/*
- * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1995-2024 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
return 0;
if ((errflags & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME) != 0)
- DHerr(DH_F_DH_CHECK_PARAMS_EX, DH_R_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME);
if ((errflags & DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR) != 0)
- DHerr(DH_F_DH_CHECK_PARAMS_EX, DH_R_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR);
if ((errflags & DH_MODULUS_TOO_SMALL) != 0)
- DHerr(DH_F_DH_CHECK_PARAMS_EX, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_SMALL);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_SMALL);
if ((errflags & DH_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE) != 0)
- DHerr(DH_F_DH_CHECK_PARAMS_EX, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
return errflags == 0;
}
-#ifdef FIPS_MODE
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
int DH_check_params(const DH *dh, int *ret)
{
int nid;
* (2b) FFC domain params conform to FIPS-186-4 explicit domain param
* validity tests.
*/
- return ffc_params_FIPS186_4_validate(&dh->params, FFC_PARAM_TYPE_DH, NULL,
- FFC_PARAMS_VALIDATE_ALL, ret, NULL);
+ return ossl_ffc_params_FIPS186_4_validate(dh->libctx, &dh->params,
+ FFC_PARAM_TYPE_DH, ret, NULL);
}
#else
int DH_check_params(const DH *dh, int *ret)
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
*ret = 0;
- ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(dh->libctx);
if (ctx == NULL)
goto err;
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
return ok;
}
-#endif /* FIPS_MODE */
+#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
/*-
* Check that p is a safe prime and
return 0;
if ((errflags & DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR) != 0)
- DHerr(DH_F_DH_CHECK_EX, DH_R_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR);
if ((errflags & DH_CHECK_Q_NOT_PRIME) != 0)
- DHerr(DH_F_DH_CHECK_EX, DH_R_CHECK_Q_NOT_PRIME);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_CHECK_Q_NOT_PRIME);
if ((errflags & DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE) != 0)
- DHerr(DH_F_DH_CHECK_EX, DH_R_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE);
if ((errflags & DH_CHECK_INVALID_J_VALUE) != 0)
- DHerr(DH_F_DH_CHECK_EX, DH_R_CHECK_INVALID_J_VALUE);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_CHECK_INVALID_J_VALUE);
if ((errflags & DH_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR) != 0)
- DHerr(DH_F_DH_CHECK_EX, DH_R_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_GENERATOR);
if ((errflags & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME) != 0)
- DHerr(DH_F_DH_CHECK_EX, DH_R_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME);
if ((errflags & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME) != 0)
- DHerr(DH_F_DH_CHECK_EX, DH_R_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME);
if ((errflags & DH_MODULUS_TOO_SMALL) != 0)
- DHerr(DH_F_DH_CHECK_EX, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_SMALL);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_SMALL);
if ((errflags & DH_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE) != 0)
- DHerr(DH_F_DH_CHECK_EX, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
return errflags == 0;
}
/* Note: according to documentation - this only checks the params */
int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret)
{
-#ifdef FIPS_MODE
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
return DH_check_params(dh, ret);
#else
- int ok = 0, r;
+ int ok = 0, r, q_good = 0;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
BIGNUM *t1 = NULL, *t2 = NULL;
int nid = DH_get_nid((DH *)dh);
if (nid != NID_undef)
return 1;
+ /* Don't do any checks at all with an excessively large modulus */
+ if (BN_num_bits(dh->params.p) > OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
+ *ret = DH_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE | DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
if (!DH_check_params(dh, ret))
return 0;
- ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(dh->libctx);
if (ctx == NULL)
goto err;
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
goto err;
if (dh->params.q != NULL) {
+ if (BN_ucmp(dh->params.p, dh->params.q) > 0)
+ q_good = 1;
+ else
+ *ret |= DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE;
+ }
+
+ if (q_good) {
if (BN_cmp(dh->params.g, BN_value_one()) <= 0)
*ret |= DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR;
else if (BN_cmp(dh->params.g, dh->params.p) >= 0)
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
return ok;
-#endif /* FIPS_MODE */
+#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
}
int DH_check_pub_key_ex(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM *pub_key)
return 0;
if ((errflags & DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_SMALL) != 0)
- DHerr(DH_F_DH_CHECK_PUB_KEY_EX, DH_R_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_SMALL);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_SMALL);
if ((errflags & DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_LARGE) != 0)
- DHerr(DH_F_DH_CHECK_PUB_KEY_EX, DH_R_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_LARGE);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_LARGE);
if ((errflags & DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID) != 0)
- DHerr(DH_F_DH_CHECK_PUB_KEY_EX, DH_R_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID);
return errflags == 0;
}
*/
int DH_check_pub_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM *pub_key, int *ret)
{
- return ffc_validate_public_key(&dh->params, pub_key, ret);
+ /* Don't do any checks at all with an excessively large modulus */
+ if (BN_num_bits(dh->params.p) > OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
+ *ret = DH_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE | DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (dh->params.q != NULL && BN_ucmp(dh->params.p, dh->params.q) < 0) {
+ *ret |= DH_CHECK_INVALID_Q_VALUE | DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ return ossl_ffc_validate_public_key(&dh->params, pub_key, ret);
}
/*
* To only be used with ephemeral FFC public keys generated using the approved
* safe-prime groups.
*/
-int dh_check_pub_key_partial(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM *pub_key, int *ret)
+int ossl_dh_check_pub_key_partial(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM *pub_key, int *ret)
{
- return ffc_validate_public_key_partial(&dh->params, pub_key, ret);
+ return ossl_ffc_validate_public_key_partial(&dh->params, pub_key, ret)
+ && *ret == 0;
}
-int dh_check_priv_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM *priv_key, int *ret)
+int ossl_dh_check_priv_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM *priv_key, int *ret)
{
int ok = 0;
BIGNUM *two_powN = NULL, *upper;
two_powN = BN_new();
if (two_powN == NULL)
return 0;
- if (dh->params.q == NULL)
- goto err;
- upper = dh->params.q;
+
+ if (dh->params.q != NULL) {
+ upper = dh->params.q;
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+ } else if (dh->params.p != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * We do not have q so we just check the key is within some
+ * reasonable range, or the number of bits is equal to dh->length.
+ */
+ int length = dh->length;
+
+ if (length == 0) {
+ length = BN_num_bits(dh->params.p) - 1;
+ if (BN_num_bits(priv_key) <= length
+ && BN_num_bits(priv_key) > 1)
+ ok = 1;
+ } else if (BN_num_bits(priv_key) == length) {
+ ok = 1;
+ }
+ goto end;
+#endif
+ } else {
+ goto end;
+ }
/* Is it from an approved Safe prime group ?*/
- if (DH_get_nid((DH *)dh) != NID_undef) {
+ if (DH_get_nid((DH *)dh) != NID_undef && dh->length != 0) {
if (!BN_lshift(two_powN, BN_value_one(), dh->length))
- goto err;
+ goto end;
if (BN_cmp(two_powN, dh->params.q) < 0)
upper = two_powN;
}
- if (!ffc_validate_private_key(upper, priv_key, ret))
- goto err;
+ if (!ossl_ffc_validate_private_key(upper, priv_key, ret))
+ goto end;
ok = 1;
-err:
+end:
BN_free(two_powN);
return ok;
}
* FFC pairwise check from SP800-56A R3.
* Section 5.6.2.1.4 Owner Assurance of Pair-wise Consistency
*/
-int dh_check_pairwise(DH *dh)
+int ossl_dh_check_pairwise(const DH *dh)
{
int ret = 0;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
goto err;
/* recalculate the public key = (g ^ priv) mod p */
- if (!dh_generate_public_key(ctx, dh, dh->priv_key, pub_key))
+ if (!ossl_dh_generate_public_key(ctx, dh, dh->priv_key, pub_key))
goto err;
- /* check it matches the existing pubic_key */
+ /* check it matches the existing public_key */
ret = BN_cmp(pub_key, dh->pub_key) == 0;
err:
BN_free(pub_key);
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