-/* crypto/cms/cms_kari.c */
-/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
- * project.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2013 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * licensing@OpenSSL.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+/*
+ * Copyright 2013-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
-#include "cryptlib.h"
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
#include <openssl/pem.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/cms.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/aes.h>
-#include "cms_lcl.h"
-#include "asn1_locl.h"
+#include "cms_local.h"
+#include "crypto/asn1.h"
-DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo)
-DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey)
-DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(CMS_OriginatorPublicKey)
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey)
/* Key Agreement Recipient Info (KARI) routines */
int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_alg(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
- X509_ALGOR **palg,
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pukm)
- {
- if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE)
- {
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_GET0_ALG,
- CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT);
- return 0;
- }
- if (palg)
- *palg = ri->d.kari->keyEncryptionAlgorithm;
- if (pukm)
- *pukm = ri->d.kari->ukm;
- return 1;
- }
+ X509_ALGOR **palg,
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pukm)
+{
+ if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_GET0_ALG,
+ CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (palg)
+ *palg = ri->d.kari->keyEncryptionAlgorithm;
+ if (pukm)
+ *pukm = ri->d.kari->ukm;
+ return 1;
+}
/* Retrieve recipient encrypted keys from a kari */
-STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey) *CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_reks(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
- {
- if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE)
- {
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_GET0_REKS,
- CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT);
- return NULL;
- }
- return ri->d.kari->recipientEncryptedKeys;
- }
+STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey)
+*CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_reks(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
+{
+ if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_GET0_REKS,
+ CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return ri->d.kari->recipientEncryptedKeys;
+}
int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_orig_id(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
- X509_ALGOR **pubalg,
- ASN1_BIT_STRING **pubkey,
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid,
- X509_NAME **issuer, ASN1_INTEGER **sno)
- {
- CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey *oik;
- if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE)
- {
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_GET0_ORIG_ID,
- CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT);
- return 0;
- }
- oik = ri->d.kari->originator;
- if (issuer)
- *issuer = NULL;
- if (sno)
- *sno = NULL;
- if (keyid)
- *keyid = NULL;
- if (pubalg)
- *pubalg = NULL;
- if (pubkey)
- *pubkey = NULL;
- if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_ISSUER_SERIAL)
- {
- if (issuer)
- *issuer = oik->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->issuer;
- if (sno)
- *sno = oik->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->serialNumber;
- }
- else if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_KEYIDENTIFIER)
- {
- if (keyid)
- *keyid = oik->d.subjectKeyIdentifier;
- }
- else if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_PUBKEY)
- {
- if (pubalg)
- *pubalg = oik->d.originatorKey->algorithm;
- if (pubkey)
- *pubkey = oik->d.originatorKey->publicKey;
- }
- else
- return 0;
- return 1;
- }
+ X509_ALGOR **pubalg,
+ ASN1_BIT_STRING **pubkey,
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid,
+ X509_NAME **issuer,
+ ASN1_INTEGER **sno)
+{
+ CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey *oik;
+ if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_GET0_ORIG_ID,
+ CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ oik = ri->d.kari->originator;
+ if (issuer)
+ *issuer = NULL;
+ if (sno)
+ *sno = NULL;
+ if (keyid)
+ *keyid = NULL;
+ if (pubalg)
+ *pubalg = NULL;
+ if (pubkey)
+ *pubkey = NULL;
+ if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_ISSUER_SERIAL) {
+ if (issuer)
+ *issuer = oik->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->issuer;
+ if (sno)
+ *sno = oik->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->serialNumber;
+ } else if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_KEYIDENTIFIER) {
+ if (keyid)
+ *keyid = oik->d.subjectKeyIdentifier;
+ } else if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_PUBKEY) {
+ if (pubalg)
+ *pubalg = oik->d.originatorKey->algorithm;
+ if (pubkey)
+ *pubkey = oik->d.originatorKey->publicKey;
+ } else
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_orig_id_cmp(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509 *cert)
- {
- CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey *oik;
- if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE)
- {
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_ORIG_ID_CMP,
- CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT);
- return -2;
- }
- oik = ri->d.kari->originator;
- if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_ISSUER_SERIAL)
- return cms_ias_cert_cmp(oik->d.issuerAndSerialNumber, cert);
- else if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_KEYIDENTIFIER)
- return cms_keyid_cert_cmp(oik->d.subjectKeyIdentifier, cert);
- return -1;
- }
+{
+ CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey *oik;
+ if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_ORIG_ID_CMP,
+ CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT);
+ return -2;
+ }
+ oik = ri->d.kari->originator;
+ if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_ISSUER_SERIAL)
+ return cms_ias_cert_cmp(oik->d.issuerAndSerialNumber, cert);
+ else if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_KEYIDENTIFIER)
+ return cms_keyid_cert_cmp(oik->d.subjectKeyIdentifier, cert);
+ return -1;
+}
int CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_get0_id(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek,
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid,
- ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **tm,
- CMS_OtherKeyAttribute **other,
- X509_NAME **issuer, ASN1_INTEGER **sno)
- {
- CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier *rid = rek->rid;
- if (rid->type == CMS_REK_ISSUER_SERIAL)
- {
- if (issuer)
- *issuer = rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->issuer;
- if (sno)
- *sno = rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->serialNumber;
- if (keyid)
- *keyid = NULL;
- if (tm)
- *tm = NULL;
- if (other)
- *other = NULL;
- }
- else if (rid->type == CMS_REK_KEYIDENTIFIER)
- {
- if (keyid)
- *keyid = rid->d.rKeyId->subjectKeyIdentifier;
- if (tm)
- *tm = rid->d.rKeyId->date;
- if (other)
- *other = rid->d.rKeyId->other;
- if (issuer)
- *issuer = NULL;
- if (sno)
- *sno = NULL;
- }
- else
- return 0;
- return 1;
- }
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid,
+ ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **tm,
+ CMS_OtherKeyAttribute **other,
+ X509_NAME **issuer, ASN1_INTEGER **sno)
+{
+ CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier *rid = rek->rid;
+ if (rid->type == CMS_REK_ISSUER_SERIAL) {
+ if (issuer)
+ *issuer = rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->issuer;
+ if (sno)
+ *sno = rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->serialNumber;
+ if (keyid)
+ *keyid = NULL;
+ if (tm)
+ *tm = NULL;
+ if (other)
+ *other = NULL;
+ } else if (rid->type == CMS_REK_KEYIDENTIFIER) {
+ if (keyid)
+ *keyid = rid->d.rKeyId->subjectKeyIdentifier;
+ if (tm)
+ *tm = rid->d.rKeyId->date;
+ if (other)
+ *other = rid->d.rKeyId->other;
+ if (issuer)
+ *issuer = NULL;
+ if (sno)
+ *sno = NULL;
+ } else
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
int CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_cert_cmp(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek,
- X509 *cert)
- {
- CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier *rid = rek->rid;
- if (rid->type == CMS_REK_ISSUER_SERIAL)
- return cms_ias_cert_cmp(rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber, cert);
- else if (rid->type == CMS_REK_KEYIDENTIFIER)
- return cms_keyid_cert_cmp(rid->d.rKeyId->subjectKeyIdentifier, cert);
- else
- return -1;
- }
+ X509 *cert)
+{
+ CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier *rid = rek->rid;
+ if (rid->type == CMS_REK_ISSUER_SERIAL)
+ return cms_ias_cert_cmp(rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber, cert);
+ else if (rid->type == CMS_REK_KEYIDENTIFIER)
+ return cms_keyid_cert_cmp(rid->d.rKeyId->subjectKeyIdentifier, cert);
+ else
+ return -1;
+}
+
+int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_set0_pkey_and_peer(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, EVP_PKEY *pk, X509 *peer)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
+ CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari = ri->d.kari;
+
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(kari->pctx);
+ kari->pctx = NULL;
+ if (pk == NULL)
+ return 1;
+
+ pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
+ if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (peer != NULL) {
+ EVP_PKEY *pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer);
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pctx, pub_pkey) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ kari->pctx = pctx;
+ return 1;
+ err:
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+ return 0;
+}
int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_set0_pkey(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, EVP_PKEY *pk)
- {
- EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
- CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari = ri->d.kari;
- if (kari->pctx)
- {
- EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(kari->pctx);
- kari->pctx = NULL;
- }
- if (!pk)
- return 1;
- pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
- if (!pctx || !EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx))
- goto err;
- kari->pctx = pctx;
- return 1;
- err:
- if (pctx)
- EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
- return 0;
- }
+{
+ return CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_set0_pkey_and_peer(ri, pk, NULL);
+}
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_ctx(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
- {
- if (ri->type == CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE)
- return &ri->d.kari->ctx;
- return NULL;
- }
-
-/* Derive KEK and decrypt/encrypt with it to produce either the
- * original CEK or the encrypted CEK.
+{
+ if (ri->type == CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE)
+ return ri->d.kari->ctx;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Derive KEK and decrypt/encrypt with it to produce either the original CEK
+ * or the encrypted CEK.
*/
-static int cms_kek_cipher(unsigned char **pout, size_t *poutlen,
- const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen,
- CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari, int enc)
- {
- /* Key encryption key */
- unsigned char kek[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
- size_t keklen;
- int rv = 0;
- unsigned char *out = NULL;
- int outlen;
- keklen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(&kari->ctx);
- if (keklen > EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH)
- return 0;
- /* Derive KEK */
- if (EVP_PKEY_derive(kari->pctx, kek, &keklen) <= 0)
- goto err;
- /* Set KEK in context */
- if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(&kari->ctx, NULL, NULL, kek, NULL, enc))
- goto err;
- /* obtain output length of ciphered key */
- if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(&kari->ctx, NULL, &outlen, in, inlen))
- goto err;
- out = OPENSSL_malloc(outlen);
- if (!out)
- goto err;
- if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(&kari->ctx, out, &outlen, in, inlen))
- goto err;
- *pout = out;
- *poutlen = (size_t)outlen;
- rv = 1;
-
- err:
- OPENSSL_cleanse(kek, keklen);
- if (!rv && out)
- OPENSSL_free(out);
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&kari->ctx);
- EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(kari->pctx);
- kari->pctx = NULL;
- return rv;
- }
-
-int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
- CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek)
- {
- int rv = 0;
- unsigned char *enckey = NULL, *cek = NULL;
- size_t enckeylen;
- size_t ceklen;
- CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec;
- enckeylen = rek->encryptedKey->length;
- enckey = rek->encryptedKey->data;
- /* Setup all parameters to derive KEK */
- if (!cms_env_asn1_ctrl(ri, 1))
- goto err;
- /* Attempt to decrypt CEK */
- if (!cms_kek_cipher(&cek, &ceklen, enckey, enckeylen, ri->d.kari, 0))
- goto err;
- ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo;
- if (ec->key)
- {
- OPENSSL_cleanse(ec->key, ec->keylen);
- OPENSSL_free(ec->key);
- }
- ec->key = cek;
- ec->keylen = ceklen;
- cek = NULL;
- rv = 1;
- err:
- if (cek)
- OPENSSL_free(cek);
- return rv;
- }
+static int cms_kek_cipher(unsigned char **pout, size_t *poutlen,
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen,
+ CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari, int enc)
+{
+ /* Key encryption key */
+ unsigned char kek[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
+ size_t keklen;
+ int rv = 0;
+ unsigned char *out = NULL;
+ int outlen;
+ keklen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(kari->ctx);
+ if (keklen > EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH)
+ return 0;
+ /* Derive KEK */
+ if (EVP_PKEY_derive(kari->pctx, kek, &keklen) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ /* Set KEK in context */
+ if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(kari->ctx, NULL, NULL, kek, NULL, enc))
+ goto err;
+ /* obtain output length of ciphered key */
+ if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(kari->ctx, NULL, &outlen, in, inlen))
+ goto err;
+ out = OPENSSL_malloc(outlen);
+ if (out == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(kari->ctx, out, &outlen, in, inlen))
+ goto err;
+ *pout = out;
+ *poutlen = (size_t)outlen;
+ rv = 1;
+
+ err:
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(kek, keklen);
+ if (!rv)
+ OPENSSL_free(out);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(kari->ctx);
+ /* FIXME: WHY IS kari->pctx freed here? /RL */
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(kari->pctx);
+ kari->pctx = NULL;
+ return rv;
+}
+
+int CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
+ CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
+ CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek)
+{
+ int rv = 0;
+ unsigned char *enckey = NULL, *cek = NULL;
+ size_t enckeylen;
+ size_t ceklen;
+ CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec;
+
+ {
+ /*
+ * TODO(3.0) Remove this when we have functionality to deserialize
+ * parameters in EVP_PKEY form from an X509_ALGOR.
+ * This is needed to be able to replace the EC_KEY specific decoding
+ * that happens in ecdh_cms_set_peerkey() (crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c)
+ *
+ * THIS IS TEMPORARY
+ */
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = CMS_RecipientInfo_get0_pkey_ctx(ri);
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(pctx);
+
+ EVP_PKEY_get0(pkey);
+ if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_NONE) {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_DECRYPT,
+ CMS_R_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEY_TYPE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ enckeylen = rek->encryptedKey->length;
+ enckey = rek->encryptedKey->data;
+ /* Setup all parameters to derive KEK */
+ if (!cms_env_asn1_ctrl(ri, 1))
+ goto err;
+ /* Attempt to decrypt CEK */
+ if (!cms_kek_cipher(&cek, &ceklen, enckey, enckeylen, ri->d.kari, 0))
+ goto err;
+ ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo;
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(ec->key, ec->keylen);
+ ec->key = cek;
+ ec->keylen = ceklen;
+ cek = NULL;
+ rv = 1;
+ err:
+ OPENSSL_free(cek);
+ return rv;
+}
/* Create ephemeral key and initialise context based on it */
static int cms_kari_create_ephemeral_key(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari,
- EVP_PKEY *pk)
- {
- EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
- EVP_PKEY *ekey = NULL;
- int rv = 0;
- pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
- if (!pctx)
- goto err;
- if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(pctx) <= 0)
- goto err;
- if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(pctx, &ekey) <= 0)
- goto err;
- EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
- pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(ekey, NULL);
- if (!pctx)
- goto err;
- if (EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx) <= 0)
- goto err;
- kari->pctx = pctx;
- rv = 1;
- err:
- if (!rv && pctx)
- EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
- if (ekey)
- EVP_PKEY_free(ekey);
- return rv;
- }
-
-/* Initialise a ktri based on passed certificate and key */
-
-int cms_RecipientInfo_kari_init(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509 *recip,
- EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned int flags)
- {
- CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari;
- CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek = NULL;
-
- ri->d.kari = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo);
- if (!ri->d.kari)
- return 0;
- ri->type = CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE;
-
- kari = ri->d.kari;
- kari->version = 3;
-
- rek = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey);
- if (!sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_push(kari->recipientEncryptedKeys, rek))
- {
- M_ASN1_free_of(rek, CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (flags & CMS_USE_KEYID)
- {
- rek->rid->type = CMS_REK_KEYIDENTIFIER;
- if (!cms_set1_keyid(&rek->rid->d.rKeyId->subjectKeyIdentifier, recip))
- return 0;
- }
- else
- {
- rek->rid->type = CMS_REK_ISSUER_SERIAL;
- if (!cms_set1_ias(&rek->rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber, recip))
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* Create ephemeral key */
- if (!cms_kari_create_ephemeral_key(kari, pk))
- return 0;
-
- CRYPTO_add(&pk->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY);
- rek->pkey = pk;
- return 1;
- }
+ EVP_PKEY *pk)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *ekey = NULL;
+ int rv = 0;
+
+ pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
+ if (pctx == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(pctx) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(pctx, &ekey) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+ pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(ekey, NULL);
+ if (pctx == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ kari->pctx = pctx;
+ rv = 1;
+ err:
+ if (!rv)
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(ekey);
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/* Set originator private key and initialise context based on it */
+static int cms_kari_set_originator_private_key(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari, EVP_PKEY *originatorPrivKey )
+{
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
+ int rv = 0;
+
+ pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(originatorPrivKey, NULL);
+ if (pctx == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ kari->pctx = pctx;
+ rv = 1;
+ err:
+ if (rv == 0)
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/* Initialise a kari based on passed certificate and key */
+
+int cms_RecipientInfo_kari_init(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509 *recip, EVP_PKEY *recipPubKey, X509 * originator, EVP_PKEY *originatorPrivKey, unsigned int flags)
+{
+ CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari;
+ CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek = NULL;
+
+ ri->d.kari = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo);
+ if (!ri->d.kari)
+ return 0;
+ ri->type = CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE;
+
+ kari = ri->d.kari;
+ kari->version = 3;
+
+ rek = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey);
+ if (rek == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_push(kari->recipientEncryptedKeys, rek)) {
+ M_ASN1_free_of(rek, CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (flags & CMS_USE_KEYID) {
+ rek->rid->type = CMS_REK_KEYIDENTIFIER;
+ rek->rid->d.rKeyId = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_RecipientKeyIdentifier);
+ if (rek->rid->d.rKeyId == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (!cms_set1_keyid(&rek->rid->d.rKeyId->subjectKeyIdentifier, recip))
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ rek->rid->type = CMS_REK_ISSUER_SERIAL;
+ if (!cms_set1_ias(&rek->rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber, recip))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (originatorPrivKey == NULL && originator == NULL) {
+ /* Create ephemeral key */
+ if (!cms_kari_create_ephemeral_key(kari, recipPubKey))
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ /* Use originator key */
+ CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey *oik = ri->d.kari->originator;
+
+ if (originatorPrivKey == NULL || originator == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (flags & CMS_USE_ORIGINATOR_KEYID) {
+ oik->type = CMS_OIK_KEYIDENTIFIER;
+ oik->d.subjectKeyIdentifier = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
+ if (oik->d.subjectKeyIdentifier == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (!cms_set1_keyid(&oik->d.subjectKeyIdentifier, originator))
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ oik->type = CMS_REK_ISSUER_SERIAL;
+ if (!cms_set1_ias(&oik->d.issuerAndSerialNumber, originator))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!cms_kari_set_originator_private_key(kari, originatorPrivKey))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ EVP_PKEY_up_ref(recipPubKey);
+ rek->pkey = recipPubKey;
+ return 1;
+}
static int cms_wrap_init(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari,
- const EVP_CIPHER *cipher)
- {
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = &kari->ctx;
- const EVP_CIPHER *kekcipher;
- int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher);
- /* If a suitable wrap algorithm is already set nothing to do */
- kekcipher = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx);
-
- if (kekcipher)
- {
- if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx) != EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE)
- return 0;
- return 1;
- }
- /* Pick a cipher based on content encryption cipher. If it is
- * DES3 use DES3 wrap otherwise use AES wrap similar to key
- * size.
- */
- if (EVP_CIPHER_type(cipher) == NID_des_ede3_cbc)
- kekcipher = EVP_des_ede3_wrap();
- else if (keylen <= 16)
- kekcipher = EVP_aes_128_wrap();
- else if (keylen <= 24)
- kekcipher = EVP_aes_192_wrap();
- else
- kekcipher = EVP_aes_256_wrap();
- return EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, kekcipher, NULL, NULL, NULL);
- }
+ const EVP_CIPHER *cipher)
+{
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = kari->ctx;
+ const EVP_CIPHER *kekcipher;
+ int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher);
+ int ret;
+
+ /* If a suitable wrap algorithm is already set nothing to do */
+ kekcipher = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx);
+ if (kekcipher != NULL) {
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx) != EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE)
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ else if (cipher != NULL
+ && (EVP_CIPHER_flags(cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_GET_WRAP_CIPHER)) {
+ ret = EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_ctrl(cipher)(NULL, EVP_CTRL_GET_WRAP_CIPHER,
+ 0, &kekcipher);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (kekcipher != NULL) {
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(kekcipher) != EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE)
+ return 0;
+
+ return EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, kekcipher, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Pick a cipher based on content encryption cipher. If it is DES3 use
+ * DES3 wrap otherwise use AES wrap similar to key size.
+ */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_type(cipher) == NID_des_ede3_cbc)
+ kekcipher = EVP_des_ede3_wrap();
+ else
+#endif
+ if (keylen <= 16)
+ kekcipher = EVP_aes_128_wrap();
+ else if (keylen <= 24)
+ kekcipher = EVP_aes_192_wrap();
+ else
+ kekcipher = EVP_aes_256_wrap();
+ return EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, kekcipher, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+}
/* Encrypt content key in key agreement recipient info */
-int cms_RecipientInfo_kari_encrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
- {
- CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari;
- CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec;
- CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek;
- STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey) *reks;
- int i;
-
- if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE)
- {
- CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_ENCRYPT,
- CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT);
- return 0;
- }
- kari = ri->d.kari;
- reks = kari->recipientEncryptedKeys;
- ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo;
- /* Initialise wrap algorithm parameters */
- if (!cms_wrap_init(kari, ec->cipher))
- return 0;
- /* If no orignator key set up initialise for ephemeral key
- * the public key ASN1 structure will set the actual public
- * key value.
- */
- if (kari->originator->type == -1)
- {
- CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey *oik = kari->originator;
- oik->type = CMS_OIK_PUBKEY;
- oik->d.originatorKey = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_OriginatorPublicKey);
- if (!oik->d.originatorKey)
- return 0;
- }
- /* Initialise KDF algorithm */
- if (!cms_env_asn1_ctrl(ri, 0))
- return 0;
- /* For each rek, derive KEK, encrypt CEK */
- for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_num(reks); i++)
- {
- unsigned char *enckey;
- size_t enckeylen;
- rek = sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_value(reks, i);
- if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(kari->pctx, rek->pkey) <= 0)
- return 0;
- if (!cms_kek_cipher(&enckey, &enckeylen, ec->key, ec->keylen,
- kari, 1))
- return 0;
- ASN1_STRING_set0(rek->encryptedKey, enckey, enckeylen);
- }
-
- return 1;
-
- }
+int cms_RecipientInfo_kari_encrypt(const CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
+ CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
+{
+ CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari;
+ CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec;
+ CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek;
+ STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey) *reks;
+ int i;
+
+ {
+ /*
+ * TODO(3.0) Remove this when we have figured out all the details
+ * need to set up encryption right. With legacy keys, a *lot* is
+ * happening in the CMS specific EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD functions,
+ * such as automatically setting a default KDF type, KDF digest,
+ * all that kind of stuff.
+ * With EVP_SIGNATURE, setting a default digest is done by getting
+ * the default MD for the key, and then inject that back into the
+ * signature implementation... we could do something similar with
+ * CMS, possibly using CMS specific OSSL_PARAM keys, just like we
+ * have for certain AlgorithmIdentifier retrievals.
+ *
+ * THIS IS TEMPORARY
+ */
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = CMS_RecipientInfo_get0_pkey_ctx(ri);
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(pctx);
+
+ EVP_PKEY_get0(pkey);
+ if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_NONE) {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_ENCRYPT,
+ CMS_R_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEY_TYPE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KARI_ENCRYPT, CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ kari = ri->d.kari;
+ reks = kari->recipientEncryptedKeys;
+ ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo;
+ /* Initialise wrap algorithm parameters */
+ if (!cms_wrap_init(kari, ec->cipher))
+ return 0;
+ /*
+ * If no originator key set up initialise for ephemeral key the public key
+ * ASN1 structure will set the actual public key value.
+ */
+ if (kari->originator->type == -1) {
+ CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey *oik = kari->originator;
+ oik->type = CMS_OIK_PUBKEY;
+ oik->d.originatorKey = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_OriginatorPublicKey);
+ if (!oik->d.originatorKey)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* Initialise KDF algorithm */
+ if (!cms_env_asn1_ctrl(ri, 0))
+ return 0;
+ /* For each rek, derive KEK, encrypt CEK */
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_num(reks); i++) {
+ unsigned char *enckey;
+ size_t enckeylen;
+ rek = sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_value(reks, i);
+ if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(kari->pctx, rek->pkey) <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ if (!cms_kek_cipher(&enckey, &enckeylen, ec->key, ec->keylen,
+ kari, 1))
+ return 0;
+ ASN1_STRING_set0(rek->encryptedKey, enckey, enckeylen);
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+
+}
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff