/*
- * Copyright 1995-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1995-2024 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
- * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
+/*
+ * DH low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
+ * internal use.
+ */
+#include "internal/deprecated.h"
+
#include <stdio.h>
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#include "dh_locl.h"
+#include "dh_local.h"
+#include "crypto/dh.h"
/*-
* Check that p and g are suitable enough
{
int errflags = 0;
- (void)DH_check_params(dh, &errflags);
+ if (!DH_check_params(dh, &errflags))
+ return 0;
if ((errflags & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME) != 0)
- DHerr(DH_F_DH_CHECK_PARAMS_EX, DH_R_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME);
if ((errflags & DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR) != 0)
- DHerr(DH_F_DH_CHECK_PARAMS_EX, DH_R_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR);
+ if ((errflags & DH_MODULUS_TOO_SMALL) != 0)
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_SMALL);
+ if ((errflags & DH_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE) != 0)
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
return errflags == 0;
}
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+int DH_check_params(const DH *dh, int *ret)
+{
+ int nid;
+
+ *ret = 0;
+ /*
+ * SP800-56A R3 Section 5.5.2 Assurances of Domain Parameter Validity
+ * (1a) The domain parameters correspond to any approved safe prime group.
+ */
+ nid = DH_get_nid((DH *)dh);
+ if (nid != NID_undef)
+ return 1;
+ /*
+ * OR
+ * (2b) FFC domain params conform to FIPS-186-4 explicit domain param
+ * validity tests.
+ */
+ return ossl_ffc_params_FIPS186_4_validate(dh->libctx, &dh->params,
+ FFC_PARAM_TYPE_DH, ret, NULL);
+}
+#else
int DH_check_params(const DH *dh, int *ret)
{
int ok = 0;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
*ret = 0;
- ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(dh->libctx);
if (ctx == NULL)
goto err;
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
if (tmp == NULL)
goto err;
- if (!BN_is_odd(dh->p))
+ if (!BN_is_odd(dh->params.p))
*ret |= DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME;
- if (BN_is_negative(dh->g) || BN_is_zero(dh->g) || BN_is_one(dh->g))
+ if (BN_is_negative(dh->params.g)
+ || BN_is_zero(dh->params.g)
+ || BN_is_one(dh->params.g))
*ret |= DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR;
- if (BN_copy(tmp, dh->p) == NULL || !BN_sub_word(tmp, 1))
+ if (BN_copy(tmp, dh->params.p) == NULL || !BN_sub_word(tmp, 1))
goto err;
- if (BN_cmp(dh->g, tmp) >= 0)
+ if (BN_cmp(dh->params.g, tmp) >= 0)
*ret |= DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR;
+ if (BN_num_bits(dh->params.p) < DH_MIN_MODULUS_BITS)
+ *ret |= DH_MODULUS_TOO_SMALL;
+ if (BN_num_bits(dh->params.p) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)
+ *ret |= DH_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE;
ok = 1;
err:
- if (ctx != NULL) {
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- }
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
return ok;
}
+#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
/*-
* Check that p is a safe prime and
- * if g is 2, 3 or 5, check that it is a suitable generator
- * where
- * for 2, p mod 24 == 11
- * for 3, p mod 12 == 5
- * for 5, p mod 10 == 3 or 7
- * should hold.
+ * g is a suitable generator.
*/
int DH_check_ex(const DH *dh)
{
int errflags = 0;
- (void)DH_check(dh, &errflags);
+ if (!DH_check(dh, &errflags))
+ return 0;
if ((errflags & DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR) != 0)
- DHerr(DH_F_DH_CHECK_EX, DH_R_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR);
if ((errflags & DH_CHECK_Q_NOT_PRIME) != 0)
- DHerr(DH_F_DH_CHECK_EX, DH_R_CHECK_Q_NOT_PRIME);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_CHECK_Q_NOT_PRIME);
if ((errflags & DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE) != 0)
- DHerr(DH_F_DH_CHECK_EX, DH_R_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE);
if ((errflags & DH_CHECK_INVALID_J_VALUE) != 0)
- DHerr(DH_F_DH_CHECK_EX, DH_R_CHECK_INVALID_J_VALUE);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_CHECK_INVALID_J_VALUE);
if ((errflags & DH_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR) != 0)
- DHerr(DH_F_DH_CHECK_EX, DH_R_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR);
if ((errflags & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME) != 0)
- DHerr(DH_F_DH_CHECK_EX, DH_R_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME);
if ((errflags & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME) != 0)
- DHerr(DH_F_DH_CHECK_EX, DH_R_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME);
+ if ((errflags & DH_MODULUS_TOO_SMALL) != 0)
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_SMALL);
+ if ((errflags & DH_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE) != 0)
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
return errflags == 0;
}
+/* Note: according to documentation - this only checks the params */
int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret)
{
- int ok = 0, r;
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ return DH_check_params(dh, ret);
+#else
+ int ok = 0, r, q_good = 0;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
- BN_ULONG l;
BIGNUM *t1 = NULL, *t2 = NULL;
+ int nid = DH_get_nid((DH *)dh);
*ret = 0;
- ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ if (nid != NID_undef)
+ return 1;
+
+ /* Don't do any checks at all with an excessively large modulus */
+ if (BN_num_bits(dh->params.p) > OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
+ *ret = DH_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE | DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!DH_check_params(dh, ret))
+ return 0;
+
+ ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(dh->libctx);
if (ctx == NULL)
goto err;
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
if (t2 == NULL)
goto err;
- if (dh->q) {
- if (BN_cmp(dh->g, BN_value_one()) <= 0)
+ if (dh->params.q != NULL) {
+ if (BN_ucmp(dh->params.p, dh->params.q) > 0)
+ q_good = 1;
+ else
+ *ret |= DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE;
+ }
+
+ if (q_good) {
+ if (BN_cmp(dh->params.g, BN_value_one()) <= 0)
*ret |= DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR;
- else if (BN_cmp(dh->g, dh->p) >= 0)
+ else if (BN_cmp(dh->params.g, dh->params.p) >= 0)
*ret |= DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR;
else {
/* Check g^q == 1 mod p */
- if (!BN_mod_exp(t1, dh->g, dh->q, dh->p, ctx))
+ if (!BN_mod_exp(t1, dh->params.g, dh->params.q, dh->params.p, ctx))
goto err;
if (!BN_is_one(t1))
*ret |= DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR;
}
- r = BN_is_prime_ex(dh->q, BN_prime_checks, ctx, NULL);
+ r = BN_check_prime(dh->params.q, ctx, NULL);
if (r < 0)
goto err;
if (!r)
*ret |= DH_CHECK_Q_NOT_PRIME;
/* Check p == 1 mod q i.e. q divides p - 1 */
- if (!BN_div(t1, t2, dh->p, dh->q, ctx))
+ if (!BN_div(t1, t2, dh->params.p, dh->params.q, ctx))
goto err;
if (!BN_is_one(t2))
*ret |= DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE;
- if (dh->j && BN_cmp(dh->j, t1))
+ if (dh->params.j != NULL
+ && BN_cmp(dh->params.j, t1))
*ret |= DH_CHECK_INVALID_J_VALUE;
+ }
- } else if (BN_is_word(dh->g, DH_GENERATOR_2)) {
- l = BN_mod_word(dh->p, 24);
- if (l == (BN_ULONG)-1)
- goto err;
- if (l != 11)
- *ret |= DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR;
- } else if (BN_is_word(dh->g, DH_GENERATOR_5)) {
- l = BN_mod_word(dh->p, 10);
- if (l == (BN_ULONG)-1)
- goto err;
- if ((l != 3) && (l != 7))
- *ret |= DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR;
- } else
- *ret |= DH_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR;
-
- r = BN_is_prime_ex(dh->p, BN_prime_checks, ctx, NULL);
+ r = BN_check_prime(dh->params.p, ctx, NULL);
if (r < 0)
goto err;
if (!r)
*ret |= DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME;
- else if (!dh->q) {
- if (!BN_rshift1(t1, dh->p))
+ else if (dh->params.q == NULL) {
+ if (!BN_rshift1(t1, dh->params.p))
goto err;
- r = BN_is_prime_ex(t1, BN_prime_checks, ctx, NULL);
+ r = BN_check_prime(t1, ctx, NULL);
if (r < 0)
goto err;
if (!r)
}
ok = 1;
err:
- if (ctx != NULL) {
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- }
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
return ok;
+#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
}
int DH_check_pub_key_ex(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM *pub_key)
{
int errflags = 0;
- (void)DH_check(dh, &errflags);
+ if (!DH_check_pub_key(dh, pub_key, &errflags))
+ return 0;
if ((errflags & DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_SMALL) != 0)
- DHerr(DH_F_DH_CHECK_PUB_KEY_EX, DH_R_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_SMALL);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_SMALL);
if ((errflags & DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_LARGE) != 0)
- DHerr(DH_F_DH_CHECK_PUB_KEY_EX, DH_R_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_LARGE);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_LARGE);
if ((errflags & DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID) != 0)
- DHerr(DH_F_DH_CHECK_PUB_KEY_EX, DH_R_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID);
return errflags == 0;
}
+/*
+ * See SP800-56Ar3 Section 5.6.2.3.1 : FFC Full public key validation.
+ */
int DH_check_pub_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM *pub_key, int *ret)
+{
+ /* Don't do any checks at all with an excessively large modulus */
+ if (BN_num_bits(dh->params.p) > OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
+ *ret = DH_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE | DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (dh->params.q != NULL && BN_ucmp(dh->params.p, dh->params.q) < 0) {
+ *ret |= DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE | DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ return ossl_ffc_validate_public_key(&dh->params, pub_key, ret);
+}
+
+/*
+ * See SP800-56Ar3 Section 5.6.2.3.1 : FFC Partial public key validation.
+ * To only be used with ephemeral FFC public keys generated using the approved
+ * safe-prime groups.
+ */
+int ossl_dh_check_pub_key_partial(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM *pub_key, int *ret)
+{
+ return ossl_ffc_validate_public_key_partial(&dh->params, pub_key, ret)
+ && *ret == 0;
+}
+
+int ossl_dh_check_priv_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM *priv_key, int *ret)
{
int ok = 0;
- BIGNUM *tmp = NULL;
- BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *two_powN = NULL, *upper;
*ret = 0;
- ctx = BN_CTX_new();
- if (ctx == NULL)
- goto err;
- BN_CTX_start(ctx);
- tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- if (tmp == NULL || !BN_set_word(tmp, 1))
- goto err;
- if (BN_cmp(pub_key, tmp) <= 0)
- *ret |= DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_SMALL;
- if (BN_copy(tmp, dh->p) == NULL || !BN_sub_word(tmp, 1))
- goto err;
- if (BN_cmp(pub_key, tmp) >= 0)
- *ret |= DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_LARGE;
+ two_powN = BN_new();
+ if (two_powN == NULL)
+ return 0;
- if (dh->q != NULL) {
- /* Check pub_key^q == 1 mod p */
- if (!BN_mod_exp(tmp, pub_key, dh->q, dh->p, ctx))
- goto err;
- if (!BN_is_one(tmp))
- *ret |= DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID;
+ if (dh->params.q != NULL) {
+ upper = dh->params.q;
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+ } else if (dh->params.p != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * We do not have q so we just check the key is within some
+ * reasonable range, or the number of bits is equal to dh->length.
+ */
+ int length = dh->length;
+
+ if (length == 0) {
+ length = BN_num_bits(dh->params.p) - 1;
+ if (BN_num_bits(priv_key) <= length
+ && BN_num_bits(priv_key) > 1)
+ ok = 1;
+ } else if (BN_num_bits(priv_key) == length) {
+ ok = 1;
+ }
+ goto end;
+#endif
+ } else {
+ goto end;
}
- ok = 1;
- err:
- if (ctx != NULL) {
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ /* Is it from an approved Safe prime group ?*/
+ if (DH_get_nid((DH *)dh) != NID_undef && dh->length != 0) {
+ if (!BN_lshift(two_powN, BN_value_one(), dh->length))
+ goto end;
+ if (BN_cmp(two_powN, dh->params.q) < 0)
+ upper = two_powN;
}
+ if (!ossl_ffc_validate_private_key(upper, priv_key, ret))
+ goto end;
+
+ ok = 1;
+end:
+ BN_free(two_powN);
return ok;
}
+
+/*
+ * FFC pairwise check from SP800-56A R3.
+ * Section 5.6.2.1.4 Owner Assurance of Pair-wise Consistency
+ */
+int ossl_dh_check_pairwise(const DH *dh)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL;
+
+ if (dh->params.p == NULL
+ || dh->params.g == NULL
+ || dh->priv_key == NULL
+ || dh->pub_key == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(dh->libctx);
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ pub_key = BN_new();
+ if (pub_key == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* recalculate the public key = (g ^ priv) mod p */
+ if (!ossl_dh_generate_public_key(ctx, dh, dh->priv_key, pub_key))
+ goto err;
+ /* check it matches the existing public_key */
+ ret = BN_cmp(pub_key, dh->pub_key) == 0;
+err:
+ BN_free(pub_key);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ return ret;
+}
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