/*
- * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2001-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
- *
- * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
- * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
- *
- * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
- * license provided above.
- *
- * The elliptic curve binary polynomial software is originally written by
- * Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
- *
- */
-
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
#include <openssl/ec.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
-
-#include "e_os.h"
+#include "internal/refcount.h"
+#include "internal/ec_int.h"
+#include "curve448/curve448_lcl.h"
#if defined(__SUNPRO_C)
# if __SUNPRO_C >= 0x520
* EC_POINT_have_precompute_mult (default implementations are used if the
* 'mul' pointer is 0):
*/
+ /*-
+ * mul() calculates the value
+ *
+ * r := generator * scalar
+ * + points[0] * scalars[0]
+ * + ...
+ * + points[num-1] * scalars[num-1].
+ *
+ * For a fixed point multiplication (scalar != NULL, num == 0)
+ * or a variable point multiplication (scalar == NULL, num == 1),
+ * mul() must use a constant time algorithm: in both cases callers
+ * should provide an input scalar (either scalar or scalars[0])
+ * in the range [0, ec_group_order); for robustness, implementers
+ * should handle the case when the scalar has not been reduced, but
+ * may treat it as an unusual input, without any constant-timeness
+ * guarantee.
+ */
int (*mul) (const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar,
size_t num, const EC_POINT *points[], const BIGNUM *scalars[],
BN_CTX *);
/* custom ECDH operation */
int (*ecdh_compute_key)(unsigned char **pout, size_t *poutlen,
const EC_POINT *pub_key, const EC_KEY *ecdh);
-} /* EC_METHOD */ ;
+ /* Inverse modulo order */
+ int (*field_inverse_mod_ord)(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r,
+ const BIGNUM *x, BN_CTX *);
+ int (*blind_coordinates)(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *p, BN_CTX *ctx);
+ int (*ladder_pre)(const EC_GROUP *group,
+ EC_POINT *r, EC_POINT *s,
+ EC_POINT *p, BN_CTX *ctx);
+ int (*ladder_step)(const EC_GROUP *group,
+ EC_POINT *r, EC_POINT *s,
+ EC_POINT *p, BN_CTX *ctx);
+ int (*ladder_post)(const EC_GROUP *group,
+ EC_POINT *r, EC_POINT *s,
+ EC_POINT *p, BN_CTX *ctx);
+};
/*
* Types and functions to manipulate pre-computed values.
/* data for ECDSA inverse */
BN_MONT_CTX *mont_data;
- /* precomputed values for speed. */
+ /*
+ * Precomputed values for speed. The PCT_xxx names match the
+ * pre_comp.xxx union names; see the SETPRECOMP and HAVEPRECOMP
+ * macros, below.
+ */
enum {
- pct_none,
- pct_nistp224, pct_nistp256, pct_nistp521, pct_nistz256,
- pct_ec } pre_comp_type;
+ PCT_none,
+ PCT_nistp224, PCT_nistp256, PCT_nistp521, PCT_nistz256,
+ PCT_ec
+ } pre_comp_type;
union {
NISTP224_PRE_COMP *nistp224;
NISTP256_PRE_COMP *nistp256;
NISTZ256_PRE_COMP *nistz256;
EC_PRE_COMP *ec;
} pre_comp;
-} /* EC_GROUP */ ;
+};
#define SETPRECOMP(g, type, pre) \
- g->pre_comp_type = pct_##type, g->pre_comp.type = pre
+ g->pre_comp_type = PCT_##type, g->pre_comp.type = pre
#define HAVEPRECOMP(g, type) \
- g->pre_comp_type == pct_##type && g->pre_comp.type != NULL
+ g->pre_comp_type == PCT_##type && g->pre_comp.type != NULL
struct ec_key_st {
const EC_KEY_METHOD *meth;
BIGNUM *priv_key;
unsigned int enc_flag;
point_conversion_form_t conv_form;
- int references;
+ CRYPTO_REF_COUNT references;
int flags;
CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data;
CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
-} /* EC_KEY */ ;
+};
struct ec_point_st {
const EC_METHOD *meth;
+ /* NID for the curve if known */
+ int curve_name;
/*
* All members except 'meth' are handled by the method functions, even if
* they appear generic
* Z) represents (X/Z^2, Y/Z^3) if Z != 0 */
int Z_is_one; /* enable optimized point arithmetics for
* special case */
-} /* EC_POINT */ ;
+};
+
+static ossl_inline int ec_point_is_compat(const EC_POINT *point,
+ const EC_GROUP *group)
+{
+ if (group->meth != point->meth
+ || (group->curve_name != 0
+ && point->curve_name != 0
+ && group->curve_name != point->curve_name))
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+}
NISTP224_PRE_COMP *EC_nistp224_pre_comp_dup(NISTP224_PRE_COMP *);
NISTP256_PRE_COMP *EC_nistp256_pre_comp_dup(NISTP256_PRE_COMP *);
const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *);
int ec_GFp_simple_field_sqr(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
BN_CTX *);
+int ec_GFp_simple_blind_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *p,
+ BN_CTX *ctx);
+int ec_GFp_simple_ladder_pre(const EC_GROUP *group,
+ EC_POINT *r, EC_POINT *s,
+ EC_POINT *p, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int ec_GFp_simple_ladder_step(const EC_GROUP *group,
+ EC_POINT *r, EC_POINT *s,
+ EC_POINT *p, BN_CTX *ctx);
+int ec_GFp_simple_ladder_post(const EC_GROUP *group,
+ EC_POINT *r, EC_POINT *s,
+ EC_POINT *p, BN_CTX *ctx);
/* method functions in ecp_mont.c */
int ec_GFp_mont_group_init(EC_GROUP *);
int ec_GF2m_simple_field_div(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *);
-/* method functions in ec2_mult.c */
-int ec_GF2m_simple_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
- const BIGNUM *scalar, size_t num,
- const EC_POINT *points[], const BIGNUM *scalars[],
- BN_CTX *);
-int ec_GF2m_precompute_mult(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx);
-int ec_GF2m_have_precompute_mult(const EC_GROUP *group);
-
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128
/* method functions in ecp_nistp224.c */
int ec_GFp_nistp224_group_init(EC_GROUP *group);
void ec_GFp_nistp_recode_scalar_bits(unsigned char *sign,
unsigned char *digit, unsigned char in);
#endif
-int ec_precompute_mont_data(EC_GROUP *);
int ec_group_simple_order_bits(const EC_GROUP *group);
#ifdef ECP_NISTZ256_ASM
const unsigned char *sigbuf, int sig_len, EC_KEY *eckey);
int (*verify_sig)(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
const ECDSA_SIG *sig, EC_KEY *eckey);
-} /* EC_KEY_METHOD */ ;
+};
#define EC_KEY_METHOD_DYNAMIC 1
int ossl_ecdsa_verify_sig(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
const ECDSA_SIG *sig, EC_KEY *eckey);
+int ED25519_sign(uint8_t *out_sig, const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,
+ const uint8_t public_key[32], const uint8_t private_key[32]);
+int ED25519_verify(const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,
+ const uint8_t signature[64], const uint8_t public_key[32]);
+void ED25519_public_from_private(uint8_t out_public_key[32],
+ const uint8_t private_key[32]);
+
int X25519(uint8_t out_shared_key[32], const uint8_t private_key[32],
const uint8_t peer_public_value[32]);
void X25519_public_from_private(uint8_t out_public_value[32],
const uint8_t private_key[32]);
+
+/*-
+ * This functions computes a single point multiplication over the EC group,
+ * using, at a high level, a Montgomery ladder with conditional swaps, with
+ * various timing attack defenses.
+ *
+ * It performs either a fixed point multiplication
+ * (scalar * generator)
+ * when point is NULL, or a variable point multiplication
+ * (scalar * point)
+ * when point is not NULL.
+ *
+ * `scalar` cannot be NULL and should be in the range [0,n) otherwise all
+ * constant time bets are off (where n is the cardinality of the EC group).
+ *
+ * This function expects `group->order` and `group->cardinality` to be well
+ * defined and non-zero: it fails with an error code otherwise.
+ *
+ * NB: This says nothing about the constant-timeness of the ladder step
+ * implementation (i.e., the default implementation is based on EC_POINT_add and
+ * EC_POINT_dbl, which of course are not constant time themselves) or the
+ * underlying multiprecision arithmetic.
+ *
+ * The product is stored in `r`.
+ *
+ * This is an internal function: callers are in charge of ensuring that the
+ * input parameters `group`, `r`, `scalar` and `ctx` are not NULL.
+ *
+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+int ec_scalar_mul_ladder(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
+ const BIGNUM *scalar, const EC_POINT *point,
+ BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+int ec_point_blind_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *p, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+static ossl_inline int ec_point_ladder_pre(const EC_GROUP *group,
+ EC_POINT *r, EC_POINT *s,
+ EC_POINT *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ if (group->meth->ladder_pre != NULL)
+ return group->meth->ladder_pre(group, r, s, p, ctx);
+
+ if (!EC_POINT_copy(s, p)
+ || !EC_POINT_dbl(group, r, s, ctx))
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static ossl_inline int ec_point_ladder_step(const EC_GROUP *group,
+ EC_POINT *r, EC_POINT *s,
+ EC_POINT *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ if (group->meth->ladder_step != NULL)
+ return group->meth->ladder_step(group, r, s, p, ctx);
+
+ if (!EC_POINT_add(group, s, r, s, ctx)
+ || !EC_POINT_dbl(group, r, r, ctx))
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+
+}
+
+static ossl_inline int ec_point_ladder_post(const EC_GROUP *group,
+ EC_POINT *r, EC_POINT *s,
+ EC_POINT *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ if (group->meth->ladder_post != NULL)
+ return group->meth->ladder_post(group, r, s, p, ctx);
+
+ return 1;
+}
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff