/*
* Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
- * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
#include <openssl/bio.h>
#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
#include "internal/thread_once.h"
+#include "internal/ctype.h"
+#include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
+#include "e_os.h"
+#include "err_locl.h"
static int err_load_strings(const ERR_STRING_DATA *str);
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_UI, 0, 0), "UI routines"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_FIPS, 0, 0), "FIPS routines"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMS, 0, 0), "CMS routines"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CRMF, 0, 0), "CRMF routines"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, 0), "CMP routines"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_HMAC, 0, 0), "HMAC routines"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CT, 0, 0), "CT routines"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_ASYNC, 0, 0), "ASYNC routines"},
- {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, 0, 0), "KDF routines"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_OSSL_STORE, 0, 0), "STORE routines"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SM2, 0, 0), "SM2 routines"},
- {0, NULL},
-};
-
-static ERR_STRING_DATA ERR_str_functs[] = {
- {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_FOPEN, 0), "fopen"},
- {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_CONNECT, 0), "connect"},
- {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_GETSERVBYNAME, 0), "getservbyname"},
- {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_SOCKET, 0), "socket"},
- {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_IOCTLSOCKET, 0), "ioctlsocket"},
- {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_BIND, 0), "bind"},
- {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_LISTEN, 0), "listen"},
- {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_ACCEPT, 0), "accept"},
-# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS
- {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_WSASTARTUP, 0), "WSAstartup"},
-# endif
- {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_OPENDIR, 0), "opendir"},
- {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_FREAD, 0), "fread"},
- {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_GETADDRINFO, 0), "getaddrinfo"},
- {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_GETNAMEINFO, 0), "getnameinfo"},
- {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_SETSOCKOPT, 0), "setsockopt"},
- {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_GETSOCKOPT, 0), "getsockopt"},
- {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_GETSOCKNAME, 0), "getsockname"},
- {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_GETHOSTBYNAME, 0), "gethostbyname"},
- {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_FFLUSH, 0), "fflush"},
- {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_OPEN, 0), "open"},
- {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_CLOSE, 0), "close"},
- {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_IOCTL, 0), "ioctl"},
- {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_STAT, 0), "stat"},
- {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_FCNTL, 0), "fcntl"},
- {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_FSTAT, 0), "fstat"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_ESS, 0, 0), "ESS routines"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PROV, 0, 0), "Provider routines"},
{0, NULL},
};
unsigned long ret, l;
l = a->error;
- ret = l ^ ERR_GET_LIB(l) ^ ERR_GET_FUNC(l);
+ ret = l ^ ERR_GET_LIB(l);
return (ret ^ ret % 19 * 13);
}
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
-/* A measurement on Linux 2018-11-21 showed about 3.5kib */
-# define SPACE_SYS_STR_REASONS 4 * 1024
+/* 2019-05-21: Russian and Ukrainian locales on Linux require more than 6,5 kB */
+# define SPACE_SYS_STR_REASONS 8 * 1024
# define NUM_SYS_STR_REASONS 127
static ERR_STRING_DATA SYS_str_reasons[NUM_SYS_STR_REASONS + 1];
size_t cnt = 0;
static int init = 1;
int i;
+ int saveerrno = get_last_sys_error();
CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(err_string_lock);
if (!init) {
ERR_STRING_DATA *str = &SYS_str_reasons[i - 1];
str->error = ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SYS, 0, i);
- if (str->string == NULL) {
+ /*
+ * If we have used up all the space in strerror_pool,
+ * there's no point in calling openssl_strerror_r()
+ */
+ if (str->string == NULL && cnt < sizeof(strerror_pool)) {
if (openssl_strerror_r(i, cur, sizeof(strerror_pool) - cnt)) {
- size_t l = strlen(cur) + 1;
+ size_t l = strlen(cur);
str->string = cur;
cnt += l;
- if (cnt > sizeof(strerror_pool))
- cnt = sizeof(strerror_pool);
cur += l;
+
+ /*
+ * VMS has an unusual quirk of adding spaces at the end of
+ * some (most? all?) messages. Lets trim them off.
+ */
+ while (cur > strerror_pool && ossl_isspace(cur[-1])) {
+ cur--;
+ cnt--;
+ }
+ *cur++ = '\0';
+ cnt++;
}
}
if (str->string == NULL)
init = 0;
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(err_string_lock);
+ /* openssl_strerror_r could change errno, but we want to preserve it */
+ set_sys_error(saveerrno);
err_load_strings(SYS_str_reasons);
}
#endif
-#define err_clear_data(p, i) \
- do { \
- if ((p)->err_data_flags[i] & ERR_TXT_MALLOCED) {\
- OPENSSL_free((p)->err_data[i]); \
- (p)->err_data[i] = NULL; \
- } \
- (p)->err_data_flags[i] = 0; \
- } while (0)
-
-#define err_clear(p, i) \
- do { \
- err_clear_data(p, i); \
- (p)->err_flags[i] = 0; \
- (p)->err_buffer[i] = 0; \
- (p)->err_file[i] = NULL; \
- (p)->err_line[i] = -1; \
- } while (0)
-
static void ERR_STATE_free(ERR_STATE *s)
{
int i;
if (s == NULL)
return;
for (i = 0; i < ERR_NUM_ERRORS; i++) {
- err_clear_data(s, i);
+ err_clear_data(s, i, 1);
}
OPENSSL_free(s);
}
err_load_strings(ERR_str_libraries);
err_load_strings(ERR_str_reasons);
- err_patch(ERR_LIB_SYS, ERR_str_functs);
- err_load_strings(ERR_str_functs);
build_SYS_str_reasons();
#endif
return 1;
/********************************************************/
-void ERR_put_error(int lib, int func, int reason, const char *file, int line)
-{
- ERR_STATE *es;
-
-#ifdef _OSD_POSIX
- /*
- * In the BS2000-OSD POSIX subsystem, the compiler generates path names
- * in the form "*POSIX(/etc/passwd)". This dirty hack strips them to
- * something sensible. @@@ We shouldn't modify a const string, though.
- */
- if (strncmp(file, "*POSIX(", sizeof("*POSIX(") - 1) == 0) {
- char *end;
-
- /* Skip the "*POSIX(" prefix */
- file += sizeof("*POSIX(") - 1;
- end = &file[strlen(file) - 1];
- if (*end == ')')
- *end = '\0';
- /* Optional: use the basename of the path only. */
- if ((end = strrchr(file, '/')) != NULL)
- file = &end[1];
- }
-#endif
- es = ERR_get_state();
- if (es == NULL)
- return;
-
- es->top = (es->top + 1) % ERR_NUM_ERRORS;
- if (es->top == es->bottom)
- es->bottom = (es->bottom + 1) % ERR_NUM_ERRORS;
- es->err_flags[es->top] = 0;
- es->err_buffer[es->top] = ERR_PACK(lib, func, reason);
- es->err_file[es->top] = file;
- es->err_line[es->top] = line;
- err_clear_data(es, es->top);
-}
-
void ERR_clear_error(void)
{
int i;
return;
for (i = 0; i < ERR_NUM_ERRORS; i++) {
- err_clear(es, i);
+ err_clear(es, i, 0);
}
es->top = es->bottom = 0;
}
return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
+ while (es->bottom != es->top) {
+ if (es->err_flags[es->top] & ERR_FLAG_CLEAR) {
+ err_clear(es, es->top, 0);
+ es->top = es->top > 0 ? es->top - 1 : ERR_NUM_ERRORS - 1;
+ continue;
+ }
+ i = (es->bottom + 1) % ERR_NUM_ERRORS;
+ if (es->err_flags[i] & ERR_FLAG_CLEAR) {
+ es->bottom = i;
+ err_clear(es, es->bottom, 0);
+ continue;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+
if (es->bottom == es->top)
return 0;
+
if (top)
i = es->top; /* last error */
else
if (data == NULL) {
if (inc) {
- err_clear_data(es, i);
+ err_clear_data(es, i, 0);
}
} else {
if (es->err_data[i] == NULL) {
void ERR_error_string_n(unsigned long e, char *buf, size_t len)
{
- char lsbuf[64], fsbuf[64], rsbuf[64];
- const char *ls, *fs, *rs;
- unsigned long l, f, r;
+ char lsbuf[64], rsbuf[64];
+ const char *ls, *rs;
+ unsigned long f = 0, l, r;
if (len == 0)
return;
ls = lsbuf;
}
- fs = ERR_func_error_string(e);
- f = ERR_GET_FUNC(e);
- if (fs == NULL) {
- BIO_snprintf(fsbuf, sizeof(fsbuf), "func(%lu)", f);
- fs = fsbuf;
- }
-
rs = ERR_reason_error_string(e);
r = ERR_GET_REASON(e);
if (rs == NULL) {
rs = rsbuf;
}
- BIO_snprintf(buf, len, "error:%08lX:%s:%s:%s", e, ls, fs, rs);
+ BIO_snprintf(buf, len, "error:%08lX:%s:%s:%s", e, ls, "", rs);
if (strlen(buf) == len - 1) {
/* Didn't fit; use a minimal format. */
BIO_snprintf(buf, len, "err:%lx:%lx:%lx:%lx", e, l, f, r);
const char *ERR_func_error_string(unsigned long e)
{
- ERR_STRING_DATA d, *p;
- unsigned long l, f;
-
- if (!RUN_ONCE(&err_string_init, do_err_strings_init)) {
+ if (!RUN_ONCE(&err_string_init, do_err_strings_init))
return NULL;
- }
-
- l = ERR_GET_LIB(e);
- f = ERR_GET_FUNC(e);
- d.error = ERR_PACK(l, f, 0);
- p = int_err_get_item(&d);
- return ((p == NULL) ? NULL : p->string);
+ return ERR_GET_LIB(e) == ERR_LIB_SYS ? "system library" : NULL;
}
const char *ERR_reason_error_string(unsigned long e)
return ((p == NULL) ? NULL : p->string);
}
-void err_delete_thread_state(void)
+/* TODO(3.0): arg ignored for now */
+static void err_delete_thread_state(void *arg)
{
ERR_STATE *state = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&err_thread_local);
if (state == NULL)
ERR_STATE_free(state);
}
-#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+#if !OPENSSL_API_1_1_0
void ERR_remove_thread_state(void *dummy)
{
}
#endif
-#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10000000L
+#if !OPENSSL_API_1_0_0
void ERR_remove_state(unsigned long pid)
{
}
ERR_STATE *ERR_get_state(void)
{
ERR_STATE *state;
+ int saveerrno = get_last_sys_error();
if (!OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_BASE_ONLY, NULL))
return NULL;
return NULL;
}
- if (!ossl_init_thread_start(OPENSSL_INIT_THREAD_ERR_STATE)
+ if (!ossl_init_thread_start(NULL, NULL, err_delete_thread_state)
|| !CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&err_thread_local, state)) {
ERR_STATE_free(state);
CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&err_thread_local, NULL);
OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CRYPTO_STRINGS, NULL);
}
+ set_sys_error(saveerrno);
return state;
}
*/
int err_shelve_state(void **state)
{
+ int saveerrno = get_last_sys_error();
+
+ /*
+ * Note, at present our only caller is OPENSSL_init_crypto(), indirectly
+ * via ossl_init_load_crypto_nodelete(), by which point the requested
+ * "base" initialization has already been performed, so the below call is a
+ * NOOP, that re-enters OPENSSL_init_crypto() only to quickly return.
+ *
+ * If are no other valid callers of this function, the call below can be
+ * removed, avoiding the re-entry into OPENSSL_init_crypto(). If there are
+ * potential uses that are not from inside OPENSSL_init_crypto(), then this
+ * call is needed, but some care is required to make sure that the re-entry
+ * remains a NOOP.
+ */
if (!OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_BASE_ONLY, NULL))
return 0;
if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&err_thread_local, (ERR_STATE*)-1))
return 0;
+ set_sys_error(saveerrno);
return 1;
}
return ret;
}
-void ERR_set_error_data(char *data, int flags)
+static int err_set_error_data_int(char *data, size_t size, int flags,
+ int deallocate)
{
ERR_STATE *es;
- int i;
es = ERR_get_state();
if (es == NULL)
- return;
+ return 0;
- i = es->top;
+ err_clear_data(es, es->top, deallocate);
+ err_set_data(es, es->top, data, size, flags);
+
+ return 1;
+}
- err_clear_data(es, i);
- es->err_data[i] = data;
- es->err_data_flags[i] = flags;
+void ERR_set_error_data(char *data, int flags)
+{
+ /*
+ * This function is void so we cannot propagate the error return. Since it
+ * is also in the public API we can't change the return type.
+ *
+ * We estimate the size of the data. If it's not flagged as allocated,
+ * then this is safe, and if it is flagged as allocated, then our size
+ * may be smaller than the actual allocation, but that doesn't matter
+ * too much, the buffer will remain untouched or will eventually be
+ * reallocated to a new size.
+ *
+ * callers should be advised that this function takes over ownership of
+ * the allocated memory, i.e. they can't count on the pointer to remain
+ * valid.
+ */
+ err_set_error_data_int(data, strlen(data) + 1, flags, 1);
}
void ERR_add_error_data(int num, ...)
void ERR_add_error_vdata(int num, va_list args)
{
- int i, n, s;
- char *str, *p, *a;
+ int i, len, size;
+ int flags = ERR_TXT_MALLOCED | ERR_TXT_STRING;
+ char *str, *arg;
+ ERR_STATE *es;
+
+ /* Get the current error data; if an allocated string get it. */
+ es = ERR_get_state();
+ if (es == NULL)
+ return;
+ i = es->top;
- s = 80;
- if ((str = OPENSSL_malloc(s + 1)) == NULL) {
- /* ERRerr(ERR_F_ERR_ADD_ERROR_VDATA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); */
+ /*
+ * If err_data is allocated already, re-use the space.
+ * Otherwise, allocate a small new buffer.
+ */
+ if ((es->err_data_flags[i] & flags) == flags) {
+ str = es->err_data[i];
+ size = es->err_data_size[i];
+
+ /*
+ * To protect the string we just grabbed from tampering by other
+ * functions we may call, or to protect them from freeing a pointer
+ * that may no longer be valid at that point, we clear away the
+ * data pointer and the flags. We will set them again at the end
+ * of this function.
+ */
+ es->err_data[i] = NULL;
+ es->err_data_flags[i] = 0;
+ } else if ((str = OPENSSL_malloc(size = 81)) == NULL) {
return;
+ } else {
+ str[0] = '\0';
}
- str[0] = '\0';
-
- n = 0;
- for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
- a = va_arg(args, char *);
- if (a == NULL)
- a = "<NULL>";
- n += strlen(a);
- if (n > s) {
- s = n + 20;
- p = OPENSSL_realloc(str, s + 1);
+ len = strlen(str);
+
+ while (--num >= 0) {
+ arg = va_arg(args, char *);
+ if (arg == NULL)
+ arg = "<NULL>";
+ len += strlen(arg);
+ if (len >= size) {
+ char *p;
+
+ size = len + 20;
+ p = OPENSSL_realloc(str, size);
if (p == NULL) {
OPENSSL_free(str);
return;
}
str = p;
}
- OPENSSL_strlcat(str, a, (size_t)s + 1);
+ OPENSSL_strlcat(str, arg, (size_t)size);
}
- ERR_set_error_data(str, ERR_TXT_MALLOCED | ERR_TXT_STRING);
+ if (!err_set_error_data_int(str, size, flags, 0))
+ OPENSSL_free(str);
}
int ERR_set_mark(void)
while (es->bottom != es->top
&& (es->err_flags[es->top] & ERR_FLAG_MARK) == 0) {
- err_clear(es, es->top);
+ err_clear(es, es->top, 0);
es->top = es->top > 0 ? es->top - 1 : ERR_NUM_ERRORS - 1;
}
es->err_flags[top] &= ~ERR_FLAG_MARK;
return 1;
}
+
+void err_clear_last_constant_time(int clear)
+{
+ ERR_STATE *es;
+ int top;
+
+ es = ERR_get_state();
+ if (es == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ top = es->top;
+
+ /*
+ * Flag error as cleared but remove it elsewhere to avoid two errors
+ * accessing the same error stack location, revealing timing information.
+ */
+ clear = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_eq_int(clear, 0),
+ 0, ERR_FLAG_CLEAR);
+ es->err_flags[top] |= clear;
+}