUST_OCSP_REQUEST);
- ret = X509_verify_cert(ctx);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- ret = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
- OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY,
- OCSP_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR);
- ERR_add_error_data(2, "Verify error:",
- X509_verify_cert_error_string(ret));
- goto err;
- }
- }
- ret = 1;
- goto end;
-
-err:
- ret = 0;
-end:
- X509_STORE_CTX_free(ctx);
- return ret;
+ if ((ret = ocsp_verify(req, NULL, signer, flags)) <= 0)
+ return 0; /* not returning 'ret' here for backward compatibility*/
+ if ((flags & OCSP_NOVERIFY) != 0)
+ return 1;
+ return ocsp_verify_signer(signer, 0, store, flags,
+ (flags & OCSP_NOCHAIN) != 0 ?
+ NULL : req->optionalSignature->certs, NULL) > 0;
+ /* using '> 0' here to avoid breaking backward compatibility returning -1 */
}
static int ocsp_req_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_REQUEST *req,
unsigned long flags)
{
X509 *signer;
- if (!(flags & OCSP_NOINTERN)) {
+
+ if ((flags & OCSP_NOINTERN) == 0) {
signer = X509_find_by_subject(req->optionalSignature->certs, nm);
- if (signer) {
+ if (signer != NULL) {
*psigner = signer;
return 1;
}
}
- signer = X509_find_by_subject(certs, nm);
- if (signer) {
+ if ((signer = X509_find_by_subject(certs, nm)) != NULL) {
*psigner = signer;
return 2;
}
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff