-/* ocsp_vfy.c */
-/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (shenson@bigfoot.com) for the OpenSSL
- * project 2000.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2000 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * licensing@OpenSSL.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+/*
+ * Copyright 2001-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
+#include "ocsp_local.h"
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <string.h>
-static int ocsp_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
- X509_STORE *st, unsigned long flags);
+static int ocsp_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_BASICRESP *bs,
+ STACK_OF(X509) *certs, unsigned long flags);
static X509 *ocsp_find_signer_sk(STACK_OF(X509) *certs, OCSP_RESPID *id);
-static int ocsp_check_issuer(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, unsigned long flags);
-static int ocsp_check_ids(STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp, OCSP_CERTID **ret);
-static int ocsp_match_issuerid(X509 *cert, OCSP_CERTID *cid, STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp);
-static int ocsp_check_delegated(X509 *x, int flags);
-static int ocsp_req_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_REQUEST *req, X509_NAME *nm, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
- X509_STORE *st, unsigned long flags);
+static int ocsp_check_issuer(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *chain);
+static int ocsp_check_ids(STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp,
+ OCSP_CERTID **ret);
+static int ocsp_match_issuerid(X509 *cert, OCSP_CERTID *cid,
+ STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp);
+static int ocsp_check_delegated(X509 *x);
+static int ocsp_req_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_REQUEST *req,
+ const X509_NAME *nm, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
+ unsigned long flags);
+
+/* Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure, or -1 on fatal error */
+static int ocsp_verify_signer(X509 *signer, int response,
+ X509_STORE *st, unsigned long flags,
+ STACK_OF(X509) *untrusted, STACK_OF(X509) **chain)
+{
+ X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vp;
+ int ret = -1;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_OCSP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, st, signer, untrusted)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_OCSP, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if ((vp = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(ctx)) == NULL)
+ goto end;
+ if ((flags & OCSP_PARTIAL_CHAIN) != 0)
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(vp, X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN);
+ if (response
+ && X509_get_ext_by_NID(signer, NID_id_pkix_OCSP_noCheck, -1) >= 0)
+ /*
+ * Locally disable revocation status checking for OCSP responder cert.
+ * Done here for CRLs; TODO should be done also for OCSP-based checks.
+ */
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_clear_flags(vp, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK);
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(ctx, X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER);
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(ctx, X509_TRUST_OCSP_REQUEST);
+ /* TODO: why is X509_TRUST_OCSP_REQUEST set? Seems to get ignored. */
+
+ ret = X509_verify_cert(ctx);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ ret = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_OCSP, OCSP_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR,
+ "Verify error: %s", X509_verify_cert_error_string(ret));
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (chain != NULL)
+ *chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(ctx);
+
+ end:
+ X509_STORE_CTX_free(ctx);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int ocsp_verify(OCSP_REQUEST *req, OCSP_BASICRESP *bs,
+ X509 *signer, unsigned long flags)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY *skey;
+ int ret = 1;
+
+ if ((flags & OCSP_NOSIGS) == 0) {
+ if ((skey = X509_get0_pubkey(signer)) == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_OCSP, OCSP_R_NO_SIGNER_KEY);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (req != NULL)
+ ret = OCSP_REQUEST_verify(req, skey, signer->libctx, signer->propq);
+ else
+ ret = OCSP_BASICRESP_verify(bs, skey, signer->libctx, signer->propq);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_OCSP, OCSP_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE);
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
/* Verify a basic response message */
-
int OCSP_basic_verify(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
- X509_STORE *st, unsigned long flags)
- {
- X509 *signer, *x;
- STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
- X509_STORE_CTX ctx;
- int i, ret = 0;
- ret = ocsp_find_signer(&signer, bs, certs, st, flags);
- if (!ret)
- {
- OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, OCSP_R_SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND);
- goto end;
- }
- if ((ret == 2) && (flags & OCSP_TRUSTOTHER))
- flags |= OCSP_NOVERIFY;
- if (!(flags & OCSP_NOSIGS))
- {
- EVP_PKEY *skey;
- skey = X509_get_pubkey(signer);
- ret = OCSP_BASICRESP_verify(bs, skey, 0);
- EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
- if(ret <= 0)
- {
- OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, OCSP_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE);
- goto end;
- }
- }
- if (!(flags & OCSP_NOVERIFY))
- {
- int init_res;
- if(flags & OCSP_NOCHAIN)
- init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, st, signer, NULL);
- else
- init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, st, signer, bs->certs);
- if(!init_res)
- {
- OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY,ERR_R_X509_LIB);
- goto end;
- }
-
- X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(&ctx, X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER);
- ret = X509_verify_cert(&ctx);
- chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(&ctx);
- X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
- if (ret <= 0)
- {
- i = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(&ctx);
- OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY,OCSP_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR);
- ERR_add_error_data(2, "Verify error:",
- X509_verify_cert_error_string(i));
- goto end;
- }
- if(flags & OCSP_NOCHECKS)
- {
- ret = 1;
- goto end;
- }
- /* At this point we have a valid certificate chain
- * need to verify it against the OCSP issuer criteria.
- */
- ret = ocsp_check_issuer(bs, chain, flags);
-
- /* If fatal error or valid match then finish */
- if (ret != 0) goto end;
-
- /* Easy case: explicitly trusted. Get root CA and
- * check for explicit trust
- */
- if(flags & OCSP_NOEXPLICIT) goto end;
-
- x = sk_X509_value(chain, sk_X509_num(chain) - 1);
- if(X509_check_trust(x, NID_OCSP_sign, 0) != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
- {
- OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY,OCSP_R_ROOT_CA_NOT_TRUSTED);
- goto end;
- }
- ret = 1;
- }
-
-
-
- end:
- if(chain) sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free);
- return ret;
- }
-
-
-static int ocsp_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
- X509_STORE *st, unsigned long flags)
- {
- X509 *signer;
- OCSP_RESPID *rid = bs->tbsResponseData->responderId;
- if ((signer = ocsp_find_signer_sk(certs, rid)))
- {
- *psigner = signer;
- return 2;
- }
- if(!(flags & OCSP_NOINTERN) &&
- (signer = ocsp_find_signer_sk(bs->certs, rid)))
- {
- *psigner = signer;
- return 1;
- }
- /* Maybe lookup from store if by subject name */
-
- *psigner = NULL;
- return 0;
- }
-
+ X509_STORE *st, unsigned long flags)
+{
+ X509 *signer, *x;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *untrusted = NULL;
+ int ret = ocsp_find_signer(&signer, bs, certs, flags);
+
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_OCSP, OCSP_R_SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if ((ret == 2) && (flags & OCSP_TRUSTOTHER) != 0)
+ flags |= OCSP_NOVERIFY;
+
+ if ((ret = ocsp_verify(NULL, bs, signer, flags)) <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ if ((flags & OCSP_NOVERIFY) == 0) {
+ ret = -1;
+ if ((flags & OCSP_NOCHAIN) == 0) {
+ if ((untrusted = sk_X509_dup(bs->certs)) == NULL)
+ goto end;
+ if (!X509_add_certs(untrusted, certs, X509_ADD_FLAG_DEFAULT))
+ goto end;
+ }
+ ret = ocsp_verify_signer(signer, 1, st, flags, untrusted, &chain);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ if ((flags & OCSP_NOCHECKS) != 0) {
+ ret = 1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ /*
+ * At this point we have a valid certificate chain need to verify it
+ * against the OCSP issuer criteria.
+ */
+ ret = ocsp_check_issuer(bs, chain);
+
+ /* If fatal error or valid match then finish */
+ if (ret != 0)
+ goto end;
+
+ /*
+ * Easy case: explicitly trusted. Get root CA and check for explicit
+ * trust
+ */
+ if ((flags & OCSP_NOEXPLICIT) != 0)
+ goto end;
+
+ x = sk_X509_value(chain, sk_X509_num(chain) - 1);
+ if (X509_check_trust(x, NID_OCSP_sign, 0) != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_OCSP, OCSP_R_ROOT_CA_NOT_TRUSTED);
+ ret = 0;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ ret = 1;
+ }
+
+ end:
+ sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free);
+ sk_X509_free(untrusted);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int OCSP_resp_get0_signer(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, X509 **signer,
+ STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs)
+{
+ return ocsp_find_signer(signer, bs, extra_certs, 0) > 0;
+}
+
+static int ocsp_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_BASICRESP *bs,
+ STACK_OF(X509) *certs, unsigned long flags)
+{
+ X509 *signer;
+ OCSP_RESPID *rid = &bs->tbsResponseData.responderId;
+
+ if ((signer = ocsp_find_signer_sk(certs, rid)) != NULL) {
+ *psigner = signer;
+ return 2;
+ }
+ if ((flags & OCSP_NOINTERN) == 0 &&
+ (signer = ocsp_find_signer_sk(bs->certs, rid))) {
+ *psigner = signer;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ /* Maybe lookup from store if by subject name */
+
+ *psigner = NULL;
+ return 0;
+}
static X509 *ocsp_find_signer_sk(STACK_OF(X509) *certs, OCSP_RESPID *id)
- {
- int i;
- unsigned char tmphash[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH], *keyhash;
- X509 *x;
-
- /* Easy if lookup by name */
- if (id->type == V_OCSP_RESPID_NAME)
- return X509_find_by_subject(certs, id->value.byName);
-
- /* Lookup by key hash */
-
- /* If key hash isn't SHA1 length then forget it */
- if (id->value.byKey->length != SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) return NULL;
- keyhash = id->value.byKey->data;
- /* Calculate hash of each key and compare */
- for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++)
- {
- x = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
- X509_pubkey_digest(x, EVP_sha1(), tmphash, NULL);
- if(!memcmp(keyhash, tmphash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH))
- return x;
- }
- return NULL;
- }
-
-
-static int ocsp_check_issuer(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, unsigned long flags)
- {
- STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp;
- X509 *signer, *sca;
- OCSP_CERTID *caid = NULL;
- int i;
- sresp = bs->tbsResponseData->responses;
-
- if (sk_X509_num(chain) <= 0)
- {
- OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_ISSUER, OCSP_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_IN_CHAIN);
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* See if the issuer IDs match. */
- i = ocsp_check_ids(sresp, &caid);
-
- /* If ID mismatch or other error then return */
- if (i <= 0) return i;
-
- signer = sk_X509_value(chain, 0);
- /* Check to see if OCSP responder CA matches request CA */
- if (sk_X509_num(chain) > 1)
- {
- sca = sk_X509_value(chain, 1);
- i = ocsp_match_issuerid(sca, caid, sresp);
- if (i < 0) return i;
- if (i)
- {
- /* We have a match, if extensions OK then success */
- if (ocsp_check_delegated(signer, flags)) return 1;
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- /* Otherwise check if OCSP request signed directly by request CA */
- return ocsp_match_issuerid(signer, caid, sresp);
- }
-
-
-/* Check the issuer certificate IDs for equality. If there is a mismatch with the same
- * algorithm then there's no point trying to match any certificates against the issuer.
- * If the issuer IDs all match then we just need to check equality against one of them.
+{
+ int i;
+ unsigned char tmphash[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH], *keyhash;
+ X509 *x;
+
+ /* Easy if lookup by name */
+ if (id->type == V_OCSP_RESPID_NAME)
+ return X509_find_by_subject(certs, id->value.byName);
+
+ /* Lookup by key hash */
+
+ /* If key hash isn't SHA1 length then forget it */
+ if (id->value.byKey->length != SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH)
+ return NULL;
+ keyhash = id->value.byKey->data;
+ /* Calculate hash of each key and compare */
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
+ x = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
+ if (!X509_pubkey_digest(x, EVP_sha1(), tmphash, NULL))
+ break;
+ if (memcmp(keyhash, tmphash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) == 0)
+ return x;
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static int ocsp_check_issuer(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
+{
+ STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp = bs->tbsResponseData.responses;
+ X509 *signer, *sca;
+ OCSP_CERTID *caid = NULL;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (sk_X509_num(chain) <= 0) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_OCSP, OCSP_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_IN_CHAIN);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* See if the issuer IDs match. */
+ ret = ocsp_check_ids(sresp, &caid);
+
+ /* If ID mismatch or other error then return */
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ signer = sk_X509_value(chain, 0);
+ /* Check to see if OCSP responder CA matches request CA */
+ if (sk_X509_num(chain) > 1) {
+ sca = sk_X509_value(chain, 1);
+ ret = ocsp_match_issuerid(sca, caid, sresp);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ /* We have a match, if extensions OK then success */
+ if (ocsp_check_delegated(signer))
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Otherwise check if OCSP request signed directly by request CA */
+ return ocsp_match_issuerid(signer, caid, sresp);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check the issuer certificate IDs for equality. If there is a mismatch with
+ * the same algorithm then there's no point trying to match any certificates
+ * against the issuer. If the issuer IDs all match then we just need to check
+ * equality against one of them.
*/
-
+
static int ocsp_check_ids(STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp, OCSP_CERTID **ret)
- {
- OCSP_CERTID *tmpid, *cid;
- int i, idcount;
-
- idcount = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_num(sresp);
- if (idcount <= 0)
- {
- OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_IDS, OCSP_R_RESPONSE_CONTAINS_NO_REVOCATION_DATA);
- return -1;
- }
-
- cid = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(sresp, 0)->certId;
-
- *ret = NULL;
-
- for (i = 1; i < idcount; i++)
- {
- tmpid = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(sresp, 0)->certId;
- /* Check to see if IDs match */
- if (OCSP_id_issuer_cmp(cid, tmpid))
- {
- /* If algoritm mismatch let caller deal with it */
- if (OBJ_cmp(tmpid->hashAlgorithm->algorithm,
- cid->hashAlgorithm->algorithm))
- return 2;
- /* Else mismatch */
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- /* All IDs match: only need to check one ID */
- *ret = cid;
- return 1;
- }
+{
+ OCSP_CERTID *tmpid, *cid;
+ int i, idcount;
+
+ idcount = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_num(sresp);
+ if (idcount <= 0) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_OCSP, OCSP_R_RESPONSE_CONTAINS_NO_REVOCATION_DATA);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ cid = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(sresp, 0)->certId;
+
+ *ret = NULL;
+ for (i = 1; i < idcount; i++) {
+ tmpid = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(sresp, i)->certId;
+ /* Check to see if IDs match */
+ if (OCSP_id_issuer_cmp(cid, tmpid)) {
+ /* If algorithm mismatch let caller deal with it */
+ if (OBJ_cmp(tmpid->hashAlgorithm.algorithm,
+ cid->hashAlgorithm.algorithm))
+ return 2;
+ /* Else mismatch */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ /* All IDs match: only need to check one ID */
+ *ret = cid;
+ return 1;
+}
-static int ocsp_match_issuerid(X509 *cert, OCSP_CERTID *cid,
- STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp)
- {
- /* If only one ID to match then do it */
- if(cid)
- {
- const EVP_MD *dgst;
- X509_NAME *iname;
- int mdlen;
- unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- if (!(dgst = EVP_get_digestbyobj(cid->hashAlgorithm->algorithm)))
- {
- OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_MATCH_ISSUERID, OCSP_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
- return -1;
- }
-
- mdlen = EVP_MD_size(dgst);
- if ((cid->issuerNameHash->length != mdlen) ||
- (cid->issuerKeyHash->length != mdlen))
- return 0;
- iname = X509_get_subject_name(cert);
- if (!X509_NAME_digest(iname, dgst, md, NULL))
- return -1;
- if (memcmp(md, cid->issuerNameHash->data, mdlen))
- return 0;
- X509_pubkey_digest(cert, EVP_sha1(), md, NULL);
- if (memcmp(md, cid->issuerKeyHash->data, mdlen))
- return 0;
-
- return 1;
-
- }
- else
- {
- /* We have to match the whole lot */
- int i, ret;
- OCSP_CERTID *tmpid;
- for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_num(sresp); i++)
- {
- tmpid = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(sresp, 0)->certId;
- ret = ocsp_match_issuerid(cert, tmpid, NULL);
- if (ret <= 0) return ret;
- }
- return 1;
- }
-
- }
-
-static int ocsp_check_delegated(X509 *x, int flags)
- {
- X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
- if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) &&
- (x->ex_xkusage & XKU_OCSP_SIGN))
- return 1;
- OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_DELEGATED, OCSP_R_MISSING_OCSPSIGNING_USAGE);
- return 0;
- }
-
-/* Verify an OCSP request. This is fortunately much easier than OCSP
- * response verify. Just find the signers certificate and verify it
- * against a given trust value.
+/*
+ * Match the certificate issuer ID.
+ * Returns -1 on fatal error, 0 if there is no match and 1 if there is a match.
*/
-
-int OCSP_request_verify(OCSP_REQUEST *req, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, X509_STORE *store, unsigned long flags)
- {
- X509 *signer;
- X509_NAME *nm;
- GENERAL_NAME *gen;
- int ret;
- X509_STORE_CTX ctx;
- if (!req->optionalSignature)
- {
- OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, OCSP_R_REQUEST_NOT_SIGNED);
- return 0;
- }
- gen = req->tbsRequest->requestorName;
- if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
- {
- OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, OCSP_R_UNSUPPORTED_REQUESTORNAME_TYPE);
- return 0;
- }
- nm = gen->d.directoryName;
- ret = ocsp_req_find_signer(&signer, req, nm, certs, store, flags);
- if (ret <= 0)
- {
- OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, OCSP_R_SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND);
- return 0;
- }
- if ((ret == 2) && (flags & OCSP_TRUSTOTHER))
- flags |= OCSP_NOVERIFY;
- if (!(flags & OCSP_NOSIGS))
- {
- EVP_PKEY *skey;
- skey = X509_get_pubkey(signer);
- ret = OCSP_REQUEST_verify(req, skey);
- EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
- if(ret <= 0)
- {
- OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, OCSP_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
- }
- if (!(flags & OCSP_NOVERIFY))
- {
- int init_res;
- if(flags & OCSP_NOCHAIN)
- init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, store, signer, NULL);
- else
- init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, store, signer,
- req->optionalSignature->certs);
- if(!init_res)
- {
- OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY,ERR_R_X509_LIB);
- return 0;
- }
-
- X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(&ctx, X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER);
- X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(&ctx, X509_TRUST_OCSP_REQUEST);
- ret = X509_verify_cert(&ctx);
- X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
- if (ret <= 0)
- {
- ret = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(&ctx);
- OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY,OCSP_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR);
- ERR_add_error_data(2, "Verify error:",
- X509_verify_cert_error_string(ret));
- return 0;
- }
- }
- return 1;
+static int ocsp_match_issuerid(X509 *cert, OCSP_CERTID *cid,
+ STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp)
+{
+ /* If only one ID to match then do it */
+ if (cid != NULL) {
+ const EVP_MD *dgst = EVP_get_digestbyobj(cid->hashAlgorithm.algorithm);
+ const X509_NAME *iname;
+ int mdlen;
+ unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+
+ if (dgst == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_OCSP, OCSP_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
+ return -1;
}
-static int ocsp_req_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_REQUEST *req, X509_NAME *nm, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
- X509_STORE *st, unsigned long flags)
- {
- X509 *signer;
- if(!(flags & OCSP_NOINTERN))
- {
- signer = X509_find_by_subject(req->optionalSignature->certs, nm);
- *psigner = signer;
- return 1;
- }
-
- signer = X509_find_by_subject(certs, nm);
- if (signer)
- {
- *psigner = signer;
- return 2;
- }
- return 0;
- }
+ mdlen = EVP_MD_size(dgst);
+ if (mdlen < 0) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_OCSP, OCSP_R_DIGEST_SIZE_ERR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (cid->issuerNameHash.length != mdlen ||
+ cid->issuerKeyHash.length != mdlen)
+ return 0;
+ iname = X509_get_subject_name(cert);
+ if (!X509_NAME_digest(iname, dgst, md, NULL)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_OCSP, OCSP_R_DIGEST_NAME_ERR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (memcmp(md, cid->issuerNameHash.data, mdlen) != 0)
+ return 0;
+ if (!X509_pubkey_digest(cert, dgst, md, NULL)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_OCSP, OCSP_R_DIGEST_ERR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (memcmp(md, cid->issuerKeyHash.data, mdlen) != 0)
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ /* We have to match the whole lot */
+ int i, ret;
+ OCSP_CERTID *tmpid;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_num(sresp); i++) {
+ tmpid = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(sresp, i)->certId;
+ ret = ocsp_match_issuerid(cert, tmpid, NULL);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int ocsp_check_delegated(X509 *x)
+{
+ if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE)
+ && (X509_get_extended_key_usage(x) & XKU_OCSP_SIGN))
+ return 1;
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_OCSP, OCSP_R_MISSING_OCSPSIGNING_USAGE);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify an OCSP request. This is much easier than OCSP response verify.
+ * Just find the signer's certificate and verify it against a given trust value.
+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure and on fatal error.
+ */
+int OCSP_request_verify(OCSP_REQUEST *req, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
+ X509_STORE *store, unsigned long flags)
+{
+ X509 *signer;
+ const X509_NAME *nm;
+ GENERAL_NAME *gen;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!req->optionalSignature) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_OCSP, OCSP_R_REQUEST_NOT_SIGNED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ gen = req->tbsRequest.requestorName;
+ if (!gen || gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_OCSP, OCSP_R_UNSUPPORTED_REQUESTORNAME_TYPE);
+ return 0; /* not returning -1 here for backward compatibility*/
+ }
+ nm = gen->d.directoryName;
+ ret = ocsp_req_find_signer(&signer, req, nm, certs, flags);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_OCSP, OCSP_R_SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND);
+ return 0; /* not returning -1 here for backward compatibility*/
+ }
+ if ((ret == 2) && (flags & OCSP_TRUSTOTHER) != 0)
+ flags |= OCSP_NOVERIFY;
+
+ if ((ret = ocsp_verify(req, NULL, signer, flags)) <= 0)
+ return 0; /* not returning 'ret' here for backward compatibility*/
+ if ((flags & OCSP_NOVERIFY) != 0)
+ return 1;
+ return ocsp_verify_signer(signer, 0, store, flags,
+ (flags & OCSP_NOCHAIN) != 0 ?
+ NULL : req->optionalSignature->certs, NULL) > 0;
+ /* using '> 0' here to avoid breaking backward compatibility returning -1 */
+}
+
+static int ocsp_req_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_REQUEST *req,
+ const X509_NAME *nm, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
+ unsigned long flags)
+{
+ X509 *signer;
+
+ if ((flags & OCSP_NOINTERN) == 0) {
+ signer = X509_find_by_subject(req->optionalSignature->certs, nm);
+ if (signer != NULL) {
+ *psigner = signer;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((signer = X509_find_by_subject(certs, nm)) != NULL) {
+ *psigner = signer;
+ return 2;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}