POD: Fix list termination

[openssl.git] / crypto / cms / cms_asn1.c

diff --git a/crypto/cms/cms_asn1.c b/crypto/cms/cms_asn1.c
index cfe67fb6c1835d9cfea21f754da91a8de97bd12b..83ae2cc0f3bd223325d107cd8c81846bc0465390 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/cms/cms_asn1.c
+++ b/crypto/cms/cms_asn1.c
@@ -97,6 +97,8 @@ static int cms_si_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
                        EVP_PKEY_free(si->pkey);
                if (si->signer)
                        X509_free(si->signer);
+               if (si->pctx)
+                       EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&si->mctx);
                }
        return 1;
        }
@@ -164,10 +166,22 @@ ASN1_CHOICE(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier) = {
   ASN1_IMP(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier, d.rKeyId, CMS_RecipientKeyIdentifier, 0)
 } ASN1_CHOICE_END(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier)
 
-ASN1_SEQUENCE(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey) = {
+static int cms_rek_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+                                                       void *exarg)
+       {
+       CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek = (CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *)*pval;
+       if(operation == ASN1_OP_FREE_POST)
+               {
+               if (rek->pkey)
+                       EVP_PKEY_free(rek->pkey);
+               }
+       return 1;
+       }
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE_cb(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey, cms_rek_cb) = {
        ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey, rid, CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier),
        ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey, encryptedKey, ASN1_OCTET_STRING)
-} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_cb(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey, CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey)
 
 ASN1_SEQUENCE(CMS_OriginatorPublicKey) = {
   ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_OriginatorPublicKey, algorithm, X509_ALGOR),
@@ -180,13 +194,33 @@ ASN1_CHOICE(CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey) = {
   ASN1_IMP(CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey, d.originatorKey, CMS_OriginatorPublicKey, 1)
 } ASN1_CHOICE_END(CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey)
 
-ASN1_SEQUENCE(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo) = {
+static int cms_kari_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+                                                       void *exarg)
+       {
+       CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari = (CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *)*pval;
+       if(operation == ASN1_OP_NEW_POST)
+               {
+               EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&kari->ctx);
+               EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_flags(&kari->ctx,
+                                       EVP_CIPHER_CTX_FLAG_WRAP_ALLOW);
+               kari->pctx = NULL;
+               }
+       else if(operation == ASN1_OP_FREE_POST)
+               {
+               if (kari->pctx)
+                       EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(kari->pctx);
+               EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&kari->ctx);
+               }
+       return 1;
+       }
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE_cb(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo, cms_kari_cb) = {
        ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo, version, LONG),
        ASN1_EXP(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo, originator, CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey, 0),
        ASN1_EXP_OPT(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo, ukm, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 1),
        ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo, keyEncryptionAlgorithm, X509_ALGOR),
        ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo, recipientEncryptedKeys, CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey)
-} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_cb(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo, CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo)
 
 ASN1_SEQUENCE(CMS_KEKIdentifier) = {
        ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_KEKIdentifier, keyIdentifier, ASN1_OCTET_STRING),
@@ -227,6 +261,8 @@ static int cms_ri_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
                                EVP_PKEY_free(ktri->pkey);
                        if (ktri->recip)
                                X509_free(ktri->recip);
+                       if (ktri->pctx)
+                               EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ktri->pctx);
                        }
                else if (ri->type == CMS_RECIPINFO_KEK)
                        {
@@ -387,3 +423,46 @@ ASN1_SEQUENCE(CMS_Receipt) = {
   ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_Receipt, originatorSignatureValue, ASN1_OCTET_STRING)
 } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(CMS_Receipt)
 
+/* Utilities to encode the CMS_SharedInfo structure used during key
+ * derivation.
+ */
+
+typedef struct {
+       X509_ALGOR *keyInfo;
+       ASN1_OCTET_STRING *entityUInfo;
+       ASN1_OCTET_STRING *suppPubInfo;
+} CMS_SharedInfo;
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(CMS_SharedInfo) = {
+  ASN1_SIMPLE(CMS_SharedInfo, keyInfo, X509_ALGOR),
+  ASN1_EXP_OPT(CMS_SharedInfo, entityUInfo, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 0),
+  ASN1_EXP_OPT(CMS_SharedInfo, suppPubInfo, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 2),
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(CMS_SharedInfo)
+
+int CMS_SharedInfo_encode(unsigned char **pder, X509_ALGOR *kekalg, 
+                       ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ukm, int keylen)
+       {
+       union {
+               CMS_SharedInfo *pecsi;
+               ASN1_VALUE *a;
+       } intsi = {NULL};
+
+       ASN1_OCTET_STRING oklen;
+       unsigned char kl[4];
+       CMS_SharedInfo ecsi;
+
+       keylen <<= 3;
+       kl[0] = (keylen >> 24) & 0xff;
+       kl[1] = (keylen >> 16) & 0xff;
+       kl[2] = (keylen >> 8) & 0xff;
+       kl[3] = keylen & 0xff;
+       oklen.length = 4;
+       oklen.data = kl;
+       oklen.type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
+       oklen.flags = 0;
+       ecsi.keyInfo = kekalg;
+       ecsi.entityUInfo = ukm;
+       ecsi.suppPubInfo = &oklen;
+       intsi.pecsi = &ecsi;
+       return ASN1_item_i2d(intsi.a, pder, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(CMS_SharedInfo));
+       }