Avoid PKCS #1 v1.5 signature attack discovered by Daniel Bleichenbacher

[openssl.git] / crypto / bio / bss_fd.c

diff --git a/crypto/bio/bss_fd.c b/crypto/bio/bss_fd.c
index 5786ed495b6b8948c1c694da05fc63bf57ca284d..d1bf85aae1750a0307b821e8b05f4b314693faa0 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/bio/bss_fd.c
+++ b/crypto/bio/bss_fd.c
@@ -56,12 +56,17 @@
  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
  */
 
-#if !defined(_WIN32_WCE)
-
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <errno.h>
 #define USE_SOCKETS
 #include "cryptlib.h"
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO)
+/*
+ * One can argue that one should implement dummy placeholder for
+ * BIO_s_fd here...
+ */
+#else
 /*
  * As for unconditional usage of "UPLINK" interface in this module.
  * Trouble is that unlike Unix file descriptors [which are indexes
@@ -79,6 +84,7 @@
 static int fd_write(BIO *h, const char *buf, int num);
 static int fd_read(BIO *h, char *buf, int size);
 static int fd_puts(BIO *h, const char *str);
+static int fd_gets(BIO *h, char *buf, int size);
 static long fd_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, long arg1, void *arg2);
 static int fd_new(BIO *h);
 static int fd_free(BIO *data);
@@ -90,7 +96,7 @@ static BIO_METHOD methods_fdp=
        fd_write,
        fd_read,
        fd_puts,
-       NULL, /* fd_gets, */
+       fd_gets,
        fd_ctrl,
        fd_new,
        fd_free,
@@ -229,6 +235,22 @@ static int fd_puts(BIO *bp, const char *str)
        return(ret);
        }
 
+static int fd_gets(BIO *bp, char *buf, int size)
+        {
+       int ret=0;
+       char *ptr=buf;
+       char *end=buf+size-1;
+
+       while ( (ptr < end) && (fd_read(bp, ptr, 1) > 0) && (ptr[0] != '\n') )
+               ptr++;
+
+       ptr[0]='\0';
+
+       if (buf[0] != '\0')
+               ret=strlen(buf);
+       return(ret);
+        }
+
 int BIO_fd_should_retry(int i)
        {
        int err;