Suppress CT callback as appropriate

[openssl.git] / crypto / ct / ct_sct.c

diff --git a/crypto/ct/ct_sct.c b/crypto/ct/ct_sct.c
index 20bb156afcd21d54fa58741fbe59adf9e43c7e64..1fc745612914ab1e0dd6ad1f1973743e95aebec5 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/ct/ct_sct.c
+++ b/crypto/ct/ct_sct.c
@@ -251,11 +251,6 @@ size_t SCT_get0_log_id(const SCT *sct, unsigned char **log_id)
     return sct->log_id_len;
 }
 
-const char *SCT_get0_log_name(const SCT *sct)
-{
-    return CTLOG_get0_name(sct->log);
-}
-
 uint64_t SCT_get_timestamp(const SCT *sct)
 {
     return sct->timestamp;
@@ -327,47 +322,6 @@ int SCT_set_source(SCT *sct, sct_source_t source)
     }
 }
 
-int SCT_LIST_set_source(const STACK_OF(SCT) *scts, sct_source_t source)
-{
-    int i, ret = 0;
-
-    for (i = 0; i < sk_SCT_num(scts); ++i) {
-        if (SCT_set_source(sk_SCT_value(scts, i), source))
-            ++ret;
-    }
-
-    return ret;
-}
-
-const CTLOG *SCT_get0_log(const SCT *sct)
-{
-    return sct->log;
-}
-
-int SCT_set0_log(SCT *sct, const CTLOG_STORE *ct_logs)
-{
-    sct->log = CTLOG_STORE_get0_log_by_id(ct_logs, sct->log_id, sct->log_id_len);
-
-    return sct->log != NULL;
-}
-
-int SCT_LIST_set0_logs(STACK_OF(SCT) *sct_list, const CTLOG_STORE *ct_logs)
-{
-    int sct_logs_found = 0;
-    int i;
-
-    for (i = 0; i < sk_SCT_num(sct_list); ++i) {
-        SCT *sct = sk_SCT_value(sct_list, i);
-
-        if (sct->log == NULL)
-            SCT_set0_log(sct, ct_logs);
-        if (sct->log != NULL)
-            ++sct_logs_found;
-    }
-
-    return sct_logs_found;
-}
-
 sct_validation_status_t SCT_get_validation_status(const SCT *sct)
 {
     return sct->validation_status;
@@ -378,29 +332,31 @@ int SCT_validate(SCT *sct, const CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx)
     int is_sct_valid = -1;
     SCT_CTX *sctx = NULL;
     X509_PUBKEY *pub = NULL, *log_pkey = NULL;
+    const CTLOG *log;
 
-    switch (sct->version) {
-    case SCT_VERSION_V1:
-        if (sct->log == NULL)
-            sct->log = CTLOG_STORE_get0_log_by_id(ctx->log_store,
-                                                  sct->log_id,
-                                                  CT_V1_HASHLEN);
-        break;
-    default:
+    /*
+     * With an unrecognized SCT version we don't know what such an SCT means,
+     * let alone validate one.  So we return validation failure (0).
+     */
+    if (sct->version != SCT_VERSION_V1) {
         sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN_VERSION;
-        goto end;
+        return 0;
     }
 
-    if (sct->log == NULL) {
+    log = CTLOG_STORE_get0_log_by_id(ctx->log_store,
+                                     sct->log_id, sct->log_id_len);
+
+    /* Similarly, an SCT from an unknown log also cannot be validated. */
+    if (log == NULL) {
         sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN_LOG;
-        goto end;
+        return 0;
     }
 
     sctx = SCT_CTX_new();
     if (sctx == NULL)
         goto err;
 
-    if (X509_PUBKEY_set(&log_pkey, CTLOG_get0_public_key(sct->log)) != 1)
+    if (X509_PUBKEY_set(&log_pkey, CTLOG_get0_public_key(log)) != 1)
         goto err;
     if (SCT_CTX_set1_pubkey(sctx, log_pkey) != 1)
         goto err;
@@ -421,10 +377,28 @@ int SCT_validate(SCT *sct, const CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx)
             goto err;
     }
 
+    /*
+     * XXX: Potential for optimization.  This repeats some idempotent heavy
+     * lifting on the certificate for each candidate SCT, and appears to not
+     * use any information in the SCT itself, only the certificate is
+     * processed.  So it may make more sense to to do this just once, perhaps
+     * associated with the shared (by all SCTs) policy eval ctx.
+     *
+     * XXX: Failure here is global (SCT independent) and represents either an
+     * issue with the certificate (e.g. duplicate extensions) or an out of
+     * memory condition.  When the certificate is incompatible with CT, we just
+     * mark the SCTs invalid, rather than report a failure to determine the
+     * validation status.  That way, callbacks that want to do "soft" SCT
+     * processing will not abort handshakes with false positive internal
+     * errors.  Since the function does not distinguish between certificate
+     * issues (peer's fault) and internal problems (out fault) the safe thing
+     * to do is to report a validation failure and let the callback or
+     * application decide what to do.
+     */
     if (SCT_CTX_set1_cert(sctx, ctx->cert, NULL) != 1)
-        goto err;
-
-    sct->validation_status = SCT_verify(sctx, sct) == 1 ?
+        sct->validation_status = SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_UNVERIFIED;
+    else
+        sct->validation_status = SCT_verify(sctx, sct) == 1 ?
             SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_VALID : SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_INVALID;
 
 end: