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[openssl.git] / crypto / ct / ct_locl.h

diff --git a/crypto/ct/ct_locl.h b/crypto/ct/ct_locl.h
index b65df5a57d8ad552052d107662eb47589ff08ee5..9f983c91beae422eac6994d1608e536c5b894f9e 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/ct/ct_locl.h
+++ b/crypto/ct/ct_locl.h
@@ -98,6 +98,8 @@ struct sct_ctx_st {
     /* pre-certificate encoding */
     unsigned char *preder;
     size_t prederlen;
+    /* milliseconds since epoch (to check that the SCT isn't from the future) */
+    uint64_t epoch_time_in_ms;
 };
 
 /* Context when evaluating whether a Certificate Transparency policy is met */
@@ -105,6 +107,8 @@ struct ct_policy_eval_ctx_st {
     X509 *cert;
     X509 *issuer;
     CTLOG_STORE *log_store;
+    /* milliseconds since epoch (to check that SCTs aren't from the future) */
+    uint64_t epoch_time_in_ms;
 };
 
 /*
@@ -150,6 +154,15 @@ __owur int SCT_CTX_set1_issuer_pubkey(SCT_CTX *sctx, X509_PUBKEY *pubkey);
  */
 __owur int SCT_CTX_set1_pubkey(SCT_CTX *sctx, X509_PUBKEY *pubkey);
 
+/*
+ * Sets the time to evaluate the SCT against, in milliseconds since the Unix
+ * epoch. If the SCT's timestamp is after this time, it will be interpreted as
+ * having been issued in the future. RFC6962 states that "TLS clients MUST
+ * reject SCTs whose timestamp is in the future", so an SCT will not validate
+ * in this case.
+ */
+void SCT_CTX_set_time(SCT_CTX *sctx, uint64_t time_in_ms);
+
 /*
  * Verifies an SCT with the given context.
  * Returns 1 if the SCT verifies successfully; any other value indicates
@@ -192,6 +205,8 @@ __owur int i2o_SCT_signature(const SCT *sct, unsigned char **out);
 * |in| will be advanced to the end of the signature if parsing succeeds.
 * |len| should be the length of the signature in |in|.
 * Returns the number of bytes parsed, or a negative integer if an error occurs.
+* If an error occurs, the SCT's signature NID may be updated whilst the
+* signature field itself remains unset.
 */
 __owur int o2i_SCT_signature(SCT *sct, const unsigned char **in, size_t len);