Add secure DSA nonce flag.
[openssl.git] / crypto / dsa / dsa_ossl.c
index 38004eced5cac6134ac7177ce5076e73e98b6df0..d1f80609b1e578f5d8935dcac6846cae54f5b7b0 100644 (file)
@@ -58,6 +58,8 @@
 
 /* Original version from Steven Schoch <schoch@sheba.arc.nasa.gov> */
 
+#define OPENSSL_FIPSAPI
+
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include "cryptlib.h"
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
 #include <openssl/dsa.h>
 #include <openssl/rand.h>
 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+#include <openssl/fips.h>
+#endif
 
 static DSA_SIG *dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa);
-static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp);
+static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in,
+                         BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp,
+                         const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen);
 static int dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, DSA_SIG *sig,
                         DSA *dsa);
 static int dsa_init(DSA *dsa);
@@ -82,7 +89,7 @@ NULL, /* dsa_mod_exp, */
 NULL, /* dsa_bn_mod_exp, */
 dsa_init,
 dsa_finish,
-0,
+DSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD,
 NULL,
 NULL,
 NULL
@@ -136,6 +143,24 @@ static DSA_SIG *dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa)
        BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
        int reason=ERR_R_BN_LIB;
        DSA_SIG *ret=NULL;
+       int noredo = 0;
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+       if(FIPS_selftest_failed())
+           {
+           FIPSerr(FIPS_F_DSA_DO_SIGN,FIPS_R_FIPS_SELFTEST_FAILED);
+           return NULL;
+           }
+
+       if (FIPS_module_mode() && !(dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW) 
+               && (BN_num_bits(dsa->p) < OPENSSL_DSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS))
+               {
+               DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_SIGN, DSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
+               return NULL;
+               }
+       if (!fips_check_dsa_prng(dsa, 0, 0))
+               goto err;
+#endif
 
        BN_init(&m);
        BN_init(&xr);
@@ -148,21 +173,13 @@ static DSA_SIG *dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa)
 
        s=BN_new();
        if (s == NULL) goto err;
-
-       /* reject a excessive digest length (currently at most
-        * dsa-with-SHA256 is supported) */
-       if (dlen > SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)
-               {
-               reason=DSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE;
-               goto err;
-               }
-
        ctx=BN_CTX_new();
        if (ctx == NULL) goto err;
-
+redo:
        if ((dsa->kinv == NULL) || (dsa->r == NULL))
                {
-               if (!DSA_sign_setup(dsa,ctx,&kinv,&r)) goto err;
+               if (!dsa->meth->dsa_sign_setup(dsa,ctx,&kinv,&r,dgst,dlen))
+                       goto err;
                }
        else
                {
@@ -170,6 +187,7 @@ static DSA_SIG *dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa)
                dsa->kinv=NULL;
                r=dsa->r;
                dsa->r=NULL;
+               noredo = 1;
                }
 
        
@@ -185,11 +203,23 @@ static DSA_SIG *dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa)
        if (!BN_mod_mul(&xr,dsa->priv_key,r,dsa->q,ctx)) goto err;/* s = xr */
        if (!BN_add(s, &xr, &m)) goto err;              /* s = m + xr */
        if (BN_cmp(s,dsa->q) > 0)
-               BN_sub(s,s,dsa->q);
+               if (!BN_sub(s,s,dsa->q)) goto err;
        if (!BN_mod_mul(s,s,kinv,dsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
 
        ret=DSA_SIG_new();
        if (ret == NULL) goto err;
+       /* Redo if r or s is zero as required by FIPS 186-3: this is
+        * very unlikely.
+        */
+       if (BN_is_zero(r) || BN_is_zero(s))
+               {
+               if (noredo)
+                       {
+                       reason = DSA_R_NEED_NEW_SETUP_VALUES;
+                       goto err;
+                       }
+               goto redo;
+               }
        ret->r = r;
        ret->s = s;
        
@@ -208,7 +238,9 @@ err:
        return(ret);
        }
 
-static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp)
+static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in,
+                         BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp,
+                         const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen)
        {
        BN_CTX *ctx;
        BIGNUM k,kq,*K,*kinv=NULL,*r=NULL;
@@ -234,11 +266,25 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp)
 
        /* Get random k */
        do
-               if (!BN_rand_range(&k, dsa->q)) goto err;
-       while (BN_is_zero(&k));
+               {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
+               if (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NONCE_FROM_HASH)
+                       {
+                       /* If DSA_FLAG_NONCE_FROM_HASH is set then we calculate k from
+                        * SHA512(private_key + H(message) + random). This protects the
+                        * private key from a weak PRNG. */
+                       if (!BN_generate_dsa_nonce(&k, dsa->q, dsa->priv_key, dgst,
+                                                  dlen, ctx))
+                               goto err;
+                       }
+               else
+#endif
+                       if (!BN_rand_range(&k, dsa->q)) goto err;
+               } while (BN_is_zero(&k));
+
        if ((dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0)
                {
-               BN_set_flags(&k, BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME);
+               BN_set_flags(&k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
                }
 
        if (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P)
@@ -320,20 +366,26 @@ static int dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, DSA_SIG *sig,
                return -1;
                }
 
-       if (BN_num_bits(dsa->p) > OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+       if(FIPS_selftest_failed())
+           {
+           FIPSerr(FIPS_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY,FIPS_R_FIPS_SELFTEST_FAILED);
+           return -1;
+           }
+
+       if (FIPS_module_mode() && !(dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW) 
+               && (BN_num_bits(dsa->p) < OPENSSL_DSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS))
                {
-               DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY,DSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
+               DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY, DSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
                return -1;
                }
+#endif
 
-       /* reject a excessive digest length (currently at most
-        * dsa-with-SHA256 is supported) */
-       if (dgst_len > SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)
+       if (BN_num_bits(dsa->p) > OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)
                {
-               DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY,DSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
+               DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY,DSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
                return -1;
                }
-
        BN_init(&u1);
        BN_init(&u2);
        BN_init(&t1);