* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
+ *
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
+ *
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
+ *
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
+ *
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
+ *
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
#include <stdio.h>
#include "cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include "asn1_locl.h"
#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
-static int X509_REVOKED_cmp(const X509_REVOKED * const *a,
- const X509_REVOKED * const *b);
-static int X509_REVOKED_seq_cmp(const X509_REVOKED * const *a,
- const X509_REVOKED * const *b);
+static int X509_REVOKED_cmp(const X509_REVOKED *const *a,
+ const X509_REVOKED *const *b);
+static void setup_idp(X509_CRL *crl, ISSUING_DIST_POINT *idp);
ASN1_SEQUENCE(X509_REVOKED) = {
- ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_REVOKED,serialNumber, ASN1_INTEGER),
- ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_REVOKED,revocationDate, ASN1_TIME),
- ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(X509_REVOKED,extensions, X509_EXTENSION)
-} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(X509_REVOKED);
-
-/* The X509_CRL_INFO structure needs a bit of customisation. This is actually
- * mirroring the old behaviour: its purpose is to allow the use of
- * sk_X509_REVOKED_find to lookup revoked certificates. Unfortunately
- * this will zap the original order and the signature so we keep a copy
- * of the original positions and reorder appropriately before encoding.
- *
- * Might want to see if there's a better way of doing this later...
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_REVOKED,serialNumber, ASN1_INTEGER),
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_REVOKED,revocationDate, ASN1_TIME),
+ ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(X509_REVOKED,extensions, X509_EXTENSION)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(X509_REVOKED)
+
+static int def_crl_verify(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *r);
+static int def_crl_lookup(X509_CRL *crl,
+ X509_REVOKED **ret, ASN1_INTEGER *serial,
+ X509_NAME *issuer);
+
+static X509_CRL_METHOD int_crl_meth = {
+ 0,
+ 0, 0,
+ def_crl_lookup,
+ def_crl_verify
+};
+
+static const X509_CRL_METHOD *default_crl_method = &int_crl_meth;
+
+/*
+ * The X509_CRL_INFO structure needs a bit of customisation. Since we cache
+ * the original encoding the signature wont be affected by reordering of the
+ * revoked field.
+ */
+static int crl_inf_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+ void *exarg)
+{
+ X509_CRL_INFO *a = (X509_CRL_INFO *)*pval;
+
+ if (!a || !a->revoked)
+ return 1;
+ switch (operation) {
+ /*
+ * Just set cmp function here. We don't sort because that would
+ * affect the output of X509_CRL_print().
+ */
+ case ASN1_OP_D2I_POST:
+ (void)sk_X509_REVOKED_set_cmp_func(a->revoked, X509_REVOKED_cmp);
+ break;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE_enc(X509_CRL_INFO, enc, crl_inf_cb) = {
+ ASN1_OPT(X509_CRL_INFO, version, ASN1_INTEGER),
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CRL_INFO, sig_alg, X509_ALGOR),
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CRL_INFO, issuer, X509_NAME),
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CRL_INFO, lastUpdate, ASN1_TIME),
+ ASN1_OPT(X509_CRL_INFO, nextUpdate, ASN1_TIME),
+ ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(X509_CRL_INFO, revoked, X509_REVOKED),
+ ASN1_EXP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(X509_CRL_INFO, extensions, X509_EXTENSION, 0)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_enc(X509_CRL_INFO, X509_CRL_INFO)
+
+/*
+ * Set CRL entry issuer according to CRL certificate issuer extension. Check
+ * for unhandled critical CRL entry extensions.
+ */
+
+static int crl_set_issuers(X509_CRL *crl)
+{
+
+ int i, j;
+ GENERAL_NAMES *gens, *gtmp;
+ STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revoked;
+
+ revoked = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(crl);
+
+ gens = NULL;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revoked); i++) {
+ X509_REVOKED *rev = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revoked, i);
+ STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts;
+ ASN1_ENUMERATED *reason;
+ X509_EXTENSION *ext;
+ gtmp = X509_REVOKED_get_ext_d2i(rev,
+ NID_certificate_issuer, &j, NULL);
+ if (!gtmp && (j != -1)) {
+ crl->flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (gtmp) {
+ gens = gtmp;
+ if (!crl->issuers) {
+ crl->issuers = sk_GENERAL_NAMES_new_null();
+ if (!crl->issuers)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!sk_GENERAL_NAMES_push(crl->issuers, gtmp))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ rev->issuer = gens;
+
+ reason = X509_REVOKED_get_ext_d2i(rev, NID_crl_reason, &j, NULL);
+ if (!reason && (j != -1)) {
+ crl->flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (reason) {
+ rev->reason = ASN1_ENUMERATED_get(reason);
+ ASN1_ENUMERATED_free(reason);
+ } else
+ rev->reason = CRL_REASON_NONE;
+
+ /* Check for critical CRL entry extensions */
+
+ exts = rev->extensions;
+
+ for (j = 0; j < sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); j++) {
+ ext = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, j);
+ if (ext->critical > 0) {
+ if (OBJ_obj2nid(ext->object) == NID_certificate_issuer)
+ continue;
+ crl->flags |= EXFLAG_CRITICAL;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+
+}
+
+/*
+ * The X509_CRL structure needs a bit of customisation. Cache some extensions
+ * and hash of the whole CRL.
*/
-static int crl_inf_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
-{
- X509_CRL_INFO *a = (X509_CRL_INFO *)*pval;
- int i;
- int (*old_cmp)(const X509_REVOKED * const *,
- const X509_REVOKED * const *);
-
- if(!a || !a->revoked) return 1;
- switch(operation) {
-
- /* Save original order */
- case ASN1_OP_D2I_POST:
- for (i=0; i<sk_X509_REVOKED_num(a->revoked); i++)
- sk_X509_REVOKED_value(a->revoked,i)->sequence=i;
- sk_X509_REVOKED_set_cmp_func(a->revoked,X509_REVOKED_cmp);
- break;
-
- /* Restore original order */
- case ASN1_OP_I2D_PRE:
- old_cmp=sk_X509_REVOKED_set_cmp_func(a->revoked,X509_REVOKED_seq_cmp);
- sk_X509_REVOKED_sort(a->revoked);
- sk_X509_REVOKED_set_cmp_func(a->revoked,old_cmp);
- break;
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-
-ASN1_SEQUENCE_cb(X509_CRL_INFO, crl_inf_cb) = {
- ASN1_OPT(X509_CRL_INFO, version, ASN1_INTEGER),
- ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CRL_INFO, sig_alg, X509_ALGOR),
- ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CRL_INFO, issuer, X509_NAME),
- ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CRL_INFO, lastUpdate, ASN1_TIME),
- ASN1_OPT(X509_CRL_INFO, nextUpdate, ASN1_TIME),
- ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(X509_CRL_INFO, revoked, X509_REVOKED),
- ASN1_EXP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(X509_CRL_INFO, extensions, X509_EXTENSION, 0)
-} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_cb(X509_CRL_INFO, X509_CRL_INFO);
-
-ASN1_SEQUENCE_ref(X509_CRL, 0, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL) = {
- ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CRL, crl, X509_CRL_INFO),
- ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CRL, sig_alg, X509_ALGOR),
- ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CRL, signature, ASN1_BIT_STRING)
-} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_ref(X509_CRL, X509_CRL);
+static int crl_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
+ void *exarg)
+{
+ X509_CRL *crl = (X509_CRL *)*pval;
+ STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts;
+ X509_EXTENSION *ext;
+ int idx;
+
+ switch (operation) {
+ case ASN1_OP_NEW_POST:
+ crl->idp = NULL;
+ crl->akid = NULL;
+ crl->flags = 0;
+ crl->idp_flags = 0;
+ crl->idp_reasons = CRLDP_ALL_REASONS;
+ crl->meth = default_crl_method;
+ crl->meth_data = NULL;
+ crl->issuers = NULL;
+ crl->crl_number = NULL;
+ crl->base_crl_number = NULL;
+ break;
+
+ case ASN1_OP_D2I_POST:
+ X509_CRL_digest(crl, EVP_sha1(), crl->sha1_hash, NULL);
+ crl->idp = X509_CRL_get_ext_d2i(crl,
+ NID_issuing_distribution_point, NULL,
+ NULL);
+ if (crl->idp)
+ setup_idp(crl, crl->idp);
+
+ crl->akid = X509_CRL_get_ext_d2i(crl,
+ NID_authority_key_identifier, NULL,
+ NULL);
+
+ crl->crl_number = X509_CRL_get_ext_d2i(crl,
+ NID_crl_number, NULL, NULL);
+
+ crl->base_crl_number = X509_CRL_get_ext_d2i(crl,
+ NID_delta_crl, NULL,
+ NULL);
+ /* Delta CRLs must have CRL number */
+ if (crl->base_crl_number && !crl->crl_number)
+ crl->flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
+
+ /*
+ * See if we have any unhandled critical CRL extensions and indicate
+ * this in a flag. We only currently handle IDP so anything else
+ * critical sets the flag. This code accesses the X509_CRL structure
+ * directly: applications shouldn't do this.
+ */
+
+ exts = crl->crl->extensions;
+
+ for (idx = 0; idx < sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); idx++) {
+ int nid;
+ ext = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, idx);
+ nid = OBJ_obj2nid(ext->object);
+ if (nid == NID_freshest_crl)
+ crl->flags |= EXFLAG_FRESHEST;
+ if (ext->critical > 0) {
+ /* We handle IDP and deltas */
+ if ((nid == NID_issuing_distribution_point)
+ || (nid == NID_authority_key_identifier)
+ || (nid == NID_delta_crl))
+ break;;
+ crl->flags |= EXFLAG_CRITICAL;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!crl_set_issuers(crl))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (crl->meth->crl_init) {
+ if (crl->meth->crl_init(crl) == 0)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case ASN1_OP_FREE_POST:
+ if (crl->meth->crl_free) {
+ if (!crl->meth->crl_free(crl))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (crl->akid)
+ AUTHORITY_KEYID_free(crl->akid);
+ if (crl->idp)
+ ISSUING_DIST_POINT_free(crl->idp);
+ ASN1_INTEGER_free(crl->crl_number);
+ ASN1_INTEGER_free(crl->base_crl_number);
+ sk_GENERAL_NAMES_pop_free(crl->issuers, GENERAL_NAMES_free);
+ break;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* Convert IDP into a more convenient form */
+
+static void setup_idp(X509_CRL *crl, ISSUING_DIST_POINT *idp)
+{
+ int idp_only = 0;
+ /* Set various flags according to IDP */
+ crl->idp_flags |= IDP_PRESENT;
+ if (idp->onlyuser > 0) {
+ idp_only++;
+ crl->idp_flags |= IDP_ONLYUSER;
+ }
+ if (idp->onlyCA > 0) {
+ idp_only++;
+ crl->idp_flags |= IDP_ONLYCA;
+ }
+ if (idp->onlyattr > 0) {
+ idp_only++;
+ crl->idp_flags |= IDP_ONLYATTR;
+ }
+
+ if (idp_only > 1)
+ crl->idp_flags |= IDP_INVALID;
+
+ if (idp->indirectCRL > 0)
+ crl->idp_flags |= IDP_INDIRECT;
+
+ if (idp->onlysomereasons) {
+ crl->idp_flags |= IDP_REASONS;
+ if (idp->onlysomereasons->length > 0)
+ crl->idp_reasons = idp->onlysomereasons->data[0];
+ if (idp->onlysomereasons->length > 1)
+ crl->idp_reasons |= (idp->onlysomereasons->data[1] << 8);
+ crl->idp_reasons &= CRLDP_ALL_REASONS;
+ }
+
+ DIST_POINT_set_dpname(idp->distpoint, X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl));
+}
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE_ref(X509_CRL, crl_cb, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL) = {
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CRL, crl, X509_CRL_INFO),
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CRL, sig_alg, X509_ALGOR),
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CRL, signature, ASN1_BIT_STRING)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_ref(X509_CRL, X509_CRL)
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_REVOKED)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(X509_REVOKED)
+
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_CRL_INFO)
+
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_CRL)
-static int X509_REVOKED_cmp(const X509_REVOKED * const *a,
- const X509_REVOKED * const *b)
- {
- return(ASN1_STRING_cmp(
- (ASN1_STRING *)(*a)->serialNumber,
- (ASN1_STRING *)(*b)->serialNumber));
- }
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(X509_CRL)
-static int X509_REVOKED_seq_cmp(const X509_REVOKED * const *a,
- const X509_REVOKED * const *b)
- {
- return((*a)->sequence-(*b)->sequence);
- }
+static int X509_REVOKED_cmp(const X509_REVOKED *const *a,
+ const X509_REVOKED *const *b)
+{
+ return (ASN1_STRING_cmp((ASN1_STRING *)(*a)->serialNumber,
+ (ASN1_STRING *)(*b)->serialNumber));
+}
int X509_CRL_add0_revoked(X509_CRL *crl, X509_REVOKED *rev)
{
- X509_CRL_INFO *inf;
- inf = crl->crl;
- if(!inf->revoked)
- inf->revoked = sk_X509_REVOKED_new(X509_REVOKED_cmp);
- if(!inf->revoked || !sk_X509_REVOKED_push(inf->revoked, rev)) {
- ASN1err(ASN1_F_X509_CRL_ADD0_REVOKED, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
+ X509_CRL_INFO *inf;
+ inf = crl->crl;
+ if (!inf->revoked)
+ inf->revoked = sk_X509_REVOKED_new(X509_REVOKED_cmp);
+ if (!inf->revoked || !sk_X509_REVOKED_push(inf->revoked, rev)) {
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_X509_CRL_ADD0_REVOKED, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ inf->enc.modified = 1;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int X509_CRL_verify(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *r)
+{
+ if (crl->meth->crl_verify)
+ return crl->meth->crl_verify(crl, r);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(X509_CRL *crl,
+ X509_REVOKED **ret, ASN1_INTEGER *serial)
+{
+ if (crl->meth->crl_lookup)
+ return crl->meth->crl_lookup(crl, ret, serial, NULL);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(X509_CRL *crl, X509_REVOKED **ret, X509 *x)
+{
+ if (crl->meth->crl_lookup)
+ return crl->meth->crl_lookup(crl, ret,
+ X509_get_serialNumber(x),
+ X509_get_issuer_name(x));
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int def_crl_verify(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *r)
+{
+ return (ASN1_item_verify(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CRL_INFO),
+ crl->sig_alg, crl->signature, crl->crl, r));
+}
+
+static int crl_revoked_issuer_match(X509_CRL *crl, X509_NAME *nm,
+ X509_REVOKED *rev)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (!rev->issuer) {
+ if (!nm)
+ return 1;
+ if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl)))
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!nm)
+ nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(rev->issuer); i++) {
+ GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(rev->issuer, i);
+ if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
+ continue;
+ if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gen->d.directoryName))
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+
+}
+
+static int def_crl_lookup(X509_CRL *crl,
+ X509_REVOKED **ret, ASN1_INTEGER *serial,
+ X509_NAME *issuer)
+{
+ X509_REVOKED rtmp, *rev;
+ int idx;
+ rtmp.serialNumber = serial;
+ /*
+ * Sort revoked into serial number order if not already sorted. Do this
+ * under a lock to avoid race condition.
+ */
+ if (!sk_X509_REVOKED_is_sorted(crl->crl->revoked)) {
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
+ sk_X509_REVOKED_sort(crl->crl->revoked);
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
+ }
+ idx = sk_X509_REVOKED_find(crl->crl->revoked, &rtmp);
+ if (idx < 0)
+ return 0;
+ /* Need to look for matching name */
+ for (; idx < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(crl->crl->revoked); idx++) {
+ rev = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(crl->crl->revoked, idx);
+ if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(rev->serialNumber, serial))
+ return 0;
+ if (crl_revoked_issuer_match(crl, issuer, rev)) {
+ if (ret)
+ *ret = rev;
+ if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
+ return 2;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void X509_CRL_set_default_method(const X509_CRL_METHOD *meth)
+{
+ if (meth == NULL)
+ default_crl_method = &int_crl_meth;
+ else
+ default_crl_method = meth;
+}
+
+X509_CRL_METHOD *X509_CRL_METHOD_new(int (*crl_init) (X509_CRL *crl),
+ int (*crl_free) (X509_CRL *crl),
+ int (*crl_lookup) (X509_CRL *crl,
+ X509_REVOKED **ret,
+ ASN1_INTEGER *ser,
+ X509_NAME *issuer),
+ int (*crl_verify) (X509_CRL *crl,
+ EVP_PKEY *pk))
+{
+ X509_CRL_METHOD *m;
+ m = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_CRL_METHOD));
+ if (!m)
+ return NULL;
+ m->crl_init = crl_init;
+ m->crl_free = crl_free;
+ m->crl_lookup = crl_lookup;
+ m->crl_verify = crl_verify;
+ m->flags = X509_CRL_METHOD_DYNAMIC;
+ return m;
+}
+
+void X509_CRL_METHOD_free(X509_CRL_METHOD *m)
+{
+ if (!(m->flags & X509_CRL_METHOD_DYNAMIC))
+ return;
+ OPENSSL_free(m);
+}
+
+void X509_CRL_set_meth_data(X509_CRL *crl, void *dat)
+{
+ crl->meth_data = dat;
+}
+
+void *X509_CRL_get_meth_data(X509_CRL *crl)
+{
+ return crl->meth_data;
}
-IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED)
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_REVOKED)
-IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_CRL)
+
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_CRL)
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff