-/* crypto/evp/p_lib.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
+/*
+ * DSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
+ * internal use.
+ */
+#include "internal/deprecated.h"
+
#include <stdio.h>
-#include "cryptlib.h"
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "internal/refcount.h"
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/asn1_mac.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
#include <openssl/dsa.h>
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
#include <openssl/dh.h>
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+#include <openssl/cmac.h>
#include <openssl/engine.h>
-#endif
+#include <openssl/params.h>
+#include <openssl/serializer.h>
+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
+
+#include "crypto/asn1.h"
+#include "crypto/evp.h"
+#include "internal/provider.h"
+#include "evp_local.h"
-#include "asn1_locl.h"
+static int pkey_set_type(EVP_PKEY *pkey, ENGINE *e, int type, const char *str,
+ int len, EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt);
+static void evp_pkey_free_it(EVP_PKEY *key);
-static void EVP_PKEY_free_it(EVP_PKEY *x);
+#ifndef FIPS_MODE
-int EVP_PKEY_bits(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
- {
- if (pkey && pkey->ameth && pkey->ameth->pkey_bits)
- return pkey->ameth->pkey_bits(pkey);
- return 0;
- }
+int EVP_PKEY_bits(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+ if (pkey != NULL) {
+ if (pkey->ameth == NULL)
+ return pkey->cache.bits;
+ else if (pkey->ameth->pkey_bits)
+ return pkey->ameth->pkey_bits(pkey);
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
-int EVP_PKEY_size(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
- {
- if (pkey && pkey->ameth && pkey->ameth->pkey_size)
- return pkey->ameth->pkey_size(pkey);
- return 0;
- }
+int EVP_PKEY_security_bits(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+ if (pkey == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (pkey->ameth == NULL)
+ return pkey->cache.security_bits;
+ if (pkey->ameth->pkey_security_bits == NULL)
+ return -2;
+ return pkey->ameth->pkey_security_bits(pkey);
+}
int EVP_PKEY_save_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int mode)
- {
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
- if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
- {
- int ret=pkey->save_parameters;
-
- if (mode >= 0)
- pkey->save_parameters=mode;
- return(ret);
- }
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
- {
- int ret = pkey->save_parameters;
-
- if (mode >= 0)
- pkey->save_parameters = mode;
- return(ret);
- }
-#endif
- return(0);
- }
+{
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
+ int ret = pkey->save_parameters;
+
+ if (mode >= 0)
+ pkey->save_parameters = mode;
+ return ret;
+ }
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
+ int ret = pkey->save_parameters;
+
+ if (mode >= 0)
+ pkey->save_parameters = mode;
+ return ret;
+ }
+# endif
+ return 0;
+}
int EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(EVP_PKEY *to, const EVP_PKEY *from)
- {
- if (to->type != from->type)
- {
- EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_COPY_PARAMETERS,EVP_R_DIFFERENT_KEY_TYPES);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(from))
- {
- EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_COPY_PARAMETERS,EVP_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
- goto err;
- }
- if (from->ameth && from->ameth->param_copy)
- return from->ameth->param_copy(to, from);
-err:
- return 0;
- }
+{
+ /*
+ * TODO: clean up legacy stuff from this function when legacy support
+ * is gone.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * Only check that type match this early when both keys are legacy.
+ * If either of them is provided, we let evp_keymgmt_util_copy()
+ * do this check, after having exported either of them that isn't
+ * provided.
+ */
+ if (to->keymgmt == NULL && from->keymgmt == NULL) {
+ if (to->type == EVP_PKEY_NONE) {
+ if (EVP_PKEY_set_type(to, from->type) == 0)
+ return 0;
+ } else if (to->type != from->type) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_COPY_PARAMETERS, EVP_R_DIFFERENT_KEY_TYPES);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(from)) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_COPY_PARAMETERS, EVP_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(to)) {
+ if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(to, from) == 1)
+ return 1;
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_COPY_PARAMETERS, EVP_R_DIFFERENT_PARAMETERS);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If |from| is provided, we upgrade |to| to be provided as well.
+ * This drops the legacy key from |to|.
+ * evp_pkey_upgrade_to_provider() checks if |to| is already provided,
+ * we don't need to do that here.
+ *
+ * TODO(3.0) We should investigate if that's too aggressive and make
+ * this scenario unsupported instead.
+ */
+ if (from->keymgmt != NULL) {
+ EVP_KEYMGMT *tmp_keymgmt = from->keymgmt;
+
+ /*
+ * The returned pointer is known to be cached, so we don't have to
+ * save it. However, if it's NULL, something went wrong and we can't
+ * copy.
+ */
+ if (evp_pkey_upgrade_to_provider(to, NULL,
+ &tmp_keymgmt, NULL) == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* For purely provided keys, we just call the keymgmt utility */
+ if (to->keymgmt != NULL && from->keymgmt != NULL)
+ return evp_keymgmt_util_copy(to, (EVP_PKEY *)from,
+ OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_ALL_PARAMETERS);
+
+ /*
+ * If |to| is provided, we know that |from| is legacy at this point.
+ * Try exporting |from| to |to|'s keymgmt, then use evp_keymgmt_copy()
+ * to copy the appropriate data to |to|'s keydata.
+ */
+ if (to->keymgmt != NULL) {
+ EVP_KEYMGMT *to_keymgmt = to->keymgmt;
+ void *from_keydata =
+ evp_pkey_export_to_provider((EVP_PKEY *)from, NULL, &to_keymgmt,
+ NULL);
+
+ if (from_keydata == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return evp_keymgmt_copy(to->keymgmt, to->keydata, from_keydata,
+ OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_ALL_PARAMETERS);
+ }
+
+ /* Both keys are legacy */
+ if (from->ameth != NULL && from->ameth->param_copy != NULL)
+ return from->ameth->param_copy(to, from);
+ err:
+ return 0;
+}
int EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
- {
- if (pkey->ameth && pkey->ameth->param_missing)
- return pkey->ameth->param_missing(pkey);
- return 0;
- }
+{
+ if (pkey != NULL) {
+ if (pkey->keymgmt != NULL)
+ return !evp_keymgmt_util_has((EVP_PKEY *)pkey,
+ OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_ALL_PARAMETERS);
+ else if (pkey->ameth != NULL && pkey->ameth->param_missing != NULL)
+ return pkey->ameth->param_missing(pkey);
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function is called for any mixture of keys except pure legacy pair.
+ * TODO When legacy keys are gone, we replace a call to this functions with
+ * a call to evp_keymgmt_util_match().
+ */
+static int evp_pkey_cmp_any(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b,
+ int selection)
+{
+ EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt1 = NULL, *keymgmt2 = NULL;
+ void *keydata1 = NULL, *keydata2 = NULL, *tmp_keydata = NULL;
+
+ /* If none of them are provided, this function shouldn't have been called */
+ if (!ossl_assert(a->keymgmt != NULL || b->keymgmt != NULL))
+ return -2;
+
+ /* For purely provided keys, we just call the keymgmt utility */
+ if (a->keymgmt != NULL && b->keymgmt != NULL)
+ return evp_keymgmt_util_match((EVP_PKEY *)a, (EVP_PKEY *)b, selection);
+
+ /*
+ * Here, we know that we have a mixture of legacy and provided keys.
+ * Try cross export and compare the resulting key data.
+ */
+ keymgmt1 = a->keymgmt;
+ keydata1 = a->keydata;
+ keymgmt2 = b->keymgmt;
+ keydata2 = b->keydata;
+
+ if ((keymgmt1 == NULL
+ && !EVP_KEYMGMT_is_a(keymgmt2, OBJ_nid2sn(a->type)))
+ || (keymgmt2 == NULL
+ && !EVP_KEYMGMT_is_a(keymgmt1, OBJ_nid2sn(b->type))))
+ return -1; /* not the same key type */
+
+ if (keymgmt2 != NULL && keymgmt2->match != NULL) {
+ tmp_keydata =
+ evp_pkey_export_to_provider((EVP_PKEY *)a, NULL, &keymgmt2, NULL);
+ if (tmp_keydata != NULL) {
+ keymgmt1 = keymgmt2;
+ keydata1 = tmp_keydata;
+ }
+ }
+ if (tmp_keydata == NULL && keymgmt1 != NULL && keymgmt1->match != NULL) {
+ tmp_keydata =
+ evp_pkey_export_to_provider((EVP_PKEY *)b, NULL, &keymgmt1, NULL);
+ if (tmp_keydata != NULL) {
+ keymgmt2 = keymgmt1;
+ keydata2 = tmp_keydata;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* If we still don't have matching keymgmt implementations, we give up */
+ if (keymgmt1 != keymgmt2)
+ return -2;
+
+ return evp_keymgmt_match(keymgmt1, keydata1, keydata2, selection);
+}
int EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b)
- {
- if (a->type != b->type)
- return -1;
- if (a->ameth && a->ameth->param_cmp)
- return a->ameth->param_cmp(a, b);
- return -2;
- }
+{
+ /*
+ * TODO: clean up legacy stuff from this function when legacy support
+ * is gone.
+ */
+
+ if (a->keymgmt != NULL || b->keymgmt != NULL)
+ return evp_pkey_cmp_any(a, b, OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_ALL_PARAMETERS);
+
+ /* All legacy keys */
+ if (a->type != b->type)
+ return -1;
+ if (a->ameth != NULL && a->ameth->param_cmp != NULL)
+ return a->ameth->param_cmp(a, b);
+ return -2;
+}
int EVP_PKEY_cmp(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b)
- {
- if (a->type != b->type)
- return -1;
-
- if (a->ameth)
- {
- int ret;
- /* Compare parameters if the algorithm has them */
- if (a->ameth->param_cmp)
- {
- ret = a->ameth->param_cmp(a, b);
- if (ret <= 0)
- return ret;
- }
-
- if (a->ameth->pub_cmp)
- return a->ameth->pub_cmp(a, b);
- }
-
- return -2;
- }
+{
+ /*
+ * TODO: clean up legacy stuff from this function when legacy support
+ * is gone.
+ */
-EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKEY_new(void)
- {
- EVP_PKEY *ret;
-
- ret=(EVP_PKEY *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_PKEY));
- if (ret == NULL)
- {
- EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return(NULL);
- }
- ret->type=EVP_PKEY_NONE;
- ret->save_type=EVP_PKEY_NONE;
- ret->references=1;
- ret->ameth=NULL;
- ret->engine=NULL;
- ret->pkey.ptr=NULL;
- ret->attributes=NULL;
- ret->save_parameters=1;
- return(ret);
- }
-
-/* Setup a public key ASN1 method and ENGINE from a NID or a string.
- * If pkey is NULL just return 1 or 0 if the algorithm exists.
- */
+ if (a->keymgmt != NULL || b->keymgmt != NULL)
+ return evp_pkey_cmp_any(a, b,
+ OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_ALL_PARAMETERS
+ | OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PUBLIC_KEY);
-static int pkey_set_type(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int type, const char *str, int len)
- {
- const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth;
- ENGINE *e = NULL;
- if (pkey)
- {
- if (pkey->pkey.ptr)
- EVP_PKEY_free_it(pkey);
- /* If key type matches and a method exists then this
- * lookup has succeeded once so just indicate success.
- */
- if ((type == pkey->save_type) && pkey->ameth)
- return 1;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
- /* If we have an ENGINE release it */
- if (pkey->engine)
- ENGINE_finish(pkey->engine);
-#endif
- }
- if (str)
- ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(&e, str, len);
- else
- ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find(&e, type);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
- if (!pkey && e)
- ENGINE_finish(e);
-#endif
- if (!ameth)
- {
- EVPerr(EVP_F_PKEY_SET_TYPE, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM);
- return 0;
- }
- if (pkey)
- {
- pkey->ameth = ameth;
- pkey->engine = e;
-
- pkey->type = pkey->ameth->pkey_id;
- pkey->save_type=type;
- }
- return 1;
- }
+ /* All legacy keys */
+ if (a->type != b->type)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (a->ameth != NULL) {
+ int ret;
+ /* Compare parameters if the algorithm has them */
+ if (a->ameth->param_cmp != NULL) {
+ ret = a->ameth->param_cmp(a, b);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if (a->ameth->pub_cmp != NULL)
+ return a->ameth->pub_cmp(a, b);
+ }
+
+ return -2;
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(int type, ENGINE *e,
+ const unsigned char *priv,
+ size_t len)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY *ret = EVP_PKEY_new();
+
+ if (ret == NULL
+ || !pkey_set_type(ret, e, type, NULL, -1, NULL)) {
+ /* EVPerr already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (ret->ameth->set_priv_key == NULL) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_NEW_RAW_PRIVATE_KEY,
+ EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!ret->ameth->set_priv_key(ret, priv, len)) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_NEW_RAW_PRIVATE_KEY, EVP_R_KEY_SETUP_FAILED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+
+ err:
+ EVP_PKEY_free(ret);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKEY_new_raw_public_key(int type, ENGINE *e,
+ const unsigned char *pub,
+ size_t len)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY *ret = EVP_PKEY_new();
+
+ if (ret == NULL
+ || !pkey_set_type(ret, e, type, NULL, -1, NULL)) {
+ /* EVPerr already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (ret->ameth->set_pub_key == NULL) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_NEW_RAW_PUBLIC_KEY,
+ EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!ret->ameth->set_pub_key(ret, pub, len)) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_NEW_RAW_PUBLIC_KEY, EVP_R_KEY_SETUP_FAILED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+
+ err:
+ EVP_PKEY_free(ret);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_get_raw_private_key(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, unsigned char *priv,
+ size_t *len)
+{
+ if (pkey->ameth->get_priv_key == NULL) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_GET_RAW_PRIVATE_KEY,
+ EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!pkey->ameth->get_priv_key(pkey, priv, len)) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_GET_RAW_PRIVATE_KEY, EVP_R_GET_RAW_KEY_FAILED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_get_raw_public_key(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, unsigned char *pub,
+ size_t *len)
+{
+ if (pkey->ameth->get_pub_key == NULL) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_GET_RAW_PUBLIC_KEY,
+ EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!pkey->ameth->get_pub_key(pkey, pub, len)) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_GET_RAW_PUBLIC_KEY, EVP_R_GET_RAW_KEY_FAILED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKEY_new_CMAC_key(ENGINE *e, const unsigned char *priv,
+ size_t len, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher)
+{
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMAC
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+ const char *engine_id = e != NULL ? ENGINE_get_id(e) : NULL;
+# endif
+ const char *cipher_name = EVP_CIPHER_name(cipher);
+ const OSSL_PROVIDER *prov = EVP_CIPHER_provider(cipher);
+ OPENSSL_CTX *libctx =
+ prov == NULL ? NULL : ossl_provider_library_context(prov);
+ EVP_PKEY *ret = EVP_PKEY_new();
+ EVP_MAC *cmac = EVP_MAC_fetch(libctx, OSSL_MAC_NAME_CMAC, NULL);
+ EVP_MAC_CTX *cmctx = cmac != NULL ? EVP_MAC_CTX_new(cmac) : NULL;
+ OSSL_PARAM params[4];
+ size_t paramsn = 0;
+
+ if (ret == NULL
+ || cmctx == NULL
+ || !pkey_set_type(ret, e, EVP_PKEY_CMAC, NULL, -1, NULL)) {
+ /* EVPerr already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+ if (engine_id != NULL)
+ params[paramsn++] =
+ OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string("engine", (char *)engine_id, 0);
+# endif
+
+ params[paramsn++] =
+ OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_CIPHER,
+ (char *)cipher_name, 0);
+ params[paramsn++] =
+ OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_KEY,
+ (char *)priv, len);
+ params[paramsn] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
+
+ if (!EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(cmctx, params)) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_NEW_CMAC_KEY, EVP_R_KEY_SETUP_FAILED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ret->pkey.ptr = cmctx;
+ return ret;
+
+ err:
+ EVP_PKEY_free(ret);
+ EVP_MAC_CTX_free(cmctx);
+ EVP_MAC_free(cmac);
+ return NULL;
+# else
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_NEW_CMAC_KEY,
+ EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
+ return NULL;
+# endif
+}
int EVP_PKEY_set_type(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int type)
- {
- return pkey_set_type(pkey, type, NULL, -1);
- }
+{
+ return pkey_set_type(pkey, NULL, type, NULL, -1, NULL);
+}
int EVP_PKEY_set_type_str(EVP_PKEY *pkey, const char *str, int len)
- {
- return pkey_set_type(pkey, EVP_PKEY_NONE, str, len);
- }
+{
+ return pkey_set_type(pkey, NULL, EVP_PKEY_NONE, str, len, NULL);
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_set_alias_type(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int type)
+{
+ if (pkey->type == type) {
+ return 1; /* it already is that type */
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The application is requesting to alias this to a different pkey type,
+ * but not one that resolves to the base type.
+ */
+ if (EVP_PKEY_type(type) != EVP_PKEY_base_id(pkey)) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_SET_ALIAS_TYPE, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ pkey->type = type;
+ return 1;
+}
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+int EVP_PKEY_set1_engine(EVP_PKEY *pkey, ENGINE *e)
+{
+ if (e != NULL) {
+ if (!ENGINE_init(e)) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_SET1_ENGINE, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (ENGINE_get_pkey_meth(e, pkey->type) == NULL) {
+ ENGINE_finish(e);
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_SET1_ENGINE, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ ENGINE_finish(pkey->pmeth_engine);
+ pkey->pmeth_engine = e;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+ENGINE *EVP_PKEY_get0_engine(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+ return pkey->engine;
+}
+# endif
int EVP_PKEY_assign(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int type, void *key)
- {
- if (!EVP_PKEY_set_type(pkey, type))
- return 0;
- pkey->pkey.ptr=key;
- return (key != NULL);
- }
-
-void *EVP_PKEY_get0(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
- {
- return pkey->pkey.ptr;
- }
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+{
+ int alias = type;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ if (EVP_PKEY_type(type) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
+ const EC_GROUP *group = EC_KEY_get0_group(key);
+
+ if (group != NULL && EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group) == NID_sm2)
+ alias = EVP_PKEY_SM2;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (pkey == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(pkey, type))
+ return 0;
+ if (!EVP_PKEY_set_alias_type(pkey, alias))
+ return 0;
+ pkey->pkey.ptr = key;
+ return (key != NULL);
+}
+
+void *EVP_PKEY_get0(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+ return pkey->pkey.ptr;
+}
+
+const unsigned char *EVP_PKEY_get0_hmac(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, size_t *len)
+{
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os = NULL;
+ if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_HMAC) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_GET0_HMAC, EVP_R_EXPECTING_AN_HMAC_KEY);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ os = EVP_PKEY_get0(pkey);
+ *len = os->length;
+ return os->data;
+}
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POLY1305
+const unsigned char *EVP_PKEY_get0_poly1305(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, size_t *len)
+{
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os = NULL;
+ if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_POLY1305) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_GET0_POLY1305, EVP_R_EXPECTING_A_POLY1305_KEY);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ os = EVP_PKEY_get0(pkey);
+ *len = os->length;
+ return os->data;
+}
+# endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SIPHASH
+const unsigned char *EVP_PKEY_get0_siphash(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, size_t *len)
+{
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os = NULL;
+
+ if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_SIPHASH) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_GET0_SIPHASH, EVP_R_EXPECTING_A_SIPHASH_KEY);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ os = EVP_PKEY_get0(pkey);
+ *len = os->length;
+ return os->data;
+}
+# endif
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
int EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey, RSA *key)
{
- int ret = EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, key);
- if(ret)
- RSA_up_ref(key);
- return ret;
+ int ret = EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, key);
+ if (ret)
+ RSA_up_ref(key);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+RSA *EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+ if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA && pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_GET0_RSA, EVP_R_EXPECTING_AN_RSA_KEY);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return pkey->pkey.rsa;
}
RSA *EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
- {
- if(pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
- EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_GET1_RSA, EVP_R_EXPECTING_AN_RSA_KEY);
- return NULL;
- }
- RSA_up_ref(pkey->pkey.rsa);
- return pkey->pkey.rsa;
+{
+ RSA *ret = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey);
+ if (ret != NULL)
+ RSA_up_ref(ret);
+ return ret;
}
-#endif
+# endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
int EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey, DSA *key)
{
- int ret = EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(pkey, key);
- if(ret)
- DSA_up_ref(key);
- return ret;
+ int ret = EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(pkey, key);
+ if (ret)
+ DSA_up_ref(key);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+DSA *EVP_PKEY_get0_DSA(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+ if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_GET0_DSA, EVP_R_EXPECTING_A_DSA_KEY);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return pkey->pkey.dsa;
}
DSA *EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
- {
- if(pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
- EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_GET1_DSA, EVP_R_EXPECTING_A_DSA_KEY);
- return NULL;
- }
- DSA_up_ref(pkey->pkey.dsa);
- return pkey->pkey.dsa;
+{
+ DSA *ret = EVP_PKEY_get0_DSA(pkey);
+ if (ret != NULL)
+ DSA_up_ref(ret);
+ return ret;
}
-#endif
+# endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
int EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(EVP_PKEY *pkey, EC_KEY *key)
{
- int ret = EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY(pkey,key);
- if (ret)
- EC_KEY_up_ref(key);
- return ret;
+ int ret = EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY(pkey, key);
+ if (ret)
+ EC_KEY_up_ref(key);
+ return ret;
}
-EC_KEY *EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+EC_KEY *EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
- if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
- {
- EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_GET1_EC_KEY, EVP_R_EXPECTING_A_EC_KEY);
- return NULL;
- }
- EC_KEY_up_ref(pkey->pkey.ec);
- return pkey->pkey.ec;
+ if (EVP_PKEY_base_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_GET0_EC_KEY, EVP_R_EXPECTING_A_EC_KEY);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return pkey->pkey.ec;
}
-#endif
+EC_KEY *EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+ EC_KEY *ret = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
+ if (ret != NULL)
+ EC_KEY_up_ref(ret);
+ return ret;
+}
+# endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
int EVP_PKEY_set1_DH(EVP_PKEY *pkey, DH *key)
{
- int ret = EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkey, key);
- if(ret)
- DH_up_ref(key);
- return ret;
+ int type = DH_get0_q(key) == NULL ? EVP_PKEY_DH : EVP_PKEY_DHX;
+ int ret = EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, type, key);
+
+ if (ret)
+ DH_up_ref(key);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+DH *EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+ if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH && pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_DHX) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_GET0_DH, EVP_R_EXPECTING_A_DH_KEY);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return pkey->pkey.dh;
}
DH *EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
- {
- if(pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) {
- EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_GET1_DH, EVP_R_EXPECTING_A_DH_KEY);
- return NULL;
- }
- DH_up_ref(pkey->pkey.dh);
- return pkey->pkey.dh;
+{
+ DH *ret = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(pkey);
+ if (ret != NULL)
+ DH_up_ref(ret);
+ return ret;
}
-#endif
+# endif
int EVP_PKEY_type(int type)
- {
- int ret;
- const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth;
- ENGINE *e;
- ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find(&e, type);
- if (ameth)
- ret = ameth->pkey_id;
- else
- ret = NID_undef;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
- if (e)
- ENGINE_finish(e);
-#endif
- return ret;
- }
+{
+ int ret;
+ const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth;
+ ENGINE *e;
+ ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find(&e, type);
+ if (ameth)
+ ret = ameth->pkey_id;
+ else
+ ret = NID_undef;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+ ENGINE_finish(e);
+# endif
+ return ret;
+}
int EVP_PKEY_id(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
- {
- return pkey->type;
- }
+{
+ return pkey->type;
+}
int EVP_PKEY_base_id(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
- {
- return EVP_PKEY_type(pkey->type);
- }
+{
+ return EVP_PKEY_type(pkey->type);
+}
-void EVP_PKEY_free(EVP_PKEY *x)
- {
- int i;
- if (x == NULL) return;
+static int print_reset_indent(BIO **out, int pop_f_prefix, long saved_indent)
+{
+ BIO_set_indent(*out, saved_indent);
+ if (pop_f_prefix) {
+ BIO *next = BIO_pop(*out);
- i=CRYPTO_add(&x->references,-1,CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
-#ifdef REF_PRINT
- REF_PRINT("EVP_PKEY",x);
-#endif
- if (i > 0) return;
-#ifdef REF_CHECK
- if (i < 0)
- {
- fprintf(stderr,"EVP_PKEY_free, bad reference count\n");
- abort();
- }
-#endif
- EVP_PKEY_free_it(x);
- if (x->attributes)
- sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_pop_free(x->attributes, X509_ATTRIBUTE_free);
- OPENSSL_free(x);
- }
-
-static void EVP_PKEY_free_it(EVP_PKEY *x)
- {
- if (x->ameth && x->ameth->pkey_free)
- x->ameth->pkey_free(x);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
- if (x->engine)
- {
- ENGINE_finish(x->engine);
- x->engine = NULL;
- }
-#endif
- }
+ BIO_free(*out);
+ *out = next;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int print_set_indent(BIO **out, int *pop_f_prefix, long *saved_indent,
+ long indent)
+{
+ *pop_f_prefix = 0;
+ *saved_indent = 0;
+ if (indent > 0) {
+ long i = BIO_get_indent(*out);
+
+ *saved_indent = (i < 0 ? 0 : i);
+ if (BIO_set_indent(*out, indent) <= 0) {
+ if ((*out = BIO_push(BIO_new(BIO_f_prefix()), *out)) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ *pop_f_prefix = 1;
+ }
+ if (BIO_set_indent(*out, indent) <= 0) {
+ print_reset_indent(out, *pop_f_prefix, *saved_indent);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
static int unsup_alg(BIO *out, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent,
- const char *kstr)
- {
- BIO_indent(out, indent, 128);
- BIO_printf(out, "%s algorithm \"%s\" unsupported\n",
- kstr, OBJ_nid2ln(pkey->type));
- return 1;
- }
+ const char *kstr)
+{
+ return BIO_indent(out, indent, 128)
+ && BIO_printf(out, "%s algorithm \"%s\" unsupported\n",
+ kstr, OBJ_nid2ln(pkey->type)) > 0;
+}
+
+static int print_pkey(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, BIO *out, int indent,
+ const char *propquery /* For provided serialization */,
+ int (*legacy_print)(BIO *out, const EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+ int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx),
+ ASN1_PCTX *legacy_pctx /* For legacy print */)
+{
+ int pop_f_prefix;
+ long saved_indent;
+ OSSL_SERIALIZER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ int ret = -2; /* default to unsupported */
+
+ if (!print_set_indent(&out, &pop_f_prefix, &saved_indent, indent))
+ return 0;
+
+ ctx = OSSL_SERIALIZER_CTX_new_by_EVP_PKEY(pkey, propquery);
+ if (OSSL_SERIALIZER_CTX_get_serializer(ctx) != NULL)
+ ret = OSSL_SERIALIZER_to_bio(ctx, out);
+ OSSL_SERIALIZER_CTX_free(ctx);
+
+ if (ret != -2)
+ goto end;
+
+ /* legacy fallback */
+ if (legacy_print != NULL)
+ ret = legacy_print(out, pkey, 0, legacy_pctx);
+ else
+ ret = unsup_alg(out, pkey, 0, "Public Key");
+
+ end:
+ print_reset_indent(&out, pop_f_prefix, saved_indent);
+ return ret;
+}
int EVP_PKEY_print_public(BIO *out, const EVP_PKEY *pkey,
- int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx)
- {
- if (pkey->ameth && pkey->ameth->pub_print)
- return pkey->ameth->pub_print(out, pkey, indent, pctx);
-
- return unsup_alg(out, pkey, indent, "Public Key");
- }
+ int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx)
+{
+ return print_pkey(pkey, out, indent, OSSL_SERIALIZER_PUBKEY_TO_TEXT_PQ,
+ (pkey->ameth != NULL ? pkey->ameth->pub_print : NULL),
+ pctx);
+}
int EVP_PKEY_print_private(BIO *out, const EVP_PKEY *pkey,
- int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx)
- {
- if (pkey->ameth && pkey->ameth->priv_print)
- return pkey->ameth->priv_print(out, pkey, indent, pctx);
-
- return unsup_alg(out, pkey, indent, "Private Key");
- }
+ int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx)
+{
+ return print_pkey(pkey, out, indent, OSSL_SERIALIZER_PrivateKey_TO_TEXT_PQ,
+ (pkey->ameth != NULL ? pkey->ameth->priv_print : NULL),
+ pctx);
+}
int EVP_PKEY_print_params(BIO *out, const EVP_PKEY *pkey,
- int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx)
- {
- if (pkey->ameth && pkey->ameth->param_print)
- return pkey->ameth->param_print(out, pkey, indent, pctx);
- return unsup_alg(out, pkey, indent, "Parameters");
- }
+ int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx)
+{
+ return print_pkey(pkey, out, indent, OSSL_SERIALIZER_Parameters_TO_TEXT_PQ,
+ (pkey->ameth != NULL ? pkey->ameth->param_print : NULL),
+ pctx);
+}
+
+static int legacy_asn1_ctrl_to_param(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int op,
+ int arg1, void *arg2)
+{
+ if (pkey->keymgmt == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ switch (op) {
+ case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_DEFAULT_MD_NID:
+ {
+ char mdname[80] = "";
+ int nid;
+ int rv = EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_name(pkey, mdname,
+ sizeof(mdname));
+
+ if (rv <= 0)
+ return rv;
+ nid = OBJ_sn2nid(mdname);
+ if (nid == NID_undef)
+ nid = OBJ_ln2nid(mdname);
+ if (nid == NID_undef)
+ return 0;
+ *(int *)arg2 = nid;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ default:
+ return -2;
+ }
+}
+
+static int evp_pkey_asn1_ctrl(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int op, int arg1, void *arg2)
+{
+ if (pkey->ameth == NULL)
+ return legacy_asn1_ctrl_to_param(pkey, op, arg1, arg2);
+ if (pkey->ameth->pkey_ctrl == NULL)
+ return -2;
+ return pkey->ameth->pkey_ctrl(pkey, op, arg1, arg2);
+}
int EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int *pnid)
- {
- if (!pkey->ameth || !pkey->ameth->pkey_ctrl)
- return -2;
- return pkey->ameth->pkey_ctrl(pkey, ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_DEFAULT_MD_NID,
- 0, pnid);
- }
+{
+ return evp_pkey_asn1_ctrl(pkey, ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_DEFAULT_MD_NID, 0, pnid);
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_name(EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+ char *mdname, size_t mdname_sz)
+{
+ if (pkey->ameth == NULL) {
+ OSSL_PARAM params[3];
+ char mddefault[100] = "";
+ char mdmandatory[100] = "";
+
+ params[0] =
+ OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_DEFAULT_DIGEST,
+ mddefault, sizeof(mddefault));
+ params[1] =
+ OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_MANDATORY_DIGEST,
+ mdmandatory,
+ sizeof(mdmandatory));
+ params[2] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
+ if (!evp_keymgmt_get_params(pkey->keymgmt, pkey->keydata, params))
+ return 0;
+ if (mdmandatory[0] != '\0') {
+ OPENSSL_strlcpy(mdname, mdmandatory, mdname_sz);
+ return 2;
+ }
+ OPENSSL_strlcpy(mdname, mddefault, mdname_sz);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ {
+ int nid = NID_undef;
+ int rv = EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid(pkey, &nid);
+ const char *name = rv > 0 ? OBJ_nid2sn(nid) : NULL;
+
+ if (rv > 0)
+ OPENSSL_strlcpy(mdname, name, mdname_sz);
+ return rv;
+ }
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_supports_digest_nid(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int nid)
+{
+ int rv, default_nid;
+
+ rv = evp_pkey_asn1_ctrl(pkey, ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_SUPPORTS_MD_NID, nid, NULL);
+ if (rv == -2) {
+ /*
+ * If there is a mandatory default digest and this isn't it, then
+ * the answer is 'no'.
+ */
+ rv = EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid(pkey, &default_nid);
+ if (rv == 2)
+ return (nid == default_nid);
+ /* zero is an error from EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid() */
+ if (rv == 0)
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+ const unsigned char *pt, size_t ptlen)
+{
+ if (ptlen > INT_MAX)
+ return 0;
+ if (evp_pkey_asn1_ctrl(pkey, ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_SET1_TLS_ENCPT, ptlen,
+ (void *)pt) <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+size_t EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(EVP_PKEY *pkey, unsigned char **ppt)
+{
+ int rv;
+ rv = evp_pkey_asn1_ctrl(pkey, ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_GET1_TLS_ENCPT, 0, ppt);
+ if (rv <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ return rv;
+}
+
+#endif /* FIPS_MODE */
+
+/*- All methods below can also be used in FIPS_MODE */
+
+EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKEY_new(void)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
+
+ if (ret == NULL) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ ret->type = EVP_PKEY_NONE;
+ ret->save_type = EVP_PKEY_NONE;
+ ret->references = 1;
+ ret->save_parameters = 1;
+ ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+ if (ret->lock == NULL) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ OPENSSL_free(ret);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Setup a public key management method.
+ *
+ * For legacy keys, either |type| or |str| is expected to have the type
+ * information. In this case, the setup consists of finding an ASN1 method
+ * and potentially an ENGINE, and setting those fields in |pkey|.
+ *
+ * For provider side keys, |keymgmt| is expected to be non-NULL. In this
+ * case, the setup consists of setting the |keymgmt| field in |pkey|.
+ *
+ * If pkey is NULL just return 1 or 0 if the key management method exists.
+ */
+
+static int pkey_set_type(EVP_PKEY *pkey, ENGINE *e, int type, const char *str,
+ int len, EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt)
+{
+#ifndef FIPS_MODE
+ const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth = NULL;
+ ENGINE **eptr = (e == NULL) ? &e : NULL;
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * The setups can't set both legacy and provider side methods.
+ * It is forbidden
+ */
+ if (!ossl_assert(type == EVP_PKEY_NONE || keymgmt == NULL)
+ || !ossl_assert(e == NULL || keymgmt == NULL)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (pkey != NULL) {
+ int free_it = 0;
+
+#ifndef FIPS_MODE
+ free_it = free_it || pkey->pkey.ptr != NULL;
+#endif
+ free_it = free_it || pkey->keydata != NULL;
+ if (free_it)
+ evp_pkey_free_it(pkey);
+#ifndef FIPS_MODE
+ /*
+ * If key type matches and a method exists then this lookup has
+ * succeeded once so just indicate success.
+ */
+ if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_NONE
+ && type == pkey->save_type
+ && pkey->ameth != NULL)
+ return 1;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+ /* If we have ENGINEs release them */
+ ENGINE_finish(pkey->engine);
+ pkey->engine = NULL;
+ ENGINE_finish(pkey->pmeth_engine);
+ pkey->pmeth_engine = NULL;
+# endif
+#endif
+ }
+#ifndef FIPS_MODE
+ if (str != NULL)
+ ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(eptr, str, len);
+ else if (type != EVP_PKEY_NONE)
+ ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find(eptr, type);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+ if (pkey == NULL && eptr != NULL)
+ ENGINE_finish(e);
+# endif
+#endif
+
+
+ {
+ int check = 1;
+
+#ifndef FIPS_MODE
+ check = check && ameth == NULL;
+#endif
+ check = check && keymgmt == NULL;
+ if (check) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_PKEY_SET_TYPE, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ if (pkey != NULL) {
+ if (keymgmt != NULL && !EVP_KEYMGMT_up_ref(keymgmt)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ pkey->keymgmt = keymgmt;
+
+ pkey->save_type = type;
+ pkey->type = type;
+
+#ifndef FIPS_MODE
+ /*
+ * If the internal "origin" key is provider side, don't save |ameth|.
+ * The main reason is that |ameth| is one factor to detect that the
+ * internal "origin" key is a legacy one.
+ */
+ if (keymgmt == NULL)
+ pkey->ameth = ameth;
+ pkey->engine = e;
+
+ /*
+ * The EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD |pkey_id| serves different purposes,
+ * depending on if we're setting this key to contain a legacy or
+ * a provider side "origin" key. For a legacy key, we assign it
+ * to the |type| field, but for a provider side key, we assign it
+ * to the |save_type| field, because |type| is supposed to be set
+ * to EVP_PKEY_NONE in that case.
+ */
+ if (keymgmt != NULL)
+ pkey->save_type = ameth->pkey_id;
+ else if (pkey->ameth != NULL)
+ pkey->type = ameth->pkey_id;
+#endif
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+#ifndef FIPS_MODE
+static void find_ameth(const char *name, void *data)
+{
+ const char **str = data;
+
+ /*
+ * The error messages from pkey_set_type() are uninteresting here,
+ * and misleading.
+ */
+ ERR_set_mark();
+ if (pkey_set_type(NULL, NULL, EVP_PKEY_NONE, name, strlen(name),
+ NULL)) {
+ if (str[0] == NULL)
+ str[0] = name;
+ else if (str[1] == NULL)
+ str[1] = name;
+ }
+
+ ERR_pop_to_mark();
+}
+#endif
+
+int EVP_PKEY_set_type_by_keymgmt(EVP_PKEY *pkey, EVP_KEYMGMT *keymgmt)
+{
+#ifndef FIPS_MODE
+# define EVP_PKEY_TYPE_STR str[0]
+# define EVP_PKEY_TYPE_STRLEN (str[0] == NULL ? -1 : (int)strlen(str[0]))
+ /*
+ * Find at most two strings that have an associated EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD
+ * Ideally, only one should be found. If two (or more) are found, the
+ * match is ambiguous. This should never happen, but...
+ */
+ const char *str[2] = { NULL, NULL };
+
+ EVP_KEYMGMT_names_do_all(keymgmt, find_ameth, &str);
+ if (str[1] != NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+#else
+# define EVP_PKEY_TYPE_STR NULL
+# define EVP_PKEY_TYPE_STRLEN -1
+#endif
+ return pkey_set_type(pkey, NULL, EVP_PKEY_NONE,
+ EVP_PKEY_TYPE_STR, EVP_PKEY_TYPE_STRLEN,
+ keymgmt);
+
+#undef EVP_PKEY_TYPE_STR
+#undef EVP_PKEY_TYPE_STRLEN
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_up_ref(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (CRYPTO_UP_REF(&pkey->references, &i, pkey->lock) <= 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ REF_PRINT_COUNT("EVP_PKEY", pkey);
+ REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 2);
+ return ((i > 1) ? 1 : 0);
+}
+
+#ifndef FIPS_MODE
+void evp_pkey_free_legacy(EVP_PKEY *x)
+{
+ if (x->ameth != NULL) {
+ if (x->ameth->pkey_free != NULL)
+ x->ameth->pkey_free(x);
+ x->pkey.ptr = NULL;
+ }
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+ ENGINE_finish(x->engine);
+ x->engine = NULL;
+ ENGINE_finish(x->pmeth_engine);
+ x->pmeth_engine = NULL;
+# endif
+ x->type = EVP_PKEY_NONE;
+}
+#endif /* FIPS_MODE */
+
+static void evp_pkey_free_it(EVP_PKEY *x)
+{
+ /* internal function; x is never NULL */
+
+ evp_keymgmt_util_clear_operation_cache(x);
+#ifndef FIPS_MODE
+ evp_pkey_free_legacy(x);
+#endif
+
+ if (x->keymgmt != NULL) {
+ evp_keymgmt_freedata(x->keymgmt, x->keydata);
+ EVP_KEYMGMT_free(x->keymgmt);
+ x->keymgmt = NULL;
+ x->keydata = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+void EVP_PKEY_free(EVP_PKEY *x)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (x == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ CRYPTO_DOWN_REF(&x->references, &i, x->lock);
+ REF_PRINT_COUNT("EVP_PKEY", x);
+ if (i > 0)
+ return;
+ REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0);
+ evp_pkey_free_it(x);
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(x->lock);
+#ifndef FIPS_MODE
+ sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_pop_free(x->attributes, X509_ATTRIBUTE_free);
+#endif
+ OPENSSL_free(x);
+}
+
+int EVP_PKEY_size(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+ int size = 0;
+
+ if (pkey != NULL) {
+ size = pkey->cache.size;
+#ifndef FIPS_MODE
+ if (pkey->ameth != NULL && pkey->ameth->pkey_size != NULL)
+ size = pkey->ameth->pkey_size(pkey);
+#endif
+ }
+ return size;
+}
+
+void *evp_pkey_export_to_provider(EVP_PKEY *pk, OPENSSL_CTX *libctx,
+ EVP_KEYMGMT **keymgmt,
+ const char *propquery)
+{
+ EVP_KEYMGMT *allocated_keymgmt = NULL;
+ EVP_KEYMGMT *tmp_keymgmt = NULL;
+ void *keydata = NULL;
+ int check;
+
+ if (pk == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /* No key data => nothing to export */
+ check = 1;
+#ifndef FIPS_MODE
+ check = check && pk->pkey.ptr == NULL;
+#endif
+ check = check && pk->keydata == NULL;
+ if (check)
+ return NULL;
+
+#ifndef FIPS_MODE
+ if (pk->pkey.ptr != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * If the legacy key doesn't have an dirty counter or export function,
+ * give up
+ */
+ if (pk->ameth->dirty_cnt == NULL || pk->ameth->export_to == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (keymgmt != NULL) {
+ tmp_keymgmt = *keymgmt;
+ *keymgmt = NULL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If no keymgmt was given or found, get a default keymgmt. We do so by
+ * letting EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey() do it for us, then we steal it.
+ */
+ if (tmp_keymgmt == NULL) {
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(libctx, pk, propquery);
+
+ tmp_keymgmt = ctx->keymgmt;
+ ctx->keymgmt = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
+ }
+
+ /* If there's still no keymgmt to be had, give up */
+ if (tmp_keymgmt == NULL)
+ goto end;
+
+#ifndef FIPS_MODE
+ if (pk->pkey.ptr != NULL) {
+ size_t i = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * If the legacy "origin" hasn't changed since last time, we try
+ * to find our keymgmt in the operation cache. If it has changed,
+ * |i| remains zero, and we will clear the cache further down.
+ */
+ if (pk->ameth->dirty_cnt(pk) == pk->dirty_cnt_copy) {
+ i = evp_keymgmt_util_find_operation_cache_index(pk, tmp_keymgmt);
+
+ /*
+ * If |tmp_keymgmt| is present in the operation cache, it means
+ * that export doesn't need to be redone. In that case, we take
+ * token copies of the cached pointers, to have token success
+ * values to return.
+ */
+ if (i < OSSL_NELEM(pk->operation_cache)
+ && pk->operation_cache[i].keymgmt != NULL) {
+ keydata = pk->operation_cache[i].keydata;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * TODO(3.0) Right now, we assume we have ample space. We will have
+ * to think about a cache aging scheme, though, if |i| indexes outside
+ * the array.
+ */
+ if (!ossl_assert(i < OSSL_NELEM(pk->operation_cache)))
+ goto end;
+
+ /* Make sure that the keymgmt key type matches the legacy NID */
+ if (!ossl_assert(EVP_KEYMGMT_is_a(tmp_keymgmt, OBJ_nid2sn(pk->type))))
+ goto end;
+
+ if ((keydata = evp_keymgmt_newdata(tmp_keymgmt)) == NULL)
+ goto end;
+
+ if (!pk->ameth->export_to(pk, keydata, tmp_keymgmt)) {
+ evp_keymgmt_freedata(tmp_keymgmt, keydata);
+ keydata = NULL;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If the dirty counter changed since last time, then clear the
+ * operation cache. In that case, we know that |i| is zero. Just
+ * in case this is a re-export, we increment then decrement the
+ * keymgmt reference counter.
+ */
+ if (!EVP_KEYMGMT_up_ref(tmp_keymgmt)) { /* refcnt++ */
+ evp_keymgmt_freedata(tmp_keymgmt, keydata);
+ keydata = NULL;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (pk->ameth->dirty_cnt(pk) != pk->dirty_cnt_copy)
+ evp_keymgmt_util_clear_operation_cache(pk);
+ EVP_KEYMGMT_free(tmp_keymgmt); /* refcnt-- */
+
+ /* Add the new export to the operation cache */
+ if (!evp_keymgmt_util_cache_keydata(pk, i, tmp_keymgmt, keydata)) {
+ evp_keymgmt_freedata(tmp_keymgmt, keydata);
+ keydata = NULL;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ /* Synchronize the dirty count */
+ pk->dirty_cnt_copy = pk->ameth->dirty_cnt(pk);
+ goto end;
+ }
+#endif /* FIPS_MODE */
+
+ keydata = evp_keymgmt_util_export_to_provider(pk, tmp_keymgmt);
+
+ end:
+ /*
+ * If nothing was exported, |tmp_keymgmt| might point at a freed
+ * EVP_KEYMGMT, so we clear it to be safe. It shouldn't be useful for
+ * the caller either way in that case.
+ */
+ if (keydata == NULL)
+ tmp_keymgmt = NULL;
+
+ if (keymgmt != NULL)
+ *keymgmt = tmp_keymgmt;
+
+ EVP_KEYMGMT_free(allocated_keymgmt);
+ return keydata;
+}
+
+#ifndef FIPS_MODE
+/*
+ * This differs from exporting in that it releases the legacy key and assigns
+ * the export keymgmt and keydata to the "origin" provider side key instead
+ * of the operation cache.
+ */
+void *evp_pkey_upgrade_to_provider(EVP_PKEY *pk, OPENSSL_CTX *libctx,
+ EVP_KEYMGMT **keymgmt,
+ const char *propquery)
+{
+ EVP_KEYMGMT *allocated_keymgmt = NULL;
+ EVP_KEYMGMT *tmp_keymgmt = NULL;
+ void *keydata = NULL;
+
+ if (pk == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * If this key is already "upgraded", this function shouldn't have been
+ * called.
+ */
+ if (!ossl_assert(pk->keymgmt == NULL))
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (keymgmt != NULL) {
+ tmp_keymgmt = *keymgmt;
+ *keymgmt = NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* If the key isn't a legacy one, bail out, but with proper values */
+ if (pk->pkey.ptr == NULL) {
+ tmp_keymgmt = pk->keymgmt;
+ keydata = pk->keydata;
+ } else {
+ /* If the legacy key doesn't have an export function, give up */
+ if (pk->ameth->export_to == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * If no keymgmt was given or found, get a default keymgmt. We do
+ * so by letting EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey() do it for us, then we
+ * steal it.
+ */
+ if (tmp_keymgmt == NULL) {
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx =
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(libctx, pk, propquery);
+
+ tmp_keymgmt = ctx->keymgmt;
+ ctx->keymgmt = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
+ }
+
+ /* If we still don't have a keymgmt, give up */
+ if (tmp_keymgmt == NULL)
+ goto end;
+
+ /* Make sure that the keymgmt key type matches the legacy NID */
+ if (!ossl_assert(EVP_KEYMGMT_is_a(tmp_keymgmt, OBJ_nid2sn(pk->type))))
+ goto end;
+
+ if ((keydata = evp_keymgmt_newdata(tmp_keymgmt)) == NULL)
+ goto end;
+
+ if (!pk->ameth->export_to(pk, keydata, tmp_keymgmt)
+ || !EVP_KEYMGMT_up_ref(tmp_keymgmt)) {
+ evp_keymgmt_freedata(tmp_keymgmt, keydata);
+ keydata = NULL;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Clear the operation cache, all the legacy data, as well as the
+ * dirty counters
+ */
+ evp_pkey_free_legacy(pk);
+ pk->dirty_cnt_copy = 0;
+
+ evp_keymgmt_util_clear_operation_cache(pk);
+ pk->keymgmt = tmp_keymgmt;
+ pk->keydata = keydata;
+ evp_keymgmt_util_cache_keyinfo(pk);
+ }
+
+ end:
+ /*
+ * If nothing was upgraded, |tmp_keymgmt| might point at a freed
+ * EVP_KEYMGMT, so we clear it to be safe. It shouldn't be useful for
+ * the caller either way in that case.
+ */
+ if (keydata == NULL)
+ tmp_keymgmt = NULL;
+
+ if (keymgmt != NULL)
+ *keymgmt = tmp_keymgmt;
+
+ EVP_KEYMGMT_free(allocated_keymgmt);
+ return keydata;
+}
+#endif /* FIPS_MODE */
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff