Fix infinite loops in secure memory allocation.

[openssl.git] / crypto / ct / ct_policy.c

diff --git a/crypto/ct/ct_policy.c b/crypto/ct/ct_policy.c
index 1bc22749d3c2b222ff85196eae62f8cd750a7d61..0d7b3463877d2b94ac2303f2d4bea4fde1d75518 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/ct/ct_policy.c
+++ b/crypto/ct/ct_policy.c
@@ -17,6 +17,14 @@
 
 #include "ct_locl.h"
 
+/*
+ * Number of seconds in the future that an SCT timestamp can be, by default,
+ * without being considered invalid. This is added to time() when setting a
+ * default value for CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX.epoch_time_in_ms.
+ * It can be overridden by calling CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set_time().
+ */
+static const time_t SCT_CLOCK_DRIFT_TOLERANCE = 300;
+
 CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_new(void)
 {
     CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX));
@@ -26,8 +34,10 @@ CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_new(void)
         return NULL;
     }
 
-    // time(NULL) shouldn't ever fail, so don't bother checking for -1.
-    ctx->epoch_time_in_ms = time(NULL) * 1000;
+    /* time(NULL) shouldn't ever fail, so don't bother checking for -1. */
+    ctx->epoch_time_in_ms = (uint64_t)(time(NULL) + SCT_CLOCK_DRIFT_TOLERANCE) *
+            1000;
+
     return ctx;
 }