Fix some missing OBJ_dup failure checks.

[openssl.git] / crypto / evp / m_md5_sha1.c

diff --git a/crypto/evp/m_md5_sha1.c b/crypto/evp/m_md5_sha1.c
index 9e8f183ea027cb4ca49fd12bf321b23545db8585..6367dc7a6f5c35574306db559b79398db937eb63 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/evp/m_md5_sha1.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/m_md5_sha1.c
@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
-/* crypto/evp/m_md5_sha1.c */
 /*
  * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
  * project.
@@ -52,16 +51,16 @@
  * ====================================================================
  */
 
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MD5) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA1)
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MD5)
 
 # include <openssl/evp.h>
 # include <openssl/objects.h>
 # include <openssl/x509.h>
 # include <openssl/md5.h>
 # include <openssl/sha.h>
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-#  include <openssl/rsa.h>
-# endif
+# include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+# include "internal/evp_int.h"
+# include <openssl/rsa.h>
 
 struct md5_sha1_ctx {
     MD5_CTX md5;
@@ -70,7 +69,7 @@ struct md5_sha1_ctx {
 
 static int init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
 {
-    struct md5_sha1_ctx *mctx = ctx->md_data;
+    struct md5_sha1_ctx *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx);
     if (!MD5_Init(&mctx->md5))
         return 0;
     return SHA1_Init(&mctx->sha1);
@@ -78,7 +77,7 @@ static int init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
 
 static int update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count)
 {
-    struct md5_sha1_ctx *mctx = ctx->md_data;
+    struct md5_sha1_ctx *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx);
     if (!MD5_Update(&mctx->md5, data, count))
         return 0;
     return SHA1_Update(&mctx->sha1, data, count);
@@ -86,12 +85,80 @@ static int update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count)
 
 static int final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md)
 {
-    struct md5_sha1_ctx *mctx = ctx->md_data;
+    struct md5_sha1_ctx *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx);
     if (!MD5_Final(md, &mctx->md5))
         return 0;
     return SHA1_Final(md + MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH, &mctx->sha1);
 }
 
+static int ctrl(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, int cmd, int mslen, void *ms)
+{
+    unsigned char padtmp[48];
+    unsigned char md5tmp[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+    unsigned char sha1tmp[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+    struct md5_sha1_ctx *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx);
+
+    if (cmd != EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET)
+        return 0;
+
+    /* SSLv3 client auth handling: see RFC-6101 5.6.8 */
+    if (mslen != 48)
+        return 0;
+
+    /* At this point hash contains all handshake messages, update
+     * with master secret and pad_1.
+     */
+
+    if (update(ctx, ms, mslen) <= 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    /* Set padtmp to pad_1 value */
+    memset(padtmp, 0x36, sizeof(padtmp));
+
+    if (!MD5_Update(&mctx->md5, padtmp, sizeof(padtmp)))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (!MD5_Final(md5tmp, &mctx->md5))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (!SHA1_Update(&mctx->sha1, padtmp, 40))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (!SHA1_Final(sha1tmp, &mctx->sha1))
+        return 0;
+
+    /* Reinitialise context */
+
+    if (!init(ctx))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (update(ctx, ms, mslen) <= 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    /* Set padtmp to pad_2 value */
+    memset(padtmp, 0x5c, sizeof(padtmp));
+
+    if (!MD5_Update(&mctx->md5, padtmp, sizeof(padtmp)))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (!MD5_Update(&mctx->md5, md5tmp, sizeof(md5tmp)))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (!SHA1_Update(&mctx->sha1, padtmp, 40))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (!SHA1_Update(&mctx->sha1, sha1tmp, sizeof(sha1tmp)))
+        return 0;
+
+    /* Now when ctx is finalised it will return the SSL v3 hash value */
+
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(md5tmp, sizeof(md5tmp));
+    OPENSSL_cleanse(sha1tmp, sizeof(sha1tmp));
+
+    return 1;
+
+}
+
 static const EVP_MD md5_sha1_md = {
     NID_md5_sha1,
     NID_md5_sha1,
@@ -102,9 +169,9 @@ static const EVP_MD md5_sha1_md = {
     final,
     NULL,
     NULL,
-    EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
     MD5_CBLOCK,
     sizeof(EVP_MD *) + sizeof(struct md5_sha1_ctx),
+    ctrl
 };
 
 const EVP_MD *EVP_md5_sha1(void)