/*
- * Copyright 2001-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2001-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
- * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
+#include <string.h>
+#include <assert.h>
#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <assert.h>
#include <openssl/aes.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/cmac.h>
#include "internal/evp_int.h"
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "internal/modes_int.h"
#include "modes_lcl.h"
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include "evp_locl.h"
typedef struct {
union {
- double align;
+ OSSL_UNION_ALIGN;
AES_KEY ks;
} ks;
block128_f block;
typedef struct {
union {
- double align;
+ OSSL_UNION_ALIGN;
AES_KEY ks;
} ks; /* AES key schedule to use */
int key_set; /* Set if key initialised */
int ivlen; /* IV length */
int taglen;
int iv_gen; /* It is OK to generate IVs */
+ int iv_gen_rand; /* No IV was specified, so generate a rand IV */
int tls_aad_len; /* TLS AAD length */
+ uint64_t tls_enc_records; /* Number of TLS records encrypted */
ctr128_f ctr;
} EVP_AES_GCM_CTX;
typedef struct {
union {
- double align;
+ OSSL_UNION_ALIGN;
AES_KEY ks;
} ks1, ks2; /* AES key schedules to use */
XTS128_CONTEXT xts;
const unsigned char iv[16]);
} EVP_AES_XTS_CTX;
+#ifdef FIPS_MODE
+static const int allow_insecure_decrypt = 0;
+#else
+static const int allow_insecure_decrypt = 1;
+#endif
+
typedef struct {
union {
- double align;
+ OSSL_UNION_ALIGN;
AES_KEY ks;
} ks; /* AES key schedule to use */
int key_set; /* Set if key initialised */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCB
typedef struct {
union {
- double align;
+ OSSL_UNION_ALIGN;
AES_KEY ks;
} ksenc; /* AES key schedule to use for encryption */
union {
- double align;
+ OSSL_UNION_ALIGN;
AES_KEY ks;
} ksdec; /* AES key schedule to use for decryption */
int key_set; /* Set if key initialised */
const unsigned char iv[16]);
#endif
+/* increment counter (64-bit int) by 1 */
+static void ctr64_inc(unsigned char *counter)
+{
+ int n = 8;
+ unsigned char c;
+
+ do {
+ --n;
+ c = counter[n];
+ ++c;
+ counter[n] = c;
+ if (c)
+ return;
+ } while (n);
+}
+
#if defined(OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ) && (defined(__powerpc__) || defined(__ppc__) || defined(_ARCH_PPC))
# include "ppc_arch.h"
# ifdef VPAES_ASM
const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
{
EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_XTS_CTX,ctx);
+
if (!iv && !key)
return 1;
if (key) {
+ /* The key is two half length keys in reality */
+ const int bytes = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) / 2;
+ const int bits = bytes * 8;
+
+ /*
+ * Verify that the two keys are different.
+ *
+ * This addresses Rogaway's vulnerability.
+ * See comment in aes_xts_init_key() below.
+ */
+ if ((!allow_insecure_decrypt || enc)
+ && CRYPTO_memcmp(key, key + bytes, bytes) == 0) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_AESNI_XTS_INIT_KEY, EVP_R_XTS_DUPLICATED_KEYS);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
/* key_len is two AES keys */
if (enc) {
- aesni_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 4,
- &xctx->ks1.ks);
+ aesni_set_encrypt_key(key, bits, &xctx->ks1.ks);
xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) aesni_encrypt;
xctx->stream = aesni_xts_encrypt;
} else {
- aesni_set_decrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 4,
- &xctx->ks1.ks);
+ aesni_set_decrypt_key(key, bits, &xctx->ks1.ks);
xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) aesni_decrypt;
xctx->stream = aesni_xts_decrypt;
}
- aesni_set_encrypt_key(key + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) / 2,
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 4,
- &xctx->ks2.ks);
+ aesni_set_encrypt_key(key + bytes, bits, &xctx->ks2.ks);
xctx->xts.block2 = (block128_f) aesni_encrypt;
xctx->xts.key1 = &xctx->ks1;
# define BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(nid,keylen,blocksize,ivlen,mode,MODE,flags) \
static const EVP_CIPHER aesni_##keylen##_##mode = { \
nid##_##keylen##_##mode,blocksize, \
- (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE?2:1)*keylen/8, ivlen, \
+ (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE||EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_SIV_MODE?2:1)*keylen/8, \
+ ivlen, \
flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \
aesni_##mode##_init_key, \
aesni_##mode##_cipher, \
NULL,NULL,aes_##mode##_ctrl,NULL }; \
static const EVP_CIPHER aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \
nid##_##keylen##_##mode,blocksize, \
- (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE?2:1)*keylen/8, ivlen, \
+ (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE||EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_SIV_MODE?2:1)*keylen/8, \
+ ivlen, \
flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \
aes_##mode##_init_key, \
aes_##mode##_cipher, \
const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
{
EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_XTS_CTX,ctx);
+
if (!iv && !key)
return 1;
if (key) {
- int bits = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 4;
+ /* The key is two half length keys in reality */
+ const int bytes = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) / 2;
+ const int bits = bytes * 8;
+
+ /*
+ * Verify that the two keys are different.
+ *
+ * This addresses Rogaway's vulnerability.
+ * See comment in aes_xts_init_key() below.
+ */
+ if ((!allow_insecure_decrypt || enc)
+ && CRYPTO_memcmp(key, key + bytes, bytes) == 0) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_AES_T4_XTS_INIT_KEY, EVP_R_XTS_DUPLICATED_KEYS);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
xctx->stream = NULL;
/* key_len is two AES keys */
if (enc) {
return 0;
}
} else {
- aes_t4_set_decrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 4,
- &xctx->ks1.ks);
+ aes_t4_set_decrypt_key(key, bits, &xctx->ks1.ks);
xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) aes_t4_decrypt;
switch (bits) {
case 128:
}
}
- aes_t4_set_encrypt_key(key + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) / 2,
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 4,
- &xctx->ks2.ks);
+ aes_t4_set_encrypt_key(key + bytes, bits, &xctx->ks2.ks);
xctx->xts.block2 = (block128_f) aes_t4_encrypt;
xctx->xts.key1 = &xctx->ks1;
const unsigned char *in, size_t len);
# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_OCB */
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SIV
+# define aes_t4_siv_init_key aes_siv_init_key
+# define aes_t4_siv_cipher aes_siv_cipher
+# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SIV */
+
# define BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,blocksize,ivlen,nmode,mode,MODE,flags) \
static const EVP_CIPHER aes_t4_##keylen##_##mode = { \
nid##_##keylen##_##nmode,blocksize,keylen/8,ivlen, \
# define BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(nid,keylen,blocksize,ivlen,mode,MODE,flags) \
static const EVP_CIPHER aes_t4_##keylen##_##mode = { \
nid##_##keylen##_##mode,blocksize, \
- (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE?2:1)*keylen/8, ivlen, \
+ (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE||EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_SIV_MODE?2:1)*keylen/8, \
+ ivlen, \
flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \
aes_t4_##mode##_init_key, \
aes_t4_##mode##_cipher, \
NULL,NULL,aes_##mode##_ctrl,NULL }; \
static const EVP_CIPHER aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \
nid##_##keylen##_##mode,blocksize, \
- (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE?2:1)*keylen/8, ivlen, \
+ (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE||EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_SIV_MODE?2:1)*keylen/8, \
+ ivlen, \
flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \
aes_##mode##_init_key, \
aes_##mode##_cipher, \
typedef struct {
union {
- double align;
+ OSSL_UNION_ALIGN;
/*-
* KM-AES parameter block - begin
* (see z/Architecture Principles of Operation >= SA22-7832-06)
typedef struct {
union {
- double align;
+ OSSL_UNION_ALIGN;
/*-
* KMO-AES parameter block - begin
* (see z/Architecture Principles of Operation >= SA22-7832-08)
typedef struct {
union {
- double align;
+ OSSL_UNION_ALIGN;
/*-
* KMF-AES parameter block - begin
* (see z/Architecture Principles of Operation >= SA22-7832-08)
typedef struct {
union {
- double align;
+ OSSL_UNION_ALIGN;
/*-
* KMA-GCM-AES parameter block - begin
* (see z/Architecture Principles of Operation >= SA22-7832-11)
int kreslen;
int tls_aad_len;
+ uint64_t tls_enc_records; /* Number of TLS records encrypted */
} S390X_AES_GCM_CTX;
typedef struct {
union {
- double align;
+ OSSL_UNION_ALIGN;
/*-
* Padding is chosen so that ccm.kmac_param.k overlaps with key.k and
* ccm.fc with key.k.rounds. Remember that on s390x, an AES_KEY's
(OPENSSL_s390xcap_P.kma[0] & \
S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_256)))
-/* iv + padding length for iv lenghts != 12 */
+/* iv + padding length for iv lengths != 12 */
# define S390X_gcm_ivpadlen(i) ((((i) + 15) >> 4 << 4) + 16)
/*-
rem = len & 0xf;
- len &= ~0xf;
+ len &= ~(size_t)0xf;
if (len) {
s390x_kma(aad, len, NULL, 0, NULL, ctx->fc, &ctx->kma.param);
aad += len;
rem = len & 0xf;
- len &= ~0xf;
+ len &= ~(size_t)0xf;
if (len) {
s390x_kma(ctx->ares, ctx->areslen, in, len, out,
ctx->fc | S390X_KMA_LAAD, &ctx->kma.param);
if (gctx->iv != iv)
OPENSSL_free(gctx->iv);
- gctx->iv = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
- if (gctx->iv == NULL)
+ if ((gctx->iv = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_S390X_AES_GCM_CTRL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
+ }
}
/* Add padding. */
memset(gctx->iv + arg, 0, len - arg - 8);
* Invocation field will be at least 8 bytes in size and so no need
* to check wrap around or increment more than last 8 bytes.
*/
- (*(unsigned long long *)(gctx->iv + gctx->ivlen - 8))++;
+ ctr64_inc(gctx->iv + gctx->ivlen - 8);
gctx->iv_set = 1;
return 1;
buf = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c);
memcpy(buf, ptr, arg);
gctx->tls_aad_len = arg;
+ gctx->tls_enc_records = 0;
len = buf[arg - 2] << 8 | buf[arg - 1];
/* Correct length for explicit iv. */
} else {
len = S390X_gcm_ivpadlen(gctx->ivlen);
- gctx_out->iv = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
- if (gctx_out->iv == NULL)
+ if ((gctx_out->iv = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_S390X_AES_GCM_CTRL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
+ }
memcpy(gctx_out->iv, gctx->iv, len);
}
keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
memcpy(&gctx->kma.param.k, key, keylen);
- /* Convert key size to function code. */
- gctx->fc = S390X_AES_128 + (((keylen << 3) - 128) >> 6);
+ gctx->fc = S390X_AES_FC(keylen);
if (!enc)
gctx->fc |= S390X_DECRYPT;
if (out != in || len < (EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN))
return -1;
+ /*
+ * Check for too many keys as per FIPS 140-2 IG A.5 "Key/IV Pair Uniqueness
+ * Requirements from SP 800-38D". The requirements is for one party to the
+ * communication to fail after 2^64 - 1 keys. We do this on the encrypting
+ * side only.
+ */
+ if (ctx->encrypt && ++gctx->tls_enc_records == 0) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_S390X_AES_GCM_TLS_CIPHER, EVP_R_TOO_MANY_RECORDS);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, enc ? EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN
: EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_INV,
EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN, out) <= 0)
ctx->aes.ccm.blocks += 2;
rem = alen & 0xf;
- alen &= ~0xf;
+ alen &= ~(size_t)0xf;
if (alen) {
s390x_kmac(aad, alen, ctx->aes.ccm.fc, &ctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param);
ctx->aes.ccm.blocks += alen >> 4;
num = 0;
rem = len & 0xf;
- len &= ~0xf;
+ len &= ~(size_t)0xf;
if (enc) {
/* mac-then-encrypt */
if (key != NULL) {
keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
- /* Convert key size to function code. */
- cctx->aes.ccm.fc = S390X_AES_128 + (((keylen << 3) - 128) >> 6);
+ cctx->aes.ccm.fc = S390X_AES_FC(keylen);
memcpy(cctx->aes.ccm.kmac_param.k, key, keylen);
/* Store encoded m and l. */
if (!cctx->aes.ccm.iv_set)
return -1;
- if (!enc && !cctx->aes.ccm.tag_set)
- return -1;
-
if (out == NULL) {
/* Update(): Pass message length. */
if (in == NULL) {
return len;
}
+ /* The tag must be set before actually decrypting data */
+ if (!enc && !cctx->aes.ccm.tag_set)
+ return -1;
+
/* Update(): Process message. */
if (!cctx->aes.ccm.len_set) {
/*-
- * In case message length was not previously set explicitely via
+ * In case message length was not previously set explicitly via
* Update(), set it now.
*/
ivec = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx);
memcpy(buf, ptr, arg);
cctx->aes.ccm.tls_aad_len = arg;
- len = *(uint16_t *)(buf + arg - 2);
+ len = buf[arg - 2] << 8 | buf[arg - 1];
if (len < EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN)
return 0;
len -= cctx->aes.ccm.m;
}
- *(uint16_t *)(buf + arg - 2) = len;
+ buf[arg - 2] = len >> 8;
+ buf[arg - 1] = len & 0xff;
+
/* Extra padding: tag appended to record. */
return cctx->aes.ccm.m;
static int s390x_aes_ocb_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int type, int arg, void *ptr);
# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SIV
+# define S390X_AES_SIV_CTX EVP_AES_SIV_CTX
+# define S390X_aes_128_siv_CAPABLE 0
+# define S390X_aes_192_siv_CAPABLE 0
+# define S390X_aes_256_siv_CAPABLE 0
+
+# define s390x_aes_siv_init_key aes_siv_init_key
+# define s390x_aes_siv_cipher aes_siv_cipher
+# define s390x_aes_siv_cleanup aes_siv_cleanup
+# define s390x_aes_siv_ctrl aes_siv_ctrl
+# endif
+
# define BLOCK_CIPHER_generic(nid,keylen,blocksize,ivlen,nmode,mode, \
MODE,flags) \
static const EVP_CIPHER s390x_aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \
static const EVP_CIPHER s390x_aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \
nid##_##keylen##_##mode, \
blocksize, \
- (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE == EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE ? 2 : 1) * keylen / 8, \
+ (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE||EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_SIV_MODE ? 2 : 1) * keylen / 8, \
ivlen, \
flags | EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \
s390x_aes_##mode##_init_key, \
}; \
static const EVP_CIPHER aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \
nid##_##keylen##_##mode,blocksize, \
- (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE == EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE ? 2 : 1) * keylen / 8, \
+ (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE||EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_SIV_MODE ? 2 : 1) * keylen / 8, \
ivlen, \
flags | EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \
aes_##mode##_init_key, \
# define BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(nid,keylen,blocksize,ivlen,mode,MODE,flags) \
static const EVP_CIPHER aes_##keylen##_##mode = { \
nid##_##keylen##_##mode,blocksize, \
- (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE?2:1)*keylen/8, ivlen, \
+ (EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE||EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE==EVP_CIPH_SIV_MODE?2:1)*keylen/8, \
+ ivlen, \
flags|EVP_CIPH_##MODE##_MODE, \
aes_##mode##_init_key, \
aes_##mode##_cipher, \
return 1;
}
-/* increment counter (64-bit int) by 1 */
-static void ctr64_inc(unsigned char *counter)
-{
- int n = 8;
- unsigned char c;
-
- do {
- --n;
- c = counter[n];
- ++c;
- counter[n] = c;
- if (c)
- return;
- } while (n);
-}
-
static int aes_gcm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
{
EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX,c);
case EVP_CTRL_INIT:
gctx->key_set = 0;
gctx->iv_set = 0;
- gctx->ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(c);
- gctx->iv = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(c);
+ gctx->ivlen = c->cipher->iv_len;
+ gctx->iv = c->iv;
gctx->taglen = -1;
gctx->iv_gen = 0;
gctx->tls_aad_len = -1;
return 0;
/* Allocate memory for IV if needed */
if ((arg > EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) && (arg > gctx->ivlen)) {
- if (gctx->iv != EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(c))
+ if (gctx->iv != c->iv)
OPENSSL_free(gctx->iv);
- gctx->iv = OPENSSL_malloc(arg);
- if (gctx->iv == NULL)
+ if ((gctx->iv = OPENSSL_malloc(arg)) == NULL) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_AES_GCM_CTRL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
+ }
}
gctx->ivlen = arg;
return 1;
case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG:
- if (arg <= 0 || arg > 16 || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c))
+ if (arg <= 0 || arg > 16 || c->encrypt)
return 0;
- memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c), ptr, arg);
+ memcpy(c->buf, ptr, arg);
gctx->taglen = arg;
return 1;
case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG:
- if (arg <= 0 || arg > 16 || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c)
+ if (arg <= 0 || arg > 16 || !c->encrypt
|| gctx->taglen < 0)
return 0;
- memcpy(ptr, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c), arg);
+ memcpy(ptr, c->buf, arg);
+ return 1;
+
+ case EVP_CTRL_GET_IV:
+ if (gctx->iv_gen != 1 && gctx->iv_gen_rand != 1)
+ return 0;
+ if (gctx->ivlen != arg)
+ return 0;
+ memcpy(ptr, gctx->iv, arg);
return 1;
case EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED:
return 0;
if (arg)
memcpy(gctx->iv, ptr, arg);
- if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c)
- && RAND_bytes(gctx->iv + arg, gctx->ivlen - arg) <= 0)
+ if (c->encrypt && RAND_bytes(gctx->iv + arg, gctx->ivlen - arg) <= 0)
return 0;
gctx->iv_gen = 1;
return 1;
return 1;
case EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_INV:
- if (gctx->iv_gen == 0 || gctx->key_set == 0
- || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c))
+ if (gctx->iv_gen == 0 || gctx->key_set == 0 || c->encrypt)
return 0;
memcpy(gctx->iv + gctx->ivlen - arg, ptr, arg);
CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, gctx->iv, gctx->ivlen);
/* Save the AAD for later use */
if (arg != EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN)
return 0;
- memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c), ptr, arg);
+ memcpy(c->buf, ptr, arg);
gctx->tls_aad_len = arg;
+ gctx->tls_enc_records = 0;
{
- unsigned int len =
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 2] << 8
- | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 1];
+ unsigned int len = c->buf[arg - 2] << 8 | c->buf[arg - 1];
/* Correct length for explicit IV */
if (len < EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN)
return 0;
len -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
/* If decrypting correct for tag too */
- if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c)) {
+ if (!c->encrypt) {
if (len < EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN)
return 0;
len -= EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
}
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 2] = len >> 8;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 1] = len & 0xff;
+ c->buf[arg - 2] = len >> 8;
+ c->buf[arg - 1] = len & 0xff;
}
/* Extra padding: tag appended to record */
return EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
return 0;
gctx_out->gcm.key = &gctx_out->ks;
}
- if (gctx->iv == EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(c))
- gctx_out->iv = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(out);
+ if (gctx->iv == c->iv)
+ gctx_out->iv = out->iv;
else {
- gctx_out->iv = OPENSSL_malloc(gctx->ivlen);
- if (gctx_out->iv == NULL)
+ if ((gctx_out->iv = OPENSSL_malloc(gctx->ivlen)) == NULL) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_AES_GCM_CTRL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
+ }
memcpy(gctx_out->iv, gctx->iv, gctx->ivlen);
}
return 1;
do {
#ifdef HWAES_CAPABLE
if (HWAES_CAPABLE) {
- HWAES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
- &gctx->ks.ks);
+ HWAES_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &gctx->ks.ks);
CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks,
(block128_f) HWAES_encrypt);
# ifdef HWAES_ctr32_encrypt_blocks
#endif
#ifdef BSAES_CAPABLE
if (BSAES_CAPABLE) {
- AES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
- &gctx->ks.ks);
+ AES_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &gctx->ks.ks);
CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks,
(block128_f) AES_encrypt);
gctx->ctr = (ctr128_f) bsaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks;
#endif
#ifdef VPAES_CAPABLE
if (VPAES_CAPABLE) {
- vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
- &gctx->ks.ks);
+ vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &gctx->ks.ks);
CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks,
(block128_f) vpaes_encrypt);
gctx->ctr = NULL;
#endif
(void)0; /* terminate potentially open 'else' */
- AES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
- &gctx->ks.ks);
+ AES_set_encrypt_key(key, ctx->key_len * 8, &gctx->ks.ks);
CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks,
(block128_f) AES_encrypt);
#ifdef AES_CTR_ASM
if (out != in
|| len < (EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN))
return -1;
+
+ /*
+ * Check for too many keys as per FIPS 140-2 IG A.5 "Key/IV Pair Uniqueness
+ * Requirements from SP 800-38D". The requirements is for one party to the
+ * communication to fail after 2^64 - 1 keys. We do this on the encrypting
+ * side only.
+ */
+ if (ctx->encrypt && ++gctx->tls_enc_records == 0) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_AES_GCM_TLS_CIPHER, EVP_R_TOO_MANY_RECORDS);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
/*
* Set IV from start of buffer or generate IV and write to start of
* buffer.
*/
- if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx) ?
- EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN : EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_INV,
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, ctx->encrypt ? EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN
+ : EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_INV,
EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN, out) <= 0)
goto err;
/* Use saved AAD */
- if (CRYPTO_gcm128_aad(&gctx->gcm, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx),
- gctx->tls_aad_len))
+ if (CRYPTO_gcm128_aad(&gctx->gcm, ctx->buf, gctx->tls_aad_len))
goto err;
/* Fix buffer and length to point to payload */
in += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
out += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
len -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
- if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) {
+ if (ctx->encrypt) {
/* Encrypt payload */
if (gctx->ctr) {
size_t bulk = 0;
goto err;
}
/* Retrieve tag */
- CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gctx->gcm, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx),
- EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN);
+ CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gctx->gcm, ctx->buf, EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN);
/* If tag mismatch wipe buffer */
- if (CRYPTO_memcmp(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx), in + len,
- EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN)) {
+ if (CRYPTO_memcmp(ctx->buf, in + len, EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN)) {
OPENSSL_cleanse(out, len);
goto err;
}
return rv;
}
+#ifdef FIPS_MODE
+/*
+ * See SP800-38D (GCM) Section 8 "Uniqueness requirement on IVS and keys"
+ *
+ * See also 8.2.2 RBG-based construction.
+ * Random construction consists of a free field (which can be NULL) and a
+ * random field which will use a DRBG that can return at least 96 bits of
+ * entropy strength. (The DRBG must be seeded by the FIPS module).
+ */
+static int aes_gcm_iv_generate(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx, int offset)
+{
+ int sz = gctx->ivlen - offset;
+
+ /* Must be at least 96 bits */
+ if (sz <= 0 || gctx->ivlen < 12)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Use DRBG to generate random iv */
+ if (RAND_bytes(gctx->iv + offset, sz) <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+#endif /* FIPS_MODE */
+
static int aes_gcm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
{
EVP_AES_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX,ctx);
+
/* If not set up, return error */
if (!gctx->key_set)
return -1;
if (gctx->tls_aad_len >= 0)
return aes_gcm_tls_cipher(ctx, out, in, len);
+#ifdef FIPS_MODE
+ /*
+ * FIPS requires generation of AES-GCM IV's inside the FIPS module.
+ * The IV can still be set externally (the security policy will state that
+ * this is not FIPS compliant). There are some applications
+ * where setting the IV externally is the only option available.
+ */
+ if (!gctx->iv_set) {
+ if (!ctx->encrypt || !aes_gcm_iv_generate(gctx, 0))
+ return -1;
+ CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, gctx->iv, gctx->ivlen);
+ gctx->iv_set = 1;
+ gctx->iv_gen_rand = 1;
+ }
+#else
if (!gctx->iv_set)
return -1;
+#endif /* FIPS_MODE */
+
if (in) {
if (out == NULL) {
if (CRYPTO_gcm128_aad(&gctx->gcm, in, len))
return -1;
- } else if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) {
+ } else if (ctx->encrypt) {
if (gctx->ctr) {
size_t bulk = 0;
#if defined(AES_GCM_ASM)
}
return len;
} else {
- if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) {
+ if (!ctx->encrypt) {
if (gctx->taglen < 0)
return -1;
- if (CRYPTO_gcm128_finish(&gctx->gcm,
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx),
- gctx->taglen) != 0)
+ if (CRYPTO_gcm128_finish(&gctx->gcm, ctx->buf, gctx->taglen) != 0)
return -1;
gctx->iv_set = 0;
return 0;
}
- CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gctx->gcm, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx), 16);
+ CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gctx->gcm, ctx->buf, 16);
gctx->taglen = 16;
/* Don't reuse the IV */
gctx->iv_set = 0;
static int aes_xts_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
{
- EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_XTS_CTX,c);
+ EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_XTS_CTX, c);
+
if (type == EVP_CTRL_COPY) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *out = ptr;
EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx_out = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_XTS_CTX,out);
+
if (xctx->xts.key1) {
if (xctx->xts.key1 != &xctx->ks1)
return 0;
const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
{
EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_XTS_CTX,ctx);
+
if (!iv && !key)
return 1;
- if (key)
+ if (key) {
do {
+ /* The key is two half length keys in reality */
+ const int bytes = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) / 2;
+ const int bits = bytes * 8;
+
+ /*
+ * Verify that the two keys are different.
+ *
+ * This addresses the vulnerability described in Rogaway's
+ * September 2004 paper:
+ *
+ * "Efficient Instantiations of Tweakable Blockciphers and
+ * Refinements to Modes OCB and PMAC".
+ * (http://web.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway/papers/offsets.pdf)
+ *
+ * FIPS 140-2 IG A.9 XTS-AES Key Generation Requirements states
+ * that:
+ * "The check for Key_1 != Key_2 shall be done at any place
+ * BEFORE using the keys in the XTS-AES algorithm to process
+ * data with them."
+ */
+ if ((!allow_insecure_decrypt || enc)
+ && CRYPTO_memcmp(key, key + bytes, bytes) == 0) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_AES_XTS_INIT_KEY, EVP_R_XTS_DUPLICATED_KEYS);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
#ifdef AES_XTS_ASM
xctx->stream = enc ? AES_xts_encrypt : AES_xts_decrypt;
#else
#ifdef HWAES_CAPABLE
if (HWAES_CAPABLE) {
if (enc) {
- HWAES_set_encrypt_key(key,
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 4,
- &xctx->ks1.ks);
+ HWAES_set_encrypt_key(key, bits, &xctx->ks1.ks);
xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) HWAES_encrypt;
# ifdef HWAES_xts_encrypt
xctx->stream = HWAES_xts_encrypt;
# endif
} else {
- HWAES_set_decrypt_key(key,
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 4,
- &xctx->ks1.ks);
+ HWAES_set_decrypt_key(key, bits, &xctx->ks1.ks);
xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) HWAES_decrypt;
# ifdef HWAES_xts_decrypt
xctx->stream = HWAES_xts_decrypt;
#endif
}
- HWAES_set_encrypt_key(key + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) / 2,
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 4,
- &xctx->ks2.ks);
+ HWAES_set_encrypt_key(key + bytes, bits, &xctx->ks2.ks);
xctx->xts.block2 = (block128_f) HWAES_encrypt;
xctx->xts.key1 = &xctx->ks1;
#ifdef VPAES_CAPABLE
if (VPAES_CAPABLE) {
if (enc) {
- vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key,
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 4,
- &xctx->ks1.ks);
+ vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key, bits, &xctx->ks1.ks);
xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) vpaes_encrypt;
} else {
- vpaes_set_decrypt_key(key,
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 4,
- &xctx->ks1.ks);
+ vpaes_set_decrypt_key(key, bits, &xctx->ks1.ks);
xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) vpaes_decrypt;
}
- vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) / 2,
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 4,
- &xctx->ks2.ks);
+ vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key + bytes, bits, &xctx->ks2.ks);
xctx->xts.block2 = (block128_f) vpaes_encrypt;
xctx->xts.key1 = &xctx->ks1;
(void)0; /* terminate potentially open 'else' */
if (enc) {
- AES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 4,
- &xctx->ks1.ks);
+ AES_set_encrypt_key(key, bits, &xctx->ks1.ks);
xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) AES_encrypt;
} else {
- AES_set_decrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 4,
- &xctx->ks1.ks);
+ AES_set_decrypt_key(key, bits, &xctx->ks1.ks);
xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) AES_decrypt;
}
- AES_set_encrypt_key(key + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) / 2,
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 4,
- &xctx->ks2.ks);
+ AES_set_encrypt_key(key + bytes, bits, &xctx->ks2.ks);
xctx->xts.block2 = (block128_f) AES_encrypt;
xctx->xts.key1 = &xctx->ks1;
} while (0);
+ }
if (iv) {
xctx->xts.key2 = &xctx->ks2;
const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
{
EVP_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_XTS_CTX,ctx);
- if (!xctx->xts.key1 || !xctx->xts.key2)
+
+ if (xctx->xts.key1 == NULL
+ || xctx->xts.key2 == NULL
+ || out == NULL
+ || in == NULL
+ || len < AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
return 0;
- if (!out || !in || len < AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
+
+ /*
+ * Impose a limit of 2^20 blocks per data unit as specifed by
+ * IEEE Std 1619-2018. The earlier and obsolete IEEE Std 1619-2007
+ * indicated that this was a SHOULD NOT rather than a MUST NOT.
+ * NIST SP 800-38E mandates the same limit.
+ */
+ if (len > XTS_MAX_BLOCKS_PER_DATA_UNIT * AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+ EVPerr(EVP_F_AES_XTS_CIPHER, EVP_R_XTS_DATA_UNIT_IS_TOO_LARGE);
return 0;
+ }
+
if (xctx->stream)
(*xctx->stream) (in, out, len,
xctx->xts.key1, xctx->xts.key2,
if (!cctx->iv_set)
return -1;
- if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx) && !cctx->tag_set)
- return -1;
if (!out) {
if (!in) {
if (CRYPTO_ccm128_setiv(ccm, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx),
CRYPTO_ccm128_aad(ccm, in, len);
return len;
}
+
+ /* The tag must be set before actually decrypting data */
+ if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx) && !cctx->tag_set)
+ return -1;
+
/* If not set length yet do it */
if (!cctx->len_set) {
if (CRYPTO_ccm128_setiv(ccm, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx),
typedef struct {
union {
- double align;
+ OSSL_UNION_ALIGN;
AES_KEY ks;
} ks;
/* Indicates if IV has been set */
BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 256, 16, 12, ocb, OCB,
EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | CUSTOM_FLAGS)
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_OCB */
+
+/* AES-SIV mode */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SIV
+
+typedef SIV128_CONTEXT EVP_AES_SIV_CTX;
+
+#define aesni_siv_init_key aes_siv_init_key
+static int aes_siv_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+ const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
+{
+ const EVP_CIPHER *ctr;
+ const EVP_CIPHER *cbc;
+ SIV128_CONTEXT *sctx = EVP_C_DATA(SIV128_CONTEXT, ctx);
+ int klen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) / 2;
+
+ if (key == NULL)
+ return 1;
+
+ switch (klen) {
+ case 16:
+ cbc = EVP_aes_128_cbc();
+ ctr = EVP_aes_128_ctr();
+ break;
+ case 24:
+ cbc = EVP_aes_192_cbc();
+ ctr = EVP_aes_192_ctr();
+ break;
+ case 32:
+ cbc = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
+ ctr = EVP_aes_256_ctr();
+ break;
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* klen is the length of the underlying cipher, not the input key,
+ which should be twice as long */
+ return CRYPTO_siv128_init(sctx, key, klen, cbc, ctr);
+}
+
+#define aesni_siv_cipher aes_siv_cipher
+static int aes_siv_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
+{
+ SIV128_CONTEXT *sctx = EVP_C_DATA(SIV128_CONTEXT, ctx);
+
+ /* EncryptFinal or DecryptFinal */
+ if (in == NULL)
+ return CRYPTO_siv128_finish(sctx);
+
+ /* Deal with associated data */
+ if (out == NULL)
+ return CRYPTO_siv128_aad(sctx, in, len);
+
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx))
+ return CRYPTO_siv128_encrypt(sctx, in, out, len);
+
+ return CRYPTO_siv128_decrypt(sctx, in, out, len);
+}
+
+#define aesni_siv_cleanup aes_siv_cleanup
+static int aes_siv_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c)
+{
+ SIV128_CONTEXT *sctx = EVP_C_DATA(SIV128_CONTEXT, c);
+
+ return CRYPTO_siv128_cleanup(sctx);
+}
+
+
+#define aesni_siv_ctrl aes_siv_ctrl
+static int aes_siv_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
+{
+ SIV128_CONTEXT *sctx = EVP_C_DATA(SIV128_CONTEXT, c);
+ SIV128_CONTEXT *sctx_out;
+
+ switch (type) {
+ case EVP_CTRL_INIT:
+ return CRYPTO_siv128_cleanup(sctx);
+
+ case EVP_CTRL_SET_SPEED:
+ return CRYPTO_siv128_speed(sctx, arg);
+
+ case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG:
+ if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c))
+ return CRYPTO_siv128_set_tag(sctx, ptr, arg);
+ return 1;
+
+ case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG:
+ if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c))
+ return 0;
+ return CRYPTO_siv128_get_tag(sctx, ptr, arg);
+
+ case EVP_CTRL_COPY:
+ sctx_out = EVP_C_DATA(SIV128_CONTEXT, (EVP_CIPHER_CTX*)ptr);
+ return CRYPTO_siv128_copy_ctx(sctx_out, sctx);
+
+ default:
+ return -1;
+
+ }
+}
+
+#define SIV_FLAGS (EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1 \
+ | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER \
+ | EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_COPY \
+ | EVP_CIPH_CTRL_INIT)
+
+BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 128, 1, 0, siv, SIV, SIV_FLAGS)
+BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 192, 1, 0, siv, SIV, SIV_FLAGS)
+BLOCK_CIPHER_custom(NID_aes, 256, 1, 0, siv, SIV, SIV_FLAGS)
+#endif