ECDSA: remove nonce padding (delegated to EC_POINT_mul)

[openssl.git] / crypto / ec / ec_lcl.h

diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h b/crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h
index d01fb30e70a50f53471bf8cb3916d7fa501c8c97..5b306dbefa8a716e918cca8b01b5cb41e65e649d 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h
+++ b/crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 /*
- * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2001-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
  *
  * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
  * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
@@ -7,27 +8,13 @@
  * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
  */
 
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
- *
- * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
- * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
- *
- * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
- * license provided above.
- *
- * The elliptic curve binary polynomial software is originally written by
- * Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
- *
- */
-
 #include <stdlib.h>
 
 #include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
 #include <openssl/ec.h>
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
-
-#include "e_os.h"
+#include "internal/refcount.h"
+#include "curve448/curve448_lcl.h"
 
 #if defined(__SUNPRO_C)
 # if __SUNPRO_C >= 0x520
@@ -133,6 +120,23 @@ struct ec_method_st {
      * EC_POINT_have_precompute_mult (default implementations are used if the
      * 'mul' pointer is 0):
      */
+    /*-
+     * mul() calculates the value
+     *
+     *   r := generator * scalar
+     *        + points[0] * scalars[0]
+     *        + ...
+     *        + points[num-1] * scalars[num-1].
+     *
+     * For a fixed point multiplication (scalar != NULL, num == 0)
+     * or a variable point multiplication (scalar == NULL, num == 1),
+     * mul() must use a constant time algorithm: in both cases callers
+     * should provide an input scalar (either scalar or scalars[0])
+     * in the range [0, ec_group_order); for robustness, implementers
+     * should handle the case when the scalar has not been reduced, but
+     * may treat it as an unusual input, without any constant-timeness
+     * guarantee.
+     */
     int (*mul) (const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar,
                 size_t num, const EC_POINT *points[], const BIGNUM *scalars[],
                 BN_CTX *);
@@ -169,7 +173,10 @@ struct ec_method_st {
     /* custom ECDH operation */
     int (*ecdh_compute_key)(unsigned char **pout, size_t *poutlen,
                             const EC_POINT *pub_key, const EC_KEY *ecdh);
-} /* EC_METHOD */ ;
+    /* Inverse modulo order */
+    int (*field_inverse_mod_ord)(const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *x,
+                                 BN_CTX *ctx);
+};
 
 /*
  * Types and functions to manipulate pre-computed values.
@@ -245,7 +252,7 @@ struct ec_group_st {
         NISTZ256_PRE_COMP *nistz256;
         EC_PRE_COMP *ec;
     } pre_comp;
-} /* EC_GROUP */ ;
+};
 
 #define SETPRECOMP(g, type, pre) \
     g->pre_comp_type = PCT_##type, g->pre_comp.type = pre
@@ -261,11 +268,11 @@ struct ec_key_st {
     BIGNUM *priv_key;
     unsigned int enc_flag;
     point_conversion_form_t conv_form;
-    int references;
+    CRYPTO_REF_COUNT references;
     int flags;
     CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data;
     CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
-} /* EC_KEY */ ;
+};
 
 struct ec_point_st {
     const EC_METHOD *meth;
@@ -279,7 +286,7 @@ struct ec_point_st {
                                  * Z) represents (X/Z^2, Y/Z^3) if Z != 0 */
     int Z_is_one;               /* enable optimized point arithmetics for
                                  * special case */
-} /* EC_POINT */ ;
+};
 
 NISTP224_PRE_COMP *EC_nistp224_pre_comp_dup(NISTP224_PRE_COMP *);
 NISTP256_PRE_COMP *EC_nistp256_pre_comp_dup(NISTP256_PRE_COMP *);
@@ -534,7 +541,6 @@ void ec_GFp_nistp_points_make_affine_internal(size_t num, void *point_array,
 void ec_GFp_nistp_recode_scalar_bits(unsigned char *sign,
                                      unsigned char *digit, unsigned char in);
 #endif
-int ec_precompute_mont_data(EC_GROUP *);
 int ec_group_simple_order_bits(const EC_GROUP *group);
 
 #ifdef ECP_NISTZ256_ASM
@@ -579,7 +585,7 @@ struct ec_key_method_st {
                   const unsigned char *sigbuf, int sig_len, EC_KEY *eckey);
     int (*verify_sig)(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
                       const ECDSA_SIG *sig, EC_KEY *eckey);
-} /* EC_KEY_METHOD */ ;
+};
 
 #define EC_KEY_METHOD_DYNAMIC   1
 
@@ -607,7 +613,17 @@ int ossl_ecdsa_verify(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
 int ossl_ecdsa_verify_sig(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
                           const ECDSA_SIG *sig, EC_KEY *eckey);
 
+int ED25519_sign(uint8_t *out_sig, const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,
+                 const uint8_t public_key[32], const uint8_t private_key[32]);
+int ED25519_verify(const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,
+                   const uint8_t signature[64], const uint8_t public_key[32]);
+void ED25519_public_from_private(uint8_t out_public_key[32],
+                                 const uint8_t private_key[32]);
+
 int X25519(uint8_t out_shared_key[32], const uint8_t private_key[32],
            const uint8_t peer_public_value[32]);
 void X25519_public_from_private(uint8_t out_public_value[32],
                                 const uint8_t private_key[32]);
+
+int EC_GROUP_do_inverse_ord(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *res,
+                            BIGNUM *x, BN_CTX *ctx);