SCT *SCT_new(void)
{
- SCT *sct = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(SCT));
+ SCT *sct = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*sct));
if (sct == NULL) {
CTerr(CT_F_SCT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
sct->version = version;
+ sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET;
return 1;
}
int SCT_set_log_entry_type(SCT *sct, ct_log_entry_type_t entry_type)
{
+ sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET;
+
switch (entry_type) {
case CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_X509:
case CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_PRECERT:
OPENSSL_free(sct->log_id);
sct->log_id = log_id;
sct->log_id_len = log_id_len;
+ sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET;
return 1;
}
OPENSSL_free(sct->log_id);
sct->log_id = NULL;
sct->log_id_len = 0;
+ sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET;
if (log_id != NULL && log_id_len > 0) {
sct->log_id = OPENSSL_memdup(log_id, log_id_len);
void SCT_set_timestamp(SCT *sct, uint64_t timestamp)
{
sct->timestamp = timestamp;
+ sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET;
}
int SCT_set_signature_nid(SCT *sct, int nid)
case NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption:
sct->hash_alg = TLSEXT_hash_sha256;
sct->sig_alg = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
+ sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET;
return 1;
case NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256:
sct->hash_alg = TLSEXT_hash_sha256;
sct->sig_alg = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
+ sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET;
return 1;
default:
CTerr(CT_F_SCT_SET_SIGNATURE_NID, CT_R_UNRECOGNIZED_SIGNATURE_NID);
OPENSSL_free(sct->ext);
sct->ext = ext;
sct->ext_len = ext_len;
+ sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET;
}
int SCT_set1_extensions(SCT *sct, const unsigned char *ext, size_t ext_len)
OPENSSL_free(sct->ext);
sct->ext = NULL;
sct->ext_len = 0;
+ sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET;
if (ext != NULL && ext_len > 0) {
sct->ext = OPENSSL_memdup(ext, ext_len);
OPENSSL_free(sct->sig);
sct->sig = sig;
sct->sig_len = sig_len;
+ sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET;
}
int SCT_set1_signature(SCT *sct, const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len)
OPENSSL_free(sct->sig);
sct->sig = NULL;
sct->sig_len = 0;
+ sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_NOT_SET;
if (sig != NULL && sig_len > 0) {
sct->sig = OPENSSL_memdup(sig, sig_len);
sct->sig != NULL && sct->sig_len > 0;
}
+sct_source_t SCT_get_source(const SCT *sct)
+{
+ return sct->source;
+}
+
+int SCT_set_source(SCT *sct, sct_source_t source)
+{
+ sct->source = source;
+ switch (source) {
+ case SCT_SOURCE_TLS_EXTENSION:
+ case SCT_SOURCE_OCSP_STAPLED_RESPONSE:
+ return SCT_set_log_entry_type(sct, CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_X509);
+ case SCT_SOURCE_X509V3_EXTENSION:
+ return SCT_set_log_entry_type(sct, CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_PRECERT);
+ default: /* if we aren't sure, leave the log entry type alone */
+ return 1;
+ }
+}
+
+sct_validation_status_t SCT_get_validation_status(const SCT *sct)
+{
+ return sct->validation_status;
+}
+
+int SCT_validate(SCT *sct, const CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ int is_sct_valid = -1;
+ SCT_CTX *sctx = NULL;
+ X509_PUBKEY *pub = NULL, *log_pkey = NULL;
+ const CTLOG *log;
+
+ /*
+ * With an unrecognized SCT version we don't know what such an SCT means,
+ * let alone validate one. So we return validation failure (0).
+ */
+ if (sct->version != SCT_VERSION_V1) {
+ sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN_VERSION;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ log = CTLOG_STORE_get0_log_by_id(ctx->log_store,
+ sct->log_id, sct->log_id_len);
+
+ /* Similarly, an SCT from an unknown log also cannot be validated. */
+ if (log == NULL) {
+ sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN_LOG;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ sctx = SCT_CTX_new();
+ if (sctx == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (X509_PUBKEY_set(&log_pkey, CTLOG_get0_public_key(log)) != 1)
+ goto err;
+ if (SCT_CTX_set1_pubkey(sctx, log_pkey) != 1)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (SCT_get_log_entry_type(sct) == CT_LOG_ENTRY_TYPE_PRECERT) {
+ EVP_PKEY *issuer_pkey;
+
+ if (ctx->issuer == NULL) {
+ sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNVERIFIED;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ issuer_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(ctx->issuer);
+
+ if (X509_PUBKEY_set(&pub, issuer_pkey) != 1)
+ goto err;
+ if (SCT_CTX_set1_issuer_pubkey(sctx, pub) != 1)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * XXX: Potential for optimization. This repeats some idempotent heavy
+ * lifting on the certificate for each candidate SCT, and appears to not
+ * use any information in the SCT itself, only the certificate is
+ * processed. So it may make more sense to to do this just once, perhaps
+ * associated with the shared (by all SCTs) policy eval ctx.
+ *
+ * XXX: Failure here is global (SCT independent) and represents either an
+ * issue with the certificate (e.g. duplicate extensions) or an out of
+ * memory condition. When the certificate is incompatible with CT, we just
+ * mark the SCTs invalid, rather than report a failure to determine the
+ * validation status. That way, callbacks that want to do "soft" SCT
+ * processing will not abort handshakes with false positive internal
+ * errors. Since the function does not distinguish between certificate
+ * issues (peer's fault) and internal problems (out fault) the safe thing
+ * to do is to report a validation failure and let the callback or
+ * application decide what to do.
+ */
+ if (SCT_CTX_set1_cert(sctx, ctx->cert, NULL) != 1)
+ sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNVERIFIED;
+ else
+ sct->validation_status = SCT_verify(sctx, sct) == 1 ?
+ SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_VALID : SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_INVALID;
+
+end:
+ is_sct_valid = sct->validation_status == SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_VALID;
+err:
+ X509_PUBKEY_free(pub);
+ X509_PUBKEY_free(log_pkey);
+ SCT_CTX_free(sctx);
+
+ return is_sct_valid;
+}
+
+int SCT_LIST_validate(const STACK_OF(SCT) *scts, CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ int are_scts_valid = 1;
+ int sct_count = scts != NULL ? sk_SCT_num(scts) : 0;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sct_count; ++i) {
+ int is_sct_valid = -1;
+ SCT *sct = sk_SCT_value(scts, i);
+
+ if (sct == NULL)
+ continue;
+
+ is_sct_valid = SCT_validate(sct, ctx);
+ if (is_sct_valid < 0)
+ return is_sct_valid;
+ are_scts_valid &= is_sct_valid;
+ }
+
+ return are_scts_valid;
+}
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff