ASN1_verify, ASN1_item_verify: cleanse and free buf_in on error path

[openssl.git] / crypto / asn1 / a_verify.c

diff --git a/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c b/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c
index 2a11927e5c1c2a68e415dbda002f711dde730c41..aacf4763b585c267dc5762f0c57742f3dba06eec 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c
@@ -70,15 +70,19 @@
 #include <openssl/objects.h>
 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include "asn1_locl.h"
 
-int ASN1_verify(int (*i2d)(), X509_ALGOR *a, ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature,
-            char *data, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+#ifndef NO_ASN1_OLD
+
+int ASN1_verify(i2d_of_void *i2d, X509_ALGOR *a, ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature,
+               char *data, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
        {
        EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
        const EVP_MD *type;
        unsigned char *p,*buf_in=NULL;
        int ret= -1,i,inl;
 
+       EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
        i=OBJ_obj2nid(a->algorithm);
        type=EVP_get_digestbyname(OBJ_nid2sn(i));
        if (type == NULL)
@@ -97,12 +101,21 @@ int ASN1_verify(int (*i2d)(), X509_ALGOR *a, ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature,
        p=buf_in;
 
        i2d(data,&p);
-       EVP_VerifyInit(&ctx,type);
-       EVP_VerifyUpdate(&ctx,(unsigned char *)buf_in,inl);
+       ret=
+               EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&ctx,type, NULL)
+               && EVP_VerifyUpdate(&ctx,(unsigned char *)buf_in,inl);
 
-       memset(buf_in,0,(unsigned int)inl);
+       OPENSSL_cleanse(buf_in,(unsigned int)inl);
        OPENSSL_free(buf_in);
 
+       if (!ret)
+               {
+               ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_VERIFY,ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+               goto err;
+               }
+       ret = -1;
+
+
        if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&ctx,(unsigned char *)signature->data,
                        (unsigned int)signature->length,pkey) <= 0)
                {
@@ -115,5 +128,113 @@ int ASN1_verify(int (*i2d)(), X509_ALGOR *a, ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature,
        /* memset(&ctx,0,sizeof(ctx)); */
        ret=1;
 err:
+       EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+       return(ret);
+       }
+
+#endif
+
+
+int ASN1_item_verify(const ASN1_ITEM *it, X509_ALGOR *a,
+               ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature, void *asn, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+       {
+       EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
+       unsigned char *buf_in=NULL;
+       int ret= -1,inl;
+
+       int mdnid, pknid;
+
+       if (!pkey)
+               {
+               ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+               return -1;
+               }
+
+       EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
+
+       /* Convert signature OID into digest and public key OIDs */
+       if (!OBJ_find_sigid_algs(OBJ_obj2nid(a->algorithm), &mdnid, &pknid))
+               {
+               ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
+               goto err;
+               }
+       if (mdnid == NID_undef)
+               {
+               if (!pkey->ameth || !pkey->ameth->item_verify)
+                       {
+                       ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
+                       goto err;
+                       }
+               ret = pkey->ameth->item_verify(&ctx, it, asn, a,
+                                                       signature, pkey);
+               /* Return value of 2 means carry on, anything else means we
+                * exit straight away: either a fatal error of the underlying
+                * verification routine handles all verification.
+                */
+               if (ret != 2)
+                       goto err;
+               ret = -1;
+               }
+       else
+               {
+               const EVP_MD *type;
+               type=EVP_get_digestbynid(mdnid);
+               if (type == NULL)
+                       {
+                       ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM);
+                       goto err;
+                       }
+
+               /* Check public key OID matches public key type */
+               if (EVP_PKEY_type(pknid) != pkey->ameth->pkey_id)
+                       {
+                       ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ASN1_R_WRONG_PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE);
+                       goto err;
+                       }
+
+               if (!EVP_DigestVerifyInit(&ctx, NULL, type, NULL, pkey))
+                       {
+                       ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+                       ret=0;
+                       goto err;
+                       }
+
+               }
+
+       inl = ASN1_item_i2d(asn, &buf_in, it);
+       
+       if (buf_in == NULL)
+               {
+               ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+               goto err;
+               }
+
+       ret = EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(&ctx,buf_in,inl);
+
+       OPENSSL_cleanse(buf_in,(unsigned int)inl);
+       OPENSSL_free(buf_in);
+
+       if (!ret)
+               {
+               ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+               goto err;
+               }
+       ret = -1;
+
+       if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(&ctx,signature->data,
+                       (size_t)signature->length) <= 0)
+               {
+               ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+               ret=0;
+               goto err;
+               }
+       /* we don't need to zero the 'ctx' because we just checked
+        * public information */
+       /* memset(&ctx,0,sizeof(ctx)); */
+       ret=1;
+err:
+       EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
        return(ret);
        }
+
+