Introduce limits to prevent malicious keys being able to

[openssl.git] / crypto / dsa / dsa_ossl.c

diff --git a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
index 3fd8a35613d32dce4d252a6c65986df615210fe7..2fab8dc65a7d7c6c5ad3a2992845755528d80693 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
+++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
@@ -281,11 +281,10 @@ err:
        if (!ret)
                {
                DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_SIGN_SETUP,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-               if (kinv != NULL) BN_clear_free(kinv);
-               if (r != NULL) BN_clear_free(r);
+               if (r != NULL)
+                       BN_clear_free(r);
                }
        if (ctx_in == NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
-       if (kinv != NULL) BN_clear_free(kinv);
        BN_clear_free(&k);
        BN_clear_free(&kq);
        return(ret);
@@ -304,6 +303,18 @@ static int dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, DSA_SIG *sig,
                return -1;
                }
 
+       if (BN_num_bits(dsa->q) != 160)
+               {
+               DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY,DSA_R_BAD_Q_VALUE);
+               return -1;
+               }
+
+       if (BN_num_bits(dsa->p) > OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)
+               {
+               DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY,DSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
+               return -1;
+               }
+
        BN_init(&u1);
        BN_init(&u2);
        BN_init(&t1);